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The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are commonly characterised as an age of 
‘neoliberalism’ in which individualism, competition, free markets and privatisation came to 
dominate Britain’s politics, economy and society. This historical framing has proven highly 
controversial, within both academia and contemporary political and public debate.
Standard accounts of neoliberalism generally focus on the influence of political ideas in 
reshaping British politics; according to this narrative, neoliberalism was a right-wing ideology, 
peddled by political economists, think-tanks and politicians from the 1930s onwards, which 
finally triumphed in the 1970s and 1980s. The Neoliberal Age? suggests this narrative is too 
simplistic.
Where the standard story sees neoliberalism as right-wing, this book points to some left-wing 
origins, too; where the standard story emphasises the agency of think-tanks and politicians, 
this book shows that other actors from the business world were also highly significant. Where 
the standard story can suggest that neoliberalism transformed subjectivities and social lives, 
this book illuminates other forces which helped make Britain more individualistic in the late 
twentieth century.
The analysis thus takes neoliberalism seriously but also shows that it cannot be the only 
explanatory framework for understanding contemporary Britain. The book showcases cutting-
edge research, making it useful to researchers and students, as well as to those interested in 
understanding the forces that have shaped our recent past.
Aled Davies is Career Development Fellow in Modern History at Jesus College, Oxford 
University.
Ben Jackson is Associate Professor of Modern History at Oxford University.
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Introduction: a neoliberal age?
Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite,  
Aled Davies and Ben Jackson
Britain’s recent past is frequently characterised – in both public and 
academic debates – as an era of ‘neoliberalism’. This descriptor is often 
associated with a wider global transformation in politics, economics and 
everyday life that is said to have taken hold from the 1970s onwards. In 
the British case (but also in the wider global story) it is most commonly 
argued that neoliberalism originated as a right-wing ideology in favour of 
free markets and against the welfare state, an ideology that was peddled 
by political economists, think tanks and politicians from the 1930s 
onwards, and that finally transformed Britain (and the world) in the 
1970s and 1980s. Neoliberalism has supposedly remained dominant 
until the present, although the financial crisis in 2008, and the rise of 
nationalist ‘populism’ in the 2010s, are now sometimes identified as 
possible endpoints of the neoliberal age (the jury remains out on this 
periodisation).1 This book subjects this commonplace understanding of 
recent British history to a more sustained and in-depth analysis, 
suggesting that the standard account oversimplifies in several regards, 
and identifying other metanarratives we must attend to in order to 
understand Britain in this period.
The introduction to this book falls into five parts. The first of these 
examines the different conceptual approaches to the category of 
‘neoliberalism’ that are prevalent within the social sciences and history. The 
second part focuses on how neoliberalism has come to form the central 
descriptive and explanatory category for understanding the late twentieth 
century in many survey histories of modern Britain and highlights some of 
the key critiques of this framing. In the final three sections, we then explore 
how neoliberalism fits within three major strands of the historiography of 
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contemporary Britain: political and intellectual history, social and cultural 
history, and economic history. These different fields, of course, overlap, but 
separating them out does, nonetheless, form a useful heuristic device. 
While there are some important subjects that we have (inevitably) 
neglected – such as a four nations perspective (though Jim Phillips 
considers the different political and cultural trajectory of Scotland in the 
period), national identity, European integration, democracy and law and 
order – the chapters gathered here offer a broad perspective on some of the 
areas and debates currently animating most historical work, and together 
they add up to more than the sum of their parts. The final three sections of 
this introduction draw together recent historiography and the arguments 
made in this volume, offering some initial answers to the central questions 
of the book: how useful is the category ‘neoliberalism’ to understanding 
Britain since c. 1970? And what alternative causes and categories 
must we look at if we want to understand the period since the 1970s 
more fully?
Approaches to neoliberalism
The adoption of ‘neoliberalism’ by historians in recent years reflects its 
development, since the late twentieth century, as a key critical concept 
within the social sciences. As in contemporary political discourse, 
the term has generated a great deal of debate and discussion over its 
meaning and validity. Fortunately, this has been a highly productive and 
sophisticated interdisciplinary examination of the concept that is in stark 
contrast with the simplistic disagreement that often characterises public 
and political debate over the term.2 As Angus Burgin has argued, one 
important benefit of the concept of neoliberalism is that it has facilitated 
a constructive dialogue between historians and social scientists after a 
period in which the methodological gap between the two had been 
widening.3 Analysts of neoliberalism in different disciplines have shared 
three fundamental questions: what is neoliberalism (a body of ideas; a 
political project; a governmentality; a form of capitalism); how coherent 
is/was neoliberalism; and what are/were its causes? In attempting to 
answer these questions anthropologists, geographers, historians, political 
economists, sociologists and others have come to recognise the value 
of neoliberalism as an analytical concept, while also revealing its 
complexities, inconsistencies and contradictions. It is evident that diverse 
disciplinary epistemologies and approaches have produced distinctly 
different answers to the questions of coherence and causation. At the risk 
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of oversimplification, it is possible to distil this literature into three strands 
focused on the ideological and political, economic, and social and cultural 
aspects of neoliberalism.4
neoliberalism as political ideology
Intellectual historians and political theorists have focused on the 
development of neoliberalism as an ideological movement – identifying its 
origins and then tracing the transfer of its ideas into politics and public 
policy throughout the second half of the twentieth century. The most 
significant contribution of this now extensive literature has been to identify 
both diversity and coherence within neoliberal thought. Neoliberalism 
is recognised as a response to the global crisis of liberalism in the 1930s. 
This led to the formation of a ‘neoliberal thought collective’, which was 
formalised at the first meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) in 1947. 
Neoliberals believed that economic planning threatened to destroy the 
only means by which individual liberty could be secured: free and 
competitive markets. The novelty of the neoliberal response was that 
rather than arguing for a return to the limited ‘night-watchman’ state of 
laissez-faire liberalism, neoliberals believed that the state should be 
repurposed and redeployed to create and uphold markets and competition. 
The neoliberal movement was anchored in this fundamental insight, but 
its participants developed a diverse range of approaches and priorities in 
pursuit of the restoration of individual freedom and the market order. 
Scholars now usually divide ‘neoliberal’ thought into at least three schools: 
the German ordo-liberals, the Austrian School associated with Friedrich 
Hayek and the Chicago School associated with Milton Friedman.5
Beyond a pure history of ideas, scholars of neoliberalism have focused 
on how neoliberal thought came to impact upon politics and policymaking 
around the world. A crude summary of this literature (examined in greater 
depth by Ben Jackson in this volume) is that these ideas were promoted by 
the effectively organised and well-funded transnational neoliberal 
movement and were then adopted by sympathetic politicians and translated 
into national policymaking environments as the economic turbulence of 
the 1970s delegitimised the more social democratic policy norms adopted 
in the 1930s and 1940s.6 The United Kingdom and the United States were 
at the forefront of this ideological triumph. It is also argued that neoliberal 
ideas colonised key sites of social scientific authority and expertise, notably 
the discipline of economics, and the international economic and financial 
institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).7 
As Will Davies has argued, the cumulative effect of this change in economic 
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expertise was to generate a powerful legitimising language for states, one 
which presented neoliberal policy objectives as attractive instantiations of 
a competitive political and economic order. Inequality was a necessary 
corollary of this competition.8
The strand of scholarship on neoliberalism that focuses on ideology 
and activism therefore draws attention to the role of political agency in 
the economic and social transformations of the last 50 years or so. This is 
a literature that identifies specific historical actors with a consequential 
role in public debate and state decision-making, an emphasis that is 
congruent with historians’ traditional interest in the contingent character 
of the juncture points that shape historical outcomes. However, it is also 
an approach that tends to focus on elites at the expense of both grassroots 
mobilisations and seemingly less ‘political’ social changes that can, in 
fact, have quite significant political implications. In emphasising transfor- 
mations in political ideology, this approach can also draw attention away 
from long- and short-term economic changes.
neoliberalism as a form of capitalism
As might be expected, the importance of ideas is relegated to secondary 
status in Marxist analyses of neoliberalism. Instead, the emphasis is 
placed on the collapse of class compromise in the 1960s, which generated 
a ‘crisis of capitalist accumulation’ and compelled the capitalist class to 
construct a new, flexible ‘regime of accumulation’. According to David 
Harvey, and Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, the chief proponents 
of this interpretation, neoliberal ideas were simply the ‘vehicle for 
the restoration of class power’ in the 1970s and beyond.9 These ideas 
promoted reforms to the management of capitalism that enabled its 
globalisation and ‘financialisation’ in pursuit of the restoration of 
profitability.10 Other scholars whose work is informed by Marxism, such 
as Andrew Glyn, follow a similar line of argument without using the term 
‘neoliberalism’. Like Harvey et al., Glyn suggests that a crisis of profitability 
in the late 1960s and 1970s was the key cause of the shifts in political 
economy seen in the late twentieth century.11 This crisis of profitability 
interacted with existing dynamics in economic development – particularly 
globalisation, deindustrialisation and the growth of the financial sector – 
to create the political economy of the late twentieth century.
Aside from Marxist-inspired accounts, there are alternative 
explanations of neoliberalism that emphasise the importance of economic 
factors. One such interpretation holds that neoliberal policies were the 
product of the globalisation of capitalism that took off in the 1960s in the 
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form of multinational business and the liberation of financial markets from 
national control. This transferred power to globalised capital, which offered 
the rewards of inward investment to countries that pursued ‘responsible’ 
policies of low taxation, balanced budgets, inflation control and limited 
regulation of private markets.12  While this analysis de-emphasises ideology, 
other scholars, by contrast, have integrated economic with ideological 
explanations. Mark Blyth, for example, has argued that the ‘stagflation’ 
crisis of the 1970s generated a political-economic problem that neoliberal 
ideas were able to define and subsequently provide a coherent solution to 
(for example, replacing Keynesianism with monetarism as the dominant 
macroeconomic policymaking framework).13 This interpretation thus 
synthesises an economic perspective with the ideological one discussed in 
the previous section.14
In each of these accounts, neoliberalism is interpreted as a response 
to, or even a function of, the changing material conditions of capitalism in 
the late twentieth century. Such economic accounts in effect provide a 
structural history of this period, placing causal weight on large-scale 
material changes in the nature of production, an approach familiar to those 
economic and social historians who have long advocated the benefits of a 
Marxist or structural economic perspective. Of course, the disadvantages 
of such a perspective are also familiar to historians: the grand scale of this 
analysis can downplay the importance of social and cultural change and the 
role of politics in mediating between broad economic trends and the 
everyday lived experience of citizens in different states.
neoliberal governmentality
The third main approach to the study of neoliberalism is inspired by 
Michel Foucault’s lectures on the topic in the late 1970s, first published in 
English in 2008, and by his concept of ‘governmentality’.15 According to 
this view, neoliberalism should be understood as a ‘rationality’ in which 
‘generalised competition’ has become a societal norm, and in which 
individual subjectivity has been reformed according to the ideal of 
entrepreneurialism.16 As the anthropologist Carla Freeman puts it:
. . . neoliberal flexibility is not reducible to the restructuring of 
labour processes or the free-floating circulation of capital to 
rationalize and expand the parameters of the global assembly line, 
but has reached into the recesses of kinship, citizenship, mind and 
body such that feeling and subjectivity itself is being constituted, 
managed, and experienced in new ways.17
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This remaking of society has not been achieved simply as a top-down, 
state-led project but has been produced by power dispersed across 
multiple sites of knowledge, and in a variety of agencies.18 This has served 
to guide and mould ‘the ways in which people conduct themselves’.19
This analysis has tended to reject the notion of a coherent 
‘Neoliberalism with a big “N”’, but instead to see it as an ‘abstract, mobile, 
and dynamic’ logic that is assembled in varied forms according to different 
contexts.20 Neoliberalism can be perceived in the cultural logics governing 
not only politics and policy, but also identities, subjectivities and everyday 
life.21 Unlike the ideological and economic accounts, this view of 
neoliberalism as a logic or effect that saturates modern society offers 
more of a map or a description of deep-rooted cultural change than an 
explicit account of causation, but it follows methods similar to those 
employed by social and cultural historians who have also been influenced 
by Foucault. Unlike the ideological and economic approaches discussed 
earlier, the governmentality literature provides a lens through which to 
interrogate neoliberalism as a phenomenon that reshapes everyday life, 
and not just large-scale economic change or elite decision-making. Hence 
scholars taking this approach have examined how processes of 
financialisation have transformed individuals’ relationship to money, 
debt and saving;22 how individuals have been encouraged to be ‘entre- 
preneurs of the self’;23 and how neoliberalism has transformed democracy 
and models of citizenship in an individualistic direction.24
*
The aim of this book is not only to contribute to the historiography of 
modern Britain, but also to respond to this broader interdisciplinary, 
international literature on neoliberalism.25 The following pages focus on 
the application of these different approaches to one detailed national case 
study. It is an exercise that helps to reveal both the analytical strengths of 
this vast body of work on neoliberalism, and the tensions within it. 
Furthermore, the chapters presented in this book encourage us to place 
the question of neoliberalism in a wider perspective, and in doing so they 
raise the question of whether to depart altogether from a framework that 
prioritises neoliberalism as the central historical development of this 
period.26 The remainder of this introduction sets the scene for the 
subsequent chapters by investigating how the approaches to the study of 
neoliberalism outlined above speak (or at times do not speak) to the 
existing historiography of contemporary Britain and the chapters 
collected in this volume.
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The dominance of the political in narratives  
of twentieth-century Britain
Synthetic, narrative works about Britain in the twentieth century 
generally reflect the standard story of neoliberalism set out at the start of 
this introduction. Most survey histories divide the post-war period into 
three phases: first, the triumph of ‘social democracy’ in the post-war 
settlement; second, a period of political and economic crisis during the 
1970s; and, finally, the triumph of ‘neoliberalism’. This is the case even in 
revisionist histories; for example, Selina Todd’s analysis of working-class 
life and politics in the period 1910–2010 challenges many of the common 
assumptions of political and social history, but nevertheless conforms to 
an historical arc which has 1976 (the IMF loan to Britain) and 1979 (the 
election of Margaret Thatcher) as its key turning points, ushering in 
‘neoliberal times’.27 James Vernon’s 2017 textbook, Modern Britain: 1750 
to the present, also identifies 1976 as a turning point, and the final section 
of the book is entitled ‘The neoliberal revolution and the making of Homo 
Economicus’. Vernon argues that the neoliberal revolution ‘largely 
dismantled’ the institutions of social democracy, replaced its governing 
logic with a new one (‘to allow markets to transform government as well 
as economic and social life’) and ultimately ‘created a new type of person 
– homo economicus – who understood themselves and the world in purely 
economistic terms’. The examples he draws on to demonstrate this are 
phenomena such as jogging and self-improvement culture.28
Popular histories of post-war Britain, including those of Dominic 
Sandbrook, Andy Beckett and Andy McSmith, follow this pattern even 
more strongly; there is little sense that these authors have any overarching 
interpretative framework outside the political.29 In Andy Beckett’s 
Promised You a Miracle, it is presented as obvious that the main question 
one might ask of the oeuvre of the pop band ABC is the extent to which it 
was ‘Thatcherite’.30 More than perhaps any other period, post-war British 
history is dominated by a periodisation and narrative structure taken 
from political history. This is a structure that derives directly from political 
accounts that were generated contemporaneously – in particular, by the 
Conservative Party. In the period after Clement Attlee’s shock victory in 
the 1945 general election, the Conservative Party made a concerted effort 
to construct a public image of itself as a party that had changed: a party 
which had taken defeat as a wake-up call and accepted the core goals and 
institutions set up by the Labour government. This was something of a 
fiction – in fact, before the election of 1945 many in the Conservative 
Party were already sympathetic to much of this policy platform. But it was 
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the narrative that was important.31 Then, in the 1970s, in order to justify 
their own political project, Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher constructed 
a narrative of a ‘progressive consensus’ in British politics, allegedly 
encompassing the mainstream of both the Labour and Tory parties. 
Thatcher claimed in 1975 that the consensus consisted in ‘the doctrine 
that the state should be active on many fronts: in promoting equality, in 
the provision of social welfare, and in the redistribution of wealth 
and incomes’, and that ‘these views have been held in varying degrees by 
all political parties, in schools and universities, and among social 
commentators generally’, but that they were ‘now being questioned right 
across the same broad spectrum’.32 Thatcher and her allies argued that 
they were smashing that consensus and introducing a real alternative into 
British politics, one which could reverse the ‘decline’ Britain had 
supposedly been experiencing for the previous 30 years. It was the 
Conservatives who constructed the broad outline of a narrative of ‘social-
democratic consensus’, ‘decline’ and ‘neoliberal revolution’ (although the 
‘social-democratic’ and ‘neoliberal’ descriptors have been more recent 
additions). That fact should inevitably lead historians to question 
its utility as an interpretative framework. The concept of ‘consensus’ 
has been widely critiqued since at least Harriet Jones and Michael 
Kandiah’s 1996 book The Myth of Consensus.33 The idea of ‘decline’ has 
been problematised by Jim Tomlinson, who argues we should think of 
‘declinism’ not ‘decline’.34 The category of ‘neoliberalism’ is now also 
coming under scrutiny.
Beyond this, the narrative of a transition from social democracy to 
neoliberalism, or from consensus to Thatcherism, has a number of 
additional weaknesses. Firstly, as David Edgerton argues in this volume, 
and in his recent book The Rise and Fall of the British Nation, the 
characterisation of Britain from c. 1945–75 as ‘social democratic’ implies 
that the most salient features of the political economy of this period were 
Keynesianism and the welfare state; as Edgerton argues, this character- 
isation misses out key features of the British economic model, in particular 
the uniquely ‘national’ character of the economy in this period, and its 
resurgent globalisation in the period after c. 1970.35 Secondly, the use of 
the term ‘neoliberal’ to describe contemporary Britain produces a 
confusion between description and causal analysis. To describe the period 
as ‘neoliberal’ produces a tendency to view the transformations seen in 
the period as the result of ‘neoliberal’ ideology and ideologues: the 
description presupposes causation. And thirdly, using ‘neoliberalism’ as 
the dominant grand narrative to describe the period means we tend to 
read all social and cultural change as the result of the discursive, political 
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and economic changes associated with ‘neoliberalism’. In fact, we must 
attend to other social, cultural, economic and technological dynamics at 
work to properly understand the period. Doing so will enable us to 
appreciate longer-term processes and lessen our reliance on the 1970s as 
a turning point or moment of disjuncture. As recent work has begun to 
talk of the ‘mid-twentieth century’ as a coherent period for some purposes, 
questioning the view of the Second World War as transformative, so we 
should do the same for the 1970s.36
Though the political has dominated synthetic narratives of twentieth-
century British history, historians have offered important new readings of 
the nature and periodisation of Britain after 1945: as noted, Edgerton 
suggests the alternative categories of national and global to characterise 
the economy, and Tomlinson posits deindustrialisation as a metanarrative 
for Britain after c. 1955.37 Meanwhile Jon Lawrence and Emily Robinson 
et al. have suggested that the rise of ‘popular individualism’ from the 
1950s onwards was a motor of change in Britain’s politics as well as its 
social norms.38 Building on such work, this volume offers a more complex 
and nuanced account of the causes and character of the period since 
c. 1970. Detailed, empirical case studies explore the utility of the category 
of ‘neoliberalism’ in intellectual, political, economic, social and cultural 
histories of Britain, and in doing so they open up the possibility of 
integrating these often disconnected areas. The volume thus offers a more 
grounded account of the human agents and the structural forces at work 
in bringing about the transformation of Britain. It presents alternative 
accounts of causation, as well as a more variegated characterisation of 
Britain in this period.
Intellectual and political history
Intellectual historians have been quickest to take up the task of analysing 
neoliberalism, and there is a well-developed literature in this field, which 
is surveyed by Ben Jackson in this volume. As we have seen, intellectual 
historians have examined the political economists and other thinkers 
grouped under the label ‘neoliberal’, unpicking intellectual lineages 
but also emphasising the diversity, and at times the contradictions, in 
neoliberal discourse.39 Where some have suggested that ‘neoliberal’ is too 
fuzzy a term to be useful, Philip Mirowski has argued that it makes sense 
to use the term ‘neoliberal thought collective’ to describe the transnational 
network of thinkers gathered by the Mont Pèlerin Society and associated 
think tanks. As with Mirowski’s work, many intellectual histories take a 
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transnational approach, reflecting the fact that neoliberal thinking 
crossed national boundaries from its earliest days. This transnationalism 
has been especially valuable in helping historians to avoid taking too 
parochial a view of Britain’s post-war history.
Building on the work of intellectual historians, many scholars have, 
in recent years, complicated our accounts of the impact of neoliberal 
thought on British politics, starting with the Thatcher years. Some of the 
foundational and most influential scholarly treatments of Thatcherism 
distinguished the Thatcher government from earlier periods of British 
political history precisely because of its unusually ideological character. 
This is most notable in the classic work of Stuart Hall and Andrew Gamble. 
While they did not, in fact, use the specific term ‘neoliberalism’ in their 
writings of the 1980s and 1990s, they deployed cognate ideas such as ‘the 
New Right’ or ‘monetarist philosophy’ to characterise the ideological 
objectives of the Thatcherite elements of the Conservative Party.40 Recent 
histories of specific policy areas have bolstered and deepened, but also in 
certain respects problematised, this analysis by offering more nuanced 
treatments of the precise nature of the neoliberalism which influenced 
Thatcherism in practice. Hugh Pemberton, Aled Davies and James 
Freeman’s examination of pensions policy suggests that it was, in fact, 
ordo-liberal logic which was most evident in the Thatcherite pensions 
reforms.41 Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite and Matthew Grimley have 
focused on the personal beliefs inculcated by Thatcher’s Methodist, small-
town, lower-middle-class upbringing, stressing the interplay of these 
ideas with neoliberal ones in the shaping of ‘Thatcherism’.42 Adrian 
Williamson has examined a range of economic policy areas to show that, 
in many spheres, there was little new about Thatcherism and much 
continuity with the thinking of the Conservative Party over the previous 
15 years.43 David Rooney has shown that the Thatcher governments took 
an interest in the neoliberal idea of using urban road pricing as a way to 
tackle congestion but ultimately discarded the idea because of their 
ideological commitment to low taxation and individual freedom, and the 
car-owning nature of their voter base.44
A bracing strand of scepticism about the ideological character of 
Thatcherism has also been introduced to this debate in the work of 
Richard Vinen, who has argued that the interpretation pioneered by 
Gamble and Hall places too much emphasis on the self-promoting 
writings of journalists and think-tank personnel rather than focusing on 
the decision-making of leading Cabinet ministers and the civil service.45 
Vinen’s point is well taken and it is certainly fair to conclude that 
Thatcherism was about more than just neoliberalism, and that it was not 
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always in tune with every brand of ‘neoliberal’ ideas. Nonetheless, as Ben 
Jackson points out in his chapter, these debates would benefit from a 
greater level of precision about how ideology and public policy interact 
with each other. Jackson demonstrates that it is important to distinguish 
between a variety of ways in which neoliberal ideas influenced politics 
in this period, ranging from the provision of new technical concepts for 
policymakers, to the promotion of particular partisan public inter- 
pretations of events, and to the development of specific policy ideas that 
were taken up by government. Jackson argues that along each of these 
dimensions a clear, though delimited case for the ideological influence of 
neoliberalism can be made, but that it should be combined with an 
acknowledgement of the importance of other intellectual influences, and 
of the role of economic and social change in setting broad constraints on 
the path of public policy. In his chapter in this volume, James Freeman 
traces how neoliberal ideas were picked up by Conservatives in the 1970s 
and 1980s as a toolkit for finding new ways to achieve old goals, and to 
revive a flagging party.46 However, he argues, historians might do well to 
move away from a preoccupation with the ‘influence’ of neoliberal ideas 
on policy under Thatcher and turn instead to an exploration of the 
historically specific points at which Conservatism and neoliberalism 
interfaced with one another, considering, for example, how separate 
developments within the Conservative and neoliberal traditions increased 
the potential compatibility of the two, and how Conservatives selectively 
read and appropriated neoliberal ideas to solve particular political 
problems that the party was confronting.
In analyses of the success and failure of ‘Thatcherism’, many have 
emphasised the fact that, for all that her governments transformed 
Britain, Thatcher’s ‘revolution’ was far from complete. As early as 1989, 
Ivor Crewe wrote of Thatcher’s attempts to change British values as ‘the 
crusade that failed’.47 Though she did succeed in changing the balance of 
spending on different elements of the welfare state, Thatcher did not 
permanently shrink overall government spending as a proportion of 
GDP.48 As Stephen Brooke has suggested, we can see ‘the stubborn 
persistence of social democracy in the attempt, for example, to construct 
a different world of social democracy at the local level’ in the 1980s, as 
well as in support for the National Health Service (NHS) and the revolt 
against the Poll Tax.49 This work cumulatively contributes to a view of 
Thatcherism not as the inevitable solution to a pervasive crisis of the 
1970s, or the outcome of decades of development of ‘neoliberal’ political 
economy promoted by a core of right-wing ideologues,50 but as a complex, 
messy amalgam of older right-wing tenets with newer neoliberal ideas, 
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which had some successes, but which was far from completely ‘triumphant’ 
in the 1980s.51
At a dinner in 2002, Thatcher was asked what she saw as her greatest 
achievement; she replied, ‘Tony Blair and New Labour. We forced our 
opponents to change their minds.’52 Debate has raged over the extent to 
which New Labour can be seen as ‘neoliberal’ or Thatcherite, as a renewed 
form of social democracy or as a genuine ‘Third Way’.53 Indeed, it seems 
likely that the very prominence of the concept of ‘neoliberalism’ from the 
late 1990s onwards in part reflected a need to explain why ‘free market’ 
principles and policies continued to exercise considerable political 
influence even as the parties that were their initial sponsors, such as the 
British Conservatives and the Republicans in the US, were ejected from 
office by a new generation of centre-left governments. The persistence of 
an underlying neoliberal ideology and/or policy regime irrespective 
of which party was in government offered one influential interpretation of 
the politics of the 1990s and 2000s.54 In this volume, Mark Wickham-Jones 
re-evaluates the debates over this question at the time and uses party 
documents and first-person accounts of the period when Labour was 
preparing for power in 1996–7 in order to assess to what extent the 
term ‘neoliberal’ is useful here. He points out that the Labour Party 
has traditionally had a fairly accommodationist attitude towards the 
market economy; this attitude long pre-dated the rise of neoliberalism. 
Furthermore, Wickham-Jones argues that although New Labour’s rhetoric 
shifted towards a more market-based approach, its policy record was more 
nuanced and harder to stereotype as ideologically on the right.
Several other chapters also examine the continuities and dis- 
continuities between neoliberal thought, Thatcherism and New Labour in 
particular policy areas. Peter Sloman examines the expansion of transfer 
payments (such as housing benefit and tax credits) in the 1970s and 
1980s, suggesting that these represent not a failure of neoliberalism, but 
rather the triumph of an ideology of ‘redistributive market liberalism’. He 
argues that some neoliberals always suggested that cash transfers to the 
poor were the best way to enable everyone to participate in markets to 
meet all their needs, and that Thatcher recognised that transfers were 
politically necessary to defuse potential tensions as she rolled back 
collective welfare provision and restructured labour markets. New Labour 
was subsequently reconciled to the practicality of using fiscal transfers to 
tackle poverty in the context of a growing economy and rising inequality. 
Sloman thus suggests that a particular strand of neoliberal thinking did 
come to dominate in this policy area. By contrast, in his examination of 
unemployment policy, Bernhard Rieger argues that both Thatcherite and 
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New Labour policies on unemployment were influenced by a neoliberal 
desire to impose economic incentives on the unemployed, but that both 
were also profoundly influenced by much longer-standing moralising 
traditions on both sides of the political divide.
In their respective chapters on work and housing in this period, Jim 
Phillips and Guy Ortolano suggest that neoliberalism was far from a 
dominant force. Ortolano examines housing in post-war Britain through 
the lens of Milton Keynes’s development corporation. He argues that 
while the development corporation held to a vision of a ‘property-owning 
social democracy’, encompassing both public and private housing, in 
practice its ability to deliver this was challenged by economic and political 
pressures from 1976 onwards, and increasingly stymied by the cuts and 
policy changes of the Thatcher government. Phillips examines the 
complex forces shaping experiences of work in Britain. He argues that 
while deindustrialisation was already transforming the British labour 
force before the 1980s, it was accelerated by deliberate actions taken by 
the Thatcher governments, which also intervened to obscure the ‘real’ 
level of unemployment. Under New Labour, government policy continued 
to structure experiences of work in significant ways, not all of which have 
roots in neoliberal ways of thinking about the economy. In particular, the 
advent of the minimum wage was an important moment of pushback 
against the neoliberal focus on the free market. Finally, Camilla Schofield, 
Rob Waters and Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, in their examination of 
New Labour policy on race and racism, trace some continuities with 
Thatcherism, and some congruities with neoliberal logic, but also point 
to significant continuities between New Labour and the radical 
New Urban Left of the 1980s. While the period of ‘modernisation’ from 
c. 1983–97 does appear as an important moment of inflection, then, there 
were still continuities on the left across this period. At most, New Labour 
can be characterised as in part shaped by neoliberalism.
Further complicating the picture, historians have begun to trace the 
pre-history of ‘neoliberal’ ideas (or at least ideas which came to be seen as 
‘neoliberal’) such as individual freedom, choice and the market on the left 
of British politics before 1979, disrupting the idea that the neoliberal 
revolution was engineered solely from the right. Ben Jackson has traced 
‘neoliberal’ ideas within the Liberal Party and even the Labour Party 
before Thatcher’s election as Prime Minister. As he points out, in 1976, 
Jim Callaghan famously told the Labour Party conference that Britain 
could no longer ‘spend [its] way out of a recession’.55 But the left had been 
generating some rather ‘neoliberal’ ideas even before this conversion to a 
monetarist analysis of government spending. As Jackson shows, Peter Jay, 
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thought to have written the key passage of Callaghan’s 1976 speech, 
developed a form of ‘market socialism’ in the 1970s which was monetarist, 
anti-corporatist and anti-trade union monopoly, but still committed to 
democratic and egalitarian outcomes.56
Other scholars have traced a line of influence from the broader new 
left politics of the 1960s and 1970s into the neoliberal revolution of the 
1980s. The politics of the new social movements and ‘expressive revolution’ 
of the 1960s and 1970s helped to undermine the structures and institutions 
of the welfare state by elaborating critiques of the paternalism, patriarchy, 
racism, sexism and ableism which were found in those institutions. 
Feminist, anti-racist and disabled activists critiqued social security rules, 
racism and sexism in schools, the disempowering of disabled people and a 
host of other forms of oppression and discrimination.57 Community activists 
critiqued the centralised, bureaucratic social democratic state and argued 
for devolved services shaped by, and run by and for, local people.58 Some of 
the architects and planners most associated with modernist attempts to 
engineer new urban environments in the 1950s and 1960s came to critique 
those grand plans by the early 1970s and helped unpick this modernist 
planning project alongside right-wing neoliberals;59 the conceptualisation 
of ‘multiple deprivation’ and the focus on deprived ‘inner-city’ areas that 
flowed from it in the 1970s fractured the universal principle of the welfare 
state, making inner-city areas compete with each other to evidence the 
highest levels of deprivation;60 and it was new left thinkers who first 
developed the idea of doing away with urban planning, an idea which 
subsequently migrated onto the right and found form in the shape of the 
Enterprise Zones that transformed some British cities in the 1980s.61 
Champions of worker participation and control in industry, who came from 
both left and right, critiqued the corporatist settlement of the post-war 
years. As Alistair Reid has written, the ‘social-democratic state . . . was 
being torn apart from within by its own beneficiaries, something which the 
old left . . . could not really understand’.62
These accounts suggest a more complex and contingent view of the 
transformations of the 1970s and 1980s: Thatcher was just one outcome, 
and there were other ‘roads not taken’; New Labour operated in a post-
Thatcherite landscape, but it was not simply a vehicle for neoliberal ideas. 
But these accounts also push us towards another (apparently somewhat 
contradictory) conclusion: Thatcherism might have been the outcome of 
some very contingent and unstable developments, but some moves in the 
direction of ‘neoliberal’ ideas were probably on the cards even if Callaghan 
had gone to the country and won in late 1978, before the Winter of 
Discontent, or if Thatcher had been toppled in the early 1980s at a 
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moment when she was weak and precarious. Certain ideas we now see as 
part of ‘neoliberal’ Britain were being incubated on the left as well as on 
the right of politics before 1979. That view is bolstered further when we 
make international comparisons; shifts that can be characterised broadly 
as ‘neoliberal’ were seen in much of the West during this period, under 
Reagan in the US but also under governments of the left in Australia, New 
Zealand and Spain, and even under François Mitterrand in France with 
the ‘austerity turn’ in 1983.63
Economic history
Historians of Britain’s political economy have tended to push back against 
ideas-centric accounts of the transition to neoliberalism and to argue that 
material forces and structural transformations have been central to the 
remaking of Britain in the final third of the twentieth century. They have 
not, however, produced narrowly determinist accounts, but have instead 
sought to emphasise how politics has interacted with specific domestic 
and international economic conditions.
The most well-developed ‘economic’ aspect of the historiography 
concerns the crisis of economic management in Britain during the 1970s. 
In particular, the concurrent rise in unemployment and inflation in the 
mid-1970s challenged the established methods of ‘managing the 
economy’ as they had been developed since the war: fine-tuning a balance 
between full employment and minimal inflation.64 The politics of incomes 
policies – working through trade unions and employers in an attempt to 
limit wage growth to control inflation – overwhelmed the Heath 
government in 1973–4 and undermined the Callaghan government in 
1978–9.65 Furthermore, the inflation problem combined with a deficit in 
the nation’s current account and a substantial growth in public borrowing 
to trigger a collapse in the value of sterling in 1976. All three of these 
macroeconomic indicators had been severely affected by the global spike 
in the price of oil engineered by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) in 1973–4. The resulting cuts to public expenditure by 
the Labour government were the price to pay for accessing IMF credit.66 
This crisis is commonly thought to signal the end of the post-war 
Keynesian-corporatist settlement. Jim Tomlinson has argued that this 
proclaimed death of Keynesianism, and its replacement with ‘monetarism’, 
is inaccurate and simplistic;67 and, in his contribution to this book, Neil 
Rollings shows how, despite the common view that Thatcher rejected the 
accommodationist, consensual tendencies of the Confederation of British 
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Industry (CBI), her government maintained a close relationship with the 
organisation throughout the 1980s as a means of keeping pay levels 
under control without having to resort to formal incomes policies. 
Nevertheless, this story of corporatist Keynesianism’s crisis and 
abandonment in the 1970s remains fairly well entrenched.
There is much work left to be done on the exact nature of the 
economic policymaking revolution in the 1970s and 1980s.68 However, 
recent historical work has also sought to understand the rise of neoliberalism 
as the product of deeper and wider structural conditions. As Aled Davies 
argues, at least part of the neoliberal turn in economic government (e.g. 
reducing taxes on wealth and high incomes; de/re-regulating markets; 
reducing the power of trade unions; and prioritising the control of inflation 
over employment) can be understood as a capitalist revolt against state 
intervention in the economy that was triggered by a steep decline in profits 
in the middle of the decade.69 This analysis draws on earlier work by 
Andrew Glyn, as well as Adam Przeworski’s assessment of the power 
relations upon which post-war social democracy was based.70 This rather 
blunt materialist explanation should not be taken too far, but it is an 
important reminder that even if we reject the simple idea that the dynamics 
of capitalism autonomously determine politics, society and culture, those 
dynamics cannot be ignored. The work of Jackson and Rollings on the 
relationship between British business groups and neoliberal ideas, Davies 
on the influence of monetarist economics in the City’s financial markets, 
and Jacob Ward on the pressure financial institutions in the City of London 
exerted in order to bring about the privatisation of BT offers a significant 
avenue for future exploration of the relationship between the material and 
the ideological components of this period.71 Emma Barrett’s study of elite 
stockbrokers Cazenove and Co. demonstrates further complexities in the 
relation between politics, ideology and financial institutions, arguing that 
while Cazenove adapted to the Thatcherite reforms to Britain’s financial 
sector, the firm made good use of elite social networks to entrench many of 
its privileges and traditions.72
Beyond the domestic British economy, changes to the international 
economic order have also been identified as a cause of the transformation 
of Britain in the late twentieth century. It can be argued that the linked 
dynamics of expanded global trade, the multi-nationalisation of business 
and the resurgence of global finance weakened the material conditions of 
post-war interventionist, nationalist economic policy. This was a gradual 
process that pre-dated the 1970s: for example, technological change, 
particularly the communications and information technology revolution, 
was a significant factor enabling the incipient re-globalisation of the world 
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economy from the 1960s onwards. Yet a focus on technology should not 
obscure the political drivers of this process: for example, the integration of 
Britain within the European Economic Community required a liberalisation 
of capital movements, and under the partial leadership of the Thatcher 
governments the European project became a means by which international 
trade and investment barriers were dismantled in the 1980s.73
Britain’s earlier role in reconstituting globalised finance (which had 
been constrained by nation states through controls on the free movement 
of capital) is especially notable. As discussed in Davies’s chapter, which 
draws on the work of Catherine Schenk, Gary Burn, Jeremy Green and 
others, the City of London’s banking establishment (overseen by the Bank 
of England) constructed an ‘offshore’ financial system that served the 
interests of the City in its effort to revive itself as a global financial centre. 
This coincided with a demand for global credit and investment facilities 
from multinational enterprises and national governments; it also assisted 
the US in managing its financial role as the Western hegemonic 
power. The development of these ‘Euromarkets’ generated flows of ‘hot 
money’ that destabilised and ultimately contributed to the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates between 1971 and 1973. 
This liberated states from the discipline of maintaining their currency 
parities (a constraint that frustrated growth-oriented post-war British 
governments). But after a vast expansion of sovereign lending to finance 
the massive current account deficits created by the oil price rise of 1973, 
nation states were then subjected to the discipline of global financial 
markets whose willingness to finance governments was determined by 
the perceived commitment of those governments to control inflation. 
Britain’s recourse to the IMF in 1976 must be placed in this context.
Rather than looking to ‘neoliberalism’, an alternative way to think 
about the political economy of Britain in the late twentieth century is to 
see it as a product of rapid deindustrialisation and the transition to a 
service-based economy after 1970. Tomlinson has argued that many of 
the key features of neoliberal Britain, such as wage inequality and work 
insecurity, are the product of the decline of industrial employment.74 For 
Avner Offer, the disappearance of a ‘proletarian mode of production’ 
underpinned the rhetorical remaking of workers into consumers.75 The 
loss of industrial jobs made the Thatcher governments’ task of weakening 
trade unions easier, and the stagnation in average incomes caused by the 
disappearance of stable employment in industry forced households to rely 
on credit and asset ownership (particularly mortgage-financed home 
ownership) to maintain their position relative to accelerating pay growth 
at the top of the income scale.76 This latter outcome suggests that the 
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‘financialisation’ of British society was a rational coping mechanism in the 
face of fundamental economic change, although as the work of Amy 
Edwards and of Kieran Heinemann has demonstrated, pressure to adopt 
individualist saving and investment strategies came from a host of sources 
and could be traced back throughout the twentieth century.77 Stuart 
Aveyard, Paul Corthorn and Sean O’Connell have also provided an 
essential history of the politics of credit in twentieth-century Britain that 
demonstrates the diverse, complex and long-term origins of credit 
liberalisation since the 1970s.78
Deindustrialisation may have also served as a constraint on the 
neoliberal political project. As Tomlinson argues in his chapter in this 
book, another fundamental effect of deindustrialisation was to 
compromise the ability of politicians to implement the neoliberal 
‘rollback’ of the welfare state. As deindustrialisation increased inequality 
and created larger numbers of unskilled or semi-skilled workers on low 
wages in the service sector, it created a situation where governments, 
unless they were willing to preside over a vast expansion of relative – and 
even absolute – poverty, were forced to subsidise wages. This began with 
Edward Heath’s Family Income Supplement in the early 1970s and 
culminated in New Labour’s tax credit programmes and the huge 
expansion of housing benefit.
Centring deindustrialisation as a driver of change in post-war Britain 
prompts us, of course, to ask what caused the disappearance of industrial 
work after 1970. An orthodox economist would point to technological 
change, relative factor costs (enabled by globalisation) and the increased 
demand for services in an affluent economy. Evidence of the decline of 
industrial jobs throughout the developed world could be used to prove 
this point, suggesting that ‘neoliberalism’ is a distraction from the more 
fundamental, autonomous transformation of global capitalism. There are, 
however, distinctions to be made between the pace of deindustrialisation 
in Britain relative to other countries. Comparative political economists have 
argued that different models of capitalism have produced these divergent 
economic outcomes. In the most commonly known typology, Britain is 
identified (alongside the US) as the archetypal ‘liberal market economy’, 
in contrast to other ‘co-ordinated market economies’ (most notably 
Germany).79 Yet the functionalist ‘varieties of capitalism’ model of Hall and 
Soskice, while useful as a descriptive characterisation of the international 
economy at the start of this millennium, is unsatisfactorily ahistorical.
One might argue that the more enthusiastic embrace of liberal 
economic policies in Britain from the 1980s was a legacy of its imperial 
position in the second half of the nineteenth century, in which the City of 
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London became the central financial hub of the world economy.80 While its 
power within Britain was subdued following the 1931 financial crash and 
the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement, the Euromarket revival allowed the 
globally oriented City to reassert its power vis-à-vis the state but also 
provided the platform for a post-industrial national economic strategy. In 
this context the City of London effectively organised itself as a coherent 
lobby group in the 1960s and 1970s, drawing on the legacy and ideals of 
the City’s pre-1931 global financial freedom (kept aflame in the Bank of 
England), which were repurposed to meet the demands of post-war 
economic politics. Davies has described the activities of the invisible 
exports campaign that began in the late 1950s and which asserted that the 
City offered a solution to British economic decline: its capacity to provide 
services to the world offered an alternative to the nation’s internationally 
uncompetitive industrial sector.81 From this perspective, we might say that 
the neoliberal reformation was driven by an embrace of a post-industrial 
vision of future national prosperity. Yet in his chapter in this volume, 
Davies suggests that this was not necessarily a conscious ‘choice’ by the 
Thatcher government: the acceleration of deindustrialisation during the 
Thatcherite monetarist experiment left the British state with little option 
but to cling to the service sector as a national lifesaver.
Empire and decolonisation are also emphasised in Tehila Sasson’s 
chapter; as Sasson suggests, important recent work by several scholars 
demonstrates the connections between the processes of decolonisation 
and financialisation, deindustrialisation and the changing labour market 
in Britain. James Vernon has argued that deregulation, outsourcing and 
‘flexibilisation’ can be seen as the result of ‘a particular conjuncture of 
decolonization, a new state-sanctioned biopolitics of racialized 
immigration controls and changing forms of racialized neoliberal 
capitalism’.82 Vanessa Ogle has shown that the end of empires led to the 
flight of white capital into expanding tax havens, driving financialisation 
and also setting the scene for the development of discourses and practices 
of development aid and modernisation in the global South.83 In her 
chapter, Sasson develops these arguments further, suggesting that 
‘microfinance’ initiatives pioneered in the global South, and imbued with 
a neoliberal rationality, were subsequently imported into Britain and 
shaped New Labour’s thinking about ‘financial inclusion’. Empire and 
decolonisation thus formed important – and intertwined – influences on 
the development of key facets of the ‘neoliberal’ economy in Britain before 
and after the 1970s.
An examination of British economic history tends to push against 
the ideas- and politics-centric accounts of the neoliberal transformation 
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of Britain, by encouraging historians to recognise the changing structural 
conditions of British and global capitalism, and the role of material 
interests. However, historians working in this area have not resorted to 
monocausal material explanations of the rise of neoliberalism in Britain 
and have been alive to how economic dynamics interacted with neoliberal 
ideas, the imperatives of national statecraft, long-term social changes, 
and the legacy of Britain’s imperial past and the process of decolonisation.
Social and cultural history
As we saw above, one way of narrating the social and cultural history of 
late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century Britain is as a ‘neoliberal’ 
period, one where, as James Vernon traces, new individualistic forms of 
self-fashioning, and cultures of greed and selfishness, came to dominate.84 
Work, family and community are said to have been relentlessly colonised 
and distorted by the demands of neoliberal economies and ideologies. 
The image of the call centre is perhaps paradigmatic of this view of 
contemporary culture: rows of isolated workers, alienated from their work 
and from one another, servicing the demands of consumers and of 
globalised and financialised capitalism, un-unionised and disempowered, 
competing to complete the most calls and meet their sales targets.85 
Historical studies of neoliberal cultures and subjectivities are not as far 
advanced, yet, as historical studies of neoliberal ideas, political movements 
and economic structures; however, this is a field into which historians are 
beginning to move. Historians working in this field have often taken as 
their starting point the tradition of social and cultural theory inspired by 
Foucault. Nikolas Rose, for example, has depicted neoliberalism as a mode 
of liberal governmentality that compels the individual to be free: to 
embrace autonomy, choice and personal responsibility, and to treat herself 
as an enterprise (to become ‘an entrepreneur of oneself’).86 Others have 
examined the development of neoliberal culture and neoliberal 
subjectivities through the lens of ‘neoliberal sensibilities’. Ellen Boucher, 
for example, has suggested that studying public reactions to the threat of 
nuclear war in the 1980s uncovers an emerging ‘neoliberal sensibility’, 
focused on assessing risk and taking personal responsibility; this sensibility, 
Boucher suggests, was not completely dominant or totalising, but it was 
one important pattern of thought and feeling.87
At the same time, as we saw above, many scholars have suggested 
that the new left politics of the 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis on 
individual self-expression and gratification of the 1960s counter-culture 
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and the ‘spirit of 68’ fed into the advent of Thatcherism or neoliberalism 
in the 1980s.88 This suggests that neoliberalism alone may not be enough 
to explain the shifts in society, culture and subjectivities of late twentieth-
century Britain. Instead, we should think about modern British history in 
terms of several cross-cutting metanarratives which interacted, but none 
of which ever had overall primacy.89 One such trend, which cuts across 
the rise of neoliberal ideas and policies, is the rise of individualism and 
the decline of deference, which Sutcliffe-Braithwaite has argued had 
long roots and diverse drivers in post-war Britain – from the right as well 
as the left – and which played into Thatcher’s hands in some ways.90 
James Hinton’s work, based on Mass Observation sources from the 
Second World War and from the 1980s, also points to rising individualism, 
as well as growing self-reflexivity and ideas about self-fulfilment as long-
term developments spanning the entire period.91 What this suggests is 
that we should not ask whether all the social and cultural phenomena of 
the late twentieth century were ‘neoliberal’; rather, we should examine 
them on their own terms, looking not simply to ‘neoliberalism’ as an 
explanation, but to longer and more varied roots. This book contributes 
to this work and thus complicates depictions of British culture and society 
in this period as ‘neoliberal’.
Studies of the family and neoliberalism have stressed the tensions 
between the impulse towards individualism in neoliberal thinking and the 
requirement, in practice, for the family to deliver the housework and 
childcare needed to keep the neoliberal economy working. Melinda 
Cooper has examined how, in the US, neoliberal thinkers adopted the 
discourse of ‘family values’ because, far from wanting to create a world of 
atomised individuals, their economic model required the family to 
shoulder the burden of responsibility for caring for its members as the 
state retreated from that responsibility.92 Helen McCarthy’s chapter in this 
book examines the pressures on women as wives and mothers in late 
twentieth-century Britain. She finds that ‘responsibilisation’ (sometimes 
identified as a defining feature of ‘neoliberalism’) was, in fact, a continuous 
theme in conceptualisations of women as mothers and workers: even in 
the 1950s and 1960s, there were many endorsements of married women’s 
work – but only where the women involved also used private resources to 
take responsibility for the home and children first. When it comes to state 
provision of childcare, Thatcher’s policies (or lack thereof) were nothing 
new; here, New Labour marked a distinctive break, introducing a National 
Childcare Strategy in 1998. But this was an ideologically messy document, 
justifying itself more often by reference to the need to tackle childhood 
inequalities than the need to create an equal playing field for women 
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workers. Women were still to a large extent ‘responsibilised’, and, as 
globalisation and deindustrialisation changed labour markets, they were 
more and more required to work in order to meet the needs of the family 
budget. Despite this long-running top-down effort at ‘responsibilisation’, 
however, turning to look at women’s subjectivities in this period, McCarthy 
suggests that there was no capitulation to the stringent demands of 
responsibilisation at home and in work: women subverted the demand that 
they should be ‘superwomen’ with humour, scepticism and ambivalence.
One of the key arguments made in literature on ‘neoliberal’ 
subjectivities concerns the development of entrepreneurial practices. 
Historical studies, though, challenge – or at least complicate – this story. 
In this volume, Bernhard Rieger points to the ways in which Thatcher’s 
governments attempted to promote entrepreneurialism among the 
unemployed, but he also emphasises that this was not the Thatcherites’ 
only approach to the out-of-work, who were more often treated punitively. 
Tehila Sasson also examines how new government-endorsed financial 
institutions encouraged new forms of financial subjectivity and risk-
taking in the late twentieth century. By contrast, Sarah Mass shifts her 
focus away from government and towards society, tracing the development 
of ‘outsider’ commercial actors buying and selling in informal spaces such 
as Sunday markets between 1945 and 1975. She argues that we should 
not see these ‘entrepreneurial subjectivities’ as ‘neoliberal’ or ‘proto-
neoliberal’. These entrepreneurs in the informal economy presented 
themselves as flexible alternatives to the inflexible provision made by 
vested interests in the public and private sector, and called for the 
deregulation of retail, but they based their case not on neoliberal ideology, 
but rather on claims about the nature of the modern ‘ordinary working 
family’ and the right of individuals to flexibility in shopping and to 
cheap goods.
Camilla Schofield, Rob Waters and Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 
also examine the theme of entrepreneurship, examining the transition of 
individuals from Black and anti-racist activism in the 1970s and 1980s 
into the emerging sector of race relations consultancy. They demonstrate 
how Black activism was rearticulated in the 1980s, partly under the 
influence of neoliberal ideas, but also because of the money the Thatcher 
governments funnelled into Black, anti-racist and ethnic groups for 
pragmatic reasons in the aftermath of the urban uprisings of 1981. Black 
enterprise was emphasised, but this did not represent an imposition from 
outside Black culture: Schofield et al. examine Black businessmen and 
activists in the 1970s who articulated a distinctive anti-racism linked 
inextricably to entrepreneurship, and who had roots in and connections 
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to the radical Black activism of the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, as 
Schofield has argued in earlier work, individualism – often seen as the 
natural correlate of Thatcherism and neoliberalism – was in fact incubated 
and encouraged by the left-wing apparatus of race relations legislation in 
1960s and 1970s Britain.93 Work on the social and cultural history of 
post-war Britain thus complicates narratives of the rise of ‘neoliberal 
subjectivities’, suggesting that developments such as entrepreneurship 
and individualism had more diverse and complicated causes; it also 
shows how partial the reach of neoliberalism into British society and 
institutions was.
Chapter structure and conclusion
Many of the chapters in this book move between intellectual, political, 
social and cultural history. The book is designed so that each chapter 
stands alone; however, the chapters also work consecutively to develop 
and interrogate a series of arguments. In the introductory section, David 
Edgerton problematises the description of Britain from 1945 to 1979 as 
‘social democratic’ and from 1979 as ‘neoliberal’, while Ben Jackson 
provides a counterpoint, arguing for a more precise calibration of the 
influence of neoliberal ideas on British politics after the 1970s. The 
second section examines the welfare state, with Peter Sloman and Jim 
Tomlinson offering contrasting analyses of how ‘neoliberal’ the welfare 
state became after the 1970s, and Bernhard Rieger tracing discontinuities 
in the approaches of Thatcherites and New Labour. In the section on work 
and family, Helen McCarthy (examining women’s work and feminism) 
and Jim Phillips (examining work and trade unionism) also trace 
continuity and change in policy on work and welfare and stress the 
significant instances of resistance to ‘neoliberal’ forms of subjectification. 
Sarah Mass examines the supposedly ‘neoliberal’ emphasis on flexible 
shopping in the late twentieth century, arguing it can be traced back to 
small-scale entrepreneurs in the decades before the 1980s, and suggesting 
important alternative sources for shifts in subjectivities and in the 
economy in this period.
In the section on politics, Camilla Schofield, Florence Sutcliffe-
Braithwaite and Rob Waters continue the focus on entrepreneurialism, 
tracing antecedents for Black enterprise culture in Britain in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and suggesting neoliberalism was only one influence on New 
Labour’s anti-racist politics. Mark Wickham-Jones and James Freeman 
also trace long-term continuities in Labour and Conservative politics, 
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while also mapping the influence of neoliberalism on both. Writing on 
political economy, Neil Rollings and Aled Davies examine the impact of 
organised business and the City of London on the direction of the British 
economy in the post-war period; Davies and Guy Ortolano both focus on 
the housing market, demonstrating how secular economic change as well 
as Thatcherite policy transformed housing after the 1970s. Finally, Tehila 
Sasson in her afterword argues for the utility of the term ‘neoliberal’ but 
suggests that we should see neoliberalism as having ‘many lives’, not one 
single story.
The chapters in this book do not all take the same view of 
‘neoliberalism’, or of its utility as a category to understand Britain after 
c. 1970. But taken together, and read alongside other recent historical 
scholarship on neoliberalism, they suggest that the story of the ‘rise and 
triumph of neoliberalism’, which is often repeated in contemporary 
political discourse, and which often structures survey histories of Britain 
after 1945, is partial and problematic. As Philip Mirowski has argued, it 
makes sense to talk about a ‘neoliberal thought collective’ which had 
significant success in influencing political discourse and public policy. 
What this book suggests, however, is that it is not particularly helpful to 
describe the late twentieth century as straightforwardly a ‘neoliberal’ 
period. This can tend to imply that neoliberal ideology was the main 
driver of the changes seen in this period when, as many of our contributors 
show, material interests, economic processes, technological changes and 
cross-cutting trends such as the rise of individualism were also important 
in shaping the politics, economics, society and culture of Britain after the 
1970s.94 This decade is rightly seen as a crucial turning point in modern 
British history but the reasons for this are complex, reflecting both short- 
and long-term factors that are variously political, economic, social and 
cultural in character. For this reason, ‘neoliberalism’ should be one, but 
not the only, category used to understand Britain since the 1970s.
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What came between new  
liberalism and neoliberalism? 
Rethinking Keynesianism, the  
welfare state and social democracy
David Edgerton*
The new neoliberalism is an ugly neologism, but it captures a crucial 
problem with the term ‘neoliberalism’ and how it is understood in relation 
to British history. Neoliberalism is supposed, in most of the extensive 
literature on it, to appear very much later than, and to be different from, 
both liberalism and the British ‘new liberalism’ of the early twentieth 
century.1 Furthermore, neoliberalism is thought to have followed 
something that succeeded new liberalism. Various terms are used 
to describe this post-new liberal and pre-neoliberal phase, usually said 
to date from 1945 to the late 1970s or early 1980s: they are usually 
Keynesianism, the welfare state and, in recent years, social democracy, 
often used in combination and defined circularly.2 The usages of 
Keynesianism and welfare state clearly pre-date the advent of the common 
usage of neoliberalism. However, social democracy as a descriptor of a 
form of polity-economy-society seems only to have come into significant 
use among historians with the rising use of the term neoliberalism. 
Curiously, Keynesianism and the (Beveridgean) welfare state are, in a 
standard historiographical cliché, identified as direct descendants of new 
liberalism, while British social democracy is typically characterised as 
Keynesianism and the welfare state.3 In short, we are in a conceptual 
mess. In this chapter I hope to bring some clarity to these issues by 
enquiring into the meaning, scope and logical consistency of the concepts, 
their relationship with each other, and how well they map onto what we 
know of the history of the UK since 1945. I want to show that the terms 
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are not innocent, but that their influence and significance arise from the 
grip that very particular historiographical traditions have had on our 
understanding of twentieth-century British history.4
I suggest that the concepts Keynesianism, the welfare state and 
social democracy, along with related ones, are in practice unhelpful 
analytical terms which should be abandoned as general descriptors (though 
certainly not as narrower, well-specified technical terms). By implication, 
neoliberalism, which too often relies on a contrast with them, for 
this and other reasons, is also best dispensed with. I echo Daniel Wincott’s 
critique of ‘epochalism’ in thinking about these issues.5 I also argue, with 
Jim Tomlinson, that the claims made for the usual chronologies of the 
welfare state and Keynesianism are misleading, especially but not only in 
that neither disappeared when neoliberalism, according to standard 
accounts of neoliberalism,  replaced them: the concept of neoliberalism 
suspect for this reason alone.6 I also suggest that neoliberalism should not 
be used because, in all its common variants, it misses key elements of 
radical changes that have been visited on the UK since the 1980s.
These concepts appear to be well grounded and capable of being 
applied in serious theoretical and analytical work. Yet they have very 
particular or very general meanings, and changeable ones. Most are not 
actors’ terms, but analysts’, and many have shifted from being negative to 
positive descriptions, from aspirations to descriptions of reality. They are 
typically poorly defined, and while they refer to mere parts, they are often 
misleadingly made to stand for the whole. Keynesianism and welfare 
state, and now social democracy, are closely related to other concepts, 
which in itself lends them authority. Thus affluence, it is often suggested, 
was the result of Keynesianism and the welfare state. The post-war 
consensus and the post-war settlement are in both cases, historians 
suggest, mainly agreements about Keynesianism and the welfare state.7 
But these concepts, far from being neutral descriptive and/or analytical 
terms, are in fact embodiments of very particular and strongly 
interdependent historiographical and ideological assumptions.
These terms are also thought to be powerful because they are (or in 
some cases are becoming) terms of art in the historiography of the post-
war UK. But their claims to usefulness as general descriptions of economy, 
society and polity are not as historiographically secure as they seem.8 
Their usage needs to be understood as the result of the dominance of a 
particular kind of social democratic historiography of post-war Britain, 
which tells that history in very particular ways, stressing Keynesianism 
and the welfare state, and seeing these as the products of what is seen as 
the creative force of the time – social democracy. But British historiography 
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could have been very different. In a blistering 1993 article, the sociologist 
W. G. Runciman asked the question: when, in the twentieth century, did 
the British capitalist mode of production change? He had no truck with 
terms such as Keynesianism or social democracy and their implied 
chronologies.9 He is clear that there was one huge change with permanent 
effects, which took place between 1915 and 1922 and involved the 
creation of the welfare state, a new corporate economy and large trade 
unions and the establishment of mass suffrage. By contrast, changes in 
1945 and 1979 were trivial: he suggests that neither nationalisation nor 
privatisation made much difference and that the new mode of production 
established early in the century continued in existence. It is both a very 
necessary corrective and a reminder of how much of history is driven by 
arguments about chronology.10 His argument is not as wrong as it must 
appear to the student of British history. But in this chapter I also argue 
for breaks in 1945 and 1979, though not for the reasons most of their 
advocates suggest, or that Runciman considers.
Social democracy
Social democracy has long been a term of art on the left. As every socialist 
knows, before 1914 many Marxist parties styled themselves as Social 
Democratic parties (in Germany, Russia and the UK, for example), and 
since the First World War social democracy was the term for non-
communist socialist parties, the most important of which, in terms of size, 
was the German Social Democratic Party (the SPD), and, after 1945, the 
British Labour Party. It was a term commonly used critically in reference 
to such parties by those further to the left, as in David Howell’s British 
Social Democracy.11 In the pages of Marxism Today in the 1980s the term 
was still used in this way by, for example, Stuart Hall.12 If for the left it was 
a term of critique, it was also used positively by the right of the Labour 
Party, to distinguish itself from the left (which in response sometimes 
styled itself democratic socialist). The revisionists of the 1950s used it of 
themselves, and in 1981 a right-wing splinter group from Labour was 
called the Social Democratic Party.
While there is obvious authority for, and value in, labelling parties 
or fractions of parties as social democratic, it is not obvious that they ever 
created societies which ought to be so labelled. Eric Hobsbawm made, in 
passing, a crucial point. As he noted, ‘[t]he Soviet systems are the only 
ones which actually claimed to have established fully socialist economies 
and societies. To the best of my knowledge no social-democratic 
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government or party, however radical or long-lived, has ever made such 
a claim.’13 I have no reason to challenge that conclusion. Certainly, it is 
implausible that the social democrats of Germany or France or Italy would 
ever make such a claim for their nation, given how rarely and/or how late 
Social Democrats achieved office compared with Christian Democrats or 
Gaullists. A Labour Party claim to have created a social democracy, given 
that Labour was in office for only roughly half the period between 1945 
and 1979, would be only a little less unlikely.
However, a number of students of modern capitalism have used the 
term as a descriptor for a phase of capitalism. In 1981 Andrew Gamble 
used ‘social democracy’ to describe a common trend in ‘most capitalist 
states’ to have universal suffrage and increased public spending, while 
clearly remaining essentially capitalist, and consequently having a 
particular kind of politics.14 In his pioneering 1988 book on the politics of 
Thatcherism, Gamble used the term to cover most advanced Western 
economies, as the political and social superstructure which best 
accommodated Fordism. It was a richer definition than Keynesianism and 
welfare, to be sure.15 Jeffry Frieden’s 2007 history of capitalism sees social 
democracy as a means of saving capitalism from itself, starting in the 
1930s with Scandinavian Social Democratic governments and the US 
New Deal, calling it a moderate anti-capitalism, which after 1945 was to 
be found even among European Christian Democrats, who extended the 
welfare state and intervened in industry.16 More recently, Branko 
Milanović has developed a three-period model of capitalism – classical, 
social democratic and liberal meritocratic – defined in terms of returns to 
capital and labour.17 Much less well defined, social democracy appears in 
work by Tony Judt. His collection of essays Ill Fares the Land uses the term 
repeatedly in the sense of a general Western European practice since 
1945.18 It has to be said that his discussion is shot through with conflicting 
and changing, vague definitions.19 By contrast, his earlier Postwar uses 
the term, and sparingly, in the classical sense.20 More recently Thomas 
Piketty has used the term for the period 1950–80 (its ‘golden age’), 
covering countries ranging from Sweden to the US to Argentina, defining 
it as a period of low inequality and a large fiscal and social state (which, 
I note below, is not a workable definition).21
Among historians of the UK, the term social democracy was very 
rarely used to describe the nation as a whole but has been coming into 
limited use in the last decade. In 1991, Paul Addison wrote in a review in 
Twentieth Century British History that ‘[t]he rise and fall of Keynesian 
social democracy is one of the central problems of twentieth century 
British history’.22 Roger Middleton labelled the last and fourth part of a 
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1996 book ‘The rise and fall of Keynesian Social Democracy’.23 But after 
around 2010 it became a little more common, including in Twentieth 
Century British History. There James Vernon wrote that ‘[t]he social 
democracy that my parents and I grew up with in Britain – where the state 
managed a mixed economy and sought to deliver full employment and 
universal forms of welfare – was shared in various forms across much of 
the world’.24 In the same journal, others have since ‘complicated the “rise 
and decline” narrative of social democracy’ or written of the ‘transition 
from post-war welfarism and social democracy’ or ‘the social democracy 
of the post-1945 welfare state’.25
Social democracy is defined in this recent literature in varying ways. 
James Vernon’s definition is intimately connected to the welfare state: the 
Beveridge report, he writes, ‘became the foundation of a new post-war 
social democratic settlement’, while recognising that social democracy 
was ‘compromised’ by anti-democratic tendencies, and differences in 
gender, class and race.26 Others see it somewhat differently. Aled Davies 
argues for a post-war ‘social democratic economic policy’ of industrial 
modernisation, and a ‘social democratic political economy’.27 He takes the 
Labour Party to have created, from 1945, a ‘social democratic state’ which 
lasted to the 1970s.28 The aim was to ‘achieve the fundamental goal of 
a modern industrial economy in which export-led growth could resist 
national decline by overcoming the endemic deficit in the nation’s balance 
of payments; as well as providing stable, productive and well-paid 
employment for all’.29 But here social democratic political economy is 
defined as the standard historians’ account of post-war economic policy – 
and nothing in the argument claims it is specifically social democratic. 
Guy Ortolano contrasts social democracy with market liberalism, as 
co-existing tendencies within the post-war UK, encouraging or opposing 
the extension of the state, specifically the welfare state, while recognising 
that there are those who see only a very weak social democracy in the 
post-war UK.30 More concretely, in the case of housing he identifies social 
democracy with mixed private and public housing, addressing, therefore, 
the crucial importance of ownership in social democratic politics and 
aspirations. He notes and rejects the historiographical focus on the origins 
of market liberalism and the degeneration of social democracy, supporting 
the claims of Davies and Edgerton that social democracy (as a party and 
intellectual programme) remained, or even became, dynamic in the 
1970s.31
Chronology is part of definition. British social democracy is usually 
dated from 1945 (or 1940) to 1979. For Andrew Gamble, ‘the war 
established social democracy in Britain’, specifically in 1940.32 However, 
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Vernon’s textbook gives it a heterodox beginning in 1931 (when it was, 
oddly, a matter of protection, support for distressed areas, colonial trade 
and a state-managed economy), though established as common sense 
from 1945 (with a radically new welfare state, and a new imperialism), 
and argues it lasted into the 1970s.33 By contrast, Scott Newton depicts a 
social democracy (though the definition is not clear) created by the Tories 
in the early 1960s, and which lasted until the Thatcher years.34
It seems to me that using the term social democracy in this new, 
broad sense has not in fact generally brought much new to the table of 
British history (and I will suggest below what else it might bring). It has 
done little more than re-label the welfare state and Keynesianism, and 
some other aspects of economic policy, to contrast it with what came 
before and later. This is nevertheless problematic, for two key reasons.
The first is that it ignores traditions of historiography which would 
deny, for important reasons, the applicability not only of the term, but of 
the underlying meanings it now conveys. Some historians have long 
maintained that precisely because of the centrality of Keynesianism and 
Beveridgean welfare, the UK was not, and could not be, social democratic. 
Thus Patrick Joyce, writing recently, referred to the ‘myth of social 
democracy’.35 Historians of the left have, as Joyce does, long insisted on 
what might be called a new liberal continuity thesis. This argument 
emphasises the importance of Edwardian new liberal innovations to the 
post-war welfare state and notes the ways in which Keynesianism 
restrained modernising state intervention. Both Keynes and Beveridge 
are characterised as new liberals. The implicit claim, surely correct, is that 
social democracy must mean something other than Keynesianism and 
Beveridgean welfare.
The second point is more complex. It is that this usage of ‘social 
democratic’ does not recognise that the historiography which labels the 
post-war UK as Keynesian and a welfare state is a very particular one, 
dating from the 1960s, and which can itself be called social democratic, 
in the sense of Labour revisionist. These histories celebrated Keynesianism 
and the welfare state, linked them and told the story of twentieth-century 
British history as the triumph of these two elements after 1945. It was a 
history focused on the civil state which systematically excluded the Cold 
War, and the warfare state, and indeed the private sector, except under 
the distorting lens of decline. It sometimes feels as if by definition all 
change of any value was the work of social democrats or resulted in social 
democracy.36 This work still defines for many historians what British 
history is, and the context in which sub-elements should be studied.37 The 
evaluation may now be generally less positive than in the past,  but the 
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key themes of broad historical understanding are (apart from empire) 
much the same.
A social democratic governmentality?
If social democratic historiography has its limitations, could the concept 
of social democracy help further illuminate British history? I believe so. 
We can ask, for example, what it would take to show that the UK could 
usefully be described as social democratic after 1945? We could ask, did 
it follow a social democratic foreign policy or defence policy? Interestingly, 
it is highly unlikely anyone has ever made this claim. Restricting the 
argument to the domestic sphere, we would need to show, I think, that 
the Labour Party, the Labour movement, developed and implemented a 
distinctively social democratic (rather than Keynesian or Beveridgean) 
method of economic and social calculation. Was there a social democratic 
governmentality?
Such a governmentality, or aspiration to it, is hard to find. One looks 
in vain (until the 1970s) for an elaborated set of arguments from the left 
for alternative ways of running the economy, except for making general 
arguments about planning and putting the interests of the nation first.38 
For example, the Labour Party made only minimal proposals for taking 
private industries into public ownership after the 1945 general election, 
and did not do so again until the early 1970s. It is interesting too how 
little attention is given in subsequent accounts to Labour policy for 
nationalised industries or to the significance for the power of property of 
the privatisations after 1979.39
That said, there were huge transfers to the public sector in the late 
1940s, giving the state enormous leverage in investment, in everything 
from public housing to electricity generation. Yet there was little discussion 
of these programmes, excepting perhaps housing, by the Labour Party and 
the left at least until the 1970s.  There were no distinctive Labour criteria 
for nationalised industries, though they were nationalised on the basis 
that they should indeed be run on principles recognising their systemic 
national and perhaps class significance. Post-war governments produced 
criteria which merely aped the profit criteria for private firms, which often 
made nationalised industries unprofitable when they did what they were 
supposed to do – behave differently from a private enterprise.40 This is not 
to say that nationalised industries and other state enterprises did not, in 
fact, operate to distinctly national and other criteria – they did, most 
notably in buying British and ignoring the costs of doing so; the point here 
THE NEOLIBERAL AGE? BRITAIN S INCE THE 1970s36
is that these crucial issues were not the subject of sustained analysis on the 
left. To put it another way, the Labour Party generally relied on state 
experts rather than on its own, including in economics. Indeed, it is crucial 
to understanding the nature of post-war expertise, including that 
associated with the public sector, not to assume that it was somehow social 
democratic in spirit, although it often is.
The exception that proves the rule is the post-Beveridge economics 
and sociology of the welfare state. There was a left tradition of investi- 
gation and policy prescription operating on assumptions about what was 
best for the nation, and which were aimed at correcting systematic 
inequalities created by capitalism. For example, in criticising the notion 
of the National Health Service (NHS) as a cost to the individual through 
taxation, and private medicine as a saving to the taxpayer, it was argued 
that both private and public medicine cost the nation money, and the 
issue was which system was more equitable and more efficient. Thus, the 
NHS, it was argued, was a cheap as well as equitable way of providing 
the nation with the health care it might otherwise provide itself by less 
equitable and more expensive private means. Similarly, a universal 
national state pension scheme of a generous kind might well be the most 
efficient from a national point of view. This was, indeed, the argument 
made by Labour welfare specialists in the late 1950s in arguing for a new 
National Superannuation scheme, one which rejected the key Beveridgean 
principle of the fixed contribution and benefit.41 The policy never came 
into practice, and it was only in the 1970s, with the State Earnings Related 
Pension Scheme (SERPS), that a limited version came (temporarily) into 
play in a world in which the private occupational pension now dominated. 
This and other measures radically (and, as it turned out, temporarily) 
increased the generosity of the welfare state in the 1970s.42 That 
transformation of the welfare state is barely known, but it is important to 
note its significance, and to understand that the reforms of the 1980s 
were in part restorations of the welfare state of the 1950s and early 
1960s.43 This argument is consonant with Richard Vinen’s important 
claim that Thatcherism was in many ways a return to the consensus of the 
1950s and 1960s, one broken by the left in the 1970s.44 We need to ask, 
given Avner Offer’s  definition of social democracy as provision for life-
cycle dependency by transfers through progressive taxation (rather than 
private savings through the market), whether even by this criterion the 
UK was ever social democratic.45
After all, the National Superannuation scheme was decisively 
rejected by the Conservatives, who favoured the expansion of private 
pensions which grew dramatically. There was, in any case, always a 
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non-social democratic economics and sociology of welfare in play, for 
example doctors and others who continued to oppose the NHS, including 
health economists, through the 1950s into the 1960s and 1970s.46 
Furthermore, much of the application of efficiency thinking to the NHS 
was the sort of work study and operational research already in use in 
government and industry to reduce costs.47
Another way of defining social democracy would be in terms of a 
systematic recognition of the existence of labour and capital, with 
mechanisms to ensure that the voices and interests of labour are 
represented, constraining the power of capital and increasing that of 
labour. To be sure, there was a good deal of tripartism after 1945, but of 
a limited kind, which was obviously, as was corporatism more generally, 
not necessarily social democratic in this sense at all. It was not until the 
1970s that Labour intellectuals, trade unions and others proposed new 
practices, exemplified in plans for ‘industrial democracy’, the social 
contract and planning agreements, which might count as such.48 In the 
British case it is rather striking that there was a change in the tone and 
nature of capital–labour relations, but that this seems mostly due to 
economic conditions rather than new governing practices. Differentials of 
income were very substantially reduced from the 1940s into the 1970s, 
though of course never anything like as much as social democrats 
wanted.49
Another way of approaching the issue would be to look for measures 
designed to restrict the prerogatives of property. Keynes himself held that 
his theory had major implications for capital. If the rich were not needed 
to drive investment, then interest rates could and should be held low, 
which would lead to the euthanasia of the rentier, the functionless 
investor.50 And indeed, the 1930s, the war and, importantly, the post-war 
years were periods of low real interest rates, and the distribution of 
wealth became more equal, until the 1980s. But it is equally notable that 
wealth taxes (as opposed to taxes on income from wealth) remained 
minimal, and that the state subsidised private ownership of some capital, 
notably in housing. The rentier was constrained but was not dead, and the 
social democratic politics of property were very much more moderate 
than Keynes’ own.
What was Keynesian welfarism?
The British case is often taken as an exemplary one for Keynesianism and 
welfare and social democracy. But comparative assessment across 
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Western Europe suggests a variegated picture from which it is very 
difficult to conclude that the British case is indeed exemplary, or that such 
forms are in fact truly transnational, except at the most trivial level. Was 
Keynesianism, whatever it is taken to be, the norm across Western Europe 
(or ‘the Western world’) after 1945? Was the UK more, or less, Keynesian 
than the norm? What did that imply for state intervention? It is very hard 
to say. For welfare the story is much clearer. Comparatively speaking, 
within Western Europe, the UK was a low spender on welfare, in the 
1950s and later too.51 Furthermore, most continental welfare states 
organised welfare on a different model from the UK. With regard to social 
democracy generally, it is tellingly completely unclear where the UK 
stands comparatively, though for some aspects, British social democracy 
is seen as comparatively weak (the institutionalisation of corporatism, the 
existence of a social democratic ‘pillar’, the authority of the trade unions), 
especially in comparison with Scandinavia.
Just as the comparative question had no easy answer, nor has the 
straightforward definitional question as to whether the post-war UK is 
usefully described as Keynesian or a welfare state. These seemingly self-
explanatory terms, rich with meaning, are in fact very problematic, in 
terms of what they are understood to mean. It is unclear, once one looks 
carefully, when Keynesianism and welfarism can be deemed to have 
started or ended.52
Implicit and explicit definitions of Keynesianism vary. Sometimes a 
very wide definition is used as a label for all economic policy, including 
nationalisation and sometimes even the welfare state. It has been 
suggested that Keynesianism even created the concept of a national 
economy. At other times Keynesianism is defined narrowly, as demand 
management, to argue that because policy was Keynesian in this sense it 
ignored ‘the supply side’ or did not lead to a ‘developmental state’. There 
are good grounds for defining it narrowly, not least because Keynes, and 
most Keynesians, wanted macroeconomic intervention to make the liberal 
market economy work better, not to replace it. They had no brief for 
nationalisation or radical industrial policy. Even defined narrowly, 
Keynesianism is used misleadingly to suggest that managing the total level 
of demand in the economy was the way in which government managed to 
generate the historically unprecedented rates of economic growth (well 
over 2% GDP growth per annum on average) with historically low rates of 
unemployment, even though demand management was used mainly, as in 
the Second World War, to restrain inflation rather than to promote growth. 
It was more stop than go. The idea that Keynesians were inflationists, and 
those opposed to inflation were anti-Keynesian, is false.53
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The question of when Keynesianism started is not straightforward. 
Although many have been tempted by the idea that the British Second 
World War economy was run on Keynesian lines, that is to misunderstand 
it. Indeed, it has been plausibly argued that Keynesianism represents a 
discontinuity with wartime and immediate post-war practice and only 
becomes significant with the removal of controls from the very late 
1940s.54 Keynesianism, in this sense, was the policy of 1950s Tories, not 
1940s Labour. But as will be noted below, even in the Conservative years, 
economic policy involved many different elements, many of which had 
nothing to do with Keynesianism.
The welfare state is similarly defined in varying ways.55 In its 
application is taken to have been, for example, the principal cause for 
lifting the British people out of poverty, when the most likely cause was 
higher wages. It is also strongly associated with state spending as a whole, 
and a new phase in the history of such spending, even though what was 
most novel in British public spending in the 1940s and 1950s was high 
levels of warfare spending.
When did the welfare state begin? is a tellingly problematic question. It 
cannot be in the Second World War itself, since the war was fought with a 
pre-war welfare system. That system was very elaborate. It was a 
Beveridgean working-class welfare state created in the 1920s. It cannot thus 
be said to have started from 1945. What Beveridge did in the Second World 
War was to plan to extend the system to the whole population. Indeed, it 
remained based on the regressive national insurance system, a poll tax, and 
aiming for a subsistence level benefit (though the NHS was not). Social 
democratic experts on the social services like Richard Titmuss did not see 
the UK as a welfare state.56 It could be argued that a new kind of welfare 
state was introduced not in the 1940s, but in the 1960s and especially the 
1970s with the rejection of the Beveridgean flat-rate principle. 
It is even doubtful if, as is often implied, Keynesianism or welfarism 
were at the centre of post-war politics, even of the Labour Party, or of the 
consensus. The economy was discussed in terms of exports and imports, 
and above all the difference between them – the balance of trade and of 
payments – as well as investment, planning and production, at least as 
much as in terms of budget deficits or surpluses. Welfare policy was not 
the main focus of politics or policy, even rhetorically, even for the Labour 
Party. The first time Labour had used the term ‘welfare state’ in a 
manifesto was in 1955. But this is what it said:
In order to strengthen our Welfare State still further and at the same 
time to play our part in assisting the under-developed areas of the 
THE NEOLIBERAL AGE? BRITAIN S INCE THE 1970s40
world, our own production must rise every year. Only a government 
prepared to plan the nation’s resources can do this. Labour will 
ensure that the claims of investment and modernisation come first.57
The Conservative manifesto of that year paired the welfare state with 
military expenditure:
In an armed Welfare State the demands on taxable resources cannot 
be light. This makes it all the more necessary that government, 
central and local, should be run economically. There are today over 
50,000 fewer civil servants and four fewer Ministries than when we 
took over. Conservatives will persist in the drive for simpler and less 
expensive administration.58
There were exceptions, notably the 1959 Labour manifesto, the work 
of the Gaitskellite social democratic revisionists, which was uniquely 
welfarist.
If the beginnings of the Keynesian welfare state are not as clear as the 
labelling implies, nor are the endings. Macroeconomic control of the 
economy hardly disappeared after 1979 – the rationale might have 
changed, but Keynesians are entitled to argue that the economy continued 
to behave in Keynesian ways. Keynesian policy instruments continued to 
be used into the 1990s and beyond, as Jim Tomlinson has eloquently 
argued.59 In any case, the fiscal size of the state did not shrink to where it 
had been in, say, the 1930s. Indeed, it did not even shrink back to 1960s 
levels for very many years, and then only temporarily. In the case of 
welfare spending specifically, the picture is more dramatic – the proportion 
of GDP devoted to welfare increased from the 1970s to today. What did 
change, in the 1980s, was the generosity of the system to individuals, and 
radically so, returning the system to the post-war norm. The most 
obviously social democratic element of welfare, the NHS (state-owned, 
run by para-state employees [excepting general practitioners], providing 
universal services, funded by mildly progressive tax) very obviously 
expanded in the supposedly post-welfarist era, even if key elements would 
be undermined through trusts, private finance initiatives (PFI) and 
contracting out.
The point can be illustrated by looking again at Piketty’s definitions 
of social democracy. He defines it as a period of reduced inequality, the 
golden age being 1950–80, and by high taxation and social spending, a 
large ‘fiscal and social state’. For Piketty and for many others it seems 
obvious that the two definitions coincide chronologically. But as Piketty’s 
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own figures show all too clearly, while inequality started to increase quite 
radically from around 1980, the fiscal and social state was usually stable 
in size in relation to GDP, and in many cases growing. In fact, for all his 
illustrative cases, including the UK, the fiscal state was larger in 2010 
than in 1970.60 His argument might be better put like this: in the period 
1950–80, in many places, inequality fell as the fiscal and social state 
expanded rapidly. However, from 1980 inequality increased, with a stable 
or growing fiscal and social state. They are not coincident indicators. It is 
a serious mistake to believe that welfare systems were designed to reduce, 
or succeeded in reducing, inequality.
Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism is a term which should, I think, not be used. As well as 
being a catch-all critical term, and not usually an advocate’s category, 
neoliberalism, by focusing attention on limited and often misconstrued 
aspects of the great transition of the 1980s, misunderstands those 
changes, and their extent, in important ways. Firstly, neoliberalism is 
commonly defined as post-Keynesianism and post-welfarism and post-
social democracy, without appreciating the multiple weaknesses of such 
a definition. Secondly, it is also used in a host of other contradictory or at 
least very different ways. It is often taken to be a set of ideas – dating to 
the 1930s – arguing for relying on market mechanism, which were then 
applied from the 1980s onwards.61 Or, it is suggested, that neoliberalism 
involved the creation of a new, entrepreneurial homo economicus. In 
another version, neoliberalism is associated with the bureaucratism 
of the New Public Management. It is usually taken to be one thing, 
overlooking the differences  between ‘Austrian’ thinking, and for example 
anti-Keynesian neoclassical liberal economics.62 This conceptual 
apparatus hardly does justice to changes which have taken place since the 
1980s, globally or in the UK. Notably, these framings do not address the 
changing relative power of capital, property and labour since the 1970s.63 
Modern hypercapitalism (to use Piketty’s term) is centrally a matter of 
rebalancing the world in favour of capital, rather than the product of a 
new entrepreneurship or the power of markets qua markets.
But there is a deeper conceptual and periodisation problem. In 
Michel Foucault’s brilliant analysis, neoliberalism was both a post-Nazi 
phenomenon which arose in nations which had never been liberal, and a 
US-centred critique of the non-liberal New Deal, post-war welfarism and 
the Great Society programmes. For him neoliberalism was both German 
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‘ordo-liberalism’, which was influential in what was called the 
‘social market economy’ of Germany from the 1950s, and in the US a new 
economics of work focused on the worker as entrepreneur.64 All this in 
itself throws a huge spanner into the standard argument that the UK and 
Western Europe/the Western world were social democratic between say 
1945 and the 1980s, and neoliberal after that.65 There is, however, a 
another problem which Foucault’s argument makes clear. For Foucault, 
neoliberalism was not centrally post-social democratic  but rather post-
non-liberal and post-nationalist. Indeed, a vital part of the Hayekian 
critique of socialism was that it was in fact nationalist. (It is worth 
noting that Road to Serfdom did not recognise any new liberalism – as 
Keith Tribe notes, Britain had, in Friedrich Hayek’s view, been corrupted 
by German (nationalist) thought, not by anything that came from 
liberalism.)66 A vital part of Austrian neoliberalism, as Quinn Slobodian’s 
recent examination rightly stresses, is its sustained critique of economic 
nationalism.67 Pushing for a cosmopolitan capitalism as opposed to a 
national (and a potentially democratic) capitalism was a central concern. 
There is an obvious case to be made that national protection increased in 
many places in the world after 1945, and that the first great moves to 
liberalisation (post-war West Germany excepted) came in the formerly 
very national protectionist (and not obviously social democratic) 
Southern Cone nations in the early 1970s.
A national economy
We need to ask, recalling Foucault and Slobodian, whether we might also 
cast post-war British history as a case of nationalism (perhaps with a 
social democratic twist) replacing liberalism and new liberalism, and this 
economic nationalism being replaced by a revitalised liberalism. It’s a 
question which most histories of twentieth-century Britain would answer 
with a bemused, perhaps outraged: NO! For British nationalism, economic 
or any other kind, barely exists in the history books. But as I have argued 
elsewhere, we need to take it seriously, especially between 1945 and the 
1970s.68
I go further than the now-common argument that Keynesianism, 
and national accounting, constructed the national economy. The national 
economy was constituted primarily by economic barriers, sustained by 
nationalist and imperialist ideologies. Unfortunately, in the British case, 
this process, so familiar around the world, has been nearly invisible 
to British historians.69 This is in part because it was not the result of a 
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political movement, nor was it associated with an intellectual, as 
Keynesianism obviously was. But it is also because a central argument of 
much left social democratic (and here the term is most definitely 
admissible) and Marxist political economy has been that British capitalism 
has been unusually liberal and cosmopolitan/imperial and therefore, 
crucially, not national enough.70 The consequence was, in this account, 
that the British national productive economy was undermined. The 
state’s interventions, it is argued in this view, were limited to macro- 
economic Keynesianism and welfarism. The problem was, in effect, that 
there was no real post-new-liberal moment at all.71 Some influential 
responses to Thatcherism certainly suggested it was a radical manifestation 
of a very long-standing aversion to national economic development in 
favour of cosmopolitan finance.72
Contrary to this thesis, I have argued there was a British national 
economy with a developmental state. There is a case for seeing it start with 
the introduction of general tariffs and general imperial preference in 
1931/2, but that is, I think, better seen as a shift to an imperial rather 
than a national economy. It might be thought, from the histories, that the 
Second World War economy was a national economy, but in many ways 
the UK became more dependent than ever on overseas supply, not least 
now from the US.73 The year 1945 saw a real break, I argue, with the end 
of Lend-Lease and the sudden need for the national economy to export in 
order to import. Although the years from the 1940s were the peak of 
imperial trade, the rhetoric was now national, and efforts were made to 
reduce imperial trade as well. From the 1940s into the late 1960s the 
proportion of trade to GDP was pushed down, as imports were reduced.74 
It was also a period, contrary to what is usually implied, of net emigration, 
not immigration. National policies to promote exports, and restrict 
imports, had the consequence that the post-war UK was more industrialised 
than it had ever been in its history, with the highest ever proportions of 
output and employment accounted for by manufacturing. Conceptually, 
the economy was highly national in that the balance of payments was seen 
as a national profit and loss account.75 This economic nationalism in the 
context of imperial preference was not the preferred outcome of 
either liberals or imperialists. Indeed, as Alan Milward showed, the elite 
wanted to get away from both imperial and national economics, but only 
succeeded in doing so in the 1970s.76
The national economy also had a developmental state transforming 
the nationalised infrastructure of the nation. It took until the 1970s 
for modern trains, mines, electricity generation, post offices and 
telephone systems to be put in place, nearly all powered by nationally 
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made equipment. On top of that, a dynamic national private capitalism 
was created in part by state action – resulting in an economy growing at 
unprecedented and still unmatched rates. Apart from state provision of 
infrastructure and energy, and generic support for education, there was 
direct state investment, investment grants and the use of the tax system 
to direct economic activity, particularly in favour of manufacturing.
All this highlights that Keynesian new liberalism was hardly the 
only economic ideology in play after 1945 and makes the point that the 
technocrats of the post-war UK were not mainly, or even mostly, liberals 
or social democrats. Many were pursuing a conservative vision of British 
modernity. One needs to think only of the aeronautical engineers and the 
aircraft industry to establish the point, though it applies very much more 
broadly.77 For example, what was social democratic about the experts 
promoting motorways and motorisation?78
Thatcher’s economy – another view
In this light it is significant and odd that British nationalism barely exists 
in the lexicon of British politics, except in relation to two important cases, 
Enoch Powell and Margaret Thatcher. But, as well as being nationalists, 
they were economic liberals who generally disdained economic 
nationalism. Powell certainly recognised British economic nationalism 
and its characteristic forms (for example the obsession with the balance 
of payments, and declinism). The Thatcher governments dismantled the 
remaining apparatus of economic nationalism, from the abolition of 
exchange controls to the promotion of the single market and myriad other 
initiatives, for example the welcoming of Japanese carmakers into the 
UK. The balance of payments, which went into historically massive 
deficits, not least in manufactures, was no longer a cause for concern. 
It ceased to be contentious to import coal. All this was hardly accidental.
Of course, the economic opening to the world was not the only 
aspect of Thatcherism, but it was decisive and sustained. However, 
Thatcherism also represented a rulers’ revolt, a radical strengthening of 
the power of wealth, and the wealth of the powerful, and a new economic 
form where, for example, privatised infrastructure was a means of 
extracting profit on an unprecedented scale. As Brett Christophers shows, 
a new form of rentier capitalism of huge scope has emerged.79 Not for 
nothing did Denis Healey call Thatcher ‘la Pasionaria of privilege’.80 
Understanding the importance of the opening up to the world, and the 
new politics of property, helps make clear what Thatcherism was not. 
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Thatcherism did not transform the rate of growth of the British economy, 
nor did it unleash a radical new British entrepreneurialism, or indeed 
consumer sovereignty in a national market.81
Paradoxically the move to economic internationalism was made 
possible by previous state investment, by the success of the state, not by 
its failure. Thatcher inherited, uniquely in modern British history, a 
nation self-sufficient in food, an exporter of wheat and meat (a point not 
noted in social democratic or left histories). She also inherited a nation 
which was about to become, for the first time since 1939, a net exporter 
of energy. This epochal post-war transformation has barely registered 
in political discourse or the history books.82 The implications were 
extraordinary: the UK no longer needed to be a net exporter of 
manufactures. The post-war national reconstruction programme was 
crucial to Thatcher for a second reason. There was a mass of modern 
public capital that had not been there in 1950, or 1960, or even 1970. As 
well as the cases mentioned above, council houses, in their millions, now 
existed, ready to be sold in unprecedented quantities. Furthermore, the 
devastations to the productive economy caused by government policy 
were only sustainable because the government inherited a newly 
comprehensive and, by historical British standards, generous welfare 
state created in the 1970s. There was an extensive safety net onto which 
many millions could and did fall. The official number of unemployed rose 
to more than three million and stayed at that level for years. The number 
of people on invalidity and sickness benefit doubled between 1980 and 
1993, to two million people.83
Conclusion
That the Second World War or the late 1940s inaugurated Keynesianism 
and the welfare state and was therefore social democratic, and that this 
was superseded by a neoliberal era which was non- or even anti-
Keynesian and which rolled back the welfare state, is a commonplace in 
British historiography. It rests on shaky foundations and is the result of, 
and has resulted in, an underpowered analysis of post-war history. 
Keynesianism, the welfare state and social democracy did exist, but 
not in ways or at times which justify any or all of them standing for 
the whole political-economic-social system. The conventional under- 
standing of neoliberalism as the successor to this badly articulated 
social democracy is similarly limited and limiting, and the term probably 
should not be used at all.
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Keynesianism, welfare state social democracy and neoliberalism are 
hardly the only keywords of modern British historiography which should 
be challenged. ‘New liberalism’, ‘the people’s budget’, ‘the war to end war’, 
‘appeasement’, ‘Britain alone’, ‘people’s war’, ‘consensus’, ‘post-war 
settlement’, ‘affluence’, ‘stop-go’, ‘decline’, ‘Thatcherism’, ‘monetarism’ 
and, indeed, ‘empire’ are similarly open to challenge. They embody very 
particular analytical frames, but these are difficult to see because they are 
seen as British history itself. That is why there is a notable lack of debate 
between interpretations – where such debates have occurred they have 
largely been skirmishes over particular cases. One reason is that 
historiography overemphasises what has been visible in the public sphere 
and to the centre left.84 While there are serious interpretative works on 
twentieth-century Britain which take distinct views, they are not the 
subject of extended debate as to their conclusions or their merits and are 
barely known to curricula.85 They deserve to be. For the idea that the post-
war UK was Keynesian and a welfare state is very much the product of 
historians’ imaginations; so too is the notion that it should be described 
as social democratic, and indeed that it should not.
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Intellectual histories of  
neoliberalism and their limits
Ben Jackson*
Writing in 1989, Maurice Cowling penned a memorable account of the 
‘sources of the New Right’ in British politics since the Second World War. 
A participant in some of the circles that he delineated, Cowling sketched a 
vivid portrait of the small group of intellectuals, politicians and activists 
who, he said, had been instrumental in rallying Conservative opinion to 
mount a concerted counter-offensive against the ‘liberal collectivism’ 
established in 1940. This ‘New Right’ constituted ‘about 50 people’ in total 
‘(mainly graduates, and mostly men)’, and had ‘five faces’: the revivalist 
market liberal economists centred around the Institute of Economic Affairs 
(IEA); the opponents of progressive education, comprehensive schools 
and university radicalism who coalesced around the publication of the 
Black Papers; the intellectuals and MPs who supported Enoch Powell and 
then Margaret Thatcher (including by founding the think tank the Centre 
for Policy Studies [CPS]); the small group of Conservative academics 
(including Cowling himself) who were associated particularly with the 
London School of Economics, Peterhouse, Cambridge and the journal The 
Salisbury Review; and, finally, the intellectually inclined journalists who 
promulgated New Right opinion across the national British press in the 
1970s and 1980s, particularly in The Telegraph but also in The Times and 
most other influential British newspapers of the period.1 Cowling 
recognised that there were severe limits to the impact of such intellectual 
endeavours on political and social life, but he nonetheless insisted that 
even the seemingly pragmatic Conservative Party required ‘reserves of 
belief which can be called up without having to be created on each 
particular occasion’. Fostering such ‘reserves of belief’, argued Cowling, 
had been the important accomplishment of the New Right.2
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The term ‘neoliberalism’ had not yet come into widespread use at the 
time Cowling wrote, but there is considerable overlap between Cowling’s 
enthusiastic reconstruction of the intellectual roots of his New Right and 
the many accounts of late modern British history that ascribe significant 
causal weight to neoliberal ideology. Like Cowling, some of the most 
influential works on Britain after the 1970s have stressed the importance 
of a variety of academics, journalists, think tanks and freelance activists in 
generating the distinctive policy agenda that has dominated British politics 
since then. The most un-Cowling-like figures Andrew Gamble and Stuart 
Hall pioneered in the pages of Marxism Today and later academic 
publications a fecund analysis of Thatcherism as a distinctively ideological 
project that sought to refashion public policy and political discourse in a 
style that would be more favourable to the interests of the Conservative 
Party. Whereas Cowling himself said little about the wider international 
context of this turn towards a more muscular form of Conservatism, 
Gamble and Hall conceptualised Thatcherism as the local embodiment of 
a global ideological counter-offensive by market liberals.3 This line of 
argument dovetails with the work undertaken more recently by intellectual 
historians, which has documented in detail the creation of an influential 
body of economic and political theory by the ‘neoliberal thought collective’ 
organised around the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), the international 
discussion group founded by Friedrich Hayek in 1947 to revive market 
liberalism.4
Scepticism about intellectual history
In spite of this widespread interest in the ideology of neoliberalism, other 
historians have nonetheless expressed reservations about how influential 
such ideas really were.5 This is particularly the case in the field of modern 
British history, where two different strands of the burgeoning scholarship 
on the late twentieth century have created a pincer movement against this 
preoccupation with the intellectual roots of Thatcherism.6 One strand 
originates in the field of political history and offers a high political account 
of the 1980s that is doubtful about the extent to which senior politicians 
and civil servants meaningfully engaged with the New Right intelligentsia 
identified by Cowling. Perhaps the most important variant of this 
argument has been elaborated by Richard Vinen. Among other things, 
Vinen has argued that historians and political scientists have paid 
disproportionate attention to think tanks and intellectuals compared with 
the more consequential role played by government ministers and civil 
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servants. These latter figures, Vinen argues, were more obviously central 
to government decision-making than the obscure scribblers emphasised 
by commentators fascinated by ideas.7 Yet in a curious twist, this inter- 
pretation of Thatcherism is itself somewhat Cowlingite in flavour, as it 
asserts the autonomy of the ‘high political’ domain at the expense of a 
wider analysis of economic, social and intellectual forces, a point that 
Cowling himself had famously used as a guiding principle when writing 
his histories of modern British politics.8 Indeed, Cowling had raised 
precisely this point in his article on the New Right:
Until enough of the archives are open, including the private archives 
of politicians, it will be difficult to know how Mrs Thatcher 
succeeded after 1979 in effecting changes which Mr Heath had 
promised in 1966 but had failed to deliver in office. It may well 
turn out that the existence of an independent intelligentsia was 
unimportant, and that what mattered was the opinions of civil 
servants and of the political heavyweights – Mr Nigel Lawson, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, Lord Joseph and, pre-eminently, Mrs Thatcher 
herself – after the acquiescence of the last three under Mr Heath.9
While this strand of political history has sought to minimise the 
importance of ideological argument to the politics of Thatcherism, a 
second strand of scholarship has striven to downplay the significance of 
party politics and state decision-making altogether. Social and economic 
historians have aimed to ‘decentre’ the 1980s and 1990s by focusing on 
larger economic, social and discursive changes that they argue are of 
more fundamental causal significance than the neoliberal ideology 
given star billing in many of the standard histories of the late twentieth 
century.10 One important economic claim that has been pressed in the 
literature on the global rise of neoliberalism is that material changes in 
capitalist production and class interests should bear the bulk of the 
explanatory weight in accounting for the neoliberal trend in public policy 
after the 1970s.11 With respect to Britain, a powerful version of this wider 
interpretation has been made by Aled Davies, who has shown that the 
changing structure of the financial sector in the 1960s and 1970s – with 
the growth of institutional investors, a liberalisation of the banking sector 
and the rise of unregulated global capital markets in London – undermined 
key elements of the post-war economic model and facilitated a shift in 
economic policy in a neoliberal direction.12
A more radical strand of economic analysis denies not just that 
ideology was important in the rise of neoliberalism but that ‘neoliberalism’ 
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itself is an overrated category for conceptualising economic change in the 
late twentieth century. Jim Tomlinson, for example, has drawn attention 
to the importance of the economics of deindustrialisation in this 
period – a process that he sees as largely independent of the actions of 
particular governments and which (he argues) produced much of 
the social and economic tumult usually attributed to the Thatcher 
government and ‘neoliberalism’.13 Similarly, David Edgerton has argued 
that economic change in modern British history is best described as a 
transition from a mid-twentieth-century nationalist and industrial model 
of the economy to an internationalist, service-sector economy that 
emerged under the Thatcher government after the state became self-
sufficient in food and energy and was therefore much less dependent on 
earnings from manufacturing exports.14
This economic analysis can be placed alongside the work of social 
historians who have detailed the decline of social deference in the post-
war period. Historians such as Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite and Jon 
Lawrence have argued that the 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of a 
new egalitarian spirit centred around the idea of ‘ordinariness’, which 
rejected established class hierarchies and prioritised individual autonomy 
and authenticity. This new social morality formed the context for 
Thatcherism, in that the individualism promoted by those governments 
was one way of formulating a political project that could appeal to these 
deeply rooted popular sentiments, but from this perspective Thatcherism 
and neoliberalism look much more like a product of this underlying social 
change rather than the cause of it.15 Like the economic histories, the new 
social histories of this period detect more deep-rooted, long-range trends 
that lie beneath the dramatic political events of the 1980s and suggest 
that a preoccupation with the personalities, policies and ideology of the 
Thatcher government obscures these more fundamental changes in 
Britain and around the world in the late twentieth century.
These are all salutary and important points, which deserve serious 
consideration in any historical account of this period. However, in this 
chapter I want to respond to this scholarship by reformulating the 
importance of intellectual history to our understanding of Britain after 
the 1970s. But I want to do so in a way that steers the debate away 
from the more exuberantly idealist accounts of the 1980s towards a more 
constrained account of how the history of ideas can complement the 
important insights that we can glean from the study of high politics, the 
economy and social change.16 Scepticism about the social significance of 
ideas is of course a perennial theme in historical study that has generated 
in turn many compelling and ingenious answers from historians of a more 
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idealist bent.17 But one of the difficulties with resolving our specific 
question of whether neoliberal ideology should be seen as causally 
significant is that critics of the importance of ideas sometimes mis- 
understand what intellectual historians see as the distinctive contribution 
of their approach. In fact, there are a variety of ways in which ideas matter 
to the political life of modern societies and it is only by enumerating them, 
and distinguishing between them, that we can make progress in identifying 
the contribution of the history of ideas to the study of late twentieth-
century Britain. In order to gauge the limits of intellectual history for our 
period, it is first necessary to make a reckoning with what precisely the 
study of neoliberal ideas can tell us.
The historiography of neoliberalism
One preliminary point to stress is that the most recent wave of scholarship 
on the intellectual history of neoliberalism is precisely trying to avoid a 
charge of gross idealism by integrating the study of ideas with a more 
sociological account of the networks that mobilised behind neoliberal 
ideas and of the social functions performed by intellectuals and think 
tanks across a variety of national contexts in the post-war period. The 
pioneering research on the MPS, and on the rise of neoliberalism in the US 
and Europe, has been distinguished from earlier work on this topic 
precisely because it has identified neoliberalism as a movement of ideas 
that publicised its ideology through a specific set of institutions that 
mobilised both intellectual and material resources in order to reshape elite 
opinion. This analysis of what Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe have 
dubbed ‘the neoliberal thought collective’ uses the tools of social research 
to track the network of intellectuals who founded the MPS. It is significant 
that Mirowski and Plehwe adopted the term ‘thought collective’ from the 
sociology of science. Following Ludwig Fleck, a ‘thought collective’ refers 
to a community of thinkers who develop a shared set of ideas as a result of 
repeated intellectual interaction – highlighting that intellectual production 
is a collective enterprise that unfolds through social networks rather than 
in the solitary minds of great thinkers.18 The ‘thought collective’ that 
coalesced around the MPS drew on the material resources of like-minded 
figures in the business world to construct a global alliance of think tanks 
and advocacy organisations whose role was to promote the neoliberal 
policy prospectus to elites around the world.19
This was a strategy that drew on Hayek’s diagnosis of political 
change in his 1949 essay ‘The intellectuals and socialism’. Hayek argued 
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that changes in intellectual fashion were politically consequential because 
the boundaries of what is considered to be feasible in public policy were 
defined by a group of public intellectuals – journalists, novelists, certain 
academics, technical experts of various kinds – who broadcast to a wider 
audience their own perception of what were the most valid political and 
economic theories (without necessarily themselves having the expertise 
to adjudicate on this question). In Hayek’s view, the success of socialism 
was explained by the widespread adoption of socialist ideas and attitudes 
by these ‘second-hand dealers in ideas’ over the course of the first half of 
the twentieth century. The neoliberal strategy, as it developed over the 
1950s and 1960s, was therefore to counteract the intellectual growth of 
socialism by broadcasting market liberal ideas to elites (and to a lesser 
extent the public) through new public policy organisations – think tanks – 
that sat at the interface between academic knowledge and political debate 
and in effect contested the status of the left-leaning social sciences that 
had made such headway in the public sphere in the decades after the 
Second World War.20 Such a project required considerable financial 
investment and assiduous political networking, both of which the ‘thought 
collective’ was able to build up over the course of the 1960s and 1970s.
The argument for the importance of neoliberal ideas is therefore a 
much more nuanced one than is sometimes supposed, insofar as it rests 
on this wider analysis of the social context of the generation of political 
ideas. In effect, the claim of intellectual historians is not that ideas were 
in and of themselves causally significant, but rather that ideas served as 
a key element in the neoliberal right’s political strategy and succeeded in 
gaining a wide social purchase because they were effectively marketed 
by well-funded and highly strategic policy entrepreneurs. This was a 
transnational process and, in the case of Britain, there is a sense in which 
this represents an Americanisation of British political debate, since the 
most prestigious neoliberal figures and ideas tended to be transferred to 
Britain after being germinated in the US.21
A second preliminary point is that this new intellectual history has 
also stressed the internal diversity of neoliberalism. Neoliberal thought 
was the product of intellectual collaboration across national boundaries, 
but it also comprised several distinct strands of argument that reflected 
these diverse national origins and were at times in tension with one 
another. Austrian economists such as Hayek, for example, elaborated a 
strong form of economic individualism and a priori reasoning that was 
highly sceptical of the use of economic statistics or even the pursuit of 
macroeconomic policy by the state, both of which were key features of the 
work of the ‘Chicago School’ of economics associated with figures such as 
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Milton Friedman. Meanwhile, the ‘ordo-liberal’ tradition developed in 
Germany by economists such as Walter Eucken and Wilhelm Röpke 
incorporated a powerful role for the state in maintaining market freedom, 
for example by enforcing strong anti-monopoly policies, precisely the 
point that economists from Chicago such as George Stigler sought to 
contest in post-war policy debates in the US.22 Other important strands of 
neoliberalism have also been identified. Quinn Slobodian, for example, 
has drawn attention to what he has called the ‘Geneva School’, which 
overlaps in membership with some of the groups mentioned earlier, 
but which focused on problems of global rather than domestic economic 
order. Slobodian has demonstrated that an important strand of 
neoliberalism has sought to ‘encase’ markets in institutions of global 
economic governance that would prevent sovereign states from disrupting 
private property rights and market transactions.23 Likewise, the ‘Virginia 
School’ associated with James Buchanan, which focused on public choice 
theory and the economic analysis of political institutions, has recently 
become the subject of considerable debate.24 At one level, this internal 
ideological diversity makes the story of neoliberalism’s influence 
much more complex, since it is necessary to dig more deeply into the 
precise ideological connotations of particular arguments and policies and 
to be aware of the extent to which there was no straightforwardly 
homogeneous ‘neoliberalism’. Neoliberalism was in any case a distinctive 
kind of ideology, which (as we have seen) was created not as part of a 
social movement, but initially as an elite-led effort to fight back against 
the ideological success of the left. Neoliberals were therefore at first 
detached from existing political factions – and to enter public debate in 
an influential way, they had to synthesise their ideas with pre-existing 
ideological traditions. This process meant that different currents of 
neoliberalism became available in public debate in Britain and elsewhere 
as liberals, conservatives and even socialists absorbed aspects of 
neoliberal theory into their political thought.25
Amid this dizzying array of differing forms of neoliberalism, 
however, it is also important to remember that neoliberal theorists 
and their political allies shared a lot in common as well, not least in 
the opponents that they saw themselves as arrayed against: the social 
democratic state bureaucracy, trade unions, the Soviet bloc, post-colonial 
movements and left-wing intellectuals and experts. One way of reconciling 
this mix of commonality and diversity within neoliberal ideology is to 
think of it as an alliance between different intellectual tendencies that 
were concerned about the various ways in which, over the course of the 
twentieth century, popular politics had eroded the liberating and efficient 
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powers of the market. Neoliberals were therefore, as William Davies has 
put it, ultimately pursuing ‘the disenchantment of politics by economics’ 
in order to ‘replace political judgement with economic evaluation’, a 
project that was ultimately capable of a variety of theorisations and 
practical instantiations.26
Varieties of intellectual influence
The nature of neoliberalism and its influence is therefore far from a 
straightforward issue. In the rest of the chapter I will seek to navigate this 
complexity by developing a working typology that distinguishes between 
four different ways in which historians of this period can usefully engage 
with the history of neoliberal thought when telling the story of Britain in 
the late twentieth century. Firstly, and minimally, the study of ideology is 
itself one important way of documenting wider social and economic 
changes. The intellectual output of writers, thinkers, politicians and 
activists forms a substantial body of source material for understanding 
how contending elites in a society understood the times in which they 
lived and the fundamental political ideals that they sought to pursue to 
reform and improve that society. Such texts can also offer the clearest and 
most systematic exposition of debates that otherwise remain implicit or 
inchoate in popular discourse. From this perspective, the palpable growth 
of advocacy for neoliberalism during the 1970s and 1980s is itself a 
signifier of the way in which market economics emerged as a challenger 
to the model of the British state that evolved in the mid-twentieth century. 
Without making any claim about wider political influence, such source 
material simply offers the historian a means of accessing the most detailed 
statements of the ways in which unvarnished capitalism began to shift 
from an old-fashioned worldview to an appealing option for the future. 
For example, leading advocates of neoliberalism in Britain, such as Arthur 
Seldon, the Editorial Director of the IEA, believed that the lived experience 
of post-war capitalism was fundamentally at odds with the top-down 
logic of the social democratic state because it gave individuals the capacity 
to make choices for themselves, as consumers, rather than simply 
accepting what they were given by state-run services. The British people, 
Seldon argued in 1966, now enjoyed much greater ‘freedom of choice for 
their food and drinks, their clothes, their furniture and household 
equipment’. Since the average man and woman were now ‘treated like 
lords and ladies at the grocer’s, the hairdresser’s and on the plane to their 
fortnight in Spain’, it was unlikely that they will ‘tolerate much longer 
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being treated as servile, cap-in-hand supplicants in the local state school, 
the doctor’s surgery, the hospital’. Hostility to the paternalism of state-
provided welfare, Seldon concluded, would therefore increase as incomes 
rose.27 The attractions of market-based forms of freedom – and their 
presumed appeal to certain electoral groups – can therefore in part be 
documented through an investigation of the way they were expressed in 
public debate.
Secondly, some of the scepticism about the importance of ideas 
noted earlier neglects the extent to which the capacity to engage in 
argument about public policy depends on fundamental conceptual 
innovations among technical specialists that in turn provide the very 
categories that structure that debate. When new political agendas are 
formulated, as they were in the 1970s and 1980s, whether they are 
pushed to the forefront of policymaking by material pressures or by high 
political manoeuvres, they nonetheless require intellectual content with 
sufficient technocratic authority to make the proposed policies appear 
credible to financial markets, civil servants, the media and (to a lesser 
extent) the public. They therefore must draw on the specialised language 
developed by professional intellectuals of various sorts, whether located 
in think tanks, academia or the higher echelons of the media. This is a 
particularly acute need in the case of economic policy, where a workable 
governing economic strategy requires a level of technical detail that can 
only be provided by specialists in the field. Professional economists are 
therefore the principal group of intellectuals who, from the mid-twentieth 
century onwards, have been able to act as the authoritative interpreters 
of a body of knowledge that has a direct relationship with policymaking. 
The precise influence of academic economics on economic policymaking 
is of course a complex one, but my specific focus here is on the way in 
which changes at a broad level in economic theory reshape public policy.28 
My argument is not at this stage the more fine-grained one that specific 
ideas shape specific policy proposals, rather it is that deep conceptual 
shifts open up new spaces in political argument.
A useful illustration of this point is the well-ventilated debate about 
monetarism. The history of neoliberalism is inextricably bound up with 
the history of new ideas about macroeconomic management, especially 
the rise of monetarism as an alternative to what is sometimes rather 
crudely referred to as ‘Keynesianism’. As Jim Bulpitt pointed out many 
years ago, monetarism proved politically useful for the Conservative 
Party because it prescribed a new form of counter-inflationary statecraft 
that departed from a reliance on negotiating wage increases with trade 
unions (a practice that was widely believed to disadvantage the 
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Conservative Party electorally in the 1970s).29 In essence, Bulpitt 
identified the high political rationale for economic policy change that has 
been widely discussed by historians and political scientists ever since.30 
But while it is correct to note that monetarism became politically useful 
to the Conservative Party for this reason, this does not mean that a more 
idealist account of monetarism is irrelevant to a historical explanation of 
its rise. As we have seen, the technocratic character of economic policy is 
such that it is not possible simply to adopt any economic idea as state 
policy unless it carries with it a degree of scientific authority, as perceived 
by government and central bank officials, financial markets and economic 
commentators. Any story about why monetarism emerged as a policy 
option in Britain in the 1970s – whether relating to the condition of the 
British economy, party interest, the role of financial markets and so on – 
therefore must start by acknowledging that the concept of something 
called ‘monetarism’ existed because it had been constructed in the 
first place by a number of technically qualified economists, notably 
Milton Friedman, who popularised the term and set out a range of 
arguments for it.
In particular, it seems clear that Friedman’s famous 1967 presidential 
address to the American Economic Association, ‘The role of monetary 
policy’, had an important international agenda-setting impact in high- 
lighting the case he (and others) had made in hitherto specialised 
publications that there was no long-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment since workers come to expect price rises and to demand 
that their wages keep pace with inflation. While there is a considerable 
debate about the theoretical originality of this lecture (or its lack of it), 
and its subsequent reception among economists, Friedman’s address was 
nonetheless widely perceived by policymakers and in elite public debate 
in the 1970s as signifying an important shift in economic opinion.31 The 
continued application of inflationary stimulus, Friedman was understood 
to have argued, cannot push unemployment below its ‘natural’ rate. 
Instead, Friedman popularised the adoption of monetary rules to control 
inflation and to focus government policy on ensuring monetary stability 
rather than lowering unemployment.32 The complexities of implementing 
this theoretical design were formidable and caused enormous problems 
for the Thatcher government in practice,33 but the point nonetheless 
stands that intellectual history is a necessary ingredient of this larger 
historical story because it enables us to identify the precise concepts and 
theories that were then taken up in policy debate, and to track how these 
concepts and theories provided political actors with new languages with 
which to legitimise their actions. Intellectual history is therefore in part 
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about a stage a few steps removed from the exigencies of political 
decision-making insofar as it reconstructs the formation of the broad 
conceptual space in which that decision-making takes place.
A third way in which ideas are salient to historical explanation is 
that it is only through language that social change can itself be interpreted. 
That is to say, the study of ideas is not only, as I suggested earlier, a means 
by which underlying social change can be registered, it is also a way to 
understand how historical actors imprinted a particular meaning on this 
social change and constructed compelling narratives about the political 
action necessary to rectify the problems they diagnosed. In one sense, this 
is to agree with much of the neo-Cowlingite picture painted by historians 
such as Richard Vinen, which focuses on the capacity of leading 
politicians, not least Margaret Thatcher herself, to use rhetoric as an 
effective weapon in the struggle for power. A ‘high politics’ analysis of 
Thatcherism is an ally of the intellectual history of this period insofar as 
both approaches agree that focusing purely on shifting economic interests 
or exogenous social change cannot offer a full account. This is because 
both political and intellectual historians follow the linguistic turn insofar 
as they see interests as only legible to historical actors through a process 
of conceptualisation and interpretation that necessarily relies on ideas 
(an insight that has of course also been recognised by social historians 
ever since the early debates about the linguistic turn in the 1980s).34 In 
the case of political history, more emphasis is placed on the way in which 
leading political figures construct coalitions of support and frame policy 
debates through careful use of public speech.35 For intellectual historians, 
the focus falls more on the fine-grained analysis of the writings of 
professional ideologists, whether formally employed as academics, 
journalists, policy experts or even politicians. But there is no reason to see 
these two approaches as contradictory, as some political historians seem 
to suggest in the case of Thatcherism. We might instead see them as 
complementary, in part because politicians inevitably draw on and render 
in more demotic form the language first set out at a more abstract level in 
specialised books and periodicals, and in part because the intellectuals 
also take their lead from the politicians and develop new arguments that 
extend and reinforce the positioning first laid out in a more popular form 
in political speeches.
To give one example of the former process, in the late 1960s 
Enoch Powell made a robust public case for market liberalism (and 
nationalism) that drew on a close acquaintance with neoliberal political 
and economic theory (Powell was a long-standing MPS member). Powell 
was an important forerunner of elements of Thatcherism, though he was 
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markedly less successful than Keith Joseph or Thatcher in framing public 
debate in Britain in neoliberal terms – in part because he spoke as an 
outsider, lacking the authority of a leading figure in a party aspiring to 
form a government, and in part because the economic context – only a 
few years into a new Labour administration – could not yet be as 
persuasively portrayed as a systematic crisis as it could be in the 
later 1970s.36
Keith Joseph played a more significant role as an outrider for what 
became Thatcherism in the 1970s, initially making a series of important 
speeches in 1974 that set out an early version of what became the 
Thatcherite analysis of Britain’s decline during the post-war period. 
These speeches were written in collaboration with his adviser, Alfred 
Sherman, as well as with the input of sympathetic economists and 
journalists such as Alan Walters and Samuel Brittan.37 All of these figures 
had close connections to the alternative intellectual infrastructure 
developed by neoliberals over the 1960s and 1970s – Walters, for 
example, was a member of the MPS (and later an adviser to Margaret 
Thatcher in government), and Brittan had been deploying the ideas of 
figures such as Hayek and Friedman in his journalism in the Financial 
Times throughout the 1970s.38 Joseph’s speeches were punctuated by 
references to IEA pamphlets and works by economists associated with the 
MPS, forming an overall analysis that clearly owed a great deal to the 
political and economic theory of neoliberalism. As Joseph himself wrote 
to Ralph Harris at the IEA during his summer holiday in the middle of 
writing and delivering these speeches: ‘I’m steeping myself in Hayek – 
and am ashamed not to have read the great Constitution of Liberty long 
ago.’ He also reported that he was reading Friedman’s IEA pamphlet, 
Monetary Correction, and various other IEA pamphlets he had taken with 
him.39 The central argument of Joseph’s speeches was that Britain’s 
economic turbulence in the 1970s – or Britain’s ‘decline’, as Joseph would 
have seen it – was the product of systemic flaws in the economic and 
social policy of the British state, flaws which he diagnosed as related to a 
failure to exercise appropriate control over inflation via monetary policy 
and the expansion of government activity into the economy in a way that 
had distorted market price signals and incentives.40 Similar points about 
the artful use of political language to construct a particular interpretation 
of the economic crisis of the 1970s have also been made by Robert 
Saunders in relation to the speeches of Margaret Thatcher and by Colin 
Hay with respect to the popular press.41 James Freeman’s chapter in this 
book gives several other important examples of the way in which 
Conservative politicians such as Thatcher and Joseph ‘interfaced’ with 
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neoliberal (as well as neoconservative) ideas in their speechwriting 
through contact with figures such as Sherman, and William and Shirley 
Letwin (who were both former students of Hayek), and through their own 
reading. Given the numerous interconnections that can be documented 
between the realm of more abstract intellectual argument and political 
speech, it therefore seems more fruitful to treat these approaches to the 
analysis of political language as complementary rather than antagonistic.
A fourth way in which ideas influence political outcomes is a much 
narrower one: when it can be demonstrated that specific policy 
innovations or decisions drew on ideas that were initially elaborated by 
think tanks or political writers. This is often the hardest category to 
document and is perhaps the form of influence that sceptics of intellectual 
history have in mind when they suggest that ideological accounts of 
Thatcherism are overblown. It is certainly important to be cautious when 
making claims about the specific influence of intellectuals on decision-
making which occurs amid the extraordinary pressures that face 
governments, when politicians and their advisers and officials daily face 
new headwinds that buffet them off course. Yet even here there are 
examples of neoliberal ideas being deployed directly by politicians and 
their advisers in state policymaking, examples which usually demonstrate 
the important mediating role played by think tanks in connecting the 
ideological domain with practical policymaking. The reason that ideology 
enters the decision-making equation at this high political level is precisely 
because of the pressures and complexity of state policy formation: amid 
this tumult it is necessary to have a ‘heuristic’ that can guide political 
action in an agreed strategic direction without having to litigate that 
overall strategy on each occasion.42 In the case of the Thatcher 
governments, such a rough rule of thumb was often related to the desire 
to increase consumer choice, widen asset ownership and increase market 
competition. In practice, this ideological orientation was not always 
successful, but it does provide an important insight into how decisions 
were taken by the Conservatives in power. Several examples of this have 
been documented in the literature on Thatcherism.
Matthew Francis, for example, has shown that the precise form 
taken by the Thatcher government’s privatisation policies reflected an 
ideological preference for widening private property ownership that went 
beyond traditional Conservative statecraft or economic necessity to reveal 
a Conservatism that had been deeply influenced by neoliberalism. Each 
of the privatisations was designed to offer preferential access to ownership 
to ‘ordinary’ individuals, whether through employee share ownership, 
priority for small investors or significant discounts on the purchase of 
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council houses (often in the face of objections from the Treasury, on the 
grounds that this approach would not maximise government revenue). 
These choices in policy design reflected an extended discussion within 
the Conservative Party from the 1970s about the relationship between 
democracy and ownership and a marked shift in the thinking of key 
Conservatives towards the neoliberal argument that the wider personal 
choice facilitated by private property ownership represented a deeper 
form of democratic control than voting or political participation.43
Charles Lockwood has identified a second example: the introduction 
of compulsory competitive tendering for local government services. 
This idea was pushed up the political agenda by the Adam Smith Institute 
(ASI) in 1980, in a pamphlet authored by the future Conservative MP 
Michael Forsyth (who at that time was a councillor on Westminster City 
Council). Drawing on the public choice theory of MPS member Gordon 
Tullock, Forsyth argued that introducing competitive tendering for core 
functions of local government would serve as a way to introduce market 
competition into council services while avoiding the full-scale political 
row that would ensue if services were straightforwardly privatised. 
Thatcher’s Policy Unit ordered 20,000 copies of the pamphlet to circulate 
to Conservative local authorities. The scope of compulsory competitive 
tendering was increased over time by the Conservatives in government 
from 1980 onwards, with certain Conservative councils acting as pioneers 
who would go much further than the legislative requirements laid down 
by central government.44
A third example, which I have discussed elsewhere, was the Major 
government’s introduction of vouchers for nursery education in 1995. 
The decision to create a voucher system for nurseries was a straightforward 
reflection of the wider debate among Conservative intellectuals and think 
tanks about the importance of introducing a market for childcare services 
in Britain rather than a universal taxpayer-funded system. Pamphlets by 
the CPS and the ASI had made this point in the run-up to the government’s 
pivot towards offering greater financial support for working parents. The 
author of the ASI pamphlet, David Soskin, ran a chain of private nurseries, 
and shortly after writing the report for the ASI he went to work in the 
Number 10 Policy Unit for John Major, thus providing a particularly clear 
example of the way in which neoliberal think tanks mobilised social 
networks and ideas in a politically effective way.45
A fourth, more ambiguous, example, uncovered by Aled Davies, 
James Freeman and Hugh Pemberton, concerns the important role played 
by the CPS in the Thatcher government’s pension policy. Figures 
associated with the CPS and the wider neoliberal policy community, such 
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as Nigel Vinson and Philip Chappell, made considerable headway in 
internal government debates by arguing for a radical extension 
of personal responsibility into pensions. Rather than accepting the 
collective and institutional character of pension funds that had developed 
by the 1980s, they argued that the Thatcher government should seek 
to introduce individualised pension funds that were owned and managed 
by individual workers themselves. This proposal was not in fact 
implemented in full, in part because of internal opposition within 
government but also because of the severe practical difficulties that 
emerged in putting such a radical vision into practice. However, as Davies, 
Freeman and Pemberton have shown, the pension reforms enacted by the 
Thatcher government did take up ideas of individual choice derived from 
neoliberal theory. Rather than the initial idea of creating a nation of 
individual investors, a new vision emerged of a pension system that 
furnished consumers with the freedom to choose between different 
pension providers. As Davies, Freeman and Pemberton put it, Thatcherism 
emerges from this case study as a ‘pathway through the diverse array of 
neoliberal ideas’, a political project that evolved in the making as it drew 
on certain strands of neoliberalism and traditional British Conservatism 
to overcome both internal ideological tensions and practical obstacles.46
The limits of neoliberalism
The case for the importance of neoliberal ideas in shaping the political 
trajectory of Britain since the 1970s is therefore a strong one, but (as the 
example of pensions policy shows) it is crucial to qualify this statement by 
recognising that the influence of neoliberalism was also a limited one, 
which should not be used straightforwardly to capture the entirety of 
British historical experience between the 1970s and today. Firstly, 
intellectual history by its nature tends to focus on the elaboration of ideas 
among elites, so this approach has tended to pay less attention to the way 
in which neoliberal ideas circulated among the wider public.47 Public 
opinion research certainly gives good reason to think that some key 
neoliberal tenets were not in fact widely accepted by the electorate.48 The 
work of social historians who have drawn on social surveys has likewise 
suggested that ‘popular individualism’ in Britain was not the same as 
Thatcherite individualism but rather provided a social context that 
Thatcherites were able to tap into rhetorically without always accurately 
representing it.49 Secondly, neoliberalism was not the only influential 
ideology in public life in the late twentieth century. A full account of the 
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period would have to consider how other politically powerful ideas made 
a social impact (and interacted with neoliberalism). Foremost among 
these other ideas would undoubtedly be feminism, multiculturalism, 
nationalism (British, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, English) and the more general 
rise of human rights in political and legal discourse.50 With respect to 
economic policy, the rise of New Keynesianism, which sought to retrieve 
insights from Keynes in the wake of the monetarist counter-offensive, also 
furnished political debate on the centre left during the 1990s with an 
influential and distinctive set of economic ideas.51 All of these bodies of 
thought were in some respects in tension with neoliberalism and pushed 
public life in directions that neoliberals were highly critical of but found 
themselves unable to stop. Thirdly, while ideas help historical actors to 
conceptualise and direct social change, there are always structural limits 
to political action set by the economic, demographic and institutional 
context. The extent, and political implications, of ‘deindustrialisation’ 
were malleable to some extent, for example, but as a broad economic 
wave it undoubtedly swept over Britain just as it did all other advanced 
industrialised states in the late twentieth century. However, it did matter 
that in the British case key state decisions were taken by a government 
that had become convinced that it was less important to worry about the 
distribution of economic prosperity and security between social classes 
than to foster individual economic responsibility and improve the 
incentives for wealth creation, which is where neoliberalism enters the 
story once again, as the key ideological influence on this distinctive 
orientation of the Thatcher government.52
All of this suggests that the preoccupation in some of the 
historiography on Britain after the 1970s with an apparent contrast 
between neoliberal ideas and political or economic interests is too 
abstract. As Andrew Gamble has observed, it is a mistake to think about 
ideas ‘as some prime mover opposed to interests’ since ‘no context can be 
understood apart from the ideas that are constitutive of it’.53 The most 
promising avenue of enquiry for historians is therefore to focus more 
closely on the way in which ideas (including, but not only, neoliberal 
ones) interact with particular social and economic contexts rather than 
seeking to prioritise one over the other.
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Part i
Welfare State and Social Policy

4
Welfare in a neoliberal age:  
the politics of redistributive  
market liberalism
Peter Sloman
In spring 1947, Milton Friedman made his first trip outside the US to speak 
at a gathering of free-market intellectuals in the Swiss resort of Mont 
Pèlerin.1 Friedman took with him a paper on ‘Taxation, poverty and income 
distribution’, which he presented to the conference on Tuesday 8 April and 
which proposed that Western governments should attempt to tackle 
poverty through a Negative Income Tax (NIT) programme. Friedman 
pointed out that the growth of state intervention and trade unionism over 
the previous half-century had largely been driven by the ‘desire to eliminate 
poverty’ and economic insecurity. If the liberals gathered at Mont Pèlerin 
wanted to ‘break up unions’ and restore a market-based economic order, 
they would have to ‘combat the evils which unions were designed to 
counteract’ in another way, since ‘no democratic society’ would ‘tolerate 
people starving to death, if there is food with which to feed them’. 
Anticipating an argument he would develop in Capitalism and Freedom 
(1962), Friedman presented NIT as a ‘substitute’ for other forms of social 
provision but denied that it was merely a political ‘expedient’. Cash transfers 
offered an attractive way of establishing a minimum income floor which 
would allow all citizens to exercise consumer choice in the market.2
Friedman’s NIT proposal was endorsed by his Chicago colleague 
(and brother-in-law) Aaron Director and welcomed by Karl Popper, who 
thought it ‘an attractive alternative to socialism’.3 Other delegates at the 
Mont Pèlerin meeting, however, were much more sceptical. The Swiss 
economist William Rappard, for instance, thought Friedman’s plan to 
‘subsidise the poor’ would have ‘the worst possible psychological effects’: 
discouraging work and adding to the burden on ‘the good citizen, who 
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pays his taxes’.4 Friedrich Hayek also pointed out that conceptions of 
poverty varied sharply between countries and argued that a minimum 
income should only be provided in return for work ‘under semi-military 
conditions’.5 Friedman’s Midwestern optimism about the possibility 
of poverty relief thus ran up against the age-old republican fear of 
‘decadence’ and demoralisation. The Mont Pèlerin Society’s (MPS) 
statement of aims, agreed after long debate at the end of the conference, 
concluded that ‘further study’ was needed of whether it was possible to 
establish ‘minimum standards by means not inimical to initiative and the 
functioning of the market’.6
The controversy over Friedman’s NIT scheme highlights an enduring 
tension in neoliberal thought over the proper extent and purpose of 
redistribution. Friedman’s 1947 paper is a classic exposition of what John 
Kay has called ‘redistributive market liberalism’: the belief that the 
distribution of income and wealth is a legitimate object of political action, 
but that the state ‘should discharge this responsibility with as little 
interference as possible in the workings of the free market’.7 As the 
neoliberal movement founded at Mont Pèlerin has become aligned with 
New Right politics since the 1960s and 1970s, Friedman’s vision has 
largely been supplanted by a moralistic conservatism which asserts the 
legitimacy of market outcomes and blames poverty on individual failure 
or cultural pathology.8 At the same time, however, cash transfers to low-
income households have become more extensive than they ever were in 
the middle decades of the twentieth century. Exploring this paradox 
reminds us of the complex relationship between ‘neoliberalism as 
doctrine’ and the messy realities of post-industrial public policy.9
The conjunction of anti-welfarist discourse with welfarist practice 
is not unique to the UK, but it is perhaps particularly striking in Britain. At 
the level of ideology and discourse, the ascendancy of free-market 
ideas in British politics has been closely tied up with a conservative 
critique of redistribution, powerfully articulated by Margaret Thatcher, 
as Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite has shown.10 Despite this rhetoric, 
however, Conservative and New Labour governments have presided over 
a significant expansion in the redistributive role of the British state. As 
market incomes from wages, salaries and investments have become 
increasingly unequal since the late 1970s, the rise in the Gini coefficient 
has been cushioned by the impact of taxes and transfers (figure 4.1). In 
particular, cash benefits to working-age adults and children have more 
than trebled in real terms since 1979, mainly through the expansion of 
means-tested benefits and tax credits for low- and middle-income 
households (figure 4.2).11 The period since 2010 has been characterised 
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Figure 4.1 Income inequality in Britain, 1975–2016: Gini coefficients 
for market and disposable income
Source: OECD Statistics database  
http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm (accessed 25 June 2021). 
Note: The OECD dataset on UK income inequality comprises intermittent figures from 1975 to 1999 
and an annual series from 1999 onwards. The OECD adopted a new definition of income in 2012, 
so the data series before and after this date are not strictly comparable.
Figure 4.2 Transfer payments to working-age adults and children in 
Great Britain, 1978/9–2018/19 (real terms, £bn, 2018/19 prices)
Source: Author’s calculations based on Department for Work and Pensions, ‘Benefit Expenditure 
and Caseload Tables’, Autumn Budget 2018 
http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/benefit-expenditure-and-caseload-tables-2018 
(accessed 25 June 2021).   
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both by efforts to rein in this spending through welfare cuts, and by the 
rationalisation of means-tested benefits into a single monthly payment 
through the introduction of Universal Credit.
This chapter examines how Friedman’s strand of neoliberal thought 
has contributed to British welfare policy since the Second World War, with 
a particular focus on the system of cash transfers to working-age 
households.12 Changes to the benefit system have, of course, reflected a 
number of factors, including the impact of deindustrialisation and 
demographic change, which accounted for much of the growth of social 
security spending during the 1980s and 1990s – as Jim Tomlinson and Jim 
Phillips show elsewhere in this volume.13 Likewise, the development of 
in-work benefits has been combined with increasingly demanding 
employment and job search conditions, designed to ‘activate’ the 
unemployed for low-paid work (an approach which Friedman, incidentally, 
repudiated).14 Despite this complexity, however, the impact of 
redistributive market liberalism can be clearly discerned. The post-
industrial British state has come to make extensive use of cash transfers 
to alleviate the inequality generated by a financialised and service-based 
liberal market economy. The wave of interest in ‘pre-distribution’ since 
the 2008 financial crisis suggests a growing awareness of the limitations 
of this strategy.15
Redistributive market liberalism in British  
social thought, c. 1945–79
As the editors note in their introduction, neoliberalism has become an 
increasingly contested category in the humanities and social sciences, as 
sociologists and cultural theorists have taken it out of the realm of political 
ideas and deployed it as a master key for understanding a range of 
contemporary phenomena. Neoliberalism is perhaps best understood, for 
our purposes, as the doctrine (or set of ideas) associated with the Mont 
Pèlerin ‘thought collective’, even though the term itself has rarely been used 
within the movement since the late 1950s.16 Although neoliberal doctrine 
has varied over time and between thinkers, the movement has long 
been centred on the promotion of market pricing as an allocation device – 
reflecting the core analytical insight of neoclassical economics. The socialist 
calculation debate of the 1930s reinforced market liberals’ conviction that 
a decentralised market economy was generally more efficient (and 
responsive to consumer demands) than collective provision of goods and 
services. As Ben Jackson has shown, many founding MPS members also 
emphasised their distance from what they saw as the laissez-faire liberalism 
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of the nineteenth century. Hayek and Friedman were neoliberals because 
they recognised that some forms of economic management, regulation and 
social provision were necessary both to create competitive markets and to 
secure political support for the capitalist system.17
It is difficult to identify an organised neoliberal movement in Britain 
before the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) was formed in the mid-1950s, 
as Keith Tribe and George Peden have noted, but British economists 
featured prominently in the MPS from the beginning.18 Twenty-four of the 
121 individuals listed in the MPS’s 1948 membership list, for instance, were 
based in the UK, including no fewer than eight at the London School of 
Economics: Hayek, Popper, Lionel Robbins, Ronald Coase, Ronald Edwards, 
Frank Paish, Sir Arnold Plant and the economic historian T. S. Ashton.19 In 
the context of the late 1940s, these and other market-oriented economists 
reacted strongly against the expansion of public ownership and the Attlee 
government’s attempts to use wartime controls as a basis for peacetime 
economic planning. Far from being frozen out by a collectivist consensus, 
as heroic narratives such as Richard Cockett’s Thinking the Unthinkable 
(1994) have implied, these free-market economists influenced policy 
debates in a variety of ways through public lectures, newspaper articles, 
and links with the Conservative and Liberal parties.20
The idea of establishing a minimum income through cash transfers 
played an important political role for the first generation of neoliberals. In 
Britain, as in much of the Western world, the growth of state intervention 
and trade union power in the first half of the twentieth century had been 
accompanied by a significant narrowing of income and wealth differentials, 
and the 1945–51 Labour government used a discourse of ‘fair shares for 
all’ to justify the maintenance of collective provision and rationing.21 Many 
working-class voters seemed to view the debate over planning in class 
terms, as the economist Honor Croome observed in a 1949 article; the 
political challenge for market liberals was to break this linkage and show 
that the removal of rationing and price subsidies need not reverse the 
trend towards social equality.22 Just as Keynesian demand management 
promised to reconcile capitalism with full employment, so fiscal 
redistribution could reconcile market mechanisms with a continued 
assault on poverty.23 Indeed, the French writer and MPS member Bertrand 
de Jouvenel argued that the redistributive effects of the Attlee government’s 
policies were ‘oblique’ rather than ‘vertical’. A ‘pure’ form of redistribution 
‘would merely transfer income from the richer to the poorer’, and ‘could 
conceivably be achieved by a simple reverse-tax or subsidy handed to the 
recipients of lower incomes’.24
Proposals for a guaranteed income dovetailed with the tradition of 
‘poverty line’ research associated with Seebohm Rowntree and A. L. 
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Bowley, which focused on quantifying the minimum income required to 
cover households’ subsistence needs.25 As José Harris has pointed out, the 
‘materialism’ of the nineteenth-century English poor law continued to 
pervade post-war social security policy through the flat-rate structure of 
National Insurance benefits (which William Beveridge based, in a 
roundabout way, on Rowntree’s scales) and the survival of means-tested 
National Assistance.26 At the same time, redistributive market liberalism 
conflicted sharply with other strands in British social thought, such as the 
trade unions’ strong commitment to the male-breadwinner ‘family wage’ 
as the foundation of household income. The bitter debates over Family 
Allowances during the 1920s and 1930s showed that many trade unionists 
saw in-work benefits as an affront to the dignity and independence of 
working men, which would undermine the pursuit of higher wages 
through collective bargaining.27 Public provision of services such as 
health care, education and housing, by contrast, disguised the state’s role 
in subsidising working-class living standards. Many socialist thinkers also 
emphasised the scope for achieving economies of scale through state 
provision. R. H. Tawney, for instance, argued that ‘collective expenditure 
makes possible results which would be unattainable, were an identical 
sum distributed . . . in fractional additions to individual incomes’.28
Despite these political obstacles, early neoliberals were able to 
argue with some force that the distributional effects of market-based 
reforms – such as the price increases which would follow the removal of 
rationing – could be offset through the tax and benefit systems. This 
approach enabled them to make common cause with left-leaning 
economists such as James Meade, who urged the Attlee government to 
move away from physical planning and focus on tackling inequality in 
other ways – for instance, through death duties, educational reform and 
perhaps even a universal basic income.29 It also reassured Conservative 
politicians that they could present liberalisation as a way of expanding 
consumer choice for all social groups, not just the better-off. The Tory 
Chancellor R. A. Butler, for instance, cut the £400 million food subsidy 
programme which he had inherited from Labour in his 1952 budget and 
used some of the savings to increase pensions and Family Allowances.30 
As the post-war housing shortage eased, the 1951–64 Conservative 
government also reined in general council house subsidies and pressed 
local authorities to target support on the poorest tenants through rent 
rebate schemes.31
Some of the most radical British neoliberals shared Friedman’s 
hope that a guaranteed minimum income would pave the way for the 
wholesale marketisation of public services, particularly in a context of 
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rising consumer ‘affluence’. Peter Goldman of the Conservative Research 
Department, for instance, argued than the government should remove 
state provision from the middle class and focus on providing a ‘safety 
net’ for ‘the shiftless or luckless 5 per cent’, while Arthur Seldon of the 
IEA believed that an NIT scheme would make it easier to introduce 
charges for public services and then move towards a private market.32 
Even the Liberal Party leader Jo Grimond looked forward to a time 
‘when the only Social Service is a straight payment to bring everyone’s 
income (including that of children) up to a national minimum’.33 In 
practice, however, movement in this direction was cautious and 
incremental. Although the removal of rationing and food subsidies was 
a political success, the Macmillan government’s attempt to liberalise the 
rented housing market under the 1957 Rent Act turned into a fiasco, and 
many Tories grudgingly accepted that the National Health Service 
(NHS) and state education were relatively cost-effective as well as being 
popular with voters.34 The principle that full-time workers should not 
receive means-tested benefits also remained a significant obstacle to 
wage supplementation, as Jim Tomlinson notes in his chapter. When 
Edward Heath crossed this Rubicon by creating the Family Income 
Supplement (FIS) in 1971 – a very limited measure designed to help 
about 190,000 families at a cost of £6 million a year – the scheme 
attracted intense criticism from across the political spectrum.35 On the 
right, Enoch Powell accused the government of reviving the ‘evil’ of the 
early nineteenth-century Speenhamland system; on the left, the Trades 
Union Congress condemned FIS as ‘a direct and explicit subsidy to low 
wages’.36 Jack Jones of the Transport and General Workers’ Union also 
warned Labour colleagues that the unions could not be expected to 
moderate their pay demands to take account of universal benefits such 
as Family Allowances: ‘To rely unduly on changes in social benefits’ to 
eliminate poverty would ‘make virtual State pensioners of hundreds of 
thousands of ordinary, healthy men and women’.37
The ‘golden age’ of the post-war welfare state thus presents us with 
a paradox. At an intellectual level, Conservative and Liberal thought was 
strongly influenced by redistributive market liberalism, and commentators 
such as Samuel Brittan and Michael Young frequently echoed Friedman’s 
argument that poverty could be tackled most effectively by a guaranteed 
minimum income.38 At the level of policy, however, social security 
spending rose only from 4 per cent of GDP in the late 1940s to about 7 per 
cent in the mid-1970s, half of it devoted to state pensions and two-thirds 
of it channelled through Beveridge’s contributory National Insurance 
system. Insofar as the British state engaged in fiscal redistribution in 
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this period, it did so primarily on the tax side, using highly progressive 
marginal rates of income tax to pay for education, health care and other 
forms of collective provision. Spending on these benefits in kind was 
somewhat progressive, as figure 4.3 shows, though this partly reflected 
life-cycle effects: for instance, poorer households benefited more from 
education and school meals because they were more likely to contain 
children. In any case, so far as disposable incomes were concerned, cash 
transfers from the rich were more important than cash transfers to the 
poor. The relatively low Gini coefficients of the 1960s and 1970s should 
thus be understood largely as the product of earnings compression in the 
context of full employment, national pay bargaining, progressive taxation 
and strong trade union organisation in manufacturing industry.
Thatcherism and social security: reluctant redistributors
Attitudes to redistribution hardened within the Conservative Party during 
the course of the 1970s, especially after Margaret Thatcher succeeded 
Edward Heath as Tory leader in January 1975. As Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 
has argued, Thatcher’s ‘vision of moral rejuvenation’ through self- 
reliance and property ownership squeezed out the redistributive strand 
of neoliberal thought associated with Friedman.39 Where Heathite 
Figure 4.3 Cash value of benefits in kind (£) to working-age households 
by equivalised disposable income decile, 1977
Source: Author’s calculations based on Office for National Statistics, ‘Effects of taxes and benefits on 
household income: Historical datasets’ (20 June 2018), https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulation 
andcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/datasets/theeffectsoftaxesand 
benefitsonhouseholdincomehistoricaldatasets (accessed 25 June 2021).
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Conservatives had embraced selective benefits as a source of distributional 
‘balance’, Thatcher worried about the growth of social security spending 
and thought a guaranteed minimum income would become ‘a shirker’s 
charter’.40 This moralistic individualism manifested itself in a number 
of ways during Thatcher’s 11 years in power, as Bernhard Rieger shows 
in his chapter: in the whittling-back of out-of-work benefits, the 
development of new forms of welfare conditionality and dramatic cuts to 
the top rate of income tax in the 1979 and 1988 budgets.41 Despite this 
ideological shift, however, redistributive market liberalism did not go 
away. Indeed, cash transfers have become much more central to 
British public policy since 1979 than they ever were during the post-war 
‘golden age’.
It is clear from the aggregate statistics in figure 4.2 that economic 
change has been an important driver of this expansion. Much of the 
growth of benefit spending on working-age households has been 
concentrated in the periods during and after the 1980–1, 1990–1 and 
2008–9 recessions, when unemployment rose sharply. During the 1980s 
and early 1990s, in particular, the unemployment benefit system ‘buckled 
under the weight of unprecedented inflows’ and many older manual 
workers became long-term social security claimants, especially in those 
regions which were hit most heavily by the decline of coal and 
manufacturing employment.42 Yet the structural changes associated with 
deindustrialisation – and exacerbated by the Thatcher government’s 
monetarist policies – do not tell the whole story. As unemployment (and 
hence unemployment benefit spending) has declined, Conservative and 
New Labour governments have rolled forward in-work benefits as an 
instrument of economic and social policy. As a result, reductions in real-
terms welfare spending during periods of economic recovery have only 
partly reversed the previous expansions.
Under the Conservative governments of 1979–97, the use of cash 
transfers as a policy tool was cautious and reluctant, reflecting Thatcher’s 
deep hostility to redistribution and the government’s declared intention 
of reducing welfare dependency. Even so, means-tested benefits 
remained an important tool of Conservative statecraft; indeed, in some 
respects the Thatcher government’s radicalism made them more 
important than they had been in 1951–64 or 1970–4. Not only did 
monetarism and changes to trade union law reduce workers’ bargaining 
power and so widen pre-tax inequalities, but a host of other Thatcherite 
policies – such as increases in VAT and National Insurance contributions, 
cuts to fuel and transport subsidies, and the introduction of the Poll 
Tax – imposed direct and tangible costs on poorer households. Shrewder 
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Conservative ministers and Whitehall officials recognised that it was 
easier to implement these regressive reforms if the losers would be 
protected by a means-tested safety net.43 As Norman Fowler pointed out 
to Thatcher in 1985, increased demand for benefits partly reflected the 
fact that the system was ‘having to pick up other people’s bills’ as a result 
of cuts in other public services.44 By the late 1980s, even Thatcher found 
it politically useful to rebut accusations that she was indifferent to 
poverty and inequality by pointing to ‘record levels’ of social security 
spending.45
The use of means-tested benefits to ‘flank’ and legitimate free-
market reforms was particularly clear in housing and employment policy. 
The creation of housing benefit in 1982 unified the systems of rent rebates 
(for council tenants) and rent allowances (for private tenants) which the 
Heath government had introduced a decade earlier and brought them 
under the control of the Department of Health and Social Security: as 
Fowler explained, it seemed best for this ‘form of income support’ to be 
‘considered in the context of the social security benefit structure . . . as a 
whole’.46 When the Conservatives went on to deregulate private lettings 
under the 1988 Housing Act, housing minister Sir George Young used the 
existence of housing benefit to justify the move to market rents: ‘If people 
cannot afford to pay that market rent, housing benefit will take the 
strain.’47 As average rental costs rose – roughly trebling in real terms 
between 1979 and 1997 – cuts in spending on council house subsidies 
were more than offset by the rising cost of housing benefit.48 By 1996/7 
the housing benefit bill came to £11.4 billion a year, two-thirds of which 
went to working-age households.
In-work benefits also formed an integral part of the Thatcher 
government’s labour market strategy, as Chris Grover has shown.49 As the 
manufacturing sector contracted during the 1980s, Thatcherite ministers 
such as Nigel Lawson insisted that ‘the rediscovery of the enterprise 
culture’ and the removal of ‘rigidities and distortions’ through supply-side 
reforms was the only sustainable way of creating new jobs.50 Lawson was 
particularly keen to emulate the US’s success in expanding service-sector 
employment, including part-time and casual jobs in fields such as retail 
and hospitality. As the Central Policy Review Staff pointed out, however, 
the ‘aim of increasing real wage flexibility’ was ‘likely to run into conflict 
with trade unions and often with the public’s sense of fairness’. The 
replacement of FIS with the more generous Family Credit in 1988 was 
partly designed to defuse these concerns, improving incentives for men 
and women with children to take low-paid jobs and ‘breaking the linkage 
in the public mind between low pay and family poverty’.51 Once in place, 
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Family Credit grew rapidly, redistributing £2.1 billion a year to 714,000 
households by 1996/7. Indeed, the Conservatives even promised to 
‘protect’ its value as part of a ‘Family Benefits Guarantee’ in their 1997 
manifesto.52
New Labour, social democracy and  
the child poverty agenda
In quantitative terms, cash transfers peaked as a share of disposable 
household income for all working-age households under the Thatcher 
government (at 15 per cent in 1984) and for the poorest decile of 
working-age households under John Major’s government (at 70 per cent 
in 1993), but these figures were partly the result of high unemploy- 
ment levels. Fiscal redistribution fitted much more comfortably with 
Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’ politics than with the harsher impulses of 
Thatcherism.53 If New Labour should be seen as ‘a social democratic 
response to issues made prominent by the New Right’, as Mark Bevir has 
suggested, then the prospect of reducing poverty through the tax and 
benefit systems played an important role in reconciling Labour politicians 
(and voters) to market liberalism.54 To be sure, the Labour Party’s 
strategy for achieving social justice remained as eclectic as it had been 
under Clement Attlee or Harold Wilson, combining efforts to raise skills 
(through education policy) and tackle low pay (through the National 
Minimum Wage) with spending on benefits and public services 
(especially the NHS). Nevertheless, the emphasis tilted perceptibly away 
from the wage politics which had dominated the party’s outlook for 
much of the twentieth century. There would be no revival of Britain’s 
old industrial base, no ‘beer and sandwiches’ with trade union leaders 
in Number 10 and no attempt to reverse the decline of collective 
bargaining.55
Characterisations of New Labour as a neoliberal project risk veering 
into simplistic caricature, as Mark Wickham-Jones points out in his 
chapter. In practice, the Blair government’s ‘neoliberalism’ consisted 
largely in its acceptance of the political economy which had emerged 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, in which the City of London, consumer 
credit and housing wealth became major drivers of an ‘Anglo-liberal 
growth model’ and service-sector employers took up the slack in the 
labour market.56 This policy choice was shaped by a heavy dose of political 
pragmatism, including the belief that good relations with business would 
help restore Labour’s reputation for economic competence. It was also 
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underpinned by the growing acceptance of mainstream (neoclassical) 
microeconomics – together with its characteristic ‘policy devices’ and 
‘styles of reasoning’ – as the government’s primary toolkit for policy 
analysis.57 Gordon Brown’s Treasury saw markets as ‘a powerful means of 
advancing the public interest’ and focused on establishing stable 
macroeconomic conditions while dealing with market failures – ‘ensuring 
dynamic properly functioning markets . . . with low barriers to entry and 
free mobility of capital and labour’.58
The influence of neoclassical economics was particularly evident in 
New Labour’s approach to the labour market. Despite the Labour Party’s 
long-standing links with the trade unions, the ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s 
and the mass unemployment of the early 1980s had prompted many 
social democratic economists to see wage rigidity as a serious problem. 
The work of Richard Layard, Steve Nickell and Richard Jackman at the 
LSE Centre for Labour Economics was particularly influential in applying 
the concept of the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment 
(NAIRU) to Britain and persuading Labour to refine rather than reverse 
the Thatcher government’s efforts to promote labour market flexibility.59 
Blair and Brown thus embraced the ‘work first’ approach to active labour 
market policy canvassed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s 1994 Jobs Study, and though they maintained the 
commitment to a minimum wage which they had inherited from Neil 
Kinnock and John Smith, they kept its initial rate down (to £3.60 an hour 
in 1999) in order to limit the impact on job creation.60 Accepting the 
growth of low-skilled service jobs allowed Brown to reduce unemployment 
without stoking the inflationary pressures which had accompanied full 
employment in the 1960s and 1970s, and so to deliver on his promise of 
‘no return to boom and bust’ – at least until the 2008 financial crisis.
Taken by itself, however, New Labour’s embrace of the ‘Anglo-liberal 
growth model’ offered little hope of arresting or reversing the rise in 
income inequality which the UK had experienced under Thatcher and 
Major, and to which economists such as Tony Atkinson and think tanks 
such as the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) had increasingly drawn 
attention.61 Blair and Brown’s public discourse focused on ‘tackling the 
root causes of poverty and inequality’ through welfare-to-work and 
investment in human capital, but Brown, at least, recognised that cash 
transfers had an important part to play in supporting low-paid workers 
while these long-term measures bore fruit.62 Brown was particularly 
impressed by the way the Earned Income Tax Credit provided ‘a top-up 
for low wages’ in the US, and he sought to emulate this by replacing 
Family Credit with tax credits delivered through the pay packet.63 When 
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Blair set out the goal of ending child poverty in a generation in his March 
1999 Beveridge Lecture, tax credits became the centrepiece of a wide-
ranging child poverty strategy.64 Picking up on a proposal by Tony 
Atkinson, the Treasury and Department of Social Security turned Blair’s 
goal into a precise income-based target: reducing the proportion of 
children in households with less than 60 per cent of median equivalised 
income by a quarter by 2004, halving it by 2010, and pushing it as close 
to zero as possible – so that it was at least among the lowest levels in 
Europe – by 2020.65 Brown expanded tax credits in successive budgets, 
taking advantage of the falling cost of out-of-work benefits and revenue 
from tax reforms (such as the abolition of Married Couples’ Allowance) 
and fiscal drag, until the system was distributing almost £30 billion a year 
by 2010 – an average of more than £4,000 a year to 6.25 million 
households.66
Despite New Labour’s avowed commitment to tackling poverty at its 
root, decomposition analysis by Richard Dickens suggests that increased 
spending on tax credits and other benefits was by far the most important 
factor in driving progress towards the child poverty target. If benefits had 
remained unchanged, the child poverty rate (before housing costs) would 
have risen from 26.2 per cent in 1997/8 to 29.0 per cent in 2008/9 as a 
result of changes in population structure, wages and work patterns; 
instead, it fell to 21.1 per cent.67 Indeed, the Family Resources Survey – on 
which these figures are based – only captures about 85 per cent of benefit 
income, so the true impact may have been even greater.68 Of course, such 
an analysis cannot account for the wider economic effects of tax credits 
and other welfare-to-work measures, and some critics suggest that they 
may have contributed to wage stagnation by encouraging firms to adopt 
‘low-road’ production strategies.69 Nevertheless, there are good reasons 
for thinking that the use of tax receipts from the City of London to pay for 
transfers to low-paid workers with children played a significant role in 
stabilising ‘Anglo-liberal capitalism’ in the run-up to the financial crisis.70 
Tax credits also provided a useful fiscal stabiliser after 2008, as the Brown 
government used above-inflation increases in Child Tax Credit to cushion 
the impact of the recession on low- and middle-income households.71
Conclusion
In a 2017 article for American Affairs, the cultural theorist Nancy Fraser 
launched a forceful attack on what she called ‘progressive neoliberalism’.72 
Building on her earlier analysis of ‘the redistribution-recognition 
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dilemma’, Fraser argued that Third Way politicians such as Bill Clinton 
and Tony Blair had used a ‘liberal-meritocratic politics of recognition’ – 
the ‘superficially egalitarian and emancipatory’ championing of 
‘feminism, antiracism, multiculturalism, environmentalism’ and gay 
rights – to ‘seduce major currents of progressive social movements into 
the new hegemonic bloc’ and give ‘an expropriative, plutocratic economic 
program . . . the patina of legitimacy’.73 Whatever the merits of Fraser’s 
broader analysis, the implication that ‘progressive neoliberals’ have 
ignored distributional issues is wholly misleading. In Britain, at least, 
redistribution through cash transfers and public services has played an 
essential role in mitigating the social effects of industrial decline and 
global competition. Under the influence of economists such as Atkinson 
and Nicholas Barr, governments now routinely apply the tools of economic 
analysis to the welfare state and use microsimulation models to quantify 
the impact of policy changes on household incomes.74
The ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ which has emerged in Britain 
since the 1980s thus bears a closer resemblance to Friedman’s vision 
at Mont Pèlerin than either its supporters or its critics have usually 
recognised. This does not, however, mean that the use of transfer 
payments to flank and legitimate neoliberal policies has been wholly 
successful. Indeed, the experience of the last 20 years suggests that, as a 
political strategy, redistributive market liberalism runs up against three 
serious limitations. Firstly, the continuing cultural resonance of the 
Protestant work ethic means that cash transfers themselves face questions 
of legitimacy, including among potential beneficiaries of redistribution, 
as Brian Steensland has noted in the US.75 Blair and Brown sought to 
sidestep the problem by focusing tax credits on working families with 
children, but this cultural framing became increasingly tenuous as the 
system expanded: after 2003, Child Tax Credit was paid directly to the 
main carer and made no distinction between families in and out of work. 
At the same time, New Labour’s rhetorical assault on ‘welfare’ seems to 
have contributed to a hardening of public attitudes towards the 
unemployed, thereby laying the groundwork for an increasingly punitive 
system of benefit sanctions.76 The introduction of Universal Credit may 
well exacerbate this problem, eroding distinctions between the so-called 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor without providing the kind of genuinely 
comprehensive safety net which Friedman envisaged back in 1947.
The second problem with a strategy based on fiscal transfers is that 
it requires a continuing stream of tax revenues to offset market inequalities 
and so accentuates the ‘structural dependence of the state on capital’ 
which Marxist political economists have long warned about.77 Although 
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the expansion of working-age benefits in Britain has not provoked an 
overt tax revolt, it has clearly been constrained by politicians’ sensitivity 
to the signals which tax rates send to investors and middle-class voters, 
and cuts to in-work benefits formed a major part of George Osborne’s 
deficit-reduction programme. These fiscal pressures may become even 
more intense in the coming decades, as other parts of the welfare state 
(such as health care, pensions and social care) demand a growing share 
of national income.78
Beneath these two practical limitations lies the conceptual or even 
ethical weakness recently highlighted by Samuel Moyn: that the pursuit 
of a social minimum focuses on ‘sufficiency’ at the expense of broader 
questions about equity, economic power and the impact of rising 
inequality further up the income spectrum.79 New Labour’s approach to 
redistribution was particularly lopsided, as Blair and Brown largely 
abandoned the ethical critique of inequality which was so important to 
previous generations of British socialists.80 Conceptions of distributive 
justice are, of course, a matter of political choice, but the downsides of a 
narrow focus on poverty alleviation have become increasingly apparent 
in recent years. Means-tested transfers such as Friedman’s NIT may be 
‘efficient’ in the sense that they represent the cheapest way of lifting 
households up to the poverty line, but they also expose claimants to high 
marginal tax rates, social stigma and uncertainty about benefit 
entitlement. Nor have technological advances – the great hope of 
generations of tax benefit reformers – entirely solved these problems, as 
the experience of Universal Credit shows.81 A universal basic income 
would provide a more stable and predictable income floor, but most 
mainstream policymakers continue to be deterred by the cost.82
In the light of these challenges, it is not difficult to understand the 
appeal of ‘pre-distribution’ strategies which would engage more directly 
with the causes of inequality. Policies to lift the wage floor, increase 
housing supply and regulate prices (for instance in the utilities sector) all 
promise to reshape the distribution of market power and so reduce the 
need to alleviate poverty through cash transfers.83 However desirable 
such an interventionist agenda might be, though, the immediate impact 
on the income distribution is likely to be relatively modest. For instance, 
projections by the Office for Budget Responsibility and the IFS suggested 
that the introduction of the National Living Wage would reduce working-
age welfare spending by less than 1 per cent and would have very little 
impact on headline poverty and inequality measures.84 Recurrent 
controversies over benefit cuts and the troubled rollout of Universal 
Credit have underlined how important cash transfers have become for 
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millions of working-age households. The UK’s current welfare system may 
be almost universally unloved, but unless there is a radical shift in the 
underlying economic model, some system of transfers to the working 
poor is likely to remain socially necessary and politically inevitable.
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5
The failures of neoliberalism in 
Britain since the 1970s: the limits on 
‘market forces’ in a deindustrialising 
economy and a ‘New Speenhamland’
Jim tomlinson
Neoliberalism has become a widely used term to describe the trajectory 
of British economic policy since the end of the 1970s.1 While there is no 
clear agreement on what exactly this portmanteau concept means, all 
uses rely on the broad notion of an ideology that believes in expanding 
the role of markets as allocation devices, and this may involve the use of 
the state to create markets, in areas where they might otherwise be weak 
or non-existent.2 This chapter shows that since the 1970s, key elements 
of the promises of neoliberalism to strengthen the market have not been 
fulfilled, most obviously in the cases of labour and housing. As Peter 
Taylor-Gooby has written, one view of the legacy of Thatcherism is that, 
while ‘the ideology grows ever stronger’, the policies, by contrast, can be 
seen to have ‘failed’.3 This chapter thus shares the view that, in Jamie 
Peck’s words, neoliberalisation has been ‘an open-ended and contradictory 
process of politically assisted market rule’.4
In both labour and housing markets, outcomes have been deemed 
politically unacceptable by all governments, and as a result in the labour 
market we have seen an explosion of wage subsidies (for example family 
tax credits) coupled with much greater wage regulation by a National 
Minimum and then a ‘New Living Wage’. In the housing market we have 
seen a parallel ballooning in spending on housing subsidies, as free-
market rents are deemed ‘unaffordable’ and politically untenable. While 
the years of austerity since 2010 have seen significant cuts in both wage 
subsidies and housing benefit, they remain very substantial parts of total 
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public spending, testimony to their entrenchment in the ‘neoliberal era’.5 
In the same period, reversing previous positioning, direct undermining of 
the operation of the labour market by legal enforcement of wage minima 
has become a taken-for-granted feature of the policy agenda of all 
mainstream political parties.
Why has neoliberalism failed to deliver on its promises in such a 
striking fashion? The key argument made here is that this failure results 
from the constraints imposed on policymaking by economic change, most 
importantly the deindustrialisation of the British economy (see also Jim 
Phillips in this volume). The underlying point here is that the richest 
accounts of neoliberalism in Britain have focused insightful attention 
on the development of neoliberal ideas.6 But rather less attention has 
been paid to the conditions of implementation for turning these ideas 
into policy.7 This is a common problem in historical accounts of the 
development of economic policy, and an instructive parallel can be made 
with discussions of a previous shift in economic doctrine and policy, ‘the 
rise of Keynesianism’.
At the end of the 1960s, triumphalist accounts of this rise traced a 
straightforward passage from the development of Keynes’s doctrine in the 
1930s to its perceived successful embodiment in the policies of the fully 
employed post-war ‘consensus’.8 In the wake of the crisis of that consensus 
in the 1970s, economic historians and others challenged that triumphalist 
narrative, arguing that the success of Keynesianism in post-war Britain 
required not just a revolution in economic theory, but a whole range of 
institutional and administrative changes. These included the construction 
of a highly centralised fiscal system, and the dominance of a Treasury able 
to deploy the statistics and instruments of national economic management.9 
But the success of this new policy regime in the 1950s and 1960s also relied 
more broadly on the buoyancy of the international economic system and 
the sharp rise in both private and public investment at home.10
The key message from this ‘revisionism’ was the need to always ask: 
under what historical conditions can programmes of economic reform be 
realised? What is the relationship between ideologies of economic reform 
and the economies that they seek to act upon?
If we start with these questions and look at neoliberalism, it is 
clear that, just as the initial success of Keynesianism relied on the 
economic conditions created by the Second World War, so the initial 
successes of neoliberalism were reliant as much on the political 
opportunities provided by the combined inflationary/fiscal/industrial 
relations crisis of the 1970s as they were on any theoretical innovations. 
These conditions allowed the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher to 
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combine elements of neoliberalism with their declinist analysis to argue 
for a fundamental shift in economic policy towards ‘rolling back the 
state’ in terms of public spending, seen as central to extending the role of 
market forces.11
But ‘rolling back the state’ proved much easier to proclaim as a goal 
than to deliver. Public spending proved hard to reduce (especially in the 
1980s), and when it was cut (as in the 1990s) it quickly led to pressures 
forcing a sharp reversal of trend in the early 2000s; a similar reversal of 
many aspects of previous austerity was evident in the run-up to the 2019 
general election.12 Simultaneously, in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, the economy was being transformed by sectoral changes 
and especially the decline of industrial employment. Thus, the economy 
proved much less malleable, much less reformable on neoliberal lines, 
than the triumphalism of the ideologues of the 1980s suggested – 
or, indeed, than is suggested by the laments of many of neoliberalism’s 
opponents.
This chapter begins with the growth of wage subsidies from the 
1970s, alongside the more recent expansion in housing subsidies, before 
outlining the move towards the current consensus on the desirability of 
the state setting legal minima for wages. The next section puts these 
changes in the context of a deindustrialising labour market and other 
aspects of Britain’s recent economic development. The final part offers 
some general conclusions on neoliberalism in Britain.
The growth of wage and housing subsidies
In 1970 the Conservative government proposed to introduce a Family 
Income Supplement (FIS), which would give a (very small) subsidy to some 
low-wage families.13 This policy initiative was in part a consequence of the 
‘re-discovery of poverty’ in the 1960s, a rediscovery that suggested the 
erosion of the basic Beveridge assumption that poverty was overwhelmingly 
due to ‘interruption of earnings’ (plus large families). In their landmark 
study, The Poor and the Poorest, Abel-Smith and Townsend showed that in 
1960 about 40 per cent of households in poverty (those below 140 per cent 
of the then National Assistance level) had a working member. Most of these 
households also had a large number of children (four or more), but FIS was 
aimed at those who were deemed to be disincentivised from seeking work 
by the small gap between income in and out of employment.14
It was in this context that Enoch Powell, a pioneer of British 
neoliberalism, made a striking parliamentary speech that summarises the 
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case against FIS, seeing the policy as fundamentally at odds with the 
commitment to free markets.15
I do not think it can be denied that we are taking a decisive new step 
now by the overt and direct payment – if I may use old-fashioned but 
significant and appropriate language – of ‘relief in supplementation 
of wages’. We are reminded that there is ‘no new thing under the 
sun’. It was on 6th May, 1795, that the Berkshire Magistrates met at 
the Pelican Inn in Speenhamland . . . It is the principle that it is an 
act of fateful consequence to pay relief – cash supplementation of 
income – to persons in full-time employment; that it is something 
which is bound profoundly to distort the wage system and to 
frustrate the ambition – which seems to me to be almost indissociable 
from the idea of a free society – that a man should receive as near as 
may be the full value of his work in cash.16
As Peter Sloman points out, such wage subsidies were also criticised from 
the left, Barbara Castle proclaiming them ‘repugnant in a modern 
society’.17 The reasons for this hostility were grounded in the belief that 
subsidies failed to address the underlying causes of low wages and 
undermined the idea that collective bargaining could and should be the 
route to improved pay.
For the proponents of this policy there was a ‘neoliberal’ logic that 
led to the opposite conclusion to that of Powell. Given the view of the 
labour market as driven by market incentives, FIS was aimed at increasing 
the gap between the incomes of the unemployed and the employed, in 
order to encourage the former to seek work. Thus, the policy was at one 
with a long tradition of Conservative thinking, which saw unemployment 
as partly, at least, caused by a lack of incentives to seek work, and resulted, 
eventually, in the squeeze in the incomes of the unemployed under 
Conservatives after 1979.18
FIS was introduced in 1971, and on a very small scale. But in the 
1980s, under the provisions of the Supplement and its successor, Family 
Credit, payments to low-wage households expanded rapidly. By the early 
1990s, the scale of spending of this kind was a source of boasting by leading 
Conservatives: ‘In just the past three years, the Government have tripled 
spending in cash terms on family credit. Since 1979, spending on benefits 
for families dependent on low-paid work has increased by 10 times in real 
terms. Today the average family credit payment is more than £30 a week.’19
In-work benefits saw spectacular further growth under New 
Labour.20 This can be seen as the product of a characteristic New Labour 
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amalgam of pro-market views about incentives with a social democratic 
desire to reduce poverty. (On tensions in New Labour’s social welfare 
policies, see Bernhard Rieger in this volume). It allowed a substantial 
expansion of cash transfers targeted on household income, without 
arousing traditional Labour hostility to means testing.21 Under this 
impetus expenditure per claimant on such benefits increased from 
approximately £500 in 1970 to £4,300 in 2000.22
The Conservatives in opposition were highly critical of New Labour’s 
policies on poverty reduction but asserted that ‘tax credits are an essential 
part of a modern welfare policy – it is obviously better to increase 
someone’s income in work than to see them either in poverty or out of 
work’.23 The leader of the Opposition spoke in similar terms of the failure 
of Labour’s policies but coupled this with a proclaimed need to ‘increase 
the working Tax Credit that couples receive’.24 There was no hint in these 
arguments of a Powellite rejection of ‘New Speenhamland’.
Total spending on tax credits and their predecessors rose from 
£1 billion to £30 billion in cash terms over the 30 years from the mid-
1980s, an increase of around tenfold in real terms. Absolute spending 
peaked in 2014/15 and by 2019/20 had fallen to around £25 billion. The 
fall relative to GDP is greater, down to around 1.3 per cent from the peak 
of 1.8 per cent in 2011/12.25
After 2010, governmental attempts to reduce wage subsidies battled 
against trends creating increased eligibility, with wages stagnating or 
falling, while the costs of childcare rose. Serious cuts were imposed, but 
spending remained substantial.26
It is not only that these in-work benefits have come to greatly 
exceed payments made to the unemployed, but that the whole principle 
of post-war welfare has shifted. As noted above, the classic mid-twentieth-
century Beveridge analysis of the sources of poverty suggested the 
problem fundamentally lay in ‘interruption to earnings’ (by unemploy- 
ment, sickness or old age) along with large numbers of children, the latter 
to be addressed by ‘Family Allowances’ (later, Child Benefit).27 This 
analysis always misrepresented the actualities of the labour market, not 
least in its barely qualified notion of the ‘male-breadwinner household’, a 
notion increasingly at odds with growing married women’s labour market 
participation from the 1950s. But its fundamental idea that, normally, 
paid work would provide a route out of poverty has underpinned most 
modern liberal understandings of how society works down to the present 
day. The ‘New Speenhamland’ provision challenges this idea and in 
doing so gives a role for the state which is difficult to see as ‘neoliberal’ in 
character.
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A year before the attack on ‘relief in supplementation of wages’ 
quoted above, Powell had similarly attacked housing subsidies as 
‘Speenhamland in Modern Dress’.28 In this case, of course, he was not 
attacking a new departure in current policy, because subsidies for 
housing of some kind had been a feature of Britain since the First World 
War and the start of local authority provision of housing. This had 
been accompanied by subsidies to home ownership, ultimately under- 
pinned by the desire, originating in the Conservative response to the 
emergence of a mass proletarian electorate, to create a ‘property-owning 
democracy’.
In the first post-war decades, subsidies were focused upon public 
sector housebuilding on the one side, and a variety of tax concessions 
to house purchasers on the other. This double pressure greatly reduced 
the role of the private rented sector, which was reduced to a residual 
role in housing provision. But from the 1970s (beginning at the time 
of the public expenditure cuts under the Labour government that 
preceded the International Monetary Fund borrowing of 1976), public 
sector housebuilding was cut back hard. This trajectory was continued 
under the Thatcher government, accompanied by some degree of 
‘balancing’ between the public and private sectors by reducing mortgage 
interest tax relief (MIRA), which was finally abolished in 2002, 
though other substantial tax advantages for home ownership were 
retained.29
Famously, the Thatcher government, through a ‘Right to Buy’ policy 
imposed on local authorities, sold off large parts of the public housing 
stock. Governments almost stopped being builders of houses, and the 
rhetoric of the time was that public money would subsidise families, not 
bricks and mortar. This led to the consolidation of existing rent subsidies 
into Housing Benefit in 1983, accompanied by incremental deregulation 
of rents over the 1980s and 1990s.30 This combination meant a growing 
expenditure on this benefit as rents increased, in part reflecting rising 
house prices (on trend: the market was subject to a sharp cycle in the 
early 1990s). But a limit was put on this growth by the fact that the 
‘property-owning democracy’ was being realised, with owner-occupation 
growing from 56.4 to its peak at 69.4 per cent of all tenures in the two 
decades after 1981.31
However, the most rapid acceleration of this spending came after 
the turn of the century.
The subsidising of home ownership had long created a race between 
house price inflation, driven by strong demand in combination with 
relatively inelastic supply, and affordability, underpinned by rising real 
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incomes among large swathes of the population. But after the crash of 
2007 the ‘race’ was increasingly ‘won’ by continuing house price inflation, 
making entry into the housing market impossible for many, and the home 
ownership ratio fell back sharply.
The corollary of this falling back, coupled to the radical reduction 
in the public housing stock, was that the strain was taken by private sector 
renting, which underwent a striking expansion. Owner-occupation had 
peaked at the turn of the century, but the sharp fall came in the wake of 
the financial crash, with social renting also continuing its long-run 
decline.32
Housing benefit spending increased from 0.8 per cent of GDP in 
1983–4 to 1.5 per cent in 2013–14, fluctuating with the economic cycle, 
but on a generally upward trend over time.33 Absolute levels of spending 
then peaked in 2015/16 at just under £22 billion. Without a change in 
policy, they are likely to fluctuate around this level down to 2022 on 
current policies, staying higher than previously forecast for reasons which 
make clear why the benefit has proved so hard to cut more seriously: 
‘[T]he share of the population renting had continued to rise faster than 
forecast . . . employment growth has been much faster than expected but 
earnings growth had been much weaker . . . rent inflation . . . had been 
higher than expected.’34
The politics of wage regulation
Significant state intervention in wages began with the Trade Boards 
introduced by the 1906 Liberal government. The scope of the Boards was 
significantly extended at the end of the First World War and again after 
1945. They were renamed Wages Councils but continued to be sector-
specific and focused on a small number of industries where the labour 
market was deemed ‘abnormal’ and trade union presence limited. For 
much of the second half of the twentieth century, opposition to the idea 
of more ambitious wage regulation by a national statutory minimum 
wage came from both the Labour and Conservative parties.
On their side, Labour and the trade unions combined a historical 
scepticism about the desirability of state intervention in the labour market 
with a belief that wages should be determined by collective bargaining 
between trade unions and employers.35 There were dissenting voices, and 
the issue was a perennial one for debate in labour circles, revived in the 
1960s partly in response to the rediscovery of poverty.36 But it was not 
until the 1980s, when an alliance between Rodney Bickerstaffe of the 
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National Union of Public Employees and the Low Pay Unit was formed, 
that Labour opposition was defeated, and a straightforward commitment 
to introduce legislation was included in the 1987 general election 
manifesto.37
As part of the post-war ‘consensus’ the Conservatives accepted 
Wages Councils down to the 1970s. But the radicalisation of Conservative 
economic thinking under Thatcher led to growing hostility, and the 
eventual abolition of most Wages Councils in the 1980s, with the Major 
government finishing the job in 1993. The press release accompanying 
this final abolition announced: ‘Wages Councils were established in the 
early 1900s when there were no employment rights, no general health 
and safety legislation and little social security protection. They have no 
role to play in the 1990s.’38
Thus, despite presiding over a significant expansion of wage 
subsidies, into the 1990s the Conservatives emphasised a continuing 
ideological commitment to the idea of the market determination 
of wages, evident in the early 1990s when they made ferocious attacks 
on Labour’s proposals for a statutory minimum wage. The title of a 
1991 Conservative Research Department document summarised their 
argument: The Minimum Wage: Labour’s axe on jobs.39 In a House of 
Commons debate in 1992 the Conservatives amended a critical 
Opposition motion to deplore ‘the commitment of Her Majesty’s 
Opposition to a National Minimum Wage which would destroy jobs, 
thereby reducing opportunities and living standards for up to two million 
people’.40
Beyond the alleged impact on employment levels, opposition to 
minimum wages was part of a broader pro-market perspective, clearly 
articulated by ex-Prime Minister Thatcher:
We have different ways of doing things. We do not have a minimum 
wage. Because if you do you get all the differentials throughout the 
place and up go your costs. We say something different. We say if 
you haven’t enough after working on which to keep your family, we 
add to it from the tax-payer Family Credit so you can keep them in 
decency and keep them in a way in which you’d expect. That doesn’t 
add to industrial costs.41
The New Labour government, following the change of heart on this 
matter in the previous decade, introduced legislation for a National 
Minimum Wage in 1998. The Conservatives fought bitterly, though 
unsuccessfully, to prevent this new law coming into force. Again, the 
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ex-Prime Minister sought to bolster the case, attacking the new 
government:
It’s easy enough to take credit for the low unemployment your 
Conservative predecessors bequeathed you. But proving your left 
wing credentials with a National Minimum Wage, with a Working 
Time Directive, and with compulsory trade union recognition is to 
take a three-fold swipe at job creation.42
But around the time of this speech the Conservative opposition started to 
row back on its hostility to the new law. In 2000, the Shadow Chancellor, 
Michael Portillo, announced that the party was officially ending its 
opposition to the policy, while saying that the party remained ‘concerned 
at the costs for business’.43 In 2005, the new party leader, David Cameron, 
proclaimed: ‘I think the minimum wage has been a success, yes. It turned 
out much better than people expected.’44 There were still equivocations in 
Conservative ranks until 2015, when Chancellor Osborne announced a 
statutory ‘New Living Wage’, despite the continuing criticism from free-
market think tanks.45 In the view of writers for such think tanks, the 
consensus between the parties had opened up the possibility of ‘a political 
bidding war’ on the level to be set for the minimum wage.46
There was a logic at work in Osborne’s position, if not an 
unambiguously neoliberal one, in seeking to reduce public spending on 
wage subsidies by shifting more of the costs of raising wages on to 
employers. In his budget speech he announced big cuts to working-age 
benefits, especially tax credits, noting that the latter had risen from 8 per 
cent of public spending in 1980 to 13 per cent in 2015. But the ambition 
was by no means to abolish these credits, rather the aim was to ‘return tax 
credits to 2007/8 levels in real terms’ (that is, the level before the financial 
crash). The announcement of the National Living Wage was coupled to a 
claim that its impact in raising unemployment (calculated at 60,000 by the 
Office for Budgetary Responsibility) would be offset by the creation of a 
million new jobs. Conscious of arguments about the cost to employers, the 
announcement included promises of continuing cuts in corporation tax for 
large business, and National Insurance cuts for small firms. The Chancellor 
also noted the steep rise in Housing Benefit and announced a cut in rents in 
the social housing sector – but there were to be no general rent controls in 
the private sector to cut claims for that benefit, to match the policy 
combination of a Living Wage being combined with cuts to tax credits.47
The shift just outlined means that in the ‘neoliberal era’ the 
leaderships of both main British political parties moved from believing 
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that wages should be settled as far as possible without legal intervention 
to a position of strongly supporting a legal minimum wage. For Labour 
this was an important shift but emerged from a long-running debate; for 
the Conservatives it involved a striking volte-face.
Deindustrialisation and wage polarisation
The link between deindustrialisation and polarisation in the labour 
market has been outlined elsewhere.48 This draws on well-known 
evidence from both economists and think tanks about the much greater 
dispersion of incomes in the service sector compared with industrial 
employment.49
Polarisation suggests, of course, growth at both ends of the wage 
distribution. Goos and Manning’s data shows this very clearly for the 
years 1979–99, when the two most rapidly growing sectors of 
employment in Britain were care assistants and attendants (a 419 per 
cent increase) and software engineers (a 405 per cent increase).50 Care 
assistants also registered the largest absolute increase in numbers at over 
400,000. The biggest proportionate falls over the same period were 
among ‘boring and drilling machine setters and setter operators’ and coal 
miners. The wage polarising aspects of such changes are suggested by 
the fact that care assistants in 1979 typically earned around 25 per cent 
below the median national wage, and software engineers two-thirds 
above that median, while the manual occupations which shrank most 
offered wages closest to (about 20 per cent above) the middle of the 
distribution.51
The significance of this polarisation is profound. Of course, it has 
meant a rapid growth in well-paid and relatively stable employment for 
the academically qualified, while making it increasingly difficult for those 
without such qualifications to secure such conditions. For many of the 
latter, while the rhetoric of ‘work is the route out of poverty’ is still widely 
heard, it is plainly no longer true. As a result of the changes in the labour 
market brought about by deindustrialisation, growing in-work poverty 
has been a central feature of the post-industrial period. While the period 
of much larger-scale employment in industry did not guarantee an above-
poverty income, most poverty was among non-workers (the sick and 
disabled, pensioners, single mothers), or those with unusually large 
families. Recent work suggests that a majority of the poor in the early 
twenty-first century were members of households with at least one 
member in work:
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[In 2014/15] there are 400,000 fewer pensioners in poverty, despite 
there being around 1.7 million more people aged 65 or over. There 
are 2 million more people in working families in poverty, now up 
to 7.4 million, than a decade earlier. In contrast the number in 
workless or retired families in poverty fell by half a million. As 
pensioner poverty is now at low levels, the rate of in-work poverty 
is the most distinctive characteristic of poverty today.52
In-work benefits are clearly far from rescuing all recipient households 
from poverty, but they were certainly used effectively to reduce those 
numbers under New Labour, and they contributed significantly to the 
overall fall in poverty, especially among families with children, in that 
period. (Part of the complex legacy of New Labour was a big fall in poverty 
combined with no reduction in overall income inequality, as very top 
incomes continued to accelerate away.)53
Thus, deindustrialisation has cut across neoliberal plans for state 
retreat from intervention in labour and housing markets. The slogan 
of ‘making work pay’ has been ‘successfully’ pursued by worsening 
the financial position of the unemployed, but the policy of seeking to 
keep those in employment out of poverty, or at least at lower levels of 
poverty, has required an expansion of state activity of a striking scale 
and scope.54
Actually existing neoliberalism
There is no one single measure of the implementation of neoliberalism. 
But it is useful to start with public expenditure as one key area where the 
impact of the desire to ‘roll back the state’ can be assessed.
As a context, it is worth noting that at the global level the clear 
trend has been for public spending to rise over the long run, driven 
primarily by rises in social welfare spending, with the highest levels both 
in absolute terms and relative to GDP in the richest countries, but with the 
same trend evident in most countries as GDP has risen.55 Within the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, it is clear that 
overall public spending has been broadly stable since 1980, but with a 
larger proportion of that spending going on social welfare as military 
spending and economic subsidies were squeezed.56 Levels of social 
expenditure among this grouping tended to grow significantly following 
the financial crash of 2007/8, and then fall back in the following period 
of austerity, but to levels still above those prevalent before the crash.57
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Table 5.1 Key components of public spending as a share of GDP, 
1978/9–2017/18
1978/9 2017/18
Health 4%  7%
Military 4% 1.9%
Social security (pensioners) 5% 6%
Social security (non-pensioners) 3% 4.6%
Source: C. Emmerson, T. Pope and B. Zaranko, Outlook for 2019 Spending Review, briefing note 243 
(London, IFS, 2019), 5.
Table 5.2 Public spending in crisis, recovery and austerity, 2007–19
Total managed expenditure in 















Source: OBR databank: Public sector finances.
What has happened in Britain has broadly mirrored the experience 
of other rich countries. Total public spending, adjusted for inflation, has 
risen almost continuously in the years since the mid-1970s, and even in 
the recent, post-2010, era of cuts the absolute level has barely declined 
(see table 5.1 and table 5.2). Over the last 40 years total spending 
(adjusted for inflation) has grown around 250 per cent.
Measured as a share of GDP, public spending has fluctuated with the 
economic cycle, but with a downward trend from just under 50 per cent 
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in 1975/6 (the post-war peak) to around 40 per cent in 2016/17, though 
the fall in public investment (not least in housing) means current spending 
has fallen by perhaps 5 per cent of GDP. Post-2010 austerity plans would 
have taken the figure to around 38 per cent by 2020 (still higher than the 
levels of the 1980s and 1990s), but that project has now ended. Within 
these totals, spending on health care and education has risen significantly 
as a share of GDP. In social security the aim of squeezing the incomes of 
the unemployed has been carried through, but overall social security 
spending has risen more than in line with GDP.58 Much of this has come 
from growing expenditure on pensions, but the most striking change, 
reversed but by no means eliminated after 2010, has, as noted above, 
been the rise in in-work benefits and Housing Benefit.
Thus, overall in the ‘neoliberal era’, state spending in absolute terms 
has risen by a substantial amount, especially on social welfare. That 
spending has risen partly at the expense of other programmes, especially 
the military. The ‘shrinking of the state’ under the austerity policies since 
2010 has hit some areas of spending enormously hard. Most striking has 
been the relentless squeeze on local authority spending, which has clear 
political advantage for central government in shifting the political focus 
but has had major regressive effects.59 There have also been very big cuts 
in working-age benefits. But we should not allow these recent changes to 
obscure the fact that the trend in the ‘neoliberal era’ has been, by any 
measure, for spending on welfare to rise; we have moved from what 
David Edgerton called a ‘warfare state’ in mid-twentieth-century Britain 
to one which, at least in quantitative terms, more than ever deserves the 
term ‘welfare state’.60
Of course, the numbers are only part of the story. For the ideologues 
of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) in the late 1950s and 1960s the 
key aim was an assault on the welfare state, by introducing markets to 
create ‘choice in welfare’ by breaking up the National Health Service 
(NHS) and introducing vouchers for schooling.61 Neither of these has 
happened as envisaged, and it is important to register that failure against 
the original priorities of British neoliberalism. But plainly these services 
(and many other parts of the public sector) have been much affected by 
reorganisations which have aimed to mimic private sector patterns of 
‘purchasers’ and ‘providers’. It is striking that in many areas the impact of 
neoliberalism has not been to ‘roll back’ the state in quantitative terms, 
but to change how that state works.62
The reorganisation of the state has included widespread contracting 
out in order to lower wage costs, and this, paradoxically, has increased the 
numbers of those paid wages which have to be supplemented by in-work 
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benefits, so that the state budget has ‘taken with one hand and given with 
the other’. This outsourcing has also meant that the scale of employment 
reliant directly on the public purse has trended clearly upwards over most 
of the ‘neoliberal era’ despite the cuts in those officially defined as working 
in the public sector.63
The aim of this chapter has not been to deny that neoliberalism 
has had profound effects on British policy since the 1970s. Trade unions 
have been marginalised, and many markets deregulated, including many 
aspects of the labour market (see Jim Phillips in this volume). This 
contributed in a major way to the extraordinary rise in income inequality 
in Britain in the 1980s, a shift which has since been stabilised but not 
reversed.64 The parallel deregulation of finance has not only underpinned 
a huge growth in personal debt (with both macroeconomic and social 
implications) but has also created a process of financialisation with a wide 
range of social and political effects.65
But alongside these effects, this chapter has argued that there is a 
fundamental clash between the marketisation ambitions of neoliberalism 
and the effects of the shifts in the labour market as a consequence of 
deindustrialisation. The latter has generated a polarised labour market, 
with wages at the bottom below those deemed ‘politically acceptable’. 
From the 1980s onwards, governments spent substantial sums in wage 
subsidies, and the scale of these became a major problem for the ambition 
to reduce public spending in the post-crash ‘austerity’ era, given their 
scale. The tensions over this issue pushed the post-2010 Conservative-led 
governments into a policy completely at odds with neoliberalism, a 
statutory national ‘living’ wage.
Thus, in an ostensibly ‘neoliberal’ policy regime we have seen the 
development of two major interventions in the labour market, entirely 
absent in the preceding period of allegedly ‘Keynesian/social democratic’ 
predominance, plus a multiplication of subsidies in the housing market, 
much of that multiplication reflecting the inability of those in work to 
afford market-determined rents.
‘Actually existing neoliberalism’ looks very different from the 
outcomes aimed for by most neoliberal ideologues. Some dimensions of 
this failure are well known. The failure to cut back the NHS in ways which 
would have followed the beliefs of early advocates of neoliberalism is 
clear.66 It is not hard to see why this particular failure has occurred. 
In Britain, neoliberalism may have found its political home in the 
Conservative Party and achieved considerable purchase as a result. But 
this linkage has also meant that the influence of this doctrine has been 
constrained in the policymaking process by Conservative statecraft.67 
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That statecraft includes some quite straightforward political calculation 
about the attractions of a free-at-the-point-of-use health care system to 
the great mass of voters, especially as those voters have on average 
become older, and hence had greater demands for such care. The 
demographic shift is also, of course, hugely important in explaining how 
pensions have become such a large and growing part of the social security 
budget, and why largely publicly funded ‘social care’ became the fastest-
growing employment sector in the final decades of the twentieth century.
This chapter has sought to add to our understanding of the constraints 
on neoliberal policymaking by emphasising the role of an economic change 
that neoliberals did not foresee: deindustrialisation.68 This change, evident 
across the whole industrial world, was the consequence of technological 
changes, changes in consumption patterns and, to a lesser extent, 
globalisation.69 It began in the 1950s and has been at work in Britain right 
through the ‘neoliberal era’. It is doubtful that within broad parameters the 
pace or scale of the change has been or could be much affected by policy 
measures.70 In response to the change, what has emerged since the 1980s 
is a political consensus on dealing with its consequences for incomes 
through increased public spending and wage regulation.71
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6
British varieties of neoliberalism: 
unemployment policy from  
Thatcher to Blair
Bernhard rieger
‘A welfare system that puts limits on an individual’s ability to find a job 
must be reformed. Modern Social Democrats want to transform the safety 
net of entitlements into a springboard to personal responsibility’, Tony 
Blair declared jointly with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in June 
1999 as they presented a programme for the ‘modernization’ of Europe.1 
In Germany, this memorandum triggered a stormy debate, in which 
the Schröder government faced accusations of opening Germany to 
‘neoliberalism’.2 In Britain, meanwhile, the outline attracted far less 
attention – and not just because the British media took little interest in a 
political statement that was deliberately European in outlook. Rather, 
Britons had been exposed to government rhetoric about excessive 
‘entitlement’ in the social security system and a supposed lack of 
‘responsibility’ among welfare recipients since the late 1970s, when 
Margaret Thatcher moved into Downing Street. Unlike in Germany, where 
unification’s social fallout necessitated a significant expansion of existing 
welfare arrangements, this language was already well established and 
hence hardly newsworthy in the UK. Indeed, nothing highlights the 
contrast between Britain’s and Germany’s welfare landscapes more 
clearly than the defence put forward by British intellectual advocates of 
the welfare policies outlined in the so-called Blair–Schröder paper. Where 
the German chancellor stood accused of promoting neoliberalism, doyen 
of third-way thinking Anthony Giddens characterised Blair’s welfare 
reforms as ‘not a continuation of neoliberalism, but an alternative political 
philosophy to it’.3
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Such diverging assessments of the Third Way’s relationship with 
neoliberalism point towards what has frequently been regarded as one of 
New Labour’s defining features. Rather than opt for a pronounced, readily 
visible break, Blair’s and Brown’s governments often adopted policies that 
overlapped with the solutions of their Conservative predecessors. In 
particular, New Labour’s rhetoric about the virtues of market mechanisms 
has underpinned impressions of considerable political continuities across 
the electoral watershed of 1997.4 None other than Giddens counts among 
those who highlighted positive qualities of market mechanisms, asserting 
that ‘markets do not always increase inequality, but can sometimes be the 
means of overcoming it’. Indeed, ‘Social Democrats’, he emphasised, ‘need 
to overcome some of their worries and fears about markets’.5 Irrespective 
of its insistence that it offered a fundamental alternative, New Labour’s 
relationship with the market-friendly policies promoted by its predecessors 
is by no means clear.
Studying social policy allows us to take a closer look at conceptual 
continuities and differences between Conservative and Labour governments 
from Thatcher to Blair. Since welfare provisions regulate myriad 
relationships between individuals and markets, they cast light on the 
social significance Conservative and New Labour politicians assigned 
to the forces of supply and demand. An examination of changes in 
unemployment policy – a prominent public issue in the 1980s and 1990s – 
provides an apt case study to this end. Provision for those who had lost 
their jobs and struggled to regain employment not only brings into view 
their fraught relationship with the labour market; policies to reduce 
joblessness also sought to turn those excluded from the job market into 
market participants. In other words, unemployment policy is shot through 
with assumptions about market mechanisms, and welfare regulations – 
that is, state institutions – played crucial roles in shaping the frameworks 
within which those out of work were expected to conduct their lives, 
thereby positioning themselves vis-à-vis the labour market. A key question 
is thus not whether British politicians sought to ‘roll back the state’ to 
make space for markets since the 1980s, but whether and how policies 
mobilised state institutions to promote market mechanisms in new social 
contexts.6
The new approaches to combating unemployment developed by 
Conservatives and New Labour unfolded as the British labour market 
itself underwent significant transformations, a topic Jim Tomlinson treats 
in more detail in this volume. It was not simply that the size of the 
workforce increased from 24.7 million to 28.2 million between 1970 and 
2004. Rather, the structure of the workforce changed in a manner that is 
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frequently captured by the term ‘deindustrialisation’, a process that pre-
dated the time period under consideration here. Between 1980 and 2001, 
the national share of manufacturing jobs fell from 15.1 to 13.7 per cent 
while service sector jobs expanded from 62.9 to 77.6 per cent. Beyond 
a growing share of female labour, Britain’s post-industrial labour 
market was characterised by an ongoing polarisation towards what the 
economists Maarten Goos and Alan Manning have termed ‘lousy and 
lovely jobs’. While highly skilled work in the private sector could command 
rising pay, the number of medium-skilled, safe jobs offering steady 
incomes diminished due to a new international division of labour as well 
as organisational and technological changes. At the same time, the 
proportion of low-skill occupations that followed no set routines and 
could not easily be rationalised away in areas such as hospitality, cleaning 
and other parts of the service sector increased substantially. The latter 
trend underpinned a growing low-wage sector in which employees found 
frequently precarious forms of employment that offered meagre incomes. 
In short, Britain saw the rise of pronounced inequalities in terms of 
incomes, skills and job security between the late 1970s and the new 
millennium.7
Whether the new political recipes designed to combat unemployment 
in a changing labour market were predicated on promoting what Wendy 
Brown has called ‘a peculiar form of reason that configures . . . existence 
in economic terms’ offers the leitmotif for assessing their neoliberal 
character.8 The shifting neoliberal elements in British social policy in 
the 1980s and 1990s gain clearer contours through an analysis of how 
welfare provision for the unemployed construed relationships between 
individuals and the labour market. As we shall see, Conservatives and 
New Labour adopted different approaches to protecting those out of 
work from, as well as exposing them to, the forces of supply and demand. 
In this process, they confronted the unemployed with different 
expectations to configure themselves as homines oeconomici who were 
anchored in market relations. As early as the late 1970s, Michel Foucault 
considered a version of homo economicus with an ‘entrepreneurial self’ as 
one of neoliberalism’s distinguishing features. Neoliberal forms of 
governance, according to Foucault, prompted individuals to conduct 
themselves as ‘entrepreneurs of [themselves]’, taking advantage of, 
and responding to, market mechanisms.9 Whether and how British 
governments set about recasting institutional arrangements that had 
firmly shielded those out of work from market forces before the 1980s 
along neoliberal lines requires an analysis of both specific political 
initiatives as well as their ideological underpinnings.
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‘Personal responsibility is key’: Conservative labour 
market policies from Thatcher to Major
Between the end of the Second World War and the 1980s, social policy 
towards the unemployed was based on the premise that those out of work 
were victims of economic circumstances beyond their control and 
therefore deserved compensation for their material hardship through 
‘Unemployment Benefit’. This welfare provision represented a firm 
individual entitlement because it was funded through a worker’s 
contributions to National Insurance and thus acted as a form of protection 
against what was widely perceived as the vicissitudes of the job market. 
Initially, Unemployment Benefit was a flat-rate benefit paid for six 
months, but in 1967 the Labour government extended its duration to 
one year and added an ‘earnings-related element’, a component that 
recognised a person’s previous income and thereby acknowledged their 
earlier employment status.10 With memories of the deprivation suffered 
by workers during the interwar slump very much alive, post-war 
governments of both political stripes considered keeping unemployment 
at low levels to be one of their foremost political priorities. One scholar 
has observed that, until the 1970s, unemployment rates over 2 per cent 
had ‘alarm bells ringing in . . . party headquarters’.11 In the late 1960s and 
first half of the 1970s, British governments repeatedly combated 
unemployment through countercyclical spending and fiscal measures. 
These policies, however, not only missed their aim of reducing 
unemployment in a lasting fashion, but stoked inflation and exacerbated 
industrial strife. Similar to other Western European countries, Britain 
witnessed the erosion of the socio-economic post-war settlement by 
the late 1970s.
While British administrations had focused on preventing unemploy- 
ment up to the mid-1970s, Thatcher’s government pursued an altogether 
different economic policy from 1979. To reverse what was widely 
regarded as Britain’s dramatic post-war economic ‘decline’, she and her 
allies hoped to re-invigorate market forces through policies ranging from 
reining in the trade union movement, to reducing public spending and 
direct taxes, to raising productivity and competitiveness. Above all, 
Thatcher saw a low rate of inflation as the foundation on which a 
prospering economy rested. To combat inflation, the government raised 
interest rates, cut public spending and increased indirect taxes in 1981, 
thereby deepening a recession triggered by the second oil crisis, which led 
to numerous business failures and a surge of unemployment. At 
1.3 million when Thatcher took office in May 1979, the count rose to 
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more than three million at the beginning of 1982, remaining above this 
mark until spring 1987.12
Thatcher paid considerable attention to unemployment, not least 
since it ranked as the nation’s most pressing issue in opinion polls.13 
Unsurprisingly, the Conservatives around Thatcher rejected the 
Opposition’s claim that the government was responsible for the UK’s 
persistent joblessness. On the contrary, Thatcherites saw high unemploy- 
ment as an indicator of long-standing distortions of the laws of supply and 
demand in the labour market. People were out of jobs, the argument ran, 
because the price of labour was too high. As a result, demand for labour 
from employers remained too weak to restore more people to work. 
Viewed from this angle, the solution appeared simple. Wages had to fall, 
or, as Keith Joseph stated in 1978, ‘[t]he initial [wage] flexibility has to 
be downward’.14 This raised the question of what was responsible for 
Britain’s supposedly excessive pay levels. Next to the unions with their 
bargaining power, the welfare state inflated wage levels, according to the 
government. As economist Patrick Minford argued in a study sponsored 
by Thatcher’s administration in 1982, ‘the operation of the unemployment 
benefit system’ established a ‘floor’ below which wages could not fall. 
After all, ‘a man’, he explained, ‘will very naturally expect to be 
re-employed at a wage after tax and work expenses which is at least as 
high as this benefit’.15 Alan Walters, Thatcher’s most trusted economic 
adviser, outlined the link between welfare payments and unemployment 
in a brief memo to the Prime Minister in 1981 by posing a rhetorical 
question: ‘[D]oes not everyone believe that were real wages to fall 10 to 
15%, there would be the most dramatic reduction in unemployment?’16
In keeping with this line of reasoning, the Conservatives started 
reducing the real value of provisions available for the unemployed from 
1980 onwards by levying income tax on Unemployment Benefit, by 
abolishing the ‘earnings-related element’ and by ending the uprating of 
benefits in line with inflation. In part, these cuts were motivated by a 
desire for household discipline during a recession that raised government 
expenditure from 45.3 per cent of GDP in 1978/9 to 48.1 per cent 
in 1981/2.17 This increase resulted not least from public protests about 
exploding unemployment, to which the government reluctantly 
responded by expanding schemes such as the Community Programme – a 
publicly funded job-creation measure for the long-term unemployed – 
and the Youth Opportunities programme, which raised the number of 
subsidised vocational training places for jobless school leavers from 
216,000 trainees to 553,000 between 1978/9 and 1981/2.18 Yet as the 
Thatcher government saw itself compelled to alleviate unemployment 
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through higher welfare expenditure, it simultaneously hoped to lay the 
foundations for a reduction of benefit rolls once the recession ended by 
decreasing the real-terms value of individual benefits. Lowering the value 
of individual benefits would, Thatcher and her allies hoped, remove 
distortions in the play of supply and demand on the labour market and 
prompt larger numbers of those out of work to seek employment at lower 
pay than in the 1970s. With its belief in the efficacy of market mechanisms 
in the medium term, this aspect of Conservative unemployment policy 
bore a decidedly neoliberal imprint.
At the same time, Thatcher’s government complemented the 
promotion of low-income work with policies that combated unemployment 
by helping those out of work set up their own small businesses. Put 
differently, Conservative welfare policy encouraged those excluded from 
the labour market to create their own jobs by joining the marketplace as 
entrepreneurs. At the beginning of the recession, recipients of 
Unemployment Benefit were deterred from pursuing this avenue to 
employment because starting up an enterprise automatically resulted in 
the loss of welfare payments. To remove this obstacle, the administration 
launched a programme that not only allowed unemployed Britons who 
began a small enterprise to keep their welfare payment for a year but also 
subsidised their private venture with a weekly payment of £40 during this 
period. Launched as a trial in late 1981 and rolled out across the country 
in summer 1983, the ‘Enterprise Allowance Scheme’ hoped to turn those 
out of work into small-scale entrepreneurs.19 The test phase of the 
programme in five areas across mainland Britain with high rates of 
joblessness revealed strong interest among the unemployed. In April 
1982, local managers of the Employment Service in the test areas 
explained that the unemployed who wished to set up as plumbers, 
furniture makers, joiners and travel agents no longer operated in the 
‘black economy’. One of the early participants stressed the importance of 
the weekly £40 subsidy: ‘Having the enterprise allowance makes a 
considerable difference . . . providing a guaranteed source of income on 
which to live while you get the business off the ground.’ These positive 
assessments led The Guardian, which was otherwise harshly critical of the 
government’s social policies, to commend this programme as an 
‘imaginative attempt’ to combat unemployment. In March 1983, The 
Times also called for the scheme’s national extension, condemning 
the prospect of another trial period of limited geographical reach as 
‘disgraceful’.20
Given Thatcher’s background as a grocer’s daughter who repeatedly 
extolled the virtues of economic ‘independence’, it is hardly surprising that 
unEmPLoymEnt PoLiCy From thAtChEr to BLAir 117
ministers followed the trials with interest. The administration also paid 
close attention to the initiative because it linked with its measures to 
support small businesses through loan guarantees, tax breaks and training 
initiatives that aimed to invigorate Britain’s supposedly underdeveloped 
‘entrepreneurial spirit’.21 Nonetheless, the Enterprise Allowance had to 
overcome considerable resistance when Thatcher’s inner circle considered 
its national expansion in late 1982. Ferdinand Mount, head of the Policy 
Unit at 10 Downing Street, wrote in December that ‘this does seem like a 
waste of money [and] should be scrapped’, because the combined 
payments of Unemployment Benefit and the start-up subsidy resulted in 
annual costs of £2,900 per person, thereby rendering the Enterprise 
Allowance Scheme significantly more expensive than, for example, the 
Community Programme.22 Other advisers, including the former merchant 
banker John Sparrow, disagreed and pointed out that, unlike most publicly 
sponsored job-creation programmes, this initiative generated ‘real jobs in 
the small firm sector’ that would provide livelihoods beyond the period 
during which the government subsidised them. A recalculation revealed 
that annual costs fell to a mere £700 on the cautious assumption that a 
quarter of the businesses launched under the scheme would survive for 
three years. When seen in this light, the Enterprise Allowance emerged as 
the cheapest measure against unemployment at the time and was rolled 
out nationally in 1983.23 After its national launch, the initiative enjoyed a 
veritable boom and was repeatedly expanded. In 1986, the government 
announced that it would fund no fewer than 100,000 places from June, an 
enthusiastic vote of confidence that reflected the finding that the scheme 
ran at ‘zero cost’, as the Chairman of the Manpower Services Commission 
stated, because three quarters of the start-ups remained in business 
after 18 months. Aided by the booming economy of the second half of 
the 1980s, 315,000 Britons had taken advantage of the subsidy by 
February 1988.24
One response to rising unemployment by the Thatcher government, 
then, consisted in promoting entrepreneurial selves in a literal manner by 
encouraging Britons without a job to create their own in the form of a 
small business. That the government offered an initial subsidy to would-be 
small businesspersons did not clash with its market-friendly credentials 
because the scheme, like other initiatives strengthening small companies 
at the time, was designed to enhance the country’s entrepreneurial 
culture. Since an auspicious economic climate ensured the survival of a 
high proportion of businesses founded under the scheme, the government 
also recouped its start-up costs and had thus happened upon a cost-
neutral policy that reduced unemployment by relying on market forces. 
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Meeting with a positive echo among the unemployed, as well as the 
progressive and conservative press, the Enterprise Allowance emerged as 
a highly popular neoliberal social policy of the Thatcher years.
Irrespective of this scheme’s boost to the small-business sector, the 
Thatcher government became increasingly convinced that Britain’s 
welfare regime required fundamental reform as unemployment still stood 
at 3.6 million in 1986, despite solid economic growth over the previous 
three years. Promoting small businesses and cutting the value of benefits 
alone could not solve Britain’s sizeable unemployment problem. The 
Prime Minister was unlikely to be surprised by the persistence of pervasive 
joblessness because she ascribed detrimental effects to existing social 
security regulations. Indeed, she regarded them as nothing less than a 
moral provocation, because institutional arrangements linked various 
forms of benefits, allowing those out of work to be in a materially better 
position than many who were in employment. As a result, she charged as 
early as 1980, ‘to be proudly but poorly independent is to be worse off, and 
full of resentment’.25 Reversing the consequences of a welfare regime that 
supposedly discouraged self-reliance and individual effort emerged as a 
central concern of a Prime Minister with a Methodist background who 
considered these very qualities as the True North of a conservative moral 
compass.26 In 1982, she impressed on Ferdinand Mount that ‘we really 
have to address . . . the values of society . . . Personal responsibility 
is key.’27
Held in high esteem by Thatcher for his record as a businessman and 
appointed Secretary of State for Employment in 1985, David Young 
presented the Prime Minister with a plan that would ‘tackle the will to 
work’. What Young euphemistically called in a secret note ‘increasing 
incentives to work’ required ‘a combination of carrots and sticks, but’, he 
impressed on Thatcher, ‘we must exercise great care that the sticks are 
never seen’.28 The punitive regime the government imposed on the 
unemployed in the mid-1980s centred on the stipulation that benefit 
recipients had to demonstrate that they were ‘available’ for work to be 
eligible for welfare payments. To test this legal criterion, Young instructed 
Jobcentres to call unemployed individuals for a formal interview at 
the end of which they were presented with a choice of undergoing 
training, signing up for a subsidised low-wage job, accepting temporary 
employment in the Community Programme or joining a ‘Job Club’, which 
offered help with targeted job searches. Crucially, those who failed to 
attend the interview or refused all four options could have their benefits 
withdrawn because they were not deemed ‘available’ for work and hence 
fell foul of the law.29
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When unemployment eventually began to fall during the ‘Lawson 
boom’ of the second half of the 1980s, the administration was quick 
to credit its welfare reforms for this development. It was thus consistent 
that, in the late 1980s, the government continued along these 
disciplinarian lines by further tightening the eligibility criteria for 
Unemployment Benefit. From 1989 on, recipients of Unemployment 
Benefit had to demonstrate that they were ‘actively seeking’ work rather 
than being ‘available’ for work, as the law had previously stated. Moreover, 
Unemployment Benefit could now be stopped after 13 weeks if a person 
declined a ‘suitable’ job on the grounds that it paid significantly less than 
her or his previous occupation. These reforms culminated under John 
Major in 1996. His Cabinet reduced the duration of payments to half a 
year and renamed the benefit for the unemployed as a ‘Jobseeker’s 
Allowance’, thereby recategorising an insurance-based form of social 
security with a term that suggests a drastically weakened entitlement to 
support.30
The Conservatives lowered the value of welfare payments, 
encouraged self-employment among a minority of the unemployed and 
adopted disciplinarian measures including the withdrawal of benefits to 
push the majority of those without jobs into wage work at lower income 
rates. Conservative welfare reforms thus pursued multiple approaches to 
combat unemployment. The promotion of small businesses aimed to 
nurture entrepreneurial selves by directly creating entrepreneurs. To this 
end, the government strengthened the market power of a minority of 
jobless Britons by subsidising their start-ups. The majority of those out of 
work, however, were turned into disempowered market participants. In 
addition to advancing a disciplinarian agenda, Thatcher’s and Major’s 
policies relied on lower wages to reduce unemployment by forcing those 
out of work to expose themselves to the laws of supply and demand in a 
crowded labour market. No matter whether intended to create empowered 
or disempowered market participants, these policies bore a profoundly 
neoliberal imprint because they aimed to remove barriers between the 
individual and the market rationalities that the government regarded as 
efficient tools for solving the social problem of unemployment. Overall, 
Thatcher and Major subscribed to a version of neoliberalism with 
profoundly conservative traits because not only was it predicated on a 
belief in the efficiency of markets, but it also affirmed fiscal discipline, 
individualism, self-dependence and hard work as key political and 
cultural virtues. In keeping with these core convictions, the Conservative 
reforms confronted those out of work with a far stronger obligation to 
find employment themselves, a trend that culminated in the Jobseeker’s 
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Allowance’s requirement to ‘actively’ engage in job searches. It was the 
unemployed themselves who had to take responsibility for their 
employment status on the labour market. In short, Thatcher’s and Major’s 
approach to unemployment policy was premised on a culturally 
conservative form of market fundamentalism.
Towards a ‘risk-taking’ work force:  
New Labour’s New Deal
At first sight, there appear to be considerable similarities between the 
Conservatives’ and New Labour’s welfare regimes for the unemployed. 
Most significantly, the Labour government that assumed office in 1997 
neither revoked the law that had recently created the new Jobseeker’s 
Allowance nor changed significantly the conditions under which this 
benefit could be claimed. Policies to counter unemployment thus retained 
a pronouncedly disciplinarian quality after 1997. This continuity reflects 
a wider reorientation of the Labour Party since the late 1980s to heighten 
its electoral appeal to voters in the political centre ground, a process Mark 
Wickham-Jones treats in greater deal elsewhere in this volume. In 
addition to abolishing the highly symbolic Clause Four that committed 
Labour to nationalisation policies, Blair emphasised in opposition that a 
government led by him would abide by Conservative reforms of trade 
union legislation and pursue a firm law-and-order course by being ‘tough 
on crime and the causes of crime’. The party leadership also repeatedly 
stressed its dedication to a ‘competitive [economic] framework that 
would help [private companies] flourish in the global economy’, as Robert 
Taylor has observed.31 To prevent the Tories from portraying Labour as 
committed to costly social programmes that would require tax increases, 
the 1997 election manifesto pledged to observe the spending targets of 
Major’s government while remaining largely silent on social security 
issues.32 Before electoral victory in 1997, New Labour emphasised that it 
broke with key tenets of the ‘old’ Labour Party and moved closer to 
positions that overlapped with Conservative policies.
This reorientation, however, does not imply that New Labour 
entered office without a distinctive social agenda – and not just because 
the new administration raised the value of many benefits to alleviate 
poverty, which had become much more pronounced under the 
Conservatives. Unemployment policy exemplifies how the Labour 
government substantially diverged from its Conservative predecessors. 
Blair’s administration turned the requirement to ‘actively’ seek work into 
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the platform from which it launched its own schemes to combat 
unemployment. New Labour could pursue its initiatives under favourable 
economic conditions. After the recession of the early 1990s, which had 
seen unemployment rise back to over three million in early 1993, 
the count had fallen back to just over two million in spring 1997.33 
Rather than fight rising unemployment, New Labour’s task consisted in 
amplifying a falling trend.
Under the heading the ‘New Deal’, which confidently invoked 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Depression-era social programmes, the 
government initiated a raft of measures targeting jobless Britons by 
demanding that, while receiving social security payments, they enhance 
their employability. The ‘New Deal for Young People’ was the first and 
most prominent of these programmes. Highlighted in the 1997 election 
manifesto as a measure against youth unemployment, it launched as a 
trial in January 1998 before national implementation in June that year. 
For recipients of Jobseeker’s Allowance aged between 18 and 24, 
participation was obligatory, thereby extending the disciplinarian 
strategy that had characterised Conservative employment policy. At the 
same time, the Employment Agency emphasised the programme’s 
supportive rather than punitive intentions. Describing the initiative as a 
‘key part of the Government’s welfare to work strategy’, a widely 
distributed official brochure stated that ‘it aims to help young people 
gain the qualities and skills they need to increase their employability and 
get and keep jobs’.34 Those enrolling in this New Deal could count on 
personal advice from a dedicated caseworker, who would assess 
a jobseeker’s ‘needs, ambitions and options’ during an initial four- 
month period. Young people whom advisers considered not yet ready 
to work could expect individually tailored assistance, including ‘intensive 
counselling’ as well as courses to boost literacy and numeracy skills. 
Subsequently, participants entered a six-month period of work 
experience and training by following an occupational skills course, by 
taking up a job in the voluntary or environmental sector or by working 
for a private business. To render the programme financially attractive, 
young people who remained enrolled received payments that at least 
equalled, but in many cases exceeded, Jobseeker’s Allowance and also 
covered job-related expenses such as travel costs.35 Crucially, those who 
failed to secure permanent employment after the phase of occupational 
training and work experience received further assistance from a personal 
caseworker to ‘build on the progress they made during the New Deal’ 
with the ultimate aim of finding a ‘suitable job’, the Employment Agency 
pledged.36
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With its upbeat tone and its emphasis on individualised assistance, 
the New Deal for Young People approached unemployed Britons as 
open to receiving help with obstacles in the labour market, rather 
than suspiciously focusing on the motivation to work, as Conservative 
social policy had done. In other words, the New Deal for Young People 
started from the premise that many benefit recipients were willing to 
work. The belief that jobless Britons drawing social security payments 
welcomed help with finding employment through training and work 
experience also characterised the programmes that targeted additional 
groups who suffered from disadvantages in the labour market. By 1999, 
the government had extended its welfare-to-work approach through 
mandatory training and personal counselling to long-term unemployed 
citizens aged over 25 as well as those looking for work who were older 
than 50. Moreover, disabled Britons as well as lone parents had the option 
of signing up to New Deals.37 When the second Blair government entered 
office in 2001, almost 1.2 million Britons had participated in a New Deal 
initiative.38
Yet it was not just in its basic assumption about the motivation of the 
unemployed that New Labour’s approach differed from Conservative 
strategies. Blair’s administration also backed these initiatives with new 
resources. By investing £4 billion in the New Deal, £2.6 billion of which 
was raised by a ‘windfall tax’ on the privatised utilities, the Labour 
government devoted considerable additional financial means to welfare-
to-work programmes during a time of economic expansion, where its 
predecessors had overseen an erosion of the value of benefits during a 
recession.39 That New Labour made fiscal and institutional investments in 
the New Deals corresponded with further measures that directly 
addressed the material dimensions of joblessness. Britons with limited 
skills, who could expect only low incomes and who made up the majority 
of those looking for work, stood at the centre of New Labour’s efforts. To 
ensure that low-income employment offered a guaranteed level of 
material rewards, the government passed legislation for a minimum wage 
at a rate of £3.60 per hour in 1999.40 In November 1997, Gordon Brown 
had already announced an additional £300 million to create affordable 
childcare places for ‘almost 1 million children’, in support of the various 
New Deals. This measure aimed to promote work among those lone 
parents and married couples whose low incomes had previously been 
absorbed by childcare costs, thereby creating a ‘poverty trap’ that had left 
many working parents worse off than their peers on benefits.41
Moreover, from April 1999, low-income families with children 
could supplement their wages with ‘Working Tax Credits’ that guaranteed 
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married couples with offspring and ‘at least one full-time earner’ a 
minimum annual income of £10,400 through a wage subsidy by the tax 
office.42 That tax credits were first available for families with children 
reflected the government’s dedication to fighting widespread child 
poverty, with the overall aim of reversing multigenerational patterns of 
social disadvantages. Indeed, one month before the introduction of 
Working Tax Credits, Blair had committed the government to the 
eradication of child poverty, which formed a central concern for the 
Social Exclusion Unit that the Prime Minister installed in 10 Downing 
Street.43 In 2003, the government made tax credits available to low 
earners without children, too.44 These measures resulted in significant 
costs. Between 1997 and 2007, annual expenditure for tax credits rose 
from £7 billion to almost £25 billion, thereby reaching almost half the size 
of the defence budget.45 New Labour thus created new baselines for 
earnings at the lower end of the income scale both through direct 
interventions into pricing mechanisms in the labour market and through 
fiscal transfer payments.
That Blair’s government pre-empted, and compensated for, what the 
administration regarded as shortcomings of market mechanisms, however, 
by no means signalled a turn against markets per se, nor towards 
redistribution policies that would have characterised ‘old’ Labour. In 
the Anglo-German outline of the Third Way, Blair explicitly dismissed 
‘the belief that the state should address damaging market failures’ 
comprehensively because, in the past, this had ‘all too often led to a 
disproportionate expansion of the government’s reach’. As he declared ‘a 
robust and competitive market framework’ a central policy aim, he 
expressly addressed the issue of those out of work. Reducing unemployment 
rates, he explained, ‘will be easier’ if ‘labour markets are working properly’. 
A ‘low-wage sector’ was necessary to this end, he continued, because it 
‘make[s] low-skill jobs’ available for a group that had long been 
disproportionately at risk of unemployment: those lacking training and 
professional qualifications. This low-wage sector, Blair hoped, would allow 
previously unemployed individuals to work their way towards more 
lucrative employment in the medium term: ‘[L]ow-paid work [is] better 
than no work because [it] ease[s] the transition from unemployment to 
jobs.’46 In keeping with the left’s ideological reorientation since the late 
1980s, Blair explicitly affirmed market rationales as positive social forces, 
not just in general terms but specifically with regard to unemployment, 
because he hoped they would promote upward social mobility.
At the same time, Blair insisted that market mechanisms had to 
operate within boundaries. Since a ‘market economy’ should not give rise 
THE NEOLIBERAL AGE? BRITAIN S INCE THE 1970s124
to a ‘market society’, he explained, ‘replenish[ing] low incomes’ among 
those on low-income jobs became the responsibility of the tax and benefits 
system. Before those holding badly paid positions could embark on their 
upward social trajectory, they deserved help that compensated for their 
willingness to expose themselves to the forces of supply and demand on 
the labour market.47 Blair credited market mechanisms with an economic 
efficiency that extended only partially to the social realm, because 
they could leave substantial groups in material deprivation. Blair 
advocated a political economy of ‘redistributive market liberalism’, in 
which, according to economist John Kay, the state has ‘a dominant role in 
income distribution, but should discharge its responsibility with as little 
interference as possible in the workings of the free market’ for goods and 
services.48 As Peter Sloman highlights in his chapter in this volume, New 
Labour’s variant of redistributive market liberalism focused on anti-
poverty measures among the working population in the low-wage labour 
market. In the case of New Labour, the laws of supply and demand 
reached the limits of their social expediency when low-wage labour failed 
to offer rewards that sustained individuals’ motivation to work or look for 
it. In effect, Blair’s government promoted the laws of supply and demand 
in the labour market by moderating their social effects at the lower end of 
the social spectrum. Rather than pay people to be out of work, New 
Labour compensated those who exposed themselves to unfavourable 
market constellations, with the ultimate aim that these employees would 
subsequently leave the low-wage sector behind.
New Labour advanced two justifications for its approach to 
unemployment policy. Firstly, it emphasised the individual obligation to 
work, which was reflected by the compulsory nature of the New Deal for 
many jobless Britons. As Tony Blair explained in 1998, New Labour’s 
employment policies were part and parcel of a protracted recalibration of 
the relationship between individual rights and responsibilities. ‘In recent 
decades, responsibility and duty were the preserves of the Right’, he 
wrote, with an eye to the Thatcher and Major administrations and their 
eulogies of individual independence. Blair regarded this Conservative 
insistence on individual responsibility as a reaction against the ‘Old 
Left’, which had allegedly ‘for too long’ separated ‘the demand for rights 
from the state . . . from the duties of citizenship’. In his eyes, no other 
social provision symbolised this discrepancy more strongly than the 
circumstance that, before Thatcher’s premiership, ‘unemployment 
benefits were often paid without strong reciprocal obligations’.49
In a 1996 speech, Blair, by contrast, started from the premise that 
‘duty is the cornerstone of a decent society’. Conceiving of individual 
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responsibilities and entitlements as mutually constitutive, he declared 
that ‘the rights we receive should reflect the duties we owe’. As he outlined 
the relationship between duties and rights that formed the core of 
New Labour’s approach to welfare, he linked individualism to the notion 
of the ‘public good’ by invoking Christian motifs: ‘[I]t is from a sense of 
individual duty that we connect to the greater good – a principle the 
Church celebrates in the sacrament of communion.’50 Blair’s explicit 
appeal to Catholicism may have been unusual for a Labour politician 
speaking on social policy, but other New Labour figures also drew 
attention to welfare’s moral dimension within a market economy. 
Anthony Giddens, for instance, argued that markets required strong 
political and moral moorings: ‘[M]arkets can’t even function without a 
social and ethical framework – which they themselves cannot provide.’51 
New Labour thus embedded the political economy of ‘redistributive 
market liberalism’ in a moral economy that hinged on a reciprocal 
relationship between individual rights and responsibilities.
While Blair’s concept of duty at first glance resembles Thatcher’s 
outlook, due to both leaders’ Christian faiths, there existed significant 
differences between them. To begin with, New Labour’s public rhetoric 
placed less emphasis on the culturally conservative virtues, such as thrift 
and self-denial, that had underpinned Thatcher’s praise of the ‘proudly 
but poorly independent’. Nor did it embrace the Conservatives’ habitual 
moral condemnation of single mothers, as the special employment 
initiatives aimed to support lone parents indicate.52 More importantly, 
New Labour saw the duty to work as an integral element of a long-term 
strategy to promote social cohesion by expanding opportunities among 
disadvantaged groups – a theme that had been conspicuously absent from 
Conservative welfare rhetoric. Junior Minister for Employment and Equal 
Opportunities Margaret Hodge stressed in 2000 that social cohesion 
required redistribution through the tax and benefits system, albeit not 
through ‘a politics of envy’ that had allegedly guided ‘Old Labour’ when it 
‘ “punish[ed]” the rich by curtailing ambition’. Rather than pursue 
equality of outcome, the government characterised its approach as a 
‘politics of need’ that targeted structural causes of poverty.53 ‘Based on the 
mantra that “work is the best route out of poverty”’, Hodge explained, the 
‘Welfare to Work agenda’ formed ‘a central feature of our redistribution 
agenda’. While the government acknowledged that for those ‘whose levels 
of poverty are too great or too ingrained, the hand out is their only 
lifeline’, it strove primarily for ‘equality based on the hand up, not the 
hand out’. To underline her egalitarian credentials, Hodge stressed that 
her party was committed to combating the unfair treatment frequently 
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encountered by the disabled, women and, most notably, racial minorities: 
‘[T]he disadvantage and discrimination people face must be central to an 
equality agenda.’54 In other words, New Labour hoped to put in place a 
welfare system that allowed all those at the bottom of the social hierarchy 
to pull themselves up.
As a New Labour signature policy, facilitating the entry of the socially 
disadvantaged into the labour market was designed to strengthen social 
cohesion and enhance the government’s wider anti-poverty strategy. 
‘Opportunity for all’ emerged as a key social policy phrase in the late 
1990s. Beyond initiatives against child poverty to break multigenerational 
deprivation, the government relied on training programmes to improve 
the prospects of adults lacking a job.55 For New Labour, the development 
of skills provided far more than an entrance key to the labour market that, 
if cultivated, could lead to the social advancement that began with 
subsidised low-wage work. Qualifications also functioned as a personal 
insurance policy against the vagaries of the contemporary economy that 
commentators characterised as demanding multiple job changes over the 
course of a working life. According to Giddens, both the shift towards a 
post-industrial labour market and ‘the high rate of business formation and 
dissolution . . . characteristic of a dynamic society’ made employment less 
stable than in the 1950s and 1960s, thereby creating new personal risks. 
Blair argued along similar lines that ‘in a more insecure and demanding 
labour market . . . people will change jobs more often’, because workers 
were in greater danger of losing their paid positions.56 In this socio-
economic environment, the welfare state, Giddens pledged, faced the 
challenge of helping individuals cope not just by offering ‘protection when 
things go wrong’ but by providing them with the ‘material and moral 
capabilities to move through major periods of transition in their lives’.57 
The New Deal, with its emphasis on training and individual advice, was 
designed to allow employees to respond more effectively to the existential 
challenges of an unpredictable post-industrial labour market.
Giddens, for one, went one step further and urged that ‘effective risk 
management (individual or collective)’ ought to go beyond protecting 
individuals against the negative consequences of change such as job 
losses. While ‘risk taking’ had long been praised as an integral dimension 
of ‘entrepreneurial activity’, Giddens pointed out that ‘the same applies to 
the labour force’. After all, ordinary workers faced numerous risks, too. 
He urged welfare reformers to ‘harness . . . the positive or energetic side 
of risk and provid[e] resources for risk taking’ on a larger scale. Since 
moving from welfare to work involved abandoning familiar forms of 
material security, entering the job market amounted for many to a 
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‘risk-infused activity’ that policymakers, Giddens suggested, should 
encourage in a similar fashion as entrepreneurialism. It was thus only 
consistent to regard welfare arrangements as part of a ‘social investment 
state’ that would strengthen workers’ competitive position.58 Blair 
resorted to the same business-inspired rhetoric when stressing the 
importance of ‘investment in human and social capital’ through training 
and other initiatives.59 While Conservative social policy conceived 
entrepreneurial values as the preserve of the minority of Britons who 
responded to unemployment by starting a business, New Labour expected 
far more citizens – not least those in and out of work at the lower end of 
the social scale – to cultivate entrepreneurial selves. To this end, Blair’s 
and Brown’s governments assigned multiple roles to the welfare state: 
they cast it as an investor in entrepreneurial virtues to strengthen the 
market power of working Britons and as a compensating institution that 
offset the material consequences of market operations among low-income 
groups. In contrast to Conservative policies predicated on a market 
fundamentalism that strongly affirmed the social efficiency of the forces 
of supply and demand, New Labour’s progressive version of neoliberalism 
embraced a more sceptical attitude to market operations in the social 
arena, emphasising the need to empower a broad range of market 
participants as well as the need to redress social inequities.
Conclusion
Both differences and similarities marked the varieties of neoliberalism 
promoted by Conservative and New Labour social policies between the 
late 1970s and the turn of the millennium. In its employment policies, 
Blair’s government retained Thatcher’s disciplinarian stipulation that the 
unemployed ‘actively’ seek work or risk losing their benefits. New Labour, 
however, diverged from its predecessors by offering those searching for 
work significantly more support in the form of training and personal 
advice. This contrast between New Labour and the Conservatives reflects 
their respective understandings of markets. While they shared optimistic 
assumptions about the efficiency of market rationales in economic 
contexts, New Labour insisted on modifying the laws of supply and 
demand in the social realm, where, as persistent poverty demonstrated 
to Blair and his adherents, this economic mechanism worked only 
imperfectly. Since Conservatives more readily accepted the social 
outcomes of market operations, they showed little concern for inequality 
as a social issue and expected benefit recipients to enter the labour market 
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irrespective of the implications for individuals’ income and status. 
New Labour, meanwhile, emphasised the need for transfer payments 
for Britons in low-wage employment as a compensation for exposing 
themselves to market rationales on unfavourable terms. Compared with 
the Conservatives, New Labour displayed more scepticism about markets 
as socially efficient and expedient institutions.
In keeping with its strategy of expanding individual opportunity 
and advancing social cohesion, New Labour’s unemployment policy 
provided additional resources for training and personal advice. 
Developing individual skills, policymakers expected, would grant those 
outside, or at the margins of, the labour market improved chances to 
assert themselves. By aiming to create empowered market participants 
with entrepreneurial traits on a broad scale, New Labour’s unemployment 
policy also responded to a perceived need to prepare employees for a job 
market that offered significantly less stable employment than in the 
past. Conservative policy, by contrast, had restricted the promotion of 
entrepreneurial selves to the minority among the unemployed who were 
willing to start a small business. The majority of those out of work, by 
contrast, were faced with conservative policies that turned benefit 
recipients into disempowered market participants who had to expose 
themselves to the forces of supply and demand at the price of low incomes.
While the Conservatives and New Labour employed state institutions 
to promote market mechanisms in their social policies, they pursued 
differing approaches. These reflected their respective assessments of the 
expediency of markets in the social realm as well as contrasting moral 
economies that balanced individual duties and entitlements in different 
ways. Regarding the majority of those out of work as unwilling to return 
to the labour market, Thatcherite policy mobilised the state to enforce an 
individual obligation to independence through work and self-dependence. 
New Labour’s policy initiatives revolved around notions that saw 
individual duties and entitlements in more reciprocal terms. Assuming 
that those out of work welcomed the opportunity to return to the labour 
market, it assigned a stronger redistributive task to the state to ensure 
that citizens became market participants. New Labour complemented the 
Conservatives’ disciplinarian approach through initiatives that cast the 
state in the role of an investor.
In 1997, a culturally conservative neoliberalism founded on market 
fundamentalism gave way to a progressive version founded on a more 
ambivalent assessment of the efficiency of markets in the social realm. 
The unemployment policies of successive governments have thus 
implemented a neoliberal turn based on differing moral economies, as 
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well as understandings of the market, to expose millions of Britons to 
market rationales. This sustained shift yielded considerable social effects. 
Benefit cuts and eroding legal protection through welfare reform under 
Thatcher contributed to Britain’s significantly rising income inequality 
during the 1980s, when the Gini indicator rose by 34 per cent from 
0.267 to 0.35.60 New Labour’s minimum wage regulations and tax credits 
may have stopped this trend but could not reverse it. Reducing income 
inequality would have required tax policies targeting higher incomes, 
which New Labour explicitly ruled out. Moreover, high income inequality 
also derived from the polarising post-industrial labour market that, 
among other things, witnessed an expansion of low-skilled, precarious 
and low-wage jobs in the service sector. Indeed, New Labour’s decision to 
subsidise low-income work through tax credits did little to counteract the 
proliferation of ‘lousy’ jobs. Rather, it may actually have inadvertently 
stoked this trend by ensuring a steady supply of workers who were 
required by New Labour’s welfare regime to seek work in this very sector 
of the labour market.61 Viewed from this angle, Giddens’s characterisation 
of the ‘Third Way’ as an attack on ‘neoliberalism’ is simultaneously right 
and wrong: right, because New Labour modified Thatcherite social policy 
significantly; and wrong, because Blair’s (and subsequently Brown’s) 
governments still placed considerable trust in market rationales to reduce 
unemployment. And by placing this trust in market rationales at a time 
when many of those out of work confronted an increasingly inauspicious 
labour market, New Labour contributed to the proliferation of forms of 
employment that have frequently been identified as a source of 
widespread political and social discontent in the UK for offering not just 
low incomes but little job security.
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‘I don’t know how she does it!’ 
Feminism, family and work in 
‘neoliberal’ Britain
helen mcCarthy
In the autumn of 1970, shortly after becoming Secretary of State for 
Education, Margaret Thatcher gave an interview to Business and 
Professional Woman magazine about her ‘double image’. Pictured 
cheerfully stirring a saucepan in her kitchen, Thatcher described her 
demanding schedule as a Cabinet minister and explained to readers how 
she juggled family and career:
I don’t switch off. I switch over. Last night for instance, I left the 
House early (I was home at about 8.45pm) then I had to get a meal 
and because we had visitors at the weekend, I had to catch up with 
the washing. I was ironing until about 11.30pm. Although things 
like sheets, towels and shirts go to the laundry, there is still a lot to 
be washed at home.
A nanny had looked after her twins when they were young, Thatcher 
further elaborated, and her services had proved indispensable: ‘Any 
working mother must have competent and reliable domestic help’, she 
advised, ‘and be prepared for emergencies.’ As a result, the magazine 
concluded, Margaret Thatcher had never been forced to choose between 
politics and housewifery because ‘she has always organised her life so that 
things run smoothly at home when she is not there’.1
Viewed retrospectively, the ‘intriguing blend of career woman and 
homebody’ which Margaret Thatcher presented to readers of Business and 
Professional Woman seems to presage the politics of gender, family and 
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work embraced by Conservative governments in the 1980s. As Prime 
Minister, Thatcher encouraged aspiration, individualism and enterprise 
but envisaged no positive role for the state in helping parents reconcile 
the pursuit of those values with their caring responsibilities in the home. 
There was no substantial public investment in childcare provision on 
Thatcher’s watch and no strengthening of maternity rights or introduction 
of paternity leave.2 Mothers who wanted to work were forced to find their 
own solutions, either by hiring domestic help, drawing on informal 
sources of childcare in the extended family or taking lower-paid part- 
time jobs which fitted around children’s school hours. Cuts in social 
welfare budgets reinforced this picture of families thrown onto their own 
resources, translating into more demands on women’s time as unpaid 
carers for children, elderly parents and perhaps even needy neighbours 
too. As a number of scholars have recently observed, the ideological 
project of Thatcherism rested on accommodating a radical commitment 
to market values with socially conservative visions of the family.3 Women 
were free economic agents, but they could not disavow their traditional 
social obligations to kin and community. To paraphrase Thatcher, they 
had to switch over, not switch off.
This chapter asks how effectively ‘neoliberalism’ as an analytical 
category captures this contradictory situation for British women in the 
late twentieth century. It makes three arguments. First, the chapter 
interrogates the concept of ‘responsibilisation’, developed by theorists of 
governmentality to denote the ways in which collectively shared burdens 
became reframed as the responsibility of private individuals under 
conditions of neoliberalism. The concept has been deployed recently by 
feminist scholars to analyse state and employer attitudes towards the 
problem of reconciling family life and work. But where those scholars 
regard responsibilisation as a distinctive element of ‘neoliberal’ times, 
I argue that it has a much longer history stretching back to late nineteenth-
century discourses of women’s paid work.
Second, the chapter shows how an ideology of personal responsi- 
bility also shaped government policy on childcare long before the 1980s, 
further complicating accounts of ‘neoliberalism’ centred on the late 
twentieth century. With the partial exception of the two world wars, 
publicly provided childcare was conceptualised as meeting a residual 
welfare need rather than being seen as a universal service for working 
mothers. When provision expanded substantially in the late 1990s under 
New Labour, the mixed economy of market, family and state solutions 
was preserved, while the needs of working mothers hovered only partially 
in view, obscured by Labour’s desire to tackle childhood inequalities and 
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its communitarian rhetoric of ‘strong’ families. In other words, the 
childcare needs of working mothers were marginalised by governments 
throughout the post-war period, and not just by ‘neoliberal’ ones.
Finally, the chapter argues that, amid these continuities, the late 
twentieth century did produce a new neoliberal subject in the figure of 
the stressed-out working mother, as exemplified in Kate Reddy, the 
heroine of Allison’s Pearson’s best-selling 2002 novel, I Don’t Know How 
She Does It! Locating the novel in the discourses of ‘post-feminism’ which 
became culturally resonant from the early 1990s, I argue that Reddy 
represents the marriage of market and maternalist values associated with 
neoliberalism but also points to the tensions within it. I suggest that the 
conflicts captured in Pearson’s novel were the object of wider critique 
around the turn of the millennium, but that this critique mostly took the 
form of individual strategies pursued by women to defend the arena of 
personal life from the values of the market. These strategies continue to 
give women a means of coping with the contradictions of responsibilised 
working motherhood in the twenty-first century.
The ‘responsibilisation’ of the working mother
In her recent study of women managers, the sociologist Zoe Young 
emphasises the high levels of stress experienced by mothers negotiating 
‘flexible’ working patterns with their employers. Non-regular arrangements 
are now a common feature of the workplace, but the pressure to make a 
success of these arrangements, Young argues, is felt primarily by women. 
Firms can take credit for being ‘enlightened’ or ‘caring’ employers, but 
when experiments in flexible working fail, the failure rests with the 
employee, who is understood to have demonstrated insufficient self-
discipline, ingenuity or determination. Young shows how women, grateful 
for the opportunity to hold on to highly valued careers, shoulder the 
practical and emotional burdens of organising their lives around their jobs 
and blame themselves when things unravel. This, Young argues, represents 
a ‘personalisation of responsibility’ and also a ‘personalisation of failure’.4
Other feminist scholars have made similar arguments about 
how neoliberalism forces women, as Rosalind Gill puts it, ‘to bear full 
responsibility for their life biography no matter how severe the constraints 
upon their action’.5 Neoliberal rationality rules that women must self-
organise all aspects of their personal and professional lives around the 
pursuit of highly individualised goals. Catherine Rottenberg shows how 
these values structure popular self-help guides such as Sheryl Sandberg’s 
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Lean In: Women, work and the will to lead (2013) and Ivanka Trump’s 
Women Who Work (2017). Rottenberg describes these texts as ‘neoliberal 
feminist manifestos’ which offer no critique, actual or immanent, of the 
social, economic and political inequalities which women are encouraged 
to surmount through their own efforts.6 For Angela McRobbie, the once-
radical language of ‘empowerment’ and ‘choice’ has been reconfigured in 
popular and official rhetoric as a type of faux-feminism. ‘How successful 
the individual heterosexual woman might be in achieving equality in 
relation to domestic labour and childcare’, McRobbie observes, ‘becomes 
a private affair, or rather evidence that she has chosen well or fortuitously 
from the range of possible partners.’7
A historical perspective helps to specify what, if anything, is peculiar 
about this early twenty-first-century moment for women. The notion 
that domestic labour constitutes women’s ‘natural’ or primary sphere of 
activity is long-established, acquiring the particular form of the male 
breadwinner family under the development of capitalist industry in the 
early nineteenth century.8 A significant proportion of married women did, 
in fact, continue to work for wages in the era of industrialisation: around 
15–25 per cent according to later nineteenth-century census returns, 
although these almost certainly undercounted casual labour and home-
work.9 Victorians tended to condemn married women’s employment, 
claiming that it depressed male wages, contributed to infant mortality 
and destroyed the home as a sanctuary from the market.10 Much of the 
agitation to limit women’s working hours or restrict them from ‘dangerous’ 
trades had the defence of the male breadwinner family as its objective.11 
Meanwhile, the panic over ‘sweated’ home-working in the 1890s and 
1900s was overwhelmingly centred on the wage-earning wife.12 How to 
support married women in their ‘proper’ work in the home, whether 
through securing a family wage for men or a system of state endowment 
for mothers, became a pressing question in progressive liberal, socialist 
and trade unionist circles in the early twentieth century.13
Yet Victorian working mothers also found their champions in liberal 
feminists who, rather like later ‘neoliberal’ ones, spoke the language of 
personal responsibility and choice. Middle-class suffragists including 
Lydia Becker, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Jessie Boucherett and Ada 
Heather-Bigg campaigned against protective legislation from the 1870s, 
organising through such bodies as the Society for the Promotion of 
Employment of Women, the Vigilance Association for the Defence of 
Personal Rights and the Women’s Industrial Defence League. They 
opposed any interference with the individual’s economic liberty, arguing 
that factory legislation infantilised women and entrenched their inferior 
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status and vulnerability in the labour market.14 In their various pamphlets, 
tracts and letters to the press, these feminists painted a powerful counter-
image of women’s work which privileged capacity, resilience and self-
help. This is well captured in Heather-Bigg’s account of the Black Country 
nail-makers whom she met in 1886. These women were ‘cheerful and 
robust’, Heather-Bigg observed, ‘liking their calling and ridiculing the 
notion of their alleged serfdom’. Located in workshops attached to the 
home, the nail trade was well suited to the wage-earning mother: ‘Her 
place of toil stands in her own small garden plot, in which her children 
can play round her after school hours. Her home being adjacent, she can 
at any moment run in and out and attend to her maternal and household 
duties.’15 Jessie Boucherett and Helen Blackburn promoted a similar 
vision of robust working motherhood in their impassioned plea against 
the Factory Acts in 1896. The factory inspector did not appreciate what 
wage-earning meant to these women, they argued:
He did not see the women after their hard day’s work sitting down to 
a good nourishing supper; he did not see them with their family 
enjoying their piece of Sunday beef; he knew nothing of the happiness 
and comfort produced by the wages of these poor women.16
In the 1920s and 1930s, liberal feminists continued to rail against protective 
legislation but by then had a further target to attack: the widespread 
enforcement of marriage bars across government and private industry. The 
Open Door Council and Lady Rhondda’s Six Point Group spoke out against 
this discriminatory practice, arguing that marriage bars removed a woman’s 
freedom to decide for herself whether matrimony (and likely maternity) 
was compatible with continued employment. As Nancy Astor, the first 
woman to take her seat in Parliament, put it during a Commons debate on 
marriage bars in 1927: ‘We do not want the Government to tell us what we 
should do. It is a question between the woman and her husband, and has 
nothing to do with a third person outside.’17 Feminist societies appearing 
before the Royal Commission on the Civil Service (1929–31) insisted that 
married women were far more capable than policymakers allowed. The 
Council of Women Civil Servants described the marriage bar as an 
anachronism based on ‘outworn’ assumptions about the difficulties of 
managing a double role as housewife and worker. ‘Women of wide 
interests’, the Council observed, ‘and particularly those whose social and 
financial position gives them the possibility of freedom, are able to combine 
marriage with a career, apparently with ease, as is abundantly clear at the 
present day in the case of many women in public life.’18
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This statement did not hide the fact that the Council had mostly 
well-educated, professionally trained women in mind. Although women 
in the Labour Party and trade union movement also opposed the marriage 
bar, they were suspicious of the implication that all that was necessary to 
create a level playing field in the workplace was the removal of artificial 
barriers. Middle-class feminists dwelt little on domestic practicalities, 
presupposing that the working mother could organise childcare and 
housework by paying someone else to do it. Such assumptions were self-
evident to women with sizeable salaries or private incomes, but they were 
far less so for those living on low earnings in working-class homes. 
Proponents of the ‘dual role’ in the 1950s and 1960s (by which time the 
middle-class home was typically servantless, too) gave greater recognition 
to these realities but tended nonetheless to talk up women’s capacity to 
care for families and hold jobs harmoniously. Alva Myrdal and Viola 
Klein, who popularised this idea in their 1956 book Women’s Two Roles, 
suggested a phased model in which women devoted themselves to full-
time home-making while their children were young and sought re-entry 
to the workforce later, usually in their forties. Myrdal and Klein argued 
for social services to support these dual-role mothers, including nursery 
schools and communal laundries, but they placed the strongest emphasis 
on the woman’s own orientation to work and her ability to organise her 
life efficiently. No longer need women choose between family and job, 
Myrdal and Klein confidently predicted: ‘The best of both worlds has 
come within their grasp, if only they reach out for it.’19
Much of the literature on professional women’s careers published in 
the post-war decades adopted this dual-role paradigm with its onus on 
personal responsibility. In her popular 1957 book Wives Who Went to 
College, Judith Hubback instructed her reader ‘to face the difficulties 
involved in combining marriage, motherhood and individualism and to 
work out her own solution in terms of her own circumstances, character 
and endowment’.20 In a 1960 newspaper article, Viola Klein elaborated on 
the qualities which allowed women to succeed in the ‘combined operation’ 
of career and family:
It would appear that what makes these women ‘tick’ is, first of all, 
their determination to make a success of their dual role. Where they 
are prompted by a sense of vocation, by a feeling of duty to fill a 
vacancy in one of the shortage occupations, or by a psychological 
need to get out of their homes for part of the day – whatever their 
motives, they are equally attached to their job and resolved to make 
it work.21
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This foregrounding of notions of personal drive, resolution and 
determination seems to prefigure the later ‘neoliberal’ emphasis on self-
reliance and self-regulation. Indeed, we might trace the genealogy of 
twenty-first-century exhortations to women to ‘lean in’ in this post-war 
literature, with its similar tendency to frame the problem of combining 
family and work as an issue of individual commitment rather than 
external constraints.22 What sets the ‘neoliberal’ feminist position 
apart from these earlier ‘liberal’ formulations, however, is its attempt to 
collapse all distinctions between the public and private self, a theme to 
which the chapter returns. Before that, it is necessary to address another 
major historical continuity in the ‘responsibilisation’ of the working 
mother: state failure in the provision of high-quality and affordable 
childcare.
Family and market solutions to the childcare problem
During both world wars, the British state took the unusual step of heavily 
subsidising local authority nurseries for use by mothers working in 
essential industries. In mid-1918, there were more than 160 publicly 
funded crèches with room for 7,000 children. Provision during the later 
conflict was significantly higher: 72,000 full-time places by mid-1944, 
with an additional 138,000 part-time nursery school places.23 These were 
temporary measures to meet the emergency: nearly all war nurseries 
closed in 1918 and again in 1945. Local authorities thereafter retreated 
to their peacetime remit of offering day care only to families in difficult 
circumstances, typically unmarried mothers, children with special needs 
or families requiring short-term care where a mother was incapacitated.24 
The ‘normal’ mother – that is to say, the married mother whose husband 
was in steady employment – had no claim on these services, however 
much she might want to work. One Medical Officer of Health told a 
conference in 1951 that the mother hoping ‘to park out her child for a 
substantial proportion of the day in order to devote herself to her career’ 
could not ‘expect the State or the municipality to subsidize her’.25 In the 
mid-1970s, this paradigm of welfarism still characterised public day care 
provision. As a nursery matron in Hackney commented, ‘you’ve got to 
have a real problem to get your child a place – unmarried, divorced, a 
battered or handicapped child, a handicapped parent or particularly bad 
housing conditions. If you can’t produce that sort of evidence you haven’t 
a hope.’26 For most families, childcare remained a private matter, as 
reiterated by the Department of Health in 1989: ‘[I]n the first instance it 
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is the responsibility of the parents to make arrangements, including 
financial arrangements, for the day-care of pre-school children.’27
How do we explain the resilience of privacy and parental respons- 
ibility as the values underpinning childcare policy throughout the 
twentieth century? One answer is that such values formed an intrinsic 
feature of Britain’s ‘liberal’ tradition in social policy, setting it apart from 
continental welfare states such as Sweden, Denmark and France, where 
spending on preschool care has been dramatically higher.28 Yet as Vicky 
Randall has argued, the ‘liberalness’ of British social policy has varied 
between policy areas and over time. British governments have intervened 
in the sphere of family through extending maternal and infant welfare 
services during and after the First World War, introducing maternity 
benefits for the wives of insured men in 1911 and universal family 
allowances in 1945, and by gradually expanding nursery school 
education, albeit at a low level by European standards. The salient point 
about these policies is that they aimed to stabilise family life by supporting 
women in their primary role of bringing up healthy and well-adjusted 
children. They were not conceived as measures to help parents reconcile 
caring responsibilities with paid employment. When Lady Plowden 
published her influential 1967 report on primary education, she explicitly 
disavowed any day care function for nursery schools. ‘It is no business of 
the educational service’, she wrote, to ‘encourage’ mothers to work.29 As 
Education Secretary, Margaret Thatcher endorsed this position, stressing 
the educational benefits of nursery schools but prioritising spending on 
part-time rather than full-time places, which were of limited use to 
mothers who wished to work.30
Maternalist ideology helped to entrench this way of conceptualising 
preschool provision in the British social welfare tradition. From the early 
twentieth century, feminists across the political spectrum argued for state 
action to aid motherhood, whether in the interests of empire, the welfare 
of the working-class family or raising the status of housewives dependent 
on male breadwinners.31 Many of the local or central government 
measures targeting the family from 1900 were the result of campaigning 
by women in the Labour Party, the Women’s Cooperative Guild or the 
‘housewives’ associations’ which proliferated between the wars.32 Helping 
women to reconcile family and paid work was never a high priority for 
these organisations, who argued instead for greater recognition of 
women’s unwaged domestic labour in the home. Maude Royden, an 
advocate of state endowment of motherhood, captured this logic well in 
1917 when she insisted that housewives were already ‘earning their 
living, and earning it hard’ by caring for their families. The problem was 
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‘that they sometimes do not get it, and never have a right to it that can 
be enforced’.33
These activists wished to increase state support for mothers, and 
their demands were often in tension with the liberal-feminist position 
which privileged non-discrimination in the labour market as the key to 
women’s equality. Yet as Denise Riley has brilliantly shown, feminist-
maternalist arguments were folded into the larger pronatalist politics of 
the 1940s which re-inscribed the male breadwinner norm in the post-war 
welfare settlement. By institutionalising married women’s economic 
dependence on men, William Beveridge’s system of social insurance and 
welfare services rendered invisible the ‘real needs’ of mothers doing both 
domestic labour in the home and paid work outside it.34 Psychoanalytic 
theories of ‘maternal attachment’ popularised by experts such as John 
Bowlby and Donald Winnicott added further authority in the 1950s to old 
prescriptions about women’s primary duty to their families.35 These were 
deferred to by proponents of the dual role, who mostly forgot about 
Myrdal and Klein’s proposals for communal laundries and neighbourhood 
nurseries, promoting instead part-time work for mothers with older 
children. Under this model, preschool care did not present itself as a 
major policy issue, as it was assumed that mothers would be at home full 
time when their children were young and would typically seek a job fitting 
around school hours thereafter.36
The dramatic expansion of part-time work from the 1950s thus 
played an important role in sustaining low levels of investment by 
governments of both left and right in preschool day care and in after-
school clubs and holiday play-schemes for older children. By the end of 
the 1970s, over two-fifths of the female workforce and nearly 70 per cent 
of working mothers were employed part time.37 Policymakers reasoned 
that mothers working short, flexible shifts could more easily arrange their 
own childcare in the family or community, which is what the majority of 
women had no choice but to do. One 1963 study found that two-thirds 
of working mothers with children under five entrusted them to the care 
of female relatives (mostly grandmothers), neighbours or local minders.38 
The apparently smooth functioning of these informal care networks, as 
evidenced in social surveys, helped to convince policymakers that state 
action was unnecessary; indeed, mothers seemed actively to prefer family 
or community-based care to local authority nurseries.39 This preference 
was sometimes stated by officials as if self-evident, even though the 
wartime experience had revealed the complexity of measuring demand 
for nursery places and the multiple factors behind women’s childcare 
decisions.40
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From the 1970s it became much harder for policymakers to claim 
that working mothers neither wanted nor needed day care. Women 
were increasingly discarding the dual-role model and returning to work 
before their children went to school. In 1976, about a quarter of mothers 
with preschool-aged children were working – more than double the 
figure 15 years earlier. By the end of the decade, one in four mothers 
re-entered the labour market within a year of giving birth, in some cases 
taking advantage of new maternity rights enshrined in the 1975 
Employment Protection Act.41 A series of official reports and academic 
surveys identified a growing demand for day care, while calls were 
made for a comprehensive system of preschool provision by an emerging 
‘under-fives’ lobby of progressively-minded local authorities, trade 
unions, childcare experts and academics.42 As previously noted, this did 
not result in any major investment by Conservative governments in the 
1980s, although Labour-controlled councils developed social democratic 
experiments in funding nursery care. The Greater London Council, for 
example, was funding 12 per cent of all full-time childcare places in the 
capital by 1986.43 More significant from the perspective of national 
policy were the ideas emerging from neoliberal think tanks such as 
the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS), who began to explore how the market might be made to 
work better in Britain’s under-resourced childcare sector. As Ben 
Jackson has shown, helping parents to become better consumers of 
childcare as an alternative to major public expenditure moved to the 
centre of Conservative policy by the mid-1990s. In a 1994 CPS pamphlet, 
Sheila Lawlor suggested that families should have wider opportunities 
to buy childcare through a universal system of vouchers, a mechanism 
for empowering public service users already much discussed by 
neoliberal policy thinkers in both the US and the UK. Similar proposals 
were put forward by the Adam Smith Institute and subsequently 
adopted by John Major’s Cabinet, although limited to families with 
four-year-olds.44
Tony Blair’s New Labour government purported to break from 
Major’s piecemeal approach by launching a National Childcare Strategy 
in 1998. A Green Paper, Meeting the Childcare Challenge, explained that 
such a strategy was necessary due to the historic failure of private and 
voluntary providers to meet parental demand for high-quality and 
affordable childcare. Yet the Green Paper was careful to delimit the scope 
for state action. It noted how social change had disrupted traditional 
forms of family-based care and suggested that government’s role was ‘to 
fill gaps’ in the formal sector:
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Parents will always have the primary responsibility for the care and 
well-being of their children. It is up to parents to decide what sort of 
childcare they want for their children. This is not a matter for the 
Government. But it is the Government’s responsibility to ensure that 
parents have access to services to enable them to make genuine 
choices.45
Emphasis was placed on bringing new providers into the market through 
substantial grant-making and, on the demand side, via a childcare tax 
credit for working parents. In keeping with all post-war governments, 
Labour thus remained committed to a mixed economy of care in which 
families ‘packaged’ care from a variety of sources.46
Unlike its predecessors, however, New Labour was willing to allocate 
considerable levels of funding into directly provided services through its 
flagship Sure Start programme. This started as a £452 million initiative 
targeting disadvantaged areas but was subsequently rolled out more 
widely. Sure Start was frequently cited by politicians as proof of Labour’s 
broader commitment to gender equality in the workplace, as exemplified 
by moves to extend maternity leave, introduce paid paternity leave 
and give carers a right to request flexible working hours. Yet the provision 
of day care was a relatively minor element of Sure Start in its early 
phase, which focused instead on home visiting, parenting skills, play 
opportunities, health services and support for parents and children with 
special needs. From around 2003, the emphasis shifted towards getting 
parents (particularly lone mothers) into work, with more centres offering 
childcare. Yet as Kitty Stewart notes in her survey of Labour’s early years 
policies, some of Sure Start’s earliest champions criticised this move away 
from the original focus ‘on play, nurture and parenting support’.47
This captures a key tension in Labour’s childcare agenda after 1997: 
was it intended to meet the working mother’s need for affordable day care 
or to advance a wider social democratic commitment to tackling 
childhood inequalities? The language of Meeting the Childcare Challenge 
slipped constantly between these objectives in its opening pages. The 
‘crucial role’ of the National Childcare Strategy was ‘meeting the needs 
and enhancing the opportunities of children and their families’ by giving 
children ‘the best start in life’ and parents ‘genuine choices: to look 
after their children full-time, or to combine work, education or training 
with parenting in a balanced way’. The Green Paper first described the 
developmental benefits to children of good quality care, then the benefits 
to the economy of getting more parents into work, and only towards the 
end of the Executive Summary did it explicitly acknowledge that ‘offering 
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equal opportunities for parents, especially women’ formed part of the 
Strategy’s objectives.48 As many feminist critics pointed out, New Labour 
was more comfortable invoking the communitarian language of ‘children 
and families’ than justifying its policies in terms of eradicating structural 
inequalities between women and men.49 Yet judged from a historical 
perspective, this stance was in keeping with a long-established tendency 
in British social policy to view the interests of women and families as one 
and the same thing. This view was shared by Conservative and Labour 
governments during the period of post-war social democracy, as well as 
in the ‘neoliberal’ era of the 1980s and beyond.
Post-feminism and the neoliberal feminist subject
This ideological inheritance offers a useful starting point for thinking 
about ‘post-feminism’ as it emerged at the end of the twentieth century 
and ‘neoliberal feminism’ at the beginning of the twenty-first. Post-
feminism has generally been characterised as a new sensibility, culturally 
resonant in Britain from the 1990s, which denies or downplays the 
persistence of structural gender inequalities and interprets women’s 
actions as expressive at all times of free choice. This sensibility imagines 
a world in which feminism has delivered sexual equality, thus releasing 
women to embrace behaviours and lifestyles, from pole dancing to home 
baking, which might previously have been understood within a framework 
of patriarchal power.50 This logic underpinned the ‘preference theory’ 
developed by sociologist Catherine Hakim in an influential body of 
academic work and popular writings purporting to explain enduring 
differences between men and women in relation to family and work. In an 
era of equal opportunities and the pill, Hakim argued, women’s greater 
tendency to take time out from the labour market for child rearing, to 
work shorter hours and to cluster in lower-paid ‘feminised’ sectors of the 
economy reflected genuine preferences. A minority of women were true 
careerists, but the rest either adapted their work to fit with family needs 
or plumped wholeheartedly for full-time domesticity. ‘No matter what 
carrots are offered’, Hakim wrote in a large feature in the Daily Mail in 
1996, ‘some women will always want to stay at home.’51
Hakim’s contributions belonged to a wider debate unfolding in the 
media and popular culture which dwelt upon the mixed legacy of second-
wave feminism for women living in 1990s Britain. A slew of memoirs and 
manifestos pondered this subject, while the press attacked it more 
brashly, inviting readers to question whether women really could ‘have it 
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all’.52 Journalists asked whether stay-at-home mothers were happier than 
working mothers or vice versa; whether women were squandering their 
freedoms by dropping out of the labour force for motherhood; and 
whether the ‘new man’, a figure much trumpeted in the 1980s, truly 
existed.53 High-profile cases such as the 1997 firing of ‘superwoman’ 
Nicola Horlick, asset manager and mother of five, fed a media appetite for 
stories about sexism in the corporate workplace.54 Allison Pearson 
introduced her fictional creation, Kate Reddy, into this highly charged 
discursive field in December 2000 when she started a regular column in 
the Daily Telegraph entitled ‘I don’t know how she does it!’ The column 
charted Reddy’s stressful life as a city fund manager and mother of two 
high-spirited children, wittily narrating her attempts to placate a surly 
nanny and resentful husband while managing her own guilty conscience 
and physical fatigue.55 In 2002, Pearson made Reddy the heroine of a 
full-length novel of the same title, which sold millions of copies in the UK 
and overseas, was serialised on the radio and later turned into a 
Hollywood film.
The considerable popular impact of Pearson’s novel makes it a 
useful waypoint on the ideological map of gender, family and work 
in late-millennium Britain. Viewed from one angle, Kate Reddy is the 
archetypal ‘responsibilised’ neoliberal subject. She takes it for granted 
that neither state nor employer will step in to help her juggle the multiple 
demands on her time and attention. She spends a large portion of her 
salary on childcare, always in the privatised form of nannies. Wider 
structural inequalities are effaced, not because Reddy is a classless figure 
but, counter-intuitively, because Pearson gives her a working-class 
backstory similar to her own rise from northern comprehensive to 
Cambridge University and eventually to Fleet Street. Kate’s social mobility 
is a device which deflects the obvious critique – that the novel deals with 
privileged women and is written from inside that privilege – and allows 
Pearson to present her heroine as an ‘ordinary’ mother trying, like 
mothers always have, to provide for and look after her family.56 Like the 
later imagined subjects of Lean In or Women Who Work, Kate Reddy, a 
high-achieving, white, heterosexual mother, is somehow made to stand 
for all working women.57
Reddy’s problems are exacerbated by her ambivalence about the 
choices she has made regarding family and career. An essentialist 
maternalism underpins Reddy’s reflections on why she cannot delegate 
more domestic labour to her husband: ‘They could give you good jobs and 
maternity leave’, she tells herself, ‘but until they programmed a man to 
notice you were out of toilet paper the project was doomed. Women carry 
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the puzzle of family life in their heads, they just do.’58 This ‘puzzle in their 
heads’ line was a favoured phrase of Pearson’s, much repeated in 
interviews and columns: ‘Working women have become honorary men 
but remained mothers in their hearts’, Pearson wrote in one piece: ‘If we 
are lucky, we love our jobs, but we still want to make the right kind of 
birthday cake. We want to be needed and not to be needed . . . We don’t 
want to do everything ourselves, but we want to do it properly, so we must 
do it ourselves.’59 In the novel, Pearson frames this as an immovable 
problem to which feminism offers no answer. ‘Do I believe in equality of 
the sexes?’ Kate asks herself:
I’m not so sure. I did once, with all the passionate certainty of 
someone very young who knew absolutely everything and therefore 
nothing at all. It was a nice idea, equality: noble, indisputably fair. 
But how the hell was it supposed to work?60
Kate eventually decides that it can’t, and she finds a solution to her 
dilemma in defeat. At the end of the novel, she quits her city job, moves 
out of London and starts a small, part-time business which allows her to 
spend more time with her children.
On this reading, the politics of I Don’t Know How She Does It! seem 
perfectly located at the neoliberal intersection of market values and social 
conservatism in late twentieth-century Britain. Kate Reddy creates wealth 
in the city and strives to be the perfect mother and wife at home. Like 
Thatcher, she doesn’t switch off, she switches over. Yet an alternative 
reading might frame Pearson’s novel as a portrait of the working mother 
in crisis, the unwilling victim of a cruel neoliberal order. The novel’s 
revealing subtitle, little noted by reviewers, was ‘A comedy about failure, 
a tragedy about success’. Kate’s life is defined not by capacity or agency 
but by their absence as her life spins out of control. Her unhappiness 
seems to expose what happens to women when the wall between the 
public and the private self collapses and when the values of the market, 
symbolised by Kate’s rapacious city employer, override the ethic of care, 
represented in the novel by her children. Their need for mothering, Kate 
reflects, ‘is like the need for water or light. It has a devastating simplicity 
. . . Children change your heart: they never wrote that in the books.’61 
Feminists had, in fact, written extensively since the 1970s on this subject, 
defining mothering as a distinctive type of labour which was calibrated 
differently from waged work and generative of its own system of values.62 
Pearson’s novel lacks the radical vision of these earlier feminist analyses, 
but it nonetheless shares something of their conviction that the 
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relationships which make us most human are not reducible to the 
rationality of the market.
Situating I Don’t Know How She Does It! in the wider popular literature 
on working motherhood between the 1980s and early 2000s reveals a 
rupture with the post-war ‘dual-role’ texts, most notably in its celebration 
of imperfection and the valorisation of women’s incapacity. This is indicated 
in the very titles of books such as Libby Purves’s How Not to Be a Perfect 
Mother (1984), Jill Black’s Working Mother’s Survival Guide (1989) and 
Shirley Conran’s Down with Superwoman (1990), in which Conran explains 
how her iconic 1975 household manual which introduced ‘Superwoman’ 
to the reading public had been fatally misinterpreted. The original 
Superwoman title, Conran remarked, ‘was used ironically to demolish a 
myth’ – that of the ‘demanding, exhausting, super-achiever that threatened 
to depress our lives’. It was now necessary ‘to forget SUPERWOMAN’ and 
remember that the real achiever was the woman ‘who avoids doing too 
much’.63 Instructing women to disavow perfection and develop their own 
strategies for ‘coping’ or ‘surviving’ the rigours of family and professional 
life did not in itself constitute a viable feminist politics. But it is possible to 
see how these texts might have given women permission to refuse, perhaps 
even laugh at, a damagingly unattainable ideal of femininity.64
Rottenberg and McRobbie might be right that something changed 
again around the turn of the millennium, with the emergence of a new 
type of ‘neoliberal feminism’ which concealed the extent of its capitulation 
to the status quo by appropriating the language of empowerment and 
agency.65 And yet, while careful empirical studies such as Zoe Young’s 
reveal the realities of stress in women’s lives, we should not be too ready 
to assume the hegemonic power of neoliberal subjectivity in women’s 
conceptions of themselves. Reflecting on the counsels of perfection found 
in texts such as Lean In, Jacqueline Rose perceptively notes how
. . . the sheer amount of effort that goes into the stereotype . . . also 
bears witness to its vacuity, to the fact that it is hanging by a thread 
. . . I have never met a single mother (myself included) who is not 
far more complex, critical, at odds with the set of clichés she is 
meant effortlessly to embody, than she is being encouraged – or 
rather instructed – to think.66
We find evidence of this sceptical posture as early as 1970, when one 
reader of Business and Professional Woman expressed her infuriation with 
the magazine’s portrait of Margaret Thatcher as an exemplary working 
mother. In a letter to the editor, Mary Kalugerovich of Bathgate poured 
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scorn on ‘those paragons who put the rest of us to shame’, pointing out 
how they all relied upon expensive help in the home to maintain their 
image of domestic order:
Here is the TV personality who goes off to the studio at 8am and 
returns at 7pm, but makes a point of spending half-an-hour with her 
baby daughter at bedtime . . . A ‘wonderful au pair’ copes with the 
other 23 and a half hours. Here is the theatrical mother who goes 
off between plays for a month’s holiday in the Mediterranean with 
her husband. The family is left behind of course, in the care of a 
‘marvellous housekeeper.’ And even . . . Mrs Margaret Thatcher 
declares that one needs a nanny. Ain’t it the truth!67
As a mother with a part-time job, Kalugerovich was doing her best to 
manage without the aid of au pairs or nannies or housekeepers and was 
exhausted as a result. ‘Dilettantes’ such as Margaret Thatcher, she 
thought, should keep a respectful silence. ‘Instead, will the real working 
mothers please stand up. Or better still, sit down. They need the rest.’68
Conclusion
The ideological formation which we might call ‘neoliberalism’ does not 
straightforwardly capture the situation of British women at the end of the 
twentieth century or the beginning of the twenty-first. As this chapter has 
shown, working mothers had been ‘responsibilised’ since at least the late 
nineteenth century by a liberal feminism which privileged the capacity of 
the wage-earning woman, and by a maternalist feminism which framed 
women’s true ‘work’ as the rearing of children. When the state intervened 
more actively to support family life in the 1940s, it institutionalised 
women’s primary status as that of home-maker and caregiver, leaving 
wage-earning mothers marginalised and unsupported. This gendered 
welfare settlement began to unravel in the 1970s as maternal employment 
rates rose, ‘equal opportunities’ became enshrined in law, and the ideas 
and vocabulary of Women’s Liberation diffused unevenly into the wider 
culture. Yet those earlier traditions of conceptualising women as in turn 
waged workers, state-endowed mothers and the eternal dependants of 
men left a complex and contested legacy for policymaking and for 
women’s own subjectivities in the 1980s and beyond.
This legacy is evident in the ‘post-feminist’ discourses of the 1990s, 
and in the ‘neoliberal feminist’ manifestos of Sandberg or Trump. Yet, as 
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the final section of this chapter argued, it was present, too, in a wider 
discursive field in which women were encouraged – often playfully, 
wittily, irreverently – to debunk the ‘myth’ of perfection and refuse the 
feelings of guilt and inadequacy which were its inevitable product. 
Individual as opposed to collective or institutional strategies for managing 
family and work always had (have still) limited political potential, 
especially when regarded as necessary for mothers but not fathers. Yet 
the contradictions of caring and providing for a family in a system which 
does not recognise the needs of working parents might still prove 
transformative. In her recent history of mothering, Sarah Knott advocates 
‘a defence of caring under capitalism, uttered by caregivers of every 
persuasion – adoptive, biological and employed; female, male, lesbian, 
gay, trans and the rest’ as a way forward which avoids reifying an 
essentialist conception of women’s maternal role.69 Without such a 
coalition behind them, it seems likely that women will be forced to follow 
Margaret Thatcher’s advice – to switch over, rather than to switch off – for 
many decades to come.
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Workers’ voice and the moral 
economy in Britain’s ‘neoliberal’ age
Jim Phillips
Work has changed significantly in the UK since the 1970s. Industrial 
employment had already peaked – in coal, cotton, metals and shipbuilding 
in the late 1950s, and in manufacturing in the 1960s – but the trend to 
deindustrialisation accelerated rapidly in the early 1980s, more quickly 
than in other mature economies. Manufacturing employment fell on 
average by 3 per cent per annum in the UK from 1979–89, whereas in 
France it fell by 1.9 per cent per annum, in Italy by 1 per cent per annum 
and in the Federal Republic of Germany by only 0.1 per cent per annum.1 
Divergence between ‘good’ jobs and ‘bad’ jobs was furthered in the UK as 
in the US by the rising preponderance of less regulated private sector 
employment and the shrinkage of better regulated public sector 
employment.2 Pessimistic accounts relate the emergence of precariousness 
in service sector employment to neoliberalism’s iron grip on work, 
workers and workplaces in various mature economies, including the UK.3
This chapter examines changes to work in the UK since the 1970s 
with a critical eye. The influence of neoliberalism is queried and qualified. 
There was tension between neoliberalism’s two core aims: freeing 
markets, while shrinking the state. Policy measures adopted by Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative governments to liberalise markets for goods and 
services involved major economic disruption and a sustained growth of 
unemployment. This resulted in increased public expenditure on the 
maintenance of redundant workers. Countervailing tendencies were also 
evident in the tightened regulation of work and workers. Thatcher’s 
reforms of employment and industrial relations law were guided by long-
running dialogue involving free marketeer academics and anti-trade 
union business figures.4 Friedrich Hayek’s influence was highly significant. 
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Trade unions were depicted as monopolistic barriers to free markets, and 
their rights – or ‘privileges’, in Hayekian terms – were incrementally 
dismantled in the 1980s.5 Thatcher’s carefully constructed regulatory 
environment shifted the distribution of power in workplaces emphatically 
to employers, but is nevertheless interpreted as a state-activist variant 
of neoliberalism, to enforce market competition.6 The extent and 
character of this activism raises an important question, however, about 
the real priorities of Thatcher’s governments. In this chapter it is argued 
that the most important goal of employment policy was not market 
liberalisation but the narrowing of industrial democracy. Within 
workplaces, this meant suppressing trade union organisation and voice. 
Andrew Gamble’s early formula for understanding the broad contours of 
Thatcherism, ‘the free economy and the strong state’, therefore remains 
highly apt when applied to the world of work. The sovereignty of 
employers and the right of management to manage were bolstered and 
cemented by concerted state action. The changes affecting employment 
from the 1980s onwards were therefore not entirely or even largely a 
reflection of neoliberalism in practice. Debates about the neoliberal 
credentials of Thatcher’s governments are therefore misdirected. Class 
conflict was the real issue.7
Neoliberalism’s ascendancy was qualified also by the extent and 
longevity of the resistance which it encountered. Thatcher and her 
neoliberal supporters depicted citizens as self-responsible individuals 
with limited obligations to others. This characterisation acquired cultural 
as well as political capital.8 Val Walkerdine wrote in the early twenty-first 
century that female ‘low-paid manual and service workers’ were being 
‘constantly enjoined to improve and remake themselves as the freed 
consumer, the “entrepreneur of themselves”’.9 Yet the popular appeal and 
practical reach of this ideological turn in the UK can be overstated. 
Thatcher’s parliamentary majorities were built on minority electoral 
support: less than 44 per cent of the vote in 1983 and just over 42 per cent 
in 1987. Opposition was strong in industrial areas of England, including 
London, a manufacturing city in the 1970s, along with Wales and 
Scotland. In these areas, Thatcherism’s market liberalisation and attacks 
on workers’ voice transgressed a popular sense of justice that had 
developed and gained significant traction since the 1940s. This popular 
moral economy can be traced in various mobilisations of workers in the 
1970s. From London, two important episodes stand out. At Trico in west 
London, 400 women secured equal pay after a lengthy strike in 1976. The 
practices of their employer, a US multinational producing windscreen 
wipers and other accessories, were challenged as immoral and possibly 
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illegal under the 1970 Equal Pay Act and the 1975 Sex Discrimination 
Act.10 The Trico strike overlapped with longer and unsuccessful industrial 
action at the Grunwick photo-processing plant in north-west London, 
where a large majority of the 450 workers were women of South Asian 
origin. They accepted as legitimate the exchange of time and effort for 
money wages, but only where their rights to consultation were respected 
through trade union recognition, which the employer resisted.11 The 
practical levers of the popular moral economy – effective trade union 
voice and state intervention to safeguard workers’ rights, along with high 
levels of manual employment – were deactivated by Thatcherism. The 
collective agency of workers was further affected in negative terms by the 
rapid acceleration of deindustrialisation. This was the most important 
long-term change affecting employment after 1979 and is examined in 
this book by Jim Tomlinson. Worker-activists became highly animated by 
a sense of the established order being unfairly disturbed and dismantled 
by employers and policymakers. Their defence of this order was an 
important popular rejection of neoliberalism.12
The shrinking number of relatively well-paid jobs for workers with 
limited educational qualifications contributed to the development of 
significant social problems which remain troubling in ex-industrial 
communities in the 2010s and early 2020s, especially those outside the 
major cities.13 The management of these difficulties limited the extension 
of neoliberalism, as did the survival of the public sector as a major 
employer. Examining policymaking in the 1990s and 2000s further 
highlights the moderate longer-run influence of neoliberalism. The 
Labour government’s 1998 National Minimum Wage covered workers in 
all sectors of the economy. Neoliberalism admittedly attained greater 
material expression under the UK Conservative–Liberal Democrat 
coalition from 2010, with ‘austerity’ a convenient cloak for shrinking 
the public realm and upwardly distributing income and wealth.14 Even in 
the late 2010s, however, neoliberalism’s effects in the world of work were 
constrained. In policy terms it was a far from hegemonic force across the 
UK. The Scottish government in 2017 announced its support for four pilot 
basic income schemes, all in ex-industrial communities. A cross-party 
group in the Scottish Parliament was established to monitor the 
initiative,15 which flowed from a strengthening critique of neoliberal 
employment regimes across the world in the 2010s.16 In summer 2020, a 
working group composed of Public Health Scotland and local authority 
officials recommended a broader three-year pilot, with emphasis on 
universality, unconditionality and periodic cash payment to individuals 
rather than households.17
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The remainder of this chapter is organised into three parts. The first 
and second parts analyse the linked acceleration of deindustrialisation 
and erosion of worker voice under Thatcherism. This involved a 
heightening of ‘market-ness’, breaching moral economy expectations that 
the state would maintain economic and employment security.18 The 
contested process highlighted the government’s real priority: narrowing 
industrial democracy. Selected groups of manual workers, notably coal 
miners and dockers, were isolated by the state, and their workplace rights 
and industry voice eroded. The final part of the chapter examines the 
limits of neoliberalism’s practical reach in employment since the 1990s. 
The Labour governments from 1997 to 2010 acknowledged the failings 
of the free market as experienced by many wage-earners through tax 
credits for low earners as well as the National Minimum Wage. Political 
divergence between Scotland and England was also important. Scotland’s 
devolved government adopted a distinct approach to employment. This 
was especially marked in the 2010s, when there were also important 
variations in trade union membership in the various regions and nations 
of the UK. These demonstrated the continuing influence of collective 
organisation in former areas of intensive industrial employment and 
countermanded further the practical extent of neoliberalism.
Deindustrialisation in the 1980s and 1990s
Employment structures in Scotland demonstrate the long pedigree of 
deindustrialisation in the UK, which pre-dated Thatcher’s election by 
two decades. Table 8.1 shows the drawn-out nature of this process, 
summarising employment in selected sectors in Scotland from 1959 
to 1996.
In coal, ‘early onset’ deindustrialisation was especially deep. Across 
Scotland, as in Northumberland, Durham and South Wales, there were 
major job losses in the 1960s, as the National Coal Board (NCB) 
concentrated operations in a smaller number of larger pits, with 
Nottinghamshire and Yorkshire, which enjoyed significant geological 
advantages, gaining a higher share of production and employment.19 In 
Scotland, these changes were managed carefully by policymakers, with 
new industrial development encouraged through regional incentives to 
manufacturers willing to establish factories in the coalfields.20 The 
shrinkage of coal jobs was broadly offset by the growth of employment in 
other industrial sectors, providing new opportunities for women as well 
as redundant miners.21 Deindustrialisation accelerated rapidly from 
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Table 8.1 Employment in industrial sectors (1,000s) (percentage of 
total) in Scotland, 1959–96
1959 1968 1978 1988 1996











Construction 162.3 185.5 163 126 111












2,183 2,200 2,067 1,911 1,981
Sources: Digest of Scottish Statistics, 16 (October 1960), tables 29 and 30; Scottish Abstract of 
Statistics, 1 (1971), tables 43a, 45 and 47; Scottish Abstract of Statistics, 10 (1981), table 9.3; 
Scottish Abstract of Statistics, 18 (1989), tables 9.2 (a) and (b); Scottish Abstract of Statistics, 26 
(1998), table 6B3; and Miles Oglethorpe, Scottish Collieries (Edinburgh, RCAHMS, 2006), 20.
1 Coal, construction and manufacturing combined.
1979, and, in contrast to preceding governments, Thatcher’s admini- 
strations were unwilling to take action that would preserve manual 
employment and working-class economic security. Industry share of jobs 
fell by 10 per cent in the decade from 1978, to just 28.3 per cent in 
Scotland in 1988, with serious losses in manufacturing. There was much 
lower government expenditure on trade and industry, with less support 
for the regional stimuli that had sustained employment diversification in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Reduced commitment in this area was neoliberal-
inspired.22 Keith Joseph, the Secretary of State for Industry from 
1979 to 1981, sternly opposed subsidising industrial production and 
employment.23 In December 1979 he surprised Scottish Trades Union 
Congress (STUC) officials when they met for the first time. Seeking 
remedies for escalating industrial job losses, they were rebuffed. Joseph 
argued that such state intervention had been ‘tried and found wanting 
over the last 15 years’. It was not the government’s responsibility, he 
added, to partially fund production of goods which consumers were not 
purchasing.24
Unemployment rose as deindustrialisation gathered pace. Across 
the UK, the official claimant count doubled to three million from 1979 to 
1982. Lost industrial production and jobs were unintended consequences 
of limiting the money supply and reducing inflation, as Tomlinson’s 
account in this volume details. Thatcher’s ‘economic adventurism’ was 
brutal,25 and the radical reduction of regional aid was not its only 
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neoliberal element. Thatcherism’s regressive and anti-collectivist 
tendencies were exemplified by income tax cuts and VAT rises, along with 
privatisation of publicly owned industries and utilities.26 Britain became 
more unequal, with the Gini coefficient for income distribution increasing 
by about 50 per cent in just ten years, from 0.23 in 1977 to 0.34 in 1987, 
where it more or less remained for the next three decades.27
The state, to reiterate, nevertheless retained a powerful role under 
Thatcher, not least in public ‘order’ and military defence.28 Moreover, 
government expenditure as a proportion of GDP increased after 1979, 
partly because of the rise in social security payments in the wake of 
accelerating deindustrialisation. The public sector also remained an 
important employer. In Scotland the share of women workers who were 
employed in the public sector barely shifted from 31.8 per cent in 1977 to 
32.4 per cent in 1987.29 If there was an ambition to shrink the state, this 
was unrealised in part because of the new demands made of welfare 
services by deindustrialisation. Many of those in local authority and social 
security employment were managing the social wounds of industrial job 
loss: unemployment and poverty. Table 8.2 shows that in Scotland women 
acquired a growing share of manufacturing employment during a period 
of expansion in the 1960s. Women retained this share, roughly one job in 
three, as manufacturing contracted, slowly in the 1970s and then more 
rapidly in the 1980s. The situation changed in the 1990s.
Women were increasingly concentrated by the 2000s in lower-paid 
jobs in private sector services, including work in the ‘contracted-out’ 
former public sector, where trade union recognition was less prevalent, 
and conditions of employment less attractive. Deindustrialisation 
Table 8.2 Women’s share of manufacturing employment in Scotland, 
1959–2005







Sources: As table 8.1, plus Scottish Abstract of Statistics, 26 (1998), table 6B; and Jim Campbell and 
Emily Thomson, ‘Changing role of women in the Scottish economy’, in Kenneth Gibb, Duncan 
Maclennan, Des McNulty and Michael Comerford (eds), The Scottish Economy (London, Routledge, 
2018), 135–51.
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contributed to the continued gender gap in rewards, as men regained a 
larger share of manufacturing jobs, and 42 per cent of women and just 
13 per cent of men were working part-time.30 This latter phenomenon 
was ‘sticky’. The STUC Women’s Advisory Committee observed in 1988 
that 43 per cent of female employees were part-time. This structural 
disadvantage compounded gender inequalities in pay, occupational 
opportunity and workplace rights. The absence of non-statutory nursery 
provision, discussed by Helen McCarthy in the previous chapter of this 
book, was a ‘scandal’ and impeded female workers from moving into 
full-time employment. The limited presence of the state in this area was 
partly a reflection of union influence being diminished in the 1980s. 
The outcome, illustrating a salient feature of a liberalised labour market, 
was pronounced gender inequality in employment opportunities and 
rewards.31
Industrial job losses were accompanied by a substantial growth of 
hidden unemployment as people withdrew from economic activity 
altogether. They were neither claiming unemployment benefits nor 
actively seeking work. Most were officially registered as ‘permanently 
sick’. In Fife the portion of adult males classified in this manner increased 
from 2.7 per cent in 1981 to 5.7 per cent in 1991 and 7.1 per cent in 
2001.32 In Glasgow the rate of permanent sickness among all adults 
increased even more quickly, from 3 per cent in 1981 to 9 per cent in 
1991, with 11.2 per cent among men.33 The permanently sick were 
incentivised to assume this identity by the benefits system. Incapacity 
entitlements were higher than unemployment benefits, the value of 
which was radically reduced in the 1980s. Those in receipt of incapacity 
benefits could also draw occupational pensions, if these came ‘early’ in 
connection with redundancy payments. Incapacity benefits were not 
means tested, and the earnings of other household members were 
unaffected. Most of the permanently sick were further motivated by the 
absence of job opportunities: they were unemployed in all but official 
categorisation and would have worked had suitable employment been 
available. Combining the permanently sick with unemployment benefit 
claimants and others who were seeking work produces a ‘real’ level of 
unemployment appreciably higher than the official tally. In Glasgow, 
among adults in the 1980s, this was consistently in the region of 
22–25 per cent, about 6–8 per cent above the UK average. In the 
Scottish coalfields it was likewise high, ranging from 21.2 per cent in Fife 
to 30 per cent in Ayrshire, via 28.7 per cent in Lanarkshire. In the Lothians 
the problem was smaller, at 16 per cent, although still above the 
UK average.34
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Thatcher’s governments did not initiate deindustrialisation. But 
economic policy from 1979 certainly accelerated the contraction of 
industrial employment, and there were no significant efforts to maintain 
economic security in the regions adversely affected. Thatcherite efforts to 
stigmatise the unemployed as authors of their own problems appear to 
have had limited general impact on political attitudes in northern 
England, Scotland and Wales, where support for the Conservative Party 
was consistently lower than in southern England, London aside. As in the 
1930s, unemployed workers in the 1980s tended to see their position 
in collective terms, albeit fatalistically.35 Thatcher’s governments 
arguably acknowledged that unemployment was not entirely a matter for 
the ‘individuals’ affected. Policy interventions to ameliorate the social 
effects of deindustrialisation, notably the increased expenditure on 
welfare benefits, pulled Thatcherism away from its idealised goal of a 
smaller state.
Management’s ‘right’ to manage
A key element of Thatcherism, and arguably its core feature in relation to 
work, was ‘restoring’ the ‘right of management to manage’, liberated from 
state regulation and the trade union ‘veto’.36 This involved an assault on the 
popular moral economy by reversing the post-1945 trend in industrial 
relations to greater pluralism and shared authority in workplaces. Thatcher 
was a principal actor in resisting the Labour government’s industrial 
democracy agenda in the mid-1970s, which included proposals for union-
channel directors in large private sector manufacturing firms.37 Union 
advocates saw enhanced worker involvement in corporate governance, 
particularly where investment and disinvestment decisions were being 
reached, as a means of arresting capital flight and deindustrialisation.38 
Business leaders were often unhappy about Thatcher’s economic approach, 
especially those in manufacturing who were squeezed in the early 1980s by 
inflation and a buoyant pound. But generally they welcomed the ‘creation 
of a climate where being the boss counted for something’, as Martin Adeney 
and John Lloyd put it in 1986.39 The government strongly privileged the 
interests of employers over those of employees. Starting with the 
Employment Act of 1980, a sequence of legal measures on strikes, picketing, 
closed shops and trade union regulations greatly reduced the scale and 
agency of organised labour. The closed shop was a particular target for 
neoliberals. Union membership as a condition of employment offended 
neoliberalism’s individualised view of freedom. Hayek saw it as a coercive 
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attempt by unions to impose costs on workers, employers and the public 
more broadly.40 Unions defended the closed shop as protection against 
free-riders who accepted the benefits of membership opportunistically 
without sharing the costs. ‘If you want a seat on the bus then you have to 
buy a ticket’, was a common collectivist defence,41 which neoliberals 
rejected. The Employment Acts of 1982 and 1988 made action to enforce 
the closed shop illegal. There was a significant fall in union membership, 
although this was more the consequence of deindustrialisation than the 
legislative reforms. Union density – the proportion of the workforce 
represented by trade unions – fell from 54.5 per cent in 1980 to 38.1 per 
cent in 1990.42 Power shifted to employers, who were encouraged to 
control and reorganise work unilaterally.43
The government’s incremental recasting of power relations in 
workplaces was coupled with two major attacks, against coal miners in 
1984–5 and dockers in 1989. The wide range of questions involved in the 
miners’ strike against job losses and colliery closures is reflected in its 
highly diverse literature. This encompasses the contested finances of the 
coal industry,44 the vital involvement of women and the extent of changes 
in coalfield gender politics,45 the role of the Labour Party, plus the 
contested strategy and tactics of the strikers.46 The breadth of these issues 
arguably obscures the central point of contestation in the strike, which 
was union voice in the management of the nationalised industry. The 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) accepted pit closures in the 1960s 
and 1970s only after careful dialogue with the NCB and government. This 
was the popular post-Second World War moral economy in action. It 
resembled the thinking ascribed by E. P. Thompson to the plebeian ‘crowd’ 
which resisted the elevation of market-ness in food provision and wage-
setting in eighteenth-century England.47 Expectations of communal and 
individual security were cultivated by the nationalisation of coal in 1947. 
Changes to the economic order in the coalfields were only accepted by 
workers through agreement, negotiated with union representatives, and 
where collective security was maintained.48 In Scotland, the NUM blocked 
further contraction of the industry from the late 1960s onwards because 
the alternative pathway to economic security for manual workers in the 
coalfields, inward investment from multinational manufacturers, was 
growing too slowly.49 Job losses in coal could no longer be offset by new 
employment in other industry.50 The strike of 1984–5 was an unsuccessful 
defence of the popular moral economy and union voice against the 
invasive force of determined government action. While dissembling 
about the scale of planned pit closures, and publicly claiming that the 
government was not involved in the dispute, Thatcher and her Cabinet 
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privately vetoed any outcome that did not give the NCB freedom to close 
pits unilaterally on economic grounds. The ‘most important requirement’ 
of an agreement, Thatcher said in September 1984, was ‘that it would not 
in any way fetter the NCB in arranging the closure, as and when necessary, 
of uneconomic pits’.51
In pursuit of this goal, the government mobilised the overwhelming 
resources of the state. Thatcher intervened directly in policing, preventing 
strikers from blockading power stations, steelworks and other pressure 
points, including collieries where miners were working.52 The government 
pushed the NCB into a ‘back to work’ movement, spending heavily on 
financial incentives to strike-breakers and ‘safe’ transport to and from 
their workplace.53 Complicated legal manoeuvres in England and Wales 
were also cultivated by the government. David Hart, a businessman and 
adviser to the Prime Minister, encouraged working miners to sue the 
NUM over the legality of the strike. In September 1984 the High Court in 
London restrained the NUM from characterising the strike as official. 
NUM leaders defied this restraint, leading in October to the sequestration 
of their union’s assets in England and Wales, although not in Scotland, 
where separate legal jurisdiction ruled the strike lawful. Thatcher’s 
papers show she followed closely the anti-strike litigation, which 
exacerbated the NUM’s difficulties.54 Little was left to chance in pursuit of 
victory, with a huge public expenditure commitment. Estimates broadly 
coalesce around £6 billion – about £16.5 billion in 2021 values – in 
disappearing production and tax revenues, replacement coal stocks and 
additional oil burn charges, along with reduced economic activity more 
generally, plus the huge expense of policing. This outweighed the NCB’s 
projected financial losses for producing coal in the financial year of 
1984–5, some £100 million, by a factor of sixty to one.55 This ‘worthwhile 
investment’, in the words of Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
was central to the government’s larger ambition of redistributing 
resources and authority from employees to employers. Business was 
liberated, and market forces strengthened, but only because of the state’s 
intensive attack on the integrity of trade unionism.56
The same ideological reasoning framed the government’s approach 
to port transport. Dock work was transformed in the late 1960s and early 
1970s by the containerisation revolution, which reduced radically the 
demand for labour. The number of dockers in all UK ports fell from 47,728 
in 1965 to 18,186 in 1989.57 Most ports in 1989 still operated under the 
National Dock Labour Scheme introduced in 1947 to provide security of 
income for workers and a reliable supply of labour for employers. A closed 
shop applied. The principal union, the Transport and General Workers’ 
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Union (TGWU), had a joint role with employers in determining the scale 
of the registered workforce and was able to influence the management of 
work in Scheme ports. Employers resented this. During a big industrial 
dispute in 1967, the chairman of the London Ocean Trades Employers’ 
Association lamented ‘the absence of master and servant legal rights as 
enjoyed in all other industries’.58 Thatcher’s government likewise loathed 
the Scheme, with its union voice and guaranteed weekly income when 
shortfalls in port traffic meant that dockers were not fully deployed.
A dock strike in July 1984 briefly jeopardised the government’s 
strategy for defeating the miners. Lengthy interruption of imports and 
exports would be far more disruptive than the miners’ strike in isolation. 
Dockers were aggrieved that British Steel Corporation (BSC) employees 
had been directed to unload coal imports. This was contrary to the rules 
of the Scheme, which the TGWU officials correctly feared was being 
threatened. Thatcher advised her Cabinet colleagues to show the public 
that the ‘pretext’ for the dockers’ strike was false. She claimed that they 
enjoyed ‘extraordinary privileges’ in job security and pay, with almost 
one-third of the 13,000 Scheme-registered workers surplus to ‘the 
genuine requirements of their industry’. Keen to isolate the miners, 
however, Thatcher detailed the Secretary of State for Transport, Nicholas 
Ridley, to issue a parliamentary assurance that the government had ‘no 
plans to abolish or change the National Dock Labour Scheme’.59 Ridley did 
so,60 but in 1989 the Scheme was abolished, ending joint regulation 
and guaranteed income for dockers.61 Redundancies and unemployment 
followed. Managerial sovereignty subsequently exerted downward 
pressure on wages in the 1990s, and the intensification of work contributed 
to an increase in injuries and fatalities.62 The new regime was typified on 
the Liverpool waterfront. In 1995, around 500 dockers employed by 
Mersey Docks and Harbours Board were sacked after refusing to cross a 
picket line established by 60 dockers in dispute with another employer, 
Torside Ltd. Energetic local activism for the dockers’ reinstatement 
broadened into an impressive international campaign. This was 
unsuccessful, in that the dockers eventually accepted severance terms in 
1998, but demonstrated the contested nature of the liberalisation of work, 
just as the miners’ strike had done in 1984–5.63
There was a significant drop in measurable industrial action after 
1979. Thatcher and her supporters claimed this demonstrated that their 
reforms had ‘worked’,64 ignoring the implications of cross-national 
comparisons. Data collated at the International Institute of Social History 
shows that falling industrial action was common in most mature 
economies from the 1980s to the 2010s,65 influenced by the twin forces of 
workErS’  voiCE AnD thE morAL EConomy 165
deindustrialisation and globalisation examined in Tomlinson’s 
chapter. Any conclusion that workers had accepted Thatcherite reforms, 
becoming self-motivated ‘economic’ men and women, would therefore be 
contentious.66 In 2006–7, almost three decades after Thatcher’s election, 
Burberry workers at Treorchy, South Wales, campaigned at length – 
although unsuccessfully – to block plant closure and redundancy. The 
mobilisation was mounted in moral economy terms familiar from the 
1980s. The workers argued that the factory ‘belonged’ to the community 
and the multinational company was behaving illegitimately as it moved 
production from South Wales to a lower-wage and lower-regulation 
environment in China. The popular moral economy had been attacked in 
the 1980s, but citizens in the twenty-first century were still asserting 
claims to workplace justice and employment security.67
The limits of neoliberalism since the 1990s
The Thatcher governments did not achieve a permanent revolution 
in economic policy in the UK, neoliberal or otherwise. John Major’s 
Conservative governments and then the Tony Blair–Gordon Brown 
Labour governments engaged in various interventionist and expansionist 
measures.68 These feature elsewhere in the volume, in the chapters by 
Bernhard Rieger, Peter Sloman and Tomlinson. Labour’s crucial 
innovations were the National Minimum Wage (NMW) and tax credits for 
the low paid. Brown, contributing to the campaign against Scottish 
independence in 2014, cited the NMW as evidence of Britain’s valuable 
‘sharing union’. The NMW narrowed differentials between regions and 
reduced the dangers of a ‘race to the bottom’ of the labour market. It was 
made possible, moreover, by the redistribution of wealth across nations 
within the UK as well as boundaries of income.69 The NMW came into 
force in April 1999, when 1.9 million workers were being paid less than 
the initial £3.60 hourly rate for workers aged 21 and over. The measure 
was designed in part to counteract the liberalising damage of the Thatcher 
years, which included abolition of various sector-wide Wages Councils, 
which had been in place since the 1940s. These had been especially 
valuable in raising the wages floor in sectors where unions had found 
organisation of workers and recognition from employers difficult to 
achieve, notably in hospitality and retail.70
The NMW was one of Labour’s main successes in government. 
Applicable to all workers, it was more comprehensive than the Wages 
Councils, which covered only selected sectors. The NMW settled at 
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around 50 per cent of the median wage and directly benefited 7 per cent 
of the workforce. Labour also introduced limited employment and trade 
union protections. The Employment Relations Act of 1999 established a 
statutory right to union recognition where 40 per cent of eligible 
employees in a workplace voted in favour, so long as a majority of 
those participating in the ballot also did so. European Union-inspired 
legislation was brought forward providing for parental leave and 
improved rights to information and consultation.71 Many Labour 
supporters were nevertheless disappointed by the modesty of this policy 
effort. The Thatcher laws constricting union action were not repealed. 
Paul Smith argues that Labour’s agenda ‘domesticated’ unions, tightening 
controls on militancy and continuing Thatcherism’s neoliberal direction 
of travel. European Commission regulations on working time and the 
protection of agency workers were introduced, but in diluted form. In 
similar fashion, unfair dismissal legislation in 1999 lowered the qualifying 
period to one year but was thereafter modified to ease the procedural 
burden on employers. Union membership continued to shrink, particularly 
in the private sector, although more slowly than in the 1980s and 
early 1990s.72
Labour’s policy shortcomings were slight when measured against 
what followed under Conservative–Liberal and then Conservative 
governments at UK level after 2010. Prolonged austerity in public 
finances, along with further oppressive anti-trade union legislation 
and private sector employment practices, framed the growth of a 
highly insecure labour regime. This included zero-hours contracts, an 
unmistakably neoliberal feature which brutally transgressed residual 
popular moral economy expectations of security and shared workplace 
authority. The number of people on employment contracts with no 
weekly minimum hours increased from fewer than 200,000 in 2010 to 
901,000 in 2017, according to the government’s Labour Force Survey. 
This amounted to 2.8 per cent of workers. The Office for National Statistics 
reported in 2018 that this phenomenon was possibly peaking,73 but the 
high visibility of the gig economy demonstrated the renewed practical 
influence of neoliberalism in the labour market. This involved a highly 
exploitative blend of bogus self-employment, lost wages coupled with 
fines for workers reporting sick, and digital-era mechanisms for policing 
employees.74
In policy terms, however, neoliberalism was not a hegemonic force 
across the UK. The Scottish government’s support for research in 2017 on 
universal basic income, with pilot schemes in Edinburgh, Fife, Glasgow 
and North Ayrshire, was noted in the introduction. The Scottish 
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government articulated a broad-based revulsion in Scotland arising 
from the UK government’s benefit cuts and contentious reform of 
welfare, Universal Credit. The Scottish government used its limited 
powers under devolution to mitigate the negative impact on claimants of 
this benefit, enabling fortnightly rather than monthly payments, and 
for housing elements of the entitlement to go directly to landlords.75 
Political divergence between Scotland and England was also clear in the 
tone used by the Scottish government in matters relating to employment 
and trade unionism. Partnership with the STUC and its affiliates was 
emphasised in the 2014 White Paper on an Independent Scotland,76 and 
in 2015 the government established the Fair Work Convention, an 
advisory and research body that endorsed the value of workplace 
union voice.77
The question of historical justice for the casualties of deindustri- 
alisation was likewise pursued in a distinct manner in Scotland. In 
October 2016, the UK Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, refused to establish 
an inquiry into policing at the ‘Battle of Orgreave’, where South Yorkshire 
Constabulary initiated a violent confrontation with striking miners in 
June 1984 at the BSC coking plant near Rotherham.78 In June 2018, by 
contrast, Michael Matheson, the Scottish government’s Cabinet Secretary 
for Justice, announced an independent review of the impact of policing 
on affected communities in the strike in Scotland. The review, chaired 
by John Scott QC, began collecting evidence in August 2018. Public 
consultation meetings were held across the ex-coalfields in mining 
welfare institutes. Former strikers provided vivid testimony of police 
harassment, intimidation and physical violence. The unusually vindictive 
punishments in sheriff courts were also emphasised, along with the 
suspected collusion between police and the NCB to secure the dismissals 
from employment of strike activists.79 Scott’s report, published in October 
2020, recommended a pardon for the 500-plus former miners convicted 
in Scotland for public order offences associated with their strike activism. 
The Scottish government accepted this recommendation in principle, 
with Matheson’s successor as Cabinet Secretary for Justice, Humza 
Yousaf, advising Parliament that the necessary legislation would follow 
in 2021.80
These policy divergences on employment and trade unionism within 
the UK have deep roots. Devolution in Scotland drew much impetus in the 
1960s from trade union concerns about the political management of 
deindustrialisation. These were a direct articulation of popular moral 
economy expectations. The STUC was an advocate of Home Rule for 
Scotland within the UK from the late 1960s onwards. Devolution was 
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regarded as holding the potential for distinct policy approaches that 
could enhance economic security for manual workers and industrial 
communities. This objective became more urgent in the early 1970s, as 
Edward Heath’s Conservative government allowed unemployment to 
escalate, with major industrial job losses on Clydeside.81 One of this 
book’s editors has elsewhere argued, with co-authors, that in Britain 
there was a notable trend to greater ‘popular individualism’ in the 1970s. 
This was not incompatible with all forms of collective action, but among 
industrial workers in England it appears to have contributed to an 
undermining of the peak-level authority of unions.82 In Scotland, by 
contrast, public support for collective action in defence of working-class 
economic security remained less ambiguous. The Labour government 
elected in 1974 became more popular over time in Scotland just as its 
support drained in England. Scottish voters appreciated the government’s 
prioritisation of income from industrial employment, protected by union 
organisation and policy action. This included major new investment in 
coal mining, the subsidised ‘rescue’ of car manufacturing at Linwood in 
Renfrewshire and the nationalisation of shipbuilding. At the 1979 general 
election, Labour’s share of the vote in Scotland increased from 36.3 per 
cent in October 1974 to 41.5 per cent, whereas its share in England fell 
from 40.1 per cent to 36.7 per cent.83 Further political divergence followed 
when Thatcher’s governments oversaw the ending of deep coal mining in 
Scotland, the privatisation of shipbuilding with big job losses on the 
Clyde and the closure of various large-scale industrial enterprises, notably 
the Linwood car plant in 1981. Local Labour MPs and management 
representatives from Linwood met Joseph prior to closure, seeking 
financial help to keep 4,800 workers in a job. Neoliberal thought was 
translated into neoliberal inaction. ‘Sir Keith was extremely reluctant to 
agree to do anything at all’, the official minute of this meeting recorded.84
Historical traditions of collectivism were not extinguished in the 
neoliberal age. In the 2010s, Walkerdine examined the damage to 
working-class self-confidence in a South Wales steel-making community 
arising from deindustrialisation. Young men unable to follow in their 
fathers’ footsteps became disengaged from economic activity, dismissing 
‘women’s employment’ in service sectors. Walkerdine concluded that 
deindustrialisation disrupted the intergenerational transmission of 
working-class traditions of solidarity.85 This overlooked the findings of an 
important study by Huw Beynon, Rhys Davies and Steve Davies. In oral 
testimony citizens whose working lives had commenced in the 1990s, and 
with limited or even no industrial employment experience, reported the 
strong formative influence of older relatives, neighbours and colleagues. 
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A strong culture of trade union organisation and activism had passed 
from one generation to the next, so that collective bargaining in service 
occupations was more robust in South Wales than in many regions of 
England.86 Labour Force Survey and Office for National Statistics data 
on union membership and collective bargaining, assembled and analysed 
by Gregor Gall, indicates that historical tradition had similar lasting 
effects on Clydeside too. In Strathclyde in 2017, collective bargaining 
coverage was higher than in regions of England with similar employment 
structures.87 In a similar register, Tim Strangleman argues that collective 
identities formed in industrial society operate as a ‘residual structure 
of feeling’ in the incomplete transition to post-industrial society. 
These identities remained valuable resources for manual workers, 
encouraging them to act in ways that mitigated the negative effects of 
deindustrialisation, such as low pay and authoritarian employers, and 
minimised the practical influence on their lives of neoliberal ideology.88
Conclusion
Neoliberal thinking inspired policy-driven changes affecting employment 
and trade unionism from 1979 onwards. The Thatcher governments first 
elected in that year introduced a sequence of reforms to employment and 
industrial relations law that cumulatively diminished the agency of trade 
unions. These laws were consistent with Hayek’s theorisation of unions as 
monopolistic and coercive restraints on the efficient functioning of the 
market. Legislative measures against the closed shop highlight the 
practical impact of neoliberal ideology. It was not acceptable in neoliberal 
terms to insist on union membership as a condition of employment. 
Neoliberalism was far from being the only influence on government 
policy, however. Diminishing the agency of trade unions and rebalancing 
authority in workplaces in favour of employers were more fundamental 
to Thatcherism than extending the practical reach of the free market. 
Concerted state action, backed by sometimes very hefty public 
expenditure, was undertaken in pursuit of this anti-trade union agenda. 
This took priority over neoliberal budget- and state-shrinking aspirations. 
The huge ‘investment’ required to defeat striking miners, to remove their 
union’s voice from the management of the coal industry, demonstrated 
this element of Thatcherism in vivid form.
Thatcherism’s active-state neoliberalism duly represented an assault 
on the popular moral economy that had developed in many industrial 
communities and localities in Britain after the Second World War. 
THE NEOLIBERAL AGE? BRITAIN S INCE THE 1970s170
The popular moral economy comprised two core expectations: individual 
and communal security, encouraged by state intervention; and meaningful 
voice in the taking of decisions affecting employment, through political 
and trade union representatives. Market liberalisation and the ‘restoration’ 
of employer sovereignty in workplaces in the 1980s marked significant 
incursions on this moral economy. The acceleration of deindustrialisation 
represented a further contravention of this moral economy, creating high 
levels of unemployment, especially in the coalfields and manufacturing 
towns. There was a neoliberal disinclination to stimulate or subsidise 
alternative employment. The key moral economy levers – robust trade 
unionism and interventionist state policy – were diminished in their 
effectiveness. Moral economy expectations nevertheless continued to 
inform political thinking and voting patterns among manual workers, at 
least in industrial localities. The Thatcher governments were compelled 
to expend substantial resources to mitigate the damage arising from lost 
jobs in coal and manufacturing. The notable increase in the volume of 
citizens classified as ‘permanently sick’, withdrawn from economic 
activity and in receipt of higher levels of benefit than those registered as 
out of work, was not a neoliberal phenomenon. The record of the Labour 
governments elected in 1997 further restricted the practical application 
of neoliberal ideas. Measures affecting employment and trade unionism 
were adopted to constrain free-market forces. The NMW was the most 
significant of these, providing coverage for all workers, and survived even 
the fresh neoliberal turn in UK-level policymaking after 2010. The 
Scottish government’s distinct approach in the 2010s and 2020s was 
shaped by the continuing influence of collectivist traditions formed under 
industrialisation and the more vigorous health of popular moral economy 
expectations, evident at times also in South Wales. This political and 
social divergence highlighted the far from universal traction of 
neoliberalism in Britain, ideologically as well as practically.
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Where was entrepreneurship in  
post-war Britain? Freedom, family 
and choice in modern British 
shopping cultures
Sarah mass
If British historians were pressed to name the archetypal entrepreneur of 
the post-war age, many would settle on John Bloom. Bloom was a pioneer 
of home washing machines in Britain. He started by selling discount 
models door-to-door in 1958, before moving to newspaper direct sales of 
Dutch-made twin tub machines in 1958 and 1959. The heights of Bloom’s 
notoriety came in the early 1960s, when he transformed the failing Rolls 
Razor safety razor company into a modern consumer durable firm. The 
Rolls Razor business had factories in Swansea and Aycliffe, in addition to 
a demonstration-manufacturing hub in Cricklewood, London. Connected 
to these sites were 400 self-employed salesmen and an advertising budget 
of £2 million, much of it going to the Daily Mirror.1 For these innovations 
and the modes of their implementation, scholars of enterprise culture 
point to Bloom as a ‘pure case’ of entrepreneurship. He not only occupied 
a stereotypically ‘outsider’ position in a business that was controlled by 
manufacturing interests and their retailer allies, but he also sold his own 
persona right alongside his product.2 His 1971 autobiography, It’s No Sin 
to Make a Profit, pioneered the genre of British entrepreneurial memoir, 
a tale of singular triumph over an inefficient and archaic marketplace.3
Depending on their methodological orientation, scholars of 
neoliberalism attribute different causal weight to the John Blooms of 
late capitalism. For those working in the vein of governmentality, the 
enterprising or entrepreneurial self is the mode by which neoliberalism 
becomes generalised within a society, linking functionally different 
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schools of economic thought.4 In management, organisational and 
workplace studies, scholars argue that the entrepreneurial driving forces 
of ‘competition’ and ‘excellence’ create distinct subjectivities in neoliberal 
societies; Margaret Thatcher’s 1980s enterprise culture and the post-
2008 precarious labour market are two of the most trenchant research 
areas.5 Across these subfields, ‘entrepreneurs’ are always ideal types 
embodying private, possessive, competitive and enterprising values.6 The 
social atomisation of the entrepreneur is both the means and the end to 
neoliberalism’s scalar potential: all it takes is one visionary to break free 
of accepted ‘group think’ and transform non-market areas of life into 
enterprise arenas.
In line with ongoing critiques of these models that tacitly accept the 
entrepreneur as a cult of personality, this chapter turns to the social 
relations that undergird individualist narratives, paying particular 
attention to the roles played by gender, family and place in the ascendency 
of ‘enterprise culture’ in post-war economic life.7 If, in the words of one 
obituarist of John Bloom, the washing machine magnate ‘launched two 
revolutions, one in the kitchen . . . and the second in the high street’,8 
what happens when we frame this enterprise revolution of individual 
freedom and economic competition as contingent and fermenting in 
various arenas of British society?
For example, Bloom capitalised on wider political and social forces 
that were destabilising the balance of power in late 1950s and early 1960s 
economic life. The first was the rising demand for consumer durables and 
the proliferating ways in which ordinary families could make this dream 
of the ‘good life’ a reality. The mass diffusion of household appliances in 
Britain became possible by the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the 
country reached the real income per head attained by the US 30 years 
earlier.9 Yet, for many consumers, the cost of modern durables still 
outpaced their real wages, so purchasing items such as washing machines 
was as often dependent on credit as it was on ready cash. In 1958, a 
survey found that nearly two-thirds of under-45-year-olds approved of 
buying on credit. Bloom’s business model was built almost entirely on this 
increasing cultural openness to credit and hire purchase, as well as the 
(often controversial) legislative changes that allowed consumers to put 
smaller deposits down on items such as washing machines, refrigerators 
and televisions.10
The rationale of ‘price competitiveness’ was also becoming a 
consumerist cry in the 1950s and 1960s. The Tories partially demolished 
Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) in 1956, before it was completely 
abolished in 1964. For the first half of the twentieth century, RPM had 
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ensured that branded goods would be sold at a minimum price that was 
advantageous not only to production interests, but also to small retailers.11 
The demise of RPM is remembered by retail and business historians as the 
final blow to small shopkeepers and the moment when commercial 
interests in British retail swung from manufacturing to large-scale retail-
distributors such as Tesco and Woolworth’s.12 John Bloom railed against 
RPM, employing iconoclastic advertising schemes and trading stamps 
as a way to subvert price minimums.13 All these bombastic initiatives 
reflected his belief that entrenched business interests could not and would 
not give consumers ‘value for money’. Like hire purchase and RPM, 
trading stamps were fiercely debated in the Commons in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, with the figure of Bloom hanging over disagreements 
about the freedom of the market.
In public, Bloom promoted himself as a ‘friend of the family’ whose 
methods suited the everyday consumer when entrenched business 
interests would not. In reality, he benefited from early, elite entanglements 
between Conservative politics and neoliberal policy influencers. Rolls 
Razor’s board of directors included Tory MP Richard ‘Reader’ Harris, and 
the company counted among its allies Ralph Harris, director of the 
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). Both Harris the MP and Harris the 
think-tank director helped deflect criticism of Rolls Razor in the early to 
mid-1960s, turning consumer choice and enterprise initiative against 
political and professional interest groups.14 For these reasons, media 
historian Adrian Johns found it unsurprising that the IEA tract ‘Piracy as 
a media force’ (1967) held up Bloom as an archetypal pirate of the 
1960s.15 By revealing the self-interest of retail and distribution 
monopolies, Bloom undercut the moral high ground of entrenched 
commercial interests.
Historians frame the decade after rationing (1954–64) as the key 
moment when British politicians shifted their rhetorical appeals to the 
affluent consumer’s pocketbook, often to the detriment of party bases.16 
Scholarship has focused on this tension in the left, where a practice such 
as RPM drove wedges between wings of the Labour Party and between 
Labour and their Co-op allies, split as these groups were over workers’ 
rights, wholesale interests and consumer protection.17 Yet the right faced 
their own unique challenges around price maintenance. The debate 
forced the Tories to reckon with ‘private enterprise’ as either a value that 
wedded them to their small business voting bloc, or a political economic 
worldview that might portend a more multinational, corporate future.18 
Whether or not Tories’ openness to consumer credit and relaxing of price 
regulations can be explained by a coherent and enthusiastic uptake of 
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distinctly neoliberal ideas is a live question.19 Yet there was no doubt that 
when Rolls Razor went into liquidation in July 1964 – three months 
before Labour won the general election – critics of Tory policy used Bloom 
as a cudgel against the freewheeling economic culture he had cultivated 
within pockets of the Conservative Party.20 Harold Wilson used Bloom’s 
downfall as a metaphor for Tory political insolvency, while the New 
Statesman prophesised that:
The rise and fall of Mr John Bloom, may well be regarded, by future 
historians, as a suitable moral tale to append to 13 years of Tory 
rule. Here was an ambitious young man who grew up in the 
Opportunity State and absorbed its atmosphere of unrestrained 
commercialism almost in the schoolroom.21
In the process of decentring the entrepreneurial self from histories of 
enterprise in post-war Britain, this chapter also seeks to trouble the 
common historical narrative explored above, where the axis of influence 
around politicised consumerism ran between figures such as Bloom and 
party self-fashioning. Rather, I introduce the more everyday idea of post-
war ‘flexible retailing’ – the belief that buying and selling should be freed 
from political, economic and even temporal and spatial constraints. The 
rise of ‘choice’ was not merely taken up by factions of the two major 
political parties, emerging think tanks or self-service and discount 
retailers; ‘choice’ in shopping was integral to the more gradually unfurling 
politics of place in post-war Britain.22
I will focus, therefore, on the material conditions that produced 
low-cost and, more importantly, flexible retailing activity on the margins 
of consumer culture from the 1950s to the early 1970s, examining in 
particular how this activity was driven by women’s shifting relationships 
to the spaces and temporalities of consumer culture. American labour 
historian Emily LaBarbera-Twarog has recently explored how the late 
modern housewife became both ‘a political constituency group and an 
imagined ideal’.23 LaBarbera-Twarog excavates a rich history of consumer 
activism that pre-dated the conservative women’s movement in the US, 
but whose calls ultimately served as the handmaiden of this political 
culture on the right. This chapter will take up a similar line of research 
questioning: how did a British shopping landscape forged in the social 
democratic ethos of family provisioning ultimately become a terrain of 
critique for state intervention in the consumer market?
Setting the market ‘free’ from state intervention is a core feature of 
neoliberal political economic rhetoric (even if, in reality, the creation and 
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stimulation of competition within markets often required forceful 
action from the strong state). This chapter argues that flexible retailing’s 
focus on the needs and desires of the ‘forgotten consumer’ and, moreover, 
the ‘forgotten seller’ is an understudied aspect of where and why 
entrepreneurialism has become a pillar of Britain’s late modern social and 
cultural formation. Mike French and John Davis have explored the deep 
fermentation of anti-collectivism among groups such as commercial 
travellers and mini-cab drivers, men who made their own schedules and 
were defined by their spatial freedoms.24 Exploring the antecedents of 
what we now recognise as the ‘gig economy’, these studies help explain 
how the rise of individual mobility and the coming of a post-industrial 
economy fed one another in the mid- to late twentieth century. Yet they 
both largely overlook how individualist disruptors often succeeded by 
romanticising the small-scale, even communal, commerce of the past. 
Scholarship on direct sales and club trading in the Americas and the 
rise of Walmart as a form of regional commercial populism helps us 
understand how retail entrepreneurs squared the freedom of the market 
with nostalgia for family and community in the mid- to late twentieth 
century.25 While the religious and political landscape of Britain and 
Europe at this moment does not facilitate easy comparisons with the US 
case, this chapter argues that flexible retailing did engender a politics that 
pitched the ‘hard working family’ against the excesses of state planning 
and public spending. John Bloom did not emerge on the consumer market 
in a vacuum; his success was predicated on a set of demands and needs in 
the shopping landscape that emerged from the domestic budget and the 
politics of place.
My focus will be on two moments before and after the early to mid-
1960s, when debates around consumerism, credit and affluence clashed 
in the public sphere. The first case study is the popularity of mobile 
trading in 1950s Harlow New Town; the second is the growth of Sunday 
open-air market trading around the Home Counties in the 1970s. Both of 
these flexible retailing trends were celebrated by their backers as simple 
solutions to consumer problems created by the local state. In Harlow, 
residents’ associations critiqued the Development Corporation for failing 
to build enough brick-and-mortar shops to keep the cost of living in the 
New Town affordable. In the state’s absence, mobile shops provided the 
retail competition and convenience that local authorities had failed to 
provide. Twenty years later, in the Home Counties, the issue revolved 
around local authorities’ undue policing of open-air markets, ventures 
that capitalised on consumer demand and underused land. More so than 
the debate over mobile trading in the 1950s, the debate over open-air 
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markets in the 1970s bled into local political life, and the chapter will end 
with a biographical survey of market organiser-turned-civic activist 
Wendy Hobday. As a small business owner, Hobday developed a two-
pronged critique of state intervention in retailer–consumer relations (as 
an entrepreneur) and profligate spending (as a ratepayer). On the surface, 
Hobday appears to combine the radical retailing of John Bloom with the 
conservative values of Margaret Thatcher; yet this chapter will show that 
Hobday is much more than a curious amalgamation of impulses that 
animated individuals on the British right: her commercial and political 
causes tapped into the very way that shopping choice was built into the 
ordinary landscapes of post-war Britain.
Mobile shops and Harlow New Town
The early days of Britain’s New Towns have been extensively covered in 
social and cultural, political, architectural and economic histories.26 
Scholars have predominantly focused on the intertwined debates over the 
politics of rehousing and the visions of architect-planners: to what extent 
did New Towns make a conscious break with the past styles and familiar 
rhythms of British urban life in order to fit the post-war ideals of social 
democracy? Less studied, however, have been the stopgap measures that 
Development Corporations developed for provisioning these new 
communities, in particular the question of how far the state should 
control business enterprise in order to direct commercial growth.27
On paper, the building of brick-and-mortar shops in New Towns was 
part of the planned socio-economic landscape: the Final Report of the 
New Towns Committee declared one shop for every 100–150 residents as 
the ideal ratio.28 However, the high cost of labour, building materials and 
licensing restrictions meant that Development Corporations fell far below 
this number, especially in the first stages of building. The same was true 
in new council housing developments. When Peter Wilmott and Michael 
Young travelled to the new estate of Greenleigh, Essex, in the early 1950s, 
they found one shop for every 300 residents, a far cry from the one shop 
for every 44 residents to which the former Bethnal Green dwellers were 
accustomed.29
Enterprising mobile shops travelled to these New Towns and new 
estates – as well as to rural or bomb-damaged areas – in these initial days 
of constrained central funding for non-essential construction. The 
National Chamber of Trade estimated that by 1963 there were 11,700 
mobile shops with an annual turnover of nearly £100 million, which 
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trebled their profits at the outset of the decade.30 The Guardian referred 
to these kitted-out vans carrying groceries and other essentials as 
‘the new pedlars’, an economic force that at once harkened back to a 
world of peripatetic trading while also acknowledging the new retail 
geography of post-war Britain.31 While these traders conjured up images 
of retailing practices gone-by, mobile shops were often offshoots of 
modern companies that had to adjust to the contemporary realities of 
working-class residential dispersal. For example, the Co-operative was 
the largest player in mobile shop activity; by 1958, they owned half of the 
mobile shops in operation, their growth far outstripping the building of 
Co-op permanent stores.32 The viability of mobile shops, in fact, created a 
feedback loop of growth between chain stores and British automobile 
manufacturing: along with the Co-operative’s own manufacturing arm, 
firms such as Smith’s Delivery Vehicles, Austin Crompton Parkinson and 
Midland Vehicles tailored their commercial vehicle production to vans, a 
development that ensured Britain would ‘far [outstrip] the rest of Europe 
in making “the shop that comes to you”’.33
Mobile shops were sites of retail innovation, but they also tethered 
their users to older forms of shopping. The Co-operative was one key 
operator in this subsection of the retail economy, joined by a fleet of 
Women’s Institute (WI) retail vans.34 In addition, there were links between 
mobile trading and the deprivations of rationing during and after the 
Second World War.35 Many ‘shops on wheels’ – like John Bloom – initially 
launched as distributors for army surplus goods.36 On a more affective 
level, the feeling of trust and loyalty that residents held towards these 
itinerant traders was often quite strong. In the Scottish New Town of 
Glenrothes, residents were particularly loyal to the mobile traders who 
had seen them through the difficult period in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, when the last days of rationing overlapped with a lack of shops. In 
residents’ words, it would be ‘plain thankless’ to disregard the service that 
mobile shops had provided by reregistering with the new permanent 
shops slowly taking shape in the New Town.37 By the 1960s, the affective 
value of the mobile shop existed in relation to a stark new world of 
supermarkets, with the National Chamber of Trade identifying the ‘great 
intangible in the mobiles’ success’ as the ‘value’ that ‘housewives put on 
the personal contact with a roundsman as an alternative to helping 
themselves among the anonymous, jostling crowd in a confusing neon- 
lit store’.38
Due to low-cost, quick start-up features of mobile shops, many local 
authorities treated their licensing with indifference. If enterprising 
traders could fill a consumer need that the cash-strapped state could not, 
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there was little point in regulating their activity in the cul-de-sacs and 
half-built sites of New Towns and new estates. In Newport and Glasgow, 
for example, authorities integrated mobile shops into the economic 
scheme of their new housing estates, encouraging mobile shops 
as competition drivers and factoring these outlets’ usage into their 
calculations of how many brick-and-mortar shops to provide for 
residents.39
Small shopkeepers – squeezed between these popular informal 
solutions and the ascendant chain stores – greeted the indifference of 
local authorities with condemnation. Shopkeepers accused the state of 
supporting ‘unfair competition’ from mobile shops, referring to the 
‘poaching’, ‘pirating’ and ‘invasion’ that these units brought to new 
communities.40 While shopkeepers were subjected to the ‘handicap’ of 
shop licensing alongside high labour and material costs, mobile traders 
could commit minimal capital and meet low overheads by moving from 
site to site. In the Scottish New Town of East Kilbride, brick-and-mortar 
traders complained to the Development Corporation about the influx of 
mobile traders who took advantage of a captive market; one notorious 
mobile shop commuted every day from neighbouring Ayrshire because 
the potential profit outweighed the travel costs.41
Mobile retailers thus capitalised on a moment of weakness and 
indecision by small shopkeepers, larger firms and the local state. They 
met a neglected demand within the market, right when the era of 
rationing gave way to a period of plenty, when ‘enterprise [was] finding 
outlets in a number of hitherto unattempted directions’.42 Advertisements 
for mobile vans in national newspapers reminded prospective mobile 
traders to ‘follow the housewife’, not to let trade ‘slip through your fingers’ 
and to ‘be prepared for increased business’. Van manufacturers – 
dependent on these outriders for their own business success – therefore 
focused on nimbleness and alacrity as the traits that would set 
1950s retailers in good stead with their imagined consumers. These 
advertisements, taken alongside the inaction by many local authorities, 
suggest if not cooperation, then at least an early detente between the 
freedom of the market and the economic planning of the state. Although 
Lord Beveridge had imagined the New Towns as a ‘housewife’s paradise’, 
where the Development Corporation would play a key role in providing 
amenities for young families, the widespread use of the ‘shop on wheels’ 
shows that the fixity of new economic space was shaken from these new 
communities’ inception.43 In the press, the ‘enterprising trader’ was 
referred to multiple times as a figure not to be hindered by vested 
interests; nor could the mobile shop be held back by building licences, 
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rates and hours legislation that applied to brick-and-mortar shops.44 The 
mid-1950s was, therefore, a moment when the role of the state in shaping 
the physical landscape of the retail economy was insufficient and flexible. 
Mobile shops capitalised on this insufficiency by compelling both 
entrenched business and the state to reconsider the relationship between 
consumer demand and the fixity of the built environment.
From the inception of Harlow New Town, its founders imagined this 
community in the north-east of London’s metropolitan green belt to be a 
self-contained commercial unit, one whose shopping core would suit the 
practices and budgets of its new residents. Part of this plan was the 
support for more informal and low-cost retail outlets. In the internal 
correspondence of the Development Corporation, officials commented on 
the common sense of allowing stall-holding to take place in the Market 
Square before brick-and-mortar shops moved in, as this would attract a 
cheaper trader and a shopping crowd.45 In the early days of town 
construction, the Corporation received interest from prospective mobile 
traders in Ilford, North Finchley and Clapton, all London traders eager to 
follow their customers into the New Towns around the capital.46 For those 
planners tasked with developing networked amenities from scratch, these 
mobile entrepreneurs were viable alternatives to the larger stores, which 
were not only constrained by high licensing, labour and material costs, 
but also tended to refrain from committing to a new consumer market 
before a steady resident demand was guaranteed.
The openness to flexible retailing, however, was not driven solely by 
planner–retailer relationships, but by the everyday demands of Harlow’s 
new housewives, overwhelmingly drawn from the working-class districts 
of London. For shopkeepers in the 1950s, mobile shops had become a 
catch-all symbol of housewives’ passiveness in the consumer market: 
those who relied on these outlets were ‘bone idle’, seeing as they 
did not even need to ‘comb their hair’ to do the family shopping.47 Angry 
housewives responded to these comments from the President of the 
National Union of Small Shopkeepers by espousing their own agency: 
‘running a house efficiently is a housewife’s business, and, as with any 
other business, she buys in what she considers to be the best market’.48 In 
Harlow, local journalists referred to shopping facilities as the ‘single 
greatest factor’ in the lives of Harlow’s women, an issue around which 
they engaged the state and the press. The slow development of the central 
shopping precinct and the uneven growth of neighbourhood sub-units 
such as The Stow generated petitioning from local Labour women.49 
While affluent out-of-town shoppers came to use the facilities at The Stow, 
its pricing and selection did not suit the recent transplants to Harlow 
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itself.50 To fill this retail void, the Essex WI established the first WI 
branch market in a New Town, in ‘recognition of the needs and difficulties 
of housewives moved from their own environment to form a new 
community’.51 Along with the stopgap solutions that linked country to 
town, many of these housewives wanted to travel closer to bustling 
market areas they knew from their childhood. Women demanded 
bus services to the nearest market centre in Romford, or in some cases 
travelled all the way back to London street markets in efforts to convince 
traders to commute and sell cheap consumer goods in Harlow from vans 
and barrows.52 Post-war sociology has tended to reinforce the belief that 
urban dispersal and the lack of a local shop or pub made the lives of 
women and families more insular and isolated.53 We should attend, 
however, to the interventions that housewives made in their local retail 
markets, organising and advocating for low-cost shopping opportunities 
that joined together their tight-knit urban districts in London with their 
new life in overspill and purpose-built communities.
In the mid-1950s, the Development Corporation and the Harlow 
housewife who suffered ‘queuing . . . far beyond moderation’ were 
locked in a battle over the role of enterprise in the socio-economic 
development of the town. In a shift from their earlier policy, the 
Development Corporation would not sanction a temporary market until 
their ‘official’ informal shopping outlet – the Market Square – opened in 
spring 1956. Consumers and traders alike found ways to work around the 
local state. In the year before the Market Square opened, there was an 
increase in trading from private homes, as well as concern around the 
rising numbers of mobile barrow traders who congregated on 
Corporation-owned land, in effect creating unsanctioned markets.54 
Consumer demand on these retail fringes built up to such an extent that, 
when the municipal retail market did open in May 1956, the market 
department was compelled to reach out to these occasional barrow 
sellers, asking them to become licensed traders and thus bring their 
existing customer bases into the official market space.
Mobile shops began on the fringes of the post-war built landscape, 
but over time they became part of the metaphorical and material 
core of retail life. Whether individual traders or known names in the 
world of collective commerce (the Co-op, the WI), mobile operators sold 
in-demand items and the promise of shopping choice to post-war 
consumers. Mobile shops’ success in locales such as Glenrothes, Glasgow 
and Harlow shows how retail flexibility disrupted the built landscape of 
post-war provisioning, with ‘forgotten’ shoppers and enterprising sellers 
counterbalancing the planning eye of the British state.
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Sunday markets and Wendy Hobday
Harlow in the mid-1950s shows us how the citizen-consumer demand for 
flexible retailing became a built-in feature of post-war society, to which 
the state responded unevenly and to which select mobile shops responded 
enthusiastically. The case of Sunday markets in the 1970s demonstrates 
how citizen-entrepreneurs politicised this practice to critique the very 
efficacy of the state in shopping cultures. Two related developments 
from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s redoubled the focus on shopping 
as a flexible component of everyday life. The first was the continuing rise 
of the ‘working family’ as a dynamic actor in the British political economy. 
By 1971, over half of married women were employed outside the home. 
Dolly Smith Wilson has attributed the growth of this demographic group 
to ‘the material and emotional attractions associated with affluence’.55 
The shifting terrain of female employment affected how political parties 
discussed not only how housewives brought money into the home, but 
how and when they spent money outside the home. For example, the 
Conservative manifesto of 1964 did not merely include the abolition of 
RPM as a policy that would gear the market towards consumers’ interests; 
the party also vowed to review shop hours which were ‘particularly 
inconvenient for the growing number of women at work’.56 From the mid-
1960s to the mid-1970s, Conservative and Labour governments tapped 
trade organisations and the ever-expanding network of consumer groups 
in efforts to understand the pros and cons of tailoring shopping to favour 
the schedules of working women, particularly extending hours past 
7.00 p.m. on Fridays and Saturdays and liberalising some forms of Sunday 
trading.57
The continuing breakdown of gendered divisions of labour and 
temporal divisions of consumption facilitated the second development of 
this period: the recognition that non-work shaped the late modern 
British landscape.58 John K. Walton, for example, has pinpointed the 
early 1970s as the moment when the industrial weekend essentially 
‘broke down’ under the demands for family leisure and the ubiquity of 
car culture.59 By the early 1970s, the freedom of the average British 
family to spend weekend time together outside the home put pressure 
on urban and suburban green belt locations: in 1973 one survey 
estimated that on a summer Sunday, there were nine million countryside 
day trips made in Britain.60 As time and mobility became markers of 
freedom and choice, underdeveloped areas of land along Britain’s town 
and city fringes became sites of concern among policymakers and 
planning officials.
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Quasi-legal Sunday markets emerged at the metaphorical intersection 
of these shifting tastes and demands in the consumption and leisure arenas. 
Sunday markets were technically made legal with the 1969 repeal of the 
1448 Sunday Fairs Act, which had forbidden these types of commercial 
gatherings on the Christian Sabbath.61 Like the mobile traders discussed 
in the first half of this chapter, Sunday market traders in the 1970s grew 
their business models in spaces of the built environment that went 
overlooked or unregulated by the local state. Markets were predominantly 
held on the ‘urban fringe’ of towns or cities, where planning regulations 
were neglected and competing retailers were sparse.62 Many traders 
congregated on underused football car parks and greyhound racing 
stadiums, sporting sites where owners needed to maximise land-use 
revenue to compensate for shifting leisure tastes.63 Other Sunday markets 
were more rural in character, taking place on farms or disused RAF fields 
across England that were reachable only by private car or hired coach. As 
cultural and economic innovations, Sunday markets were part of the 
retail landscape that included supermarkets, discount warehouses, do-it-
yourself stores and other forms of out-of-town shopping that appealed to 
the car-owning family.64 Open-air Sunday markets resonated with 
consumers in the 1960s and early 1970s on two levels: they were an 
outlet for Britons’ simultaneous unparalleled leisure spending power and 
the impulse to ‘make ends meet’ in an era of rising prices.65
This consumer demand for more varied and accessible shopping 
underwrote ‘Wendy Fair’, the market firm owned and operated by Ken 
and Wendy Hobday. Wendy Fair began making headlines in the local and 
national press in summer 1973. It joined the scrum of Sunday markets 
that had been growing in competitiveness and popularity since the late 
1960s, attracting hundreds of stalls and tens of thousands of customers 
during their busiest seasons. The Hobdays, owners of a lighting store in 
Hillingdon, opened Sunday markets near Heathrow Airport and on 
disused RAF airfields in Buckinghamshire and Hampshire in the early to 
mid-1970s.66 Almost immediately, these enterprises attracted the ire of 
local authorities and local shopkeepers, who argued that holding an 
open-air market on a Sunday not only contravened trading laws but, in 
the case of Buckinghamshire, also interfered with county-wide proposals 
to protect green belt land and slow the environmental degradation 
brought on by changes in land use and the growth of motor traffic.67 
Wendy Fair, like other market firms, worked through a variety of planning 
and legal loopholes to keep their rogue business open to eager buyers and 
sellers. This included rotating the location of the market, employing 
stallholders as ‘department managers’ to contravene labour law, and even 
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attempting to register as a ‘Jewish company’ in order to receive Sunday 
trading exemption. After incurring fines of more than £1,000, the 
Hobdays ‘took the best legal advice’ and decided to transform Wendy Fair 
into a club trading firm, meaning that customers would pay a nominal fee 
(between 10 and 20 pence), thereby protecting the company from the 
regulations of the Shops Act.68
More than any other Sunday market firm, Wendy Fair and the 
Hobdays relied on the club trading model as a method of circumventing 
shopping hours and labour legislation. They also built up their retail 
outlet to be far more than a space of simple buying and selling; it was a 
space of collective non-work. Alongside the stalls selling discount or 
second-hand home goods, toys and food, Ken and Wendy Hobday also 
provided steam organs and hot-air balloons, appealing to pleasure-
seeking families.69 The Hobdays dotted their markets along the semi-rural 
and rural London green belt locales; these choices took advantage not 
only of underdeveloped land, but also of car-owning young couples who 
wanted to shop for pleasure together on the weekend, and of young 
families seeking outdoor leisure. The Sunday Telegraph described this 
new retail environment ‘on the runways built for war’ in positively 
Dunkirk-esque terms: ‘traders were fighting the archaic laws that forbid 
the sale of . . . goods on a Sunday and defending the principle of free 
trading, working when you want to and not when you are told to’.70 The 
Hobdays, thus, were the plucky entrepreneurs versus an overbearing 
state, whose land-use planning regulations and army of shops inspectors 
were needlessly interfering with the modern needs and desires of hard-
working families. At one Hobday market, where ‘a lot of the women 
work[ed] during the week’ and left the weekend for housework and 
shopping, the appeal of Sunday markets was their capacity to bend to the 
modern working family schedule.71
Although the Hobdays were equal partners in the running of Wendy 
Fair, it was Wendy who elevated independent market trading to a political 
cause. In addition to her roles operating the string of Wendy Fair markets 
and running the family lighting shop, Hobday was an active participant 
in local Hillingdon civil society. She was a member of the Hillingdon 
Residents’ Federation and the Ruislip Residents’ Association. In the press 
coverage of Hobday’s amenity activism, her role as a ‘local mother’ or 
‘mother of seven’ was always at the core of her public persona.
In February 1974, Hobday made her initial entry into national 
politics when she ran as an independent Conservative candidate for 
Ruislip-Northwood. One of 143 women running for Parliament (up from 
80 at the previous general election), Hobday had defected from the local 
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Conservative group, marking the first time that the Tories had ‘broken 
ranks’ since the Ruislip-Northwood constituency was created in 1950.72 
Running on a broadly ‘power to the local people’ campaign, Hobday 
focused on causes that had animated her civic activism in her previous 
political life: protesting against Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs) by 
the council in the name of public housing and opposing incursions on the 
green belt. Scaling up to national and international issues, Hobday 
subscribed to a largely popular consumerist platform that included better 
protections and prices for consumers, a critical investigation of Common 
Market membership and the exploration of North Sea oil for the ‘benefit 
of the nation’.
Hobday lost her deposit that February when the establishment Tory 
MP, Petre Crowder, was returned. This initial setback did not dampen her 
political ambitions. When a second general election was called in October 
1974, Hobday joined with the newly formed United Democratic Party. 
Comprising disaffected Tories – many of whom had likewise run in the 
February election as independent Conservatives – the United Democratic 
Party had its roots in the Conservative heartlands of the South of England 
(primarily around Somerset and East Anglia).73 Candidates ran on 
opposing existing Tory policy, especially Britain’s entry into the Common 
Market. For example, one of Hobday’s promises as candidate and south-
eastern region chairperson-organiser was to ‘set the British people free 
from bureaucrats’ control, whether it be from Brussels, Whitehall or 
County Hall’, in a nod to her roots in local residents’ activism.74
Hobday was among those small businesspersons whom Andrew 
Gamble called the base of the Enoch Powell-led Conservative rebels in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.75 Just as the economic facets of Powellism 
eschewed all state intervention for the benefit of small capital, the 
primacy of ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ repeatedly returns in Hobday’s 
everywoman political outlook. Whether it was a focus on cutting down 
bureaucratic institutions, the rights of the homeowner to oppose a CPO, 
or the importance of grammar schools and school choice, Hobday made 
the ordinary person railing against the structures and institutions of post-
war life the key voter in her campaign. When her share of the vote moved 
little from its February levels, Hobday then threw her political efforts 
back into the local realm. As a critical player in ratepaying campaigns in 
the mid-1970s, Hobday drew on her background in small business and 
her persona as a ‘common sense’ housewife to protest the increase in 
homeowners’ and business rates against the spending habits of Hillingdon 
Council. In methods that mirrored her tactics at Wendy Fair, Hobday 
helped organise subscriptions to mitigate the legal costs of withholding 
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rates, constantly searching for stipulations in local government acts that 
would allow a private citizen to protest against state policy and spending.
In 1978 borough elections, Hobday combined her small business 
background with her ratepaying activism by launching a hyper-local 
organisation in Hillingdon, the ‘We Mean Business’ group, backed by the 
National Federation of the Self Employed.76 The group members came 
from eclectic backgrounds: small business owners like the Hobdays, but 
also trade unionists, tradesmen and professionals. The cause that united 
the group was, again, the belief that standard party politics no longer 
represented the views of constituents. Profligate spending and obfuscated 
council deals had increased the distance between the electorate and 
political power; only by ‘taking the politics out of government’ would 
there be a local council that worked for the many. Although ‘non-party’ in 
name, the manifesto of the group previews many of the tenets of the 
Thatcherite national project that would enter Downing Street in less than 
a year: ‘pruning out of all dead wood’ and ‘removal of political animals’, 
the encouragement of home ownership in ‘all its aspects’, curtailing 
closed shop trade union policies, reducing the borough debt, law and 
order policing, and the stimulation of small businesses as the root of 
tackling unemployment.77
Hobday was an entrepreneur in the mould of Bloom: she claimed 
the British state’s anachronistic interference in retail markets was a 
hindrance to the freedom of the British shopping family. Linking her 
tactics and politics to an earlier history of enterprise culture rooted in 
alternative uses of lived space, however, reveals new facets of the 
development of neoliberal logics in everyday life. By starting this story 
with retail provisioning in late 1940s and 1950s New Towns, we see how, 
from their inception, proposals to plan and rationalise shopping space 
often clashed with the immediate, day-to-day needs of consumers. The 
mobile shop, the self-proclaimed saviour of the under-provisioned family, 
was thus a curious case of anachronistic retail that had contemporary 
purchase. Fast-forward to the 1970s, when support for state intervention 
in economic relations and the built environment was fraying at the 
national and local political level. Wendy Hobday harnessed her dual 
identity as retail disruptor and concerned housewife to galvanise a 
renewed vision of ‘collective’ consumerism and leisure outside social 
democratic structures and in opposition to outdated laws. Figures such as 
Wendy Hobday expand the actors who count as entrepreneurs in the post-
war period. She leveraged ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ not merely as free-
market signals, but as values that had their roots in the spatial and 
temporal autonomy of family life in late modern Britain.
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Conclusion
This chapter opened with the iconoclasm of John Bloom, a retail hero in 
Britain’s ‘age of affluence’. From a twenty-first-century perspective, 
Bloom’s entrepreneurialism both embodies and anticipates many of the 
accepted timelines of post-war Britain: the short life of social democracy, 
a national polity comprised of ‘consumers’ rather than ‘producers’ and, 
most germane to the contents of this volume, the implication of proto-
neoliberal thought within various corners of the political and social right. 
Bloom was a pioneer of direct sales in Britain, a model of retail that 
depended on disrupting the very spaces of buying and selling in order to 
keep overheads low and sales buoyant. The art of the ‘deal’, then, was not 
made in the high street, the shopping precinct or the showroom; it was 
closed through the newspaper advertisement, the catalogue and the 
parlour. Bloom’s focus on choice in his business model was one instance 
of a larger trend in diffuse methods of sale in the 1950s through the 
1970s: the modern British housewife should have the best products 
and best prices available without the interference of state or vested 
interests.
The posthumous evaluations of Bloom’s legacy tend to draw a direct 
line between his disruptive vision in the 1950s and 1960s and today’s 
discount retail entrepreneurs,78 whether those are pound shop fixtures on 
the high street or the ‘anytime, anywhere’ methods of Amazon. I have told 
a different story in this chapter, one that places emphasis on how a market 
for ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ in retailing was collectively created, not 
individually invented. Even the self-promoting Bloom could see that 
change in the consumer market was made through infiltrating its pre-
existing communal spaces. His prodigious Daily Mirror advertisements 
rely, often, on appealing to the lone housewife or the married couple. In 
the second half of 1962, Rolls Razor’s Daily Mirror advertising chose to 
target the British housewife in those moments of community and 
exchange that defined her larger homosocial network.79 Quarter- or half-
page advertisements include groups of women discussing Rolls Razor’s 
merits across hedges in their interwar suburban housing, or while sitting 
in a row opposite prams with babies who remind the reader that ‘Mummy 
did not have to drag off to the shops. She just saved oodles of boodle by 
buying DIRECT FROM FACTORY and by-passing all middlemen’s costs.’80 
Advertisers didn’t always imagine that their consumers stayed within the 
confines of the residential neighbourhood; other versions show women 
discussing the merits of twin-tub washing machines in their local 
hairdresser or while being waited upon in a shoe shop.81
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The most striking pages, however, are those that place Rolls Razor 
at the heart of women’s sociable, non-shopping lives: a women’s choir 
reading off the literal ‘praises’ of Rolls Razor from the hymn books, or a 
collective of smartly dressed women, gathered with placards, who appear 
to be marching for the company. Women’s calls to ‘Join Us! Join Us!’ are, 
on one level, group-think marketing. Yet read on a different rhetorical 
level, this message evokes the ordinary networks and landscapes through 
which demands for ‘flexible’ retailing grew in voice between the 1950s 
and the 1970s. By integrating the lesser-known activism of the housewives 
of Harlow and the causes of Wendy Fair into the familiar story of the 
heroic entrepreneur, we are better equipped to see how demand for 
commercial flexibility in post-war retail and shopping life was generated 
through collective action, not just through an outriding disruptor.
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‘The privatisation of the struggle’: 
anti-racism in the age of enterprise
Camilla Schofield, Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 
and rob waters
Neoliberalism – to the surprise of some – has seemingly been able to 
accommodate multiculturalism, diversity and even forms of anti-racism: 
as Paul Gilroy has written, ‘[e]ven if racism remains intractable elsewhere, 
it seems that neoliberal capitalism is ready to free itself from the fetters 
placed upon it by the historic commitment to pigmentocracy’.1 Quinn 
Slobodian’s work illuminates how neoliberal theorists approached ‘race’ 
and racism. He finds that explicit racism was ‘not the norm’ for neoliberals; 
like most white political theorists after the Second World War, they 
rejected scientific racism.2 The key concern of thinkers such as Friedrich 
Hayek and Milton Friedman, however, was to find rules and institutions 
to insulate the global market from economic nationalism and from 
national democratic processes that might disrupt markets. They thus 
tended to think that the market was the ultimate neutral force that would 
undermine racism; but, because their priority was creating a world of 
rule-bound free markets, they were often lax or equivocal about racism 
contained within the boundaries of the nation state. Some even argued 
that citizens of colour without equal civil rights should only slowly be 
given those rights, in order that they should not use them to disrupt 
markets.3 Just as imperialists had consigned colonised peoples to the 
‘waiting room’ of history,4 supposedly not yet ready for liberal democracy, 
some neoliberals consigned people of colour to wait patiently to come 
into their full rights under neoliberalism.
Slobodian’s focus is on the theory of neoliberalism. In practice, 
neoliberal capitalism has increasingly been seen to benefit from an active 
association with ‘diversity’ and multiculturalism. In 1997, Slavoj Žižek 
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called multiculturalism ‘the cultural logic of multinational capitalism’, 
and from the 1990s onwards, the global actors which have promoted 
neoliberal reforms such as privatisation (for example, the World Bank, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the 
European Union), have also promoted multiculturalism.5 Some scholars 
have suggested that this is simply ‘cover’ for a damaging economic agenda 
which promotes the interests of the wealthy and the global North, or an 
attempt to close down ‘the Pandora’s box of race’.6 Others, however, have 
identified a more active synergy between neoliberalism, multiculturalism 
and diversity. Multiculturalism – albeit in an attenuated form – enables 
ethnic minorities to leverage their social and cultural capital and 
transnational networks; a diverse business can access new markets, new 
consumers and new ideas; and multicultural places are often more 
attractive to skilled workers and entrepreneurs.7 Whatever their stance, 
though, most critical commentators have seen neoliberalism as, in fact, 
largely or wholly negative for people of colour, because they tend to be 
less economically advantaged and so suffer disproportionately in a 
neoliberal economy, because neoliberal claims to be ‘post-racial’ generally 
function to reinforce structures of racial discrimination and disadvantage, 
because commodifying ethnic diversity works against collectivist 
projects to transform those structures and, finally, because ‘consumer 
multiculturalism’ does little to tackle racism.8
In the British context, discussions of the connections between 
neoliberalism, multiculturalism and anti-racism have focused on analyses 
of New Labour. Where, as Will Kymlicka suggests, the ‘first wave of 
neoliberals’, including Margaret Thatcher, was critical of multiculturalism, 
equal opportunities and anti-racism, seeing these formations as ‘a 
pathology of the interventionist welfare state’,9 later neoliberals presented 
themselves as anti-racist and proudly multicultural. Nisha Kapoor has 
argued that New Labour’s ideology was the British version of the 
neoliberal ‘post-race’ discourse found in the United States under Barack 
Obama.10 Other scholars, however, have emphasised the conflicting and 
contradictory tendencies contained within New Labour’s approach to 
race and racism: neoliberalism was only one influence among many. New 
Labour, in this reading, could neither ‘mourn its imperial ghosts, nor 
embrace a democratic and truly multicultural future’.11 We take up this 
argument: while neoliberal assumptions are clearly visible in New 
Labour’s policies and rhetoric on race and racism, New Right neoliberalism 
was certainly not the only ideology that shaped New Labour. There were 
also significant continuities with aspects of the multiculturalist, equal 
opportunities and anti-racist activism of the 1970s and 1980s, and with 
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elements of the meritocratic ideology that suffused social democracy 
in Britain.
The possible connections between neoliberalism, multiculturalism 
and anti-racism in Britain, moreover, do not begin and end with New 
Labour. In this chapter, we also show how neoliberal rationalities operated 
as active ingredients of Black political culture in late twentieth-century 
Britain. Neoliberalism was not simply an ideology, culture or practice 
foisted upon Black communities from the outside. The story of Black 
politics in Britain in the 1980s is usually told as one of defeat and rupture. 
The 1970s was a moment of dynamic and radical activism, when 
Blackness was imagined as a political identity held to have the ability to 
unite all colonised and oppressed peoples, whatever their skin colour.12 
Some scholars have seen the incorporation of Black activists into the local 
state in the 1980s as co-optation, leading to the abandonment of the 
powerful notion of political Blackness in favour of divisive organisation 
on the basis of different ‘ethnicities’, with groups competing rather than 
working collectively for systemic transformation.13 In particular, Gilroy 
has criticised activists who, in turning activism into a career in diversity 
consultancy, ‘accepted the privatisation of the struggle against racial 
inequality and hierarchy’:
. . . armed with all the tools and techniques of neoliberal revolution 
which are disposed to refine and enhance capitalist control of social 
and cultural life rather than to feed the possibilities of any alternative 
to it.14
Other scholars have looked more favourably on the anti-racist work of 
activists working in and with local authorities in the 1980s; but, on this 
view, Thatcher’s abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) and cuts 
to local authority budgets in the later 1980s appear as moments of 
profound defeat.15 A third strand in the literature on Black politics in the 
1980s suggests that Thatcherism drew to the fore traditions of ‘hustling’ 
and entrepreneurship with a long history in Black culture, marginalising 
traditions of collectivism.16 When the 1980s is identified as a moment of 
defeat, then, Thatcherism and/or neoliberalism generally appear as the 
key antagonists. In this chapter, however, we set out a more nuanced 
story, alert to the successes of Black and ethnic minority activism in the 
1980s and 1990s alongside the failures, and to continuities and radical 
inheritances.
It is important to recognise that Black and anti-racist activism 
in the 1970s and 1980s was far from homogeneous, with a radical, 
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anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist end and a more moderate, ameliorative 
end: there were more and less radical versions of equal opportunities, 
self-help, multiculturalism and anti-racism, and vigorous debates 
between different tendencies. ‘Equal opportunities’ could mean removing 
formal barriers to opportunity, or actively working to ensure disadvantaged 
groups had substantive opportunities.17 ‘Self-help’ initiatives – which were 
on the rise in urban communities in Britain in the 1970s – could emphasise 
the importance of radical, autonomous collectives but were also often 
understood in very different political terms as a model of ‘self-
improvement’, sometimes even inhabiting the moralising (and often 
highly racialised) discourse of the deserving and undeserving poor.18 Self-
help thus had both individualistic and collectivist forms. In the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the more radical versions of these ideologies were in the 
ascendant; this changed in the 1980s, under the influence of Thatcherism 
– and several other forces. In accounting for the trajectory of Black 
activism in Britain in the 1980s, we must pay attention to more than 
simply Thatcher. In the late 1970s, many activists of the New Left decided 
to go ‘into the state’, feeling this was crucial to achieving many of their 
goals; in the early 1980s, the New Urban Left entered its most fertile 
period. After the uprisings of 1980 and 1981, the Thatcher governments 
were forced to significantly expand funding for inner-city areas. It was in 
this context that Black activism in Britain was reoriented, and less radical 
versions of multiculturalism, anti-racism and Black enterprise traditions 
were drawn to the fore; these were not, however, simply impositions from 
outside ‘authentic’ Black radicalism, and this rearticulation should not be 
seen as a simple capitulation to neoliberalism.
In this chapter we work backwards. First, we examine the New Labour 
years, showing how a complex array of anti-racist, equal opportunities and 
multicultural ideologies shaped New Labour policymaking, alongside a 
celebration of ‘ethnic minority enterprise’. We then move back to the post-
1981 period and trace the pre-history and development of these ideas in 
the New Urban Left and the activist circles of the 1980s; finally, we move 
back in time again, to examine the Black enterprise culture of the pre-
Thatcher period.
Anti-racist ideology and practice in  
New Labour’s Britain, c. 1997–2010
At the turn of the millennium, the chair of the Commission for Racial 
Equality (CRE), Herman Ouseley, commented on the ‘mood of optimism’ 
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that accompanied New Labour’s election.19 Trevor Phillips, too, speaking 
in 2009 as chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), 
depicted New Labour as transformational: ‘[Y]ou had a government 
which was full of people who saw being in the right place on race and 
racial discrimination as a symbol of progressive politics.’20 In 1998, 
Gordon Brown celebrated ‘a multicultural multi-ethnic and multinational 
Britain’,21 and just months after the party’s election victory in 1997, 
Jack Straw commissioned the Macpherson Inquiry into the botched 
investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence. Macpherson concluded, 
in explicit contrast to the Scarman report into the disturbances in Brixton 
in 1981, that the Metropolitan Police Service was institutionally racist.22 
The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 responded to Macpherson’s 
recommendations; monitoring began of the recruitment and retention of 
ethnic minority staff in public services, and racial awareness training was 
promoted. New Labour’s self-image was, thus, proudly multicultural 
and anti-racist. Yet, particularly after 2001 – the year that saw the 9/11 
attacks as well as the resurgence of a language of crisis around ‘community 
relations’ and public order after the Bradford and Oldham riots  – many 
scholars identified continuities with the Thatcherite approach to race.23 
New Labour rhetoric began to focus more on ‘integration’ and ‘belonging 
and identity’.24 Policies known to disproportionately affect Black people, 
such as encouragement of plea bargaining, were introduced in order to 
seem ‘tough on crime’, and Macpherson’s recommendations were 
deprioritised.25 New Labour’s approach to asylum seekers intensified 
previous Conservative governments’ hostile policies.26 The rhetoric of the 
‘war on terror’ and ‘clash of civilisations’ demonised Muslims,27 and the 
language of race and ethnicity was ‘increasingly effaced from discussion’.28 
But we should not entirely dismiss the testimonies of Ouseley and Phillips: 
what they suggest is that alongside the influence of neoliberal rationalities 
(and older Conservative/conservative discourses on race) we can also 
see, in the New Labour years, continuities with the New Urban Left and 
the Black and anti-racist activism of the preceding decades – if usually 
with the less radical elements within those formations. This becomes 
clear if we examine case studies drawn from the public sector: judicial 
appointments and the Public Sector Equality Duty.
Attempts to create a more diverse judiciary had roots in the 1990s 
but gained momentum when the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 set up 
a new non-departmental public body, the Judicial Appointments 
Commission (JAC), with the duty to select candidates ‘on merit’ and to 
‘have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons 
available for selection for appointment’.29 Its first chairman, Baroness 
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Usha Prashar, sat on the Race Relations Board between 1971 and 1976 
and was assistant director and then director of the Runnymede Trust 
between 1976 and 1984 (a body Trevor Phillips later chaired, from 1993 
to 1998).30 Merit and diversity were consistently emphasised in the work 
of the Commission. The JAC was to deliver a more diverse – but definitely 
meritocratic – judiciary, by working to recruit from as wide a pool as 
possible, encouraging any eligible candidate to consider a judicial 
appointment, and ensuring selection processes were fair and transparent, 
in order to ensure no old boys’ networks or assumptions about what a 
judge ‘should’ look like could influence appointments. To this end, the 
Commission developed new selection processes and undertook outreach 
activities with a range of partners, including the Black Solicitors Network, 
the Society of Asian Lawyers, the Association of Women Barristers and 
the Group for Solicitors with Disabilities. The goal was a more diverse 
judiciary, but the JAC emphasised that diversity was good not because it 
improved the quality of judicial decisions or even the public legitimacy of 
the judiciary, but because ‘[i]f you draw from a wider pool of people, you 
have a better choice, and you are more likely to improve rather than 
diminish the quality of the pool of judicial appointments’.31 The social 
justice arguments for such policies were, thus, marginalised, but the 
Committee did undertake some forms of ‘positive action’ in order to try 
to create more meaningful ‘equal opportunity’ for potential judicial 
candidates.
The JAC’s duty to promote diversity was backed up by a duty 
introduced in the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 that required all 
public bodies to work proactively to eliminate racial discrimination and 
promote ‘equality of opportunity’.32 This was an important step forward, 
but, importantly, the 2000 Act built on the requirement introduced in 
1976 that local authorities should encourage equal opportunities and 
counter discrimination.33 In 2010, the Equality Act brought together all 
protected categories, including ethnicity, sex and disability, in one legal 
framework, with a standard Public Sector Equality Duty now applying 
across all. In developing the Act, efficiency and business sense were 
emphasised: public bodies were to be allowed to focus on ‘a limited 
number of priority areas’,34 and equality was justified not only on the basis 
of ‘principle’ – a ‘basic right’ of each individual – but also as necessary for 
‘social cohesion’ and for a strong ‘modern economy’, which would benefit 
from ‘a culture of equality which brings employers the widest labour pool’ 
and from ‘diversity’ which would make Britain ‘outward facing’ and more 
globally competitive.35 This rhetoric chimed with Trevor Phillips’s 
emphasis, as chair of the CRE between 2003 and 2006, on diversity as a 
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‘business problem’.36 It also fit with an increasing public celebration of 
entrepreneurs such as Tim Campbell, a young British man of African-
Caribbean heritage who in 2005 won the first UK series of the business 
reality show The Apprentice; two years later, Campbell served as one of the 
government’s first Social Enterprise Ambassadors, as part of a programme 
that ran between 2007 and 2010 and which aimed to use business 
solutions to confront social problems.37 Some scholars have seen all this 
as evidence of the triumph of enterprise and efficiency over justice. 
Kapoor argues that the process of legal ‘simplification’ in fact ‘meant 
watering down, thinning out and erasing detail’, reducing race to just one 
axis of equality among many.38 But it is important to recognise that the 
equal opportunities ideology of social democracy infused New Labour’s 
policies at least as much as the logic of neoliberalism. New Labour’s 
reforms built upon the legislation of the 1970s and were fundamentally 
premised on a modernist belief in the possibilities of planning and 
bureaucracy to reform capitalism – to create a fair market or ‘free 
competition’ between individuals.39
The expansion of the Public Sector Equality Duty under New Labour 
also led to the expansion of a technique developed at the heart of the New 
Urban Left in the 1980s: the ‘equality impact assessment’, pioneered by 
Linda Bellos as leader of Lambeth Council. Bellos, a radical Black feminist 
and gay rights activist, sometime member of the Spare Rib editorial 
collective, GLC worker and Labour Party Black Sections activist, became 
a local councillor for Lambeth in 1985 and council leader in 1986.40 In 
1988, forced by central government to make budget cuts of 25 per cent, 
she demanded information on the differential impact of each type of 
council spending on different social groups and used this data to prioritise 
services used by those most in need.41 After leaving local government, 
Bellos founded Diversity Solutions Ltd, training organisations on diversity, 
including how to complete equality impact assessments.42 Interviewed in 
2017, she highlighted the way her work in the GLC convinced her of the 
need to ‘empower’ third sector groups by giving them the information, 
tools and skills they needed to navigate employment and equal 
opportunities legislation,43 an experience which doubtless informed her 
work as a consultant. The emphasis on data and monitoring in Bellos’s 
work reflected the pragmatism of anti-racist praxis in the 1980s; this was 
a strategy that persisted – and indeed grew, under the expanded Public 
Sector Equality Duty – in the 2000s.
Individuals such as Prashar and Bellos might be seen by some to 
embody the ideal neoliberal subject, having turned work in the race 
relations industry and local government in the 1970s and 1980s into 
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portfolio careers in the public and third sectors, and running their own 
consultancies. The work of such consultants and diversity professionals 
– not least, their rhetorical focus on ‘diversity’ rather than substantive 
‘equality’ – has been widely critiqued. Yet some studies have been more 
measured in their conclusions. Interviewing Australian ‘diversity’ 
practitioners in the early 2000s, Sara Ahmed argued that the language of 
‘diversity’ could be put to transformative use.44 Gill Kirton and Anne-
Marie Greene, in their close analysis of ‘diversity professionals’ in Britain 
in the 2000s and 2010s, argue similarly that though ‘the business case has 
undoubtedly influenced this field of professional practice, the field’s 
origins in the social justice activism of historically marginalised groups 
have left a legacy’;45 these professionals ‘bring personal experiences of 
marginalisation, under-representation, and discrimination’ to their 
approach and should be seen as ‘tempered radicals’.46 There were always 
more and less radical versions of equal opportunities, multiculturalist and 
anti-racist ideology and practice, and it was the less radical versions of 
these that infused New Labour, but the legacy of social democracy and of 
the New Urban Left is visible in the New Labour project; the category 
of neoliberalism is not a sufficient explanation.
An ‘anti-racist’ moment? Britain after 1981
Pragna Patel, a founding member in 1979 of the feminist group Southall 
Black Sisters (SBS), remembers the Thatcher era as the moment ‘when 
the GLC was at its best, had a lot of influential people within it, feminists 
and others who’d gone in’.47 Convinced that the levers of state power were 
needed to achieve many of their goals, from the late 1970s many radicals 
shaped by the New Left entered into the state and – as the central 
government began to defund local authorities – were on the frontline of 
a battle between central and local government that raged throughout the 
1980s. ‘Despite Thatcherism, despite the really bleak landscape that was 
around us’, Patel recounts, this was also a moment of possibility, with 
local authorities setting up women’s centres, race committees and 
equalities committees. In 1983, funding from the GLC helped to establish 
the Southall Black Women’s Centre. Working with the GLC was, in Patel’s 
view, essential training for work at the national level with the New Labour 
government – their greatest achievement came, she noted, in 2002 when 
SBS pushed through a major piece of reform in immigration law that 
recognised the plight of women suffering domestic violence who held 
insecure status.48
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The 1981 urban uprisings pulled more activists into the local 
state; Linda Bellos, for example, recalled this as a key moment. She was 
‘furious’ about discriminatory policing, ‘pained by the criminalisation of a 
significant percentage of Black boys for being Black’, and, looking back, 
she saw this as ‘one of the reasons I came to the view about joining the 
GLC’.49 Ambalavaner Sivanandan, Gilroy and others have critiqued the 
incorporation of anti-racism into the state, and the later emergence of a 
generation of ‘diversity professionals’, seeing these developments as 
representing a loss of radicalism or, in the language of social movement 
theory, co-optation.50 As Sivanandan points out, this was not a process that 
began after 1981: it was already underway with the Community Relations 
Councils and the Community Relations Commission of the 1960s.51 
But, as Bellos makes clear, 1981 did mark a moment of rupture and 
transformation. While police harassment of young Black people continued 
to be a major galvanising issue, grassroots efforts to combat extreme levels 
of unemployment in areas such as Brixton also produced an unstable 
coalition of Black community workers and a government concerned with 
economic development in the ‘inner city’. In this section, we show how the 
Thatcher years rearticulated Black and anti-racist activism, drawing 
enterprise to the fore and encouraging the further professionalisation of 
the race relations industry, but also how radicalism persisted in the decade.
From 1979, a shift could be discerned in the approach of the CRE. 
The Commission had long promoted training and employment, not least 
through its self-help fund, initiated in 1975, which funded organisations 
such as Brixton Melting Pot Foundation from the late 1970s onwards.52 
But ‘enterprise’, not mentioned in the Commission’s reports for 1977 or 
1978, was newly on the agenda under Thatcher.53 Giving evidence in 
Parliament on 30 March 1981 – just days before the start of the uprisings 
in Brixton that year – the CRE noted it was refocusing its strategy on 
promoting ‘minority business enterprise’.54 After the 1981 uprisings, a 
further and highly significant shift occurred: ‘black alienation’ went to the 
top of the policy agenda,55 and money was funnelled into a range of anti-
racist, self-help and community projects through the Urban Programme. 
Begun by Labour in 1968 to fund social projects in inner-city areas, and 
expanded in 1978 to fund economic and environmental projects as well, 
funding for the Programme increased significantly after 1981, from 
£165 million in 1979–80 to £348 million in 1984–5.56 The proportion of 
funding to Black projects also rose dramatically: in 1981–2, 20 per cent 
of Programme funding for voluntary organisations went to Black groups; 
by 1986, half of all funding did.57 This was an essentially pragmatic move: 
the Tories needed to be seen to be achieving something in the inner 
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cities.58 Indeed, Thatcher’s close advisers were often scathing about 
‘black enterprise’ programmes: after the Tottenham and Handsworth 
disturbances of 1985, one suggested that funding to support ‘new 
entrepreneurs’ would simply expand ‘the disco and drug trade’.59 
Nevertheless, funding expanded; it also shifted increasingly towards 
projects associated with employment, business and enterprise, as well as 
projects celebrating the cultural identities of particular ethnic groups 
(rather than projects driven by the collectivist ideology of Blackness).60
A critical further goal of the Thatcher governments was to create 
more Black ‘leaders’ and integrate them into the state.61 As Sir George 
Young, Conservative minister responsible for race relations, put it, ‘[w]e’ve 
got to back the good guys, the sensible, moderate, responsible leaders of 
ethnic groups’; funding their projects would increase their legitimacy, 
ensuring people of colour did not ‘turn to the militants’.62 This was linked 
to a wider commitment to ‘create a black middle class’ who would 
‘exercise responsible and creative leadership in their own community’.63 
Kalbir Shukra calls this a strategy of ‘repression and containment’;64 
funding was designed to flow to moderates and develop a Black middle 
class, while hard, targeted policing of Black people, especially Black boys 
and young men, continued. Yet examining the ideas and careers of several 
‘race relations professionals’ serves to demonstrate that the ‘containment’ 
was not always complete.
Herman Ouseley had been a local government officer since 1963, 
working in town planning; he was Race Relations Adviser to Lambeth 
Council between 1979 and 1981, and the first Principal Race Relations 
Advisor to the GLC from 1981 to 1984. Though Ouseley could be seen as 
an anti-revolutionary, a man of the administration of the state, that view 
diminishes his contribution to the history of Black resistance. In 1981, he 
argued against Lambeth Council’s ‘divide and rule’ strategy of giving 
competitive grants to local Black groups and, to strengthen the collective 
lobbying power of these groups, helped develop an umbrella organisation 
– independent of the local Community Relations Council – called the 
Consortium. As he explained:
The black self-help programmes and the Consortium’s overviewing 
thrusts are providing individuals with the confidence, skills and 
expertise to develop an awareness of ‘the system’ in order to get 
access to it and to manipulate it accordingly.65
Ouseley’s vision of Black emancipation in 1981 was the ‘confidence, skill 
and expertise’ to manipulate the system, but it was also predicated on 
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collective action and on challenging, as well as working within, the state. 
Ouseley developed his analysis further in a book co-authored with Usha 
Prashar and Daniel Silverstone in 1981 and titled The System, which 
examined the work of local authorities – particularly Lambeth – on race. 
It argued that local authorities which declared a ‘colour blind’ approach 
were likely failing to meet the duty placed on them by the 1976 Race 
Relations Act to eradicate racial discrimination. ‘The system’, Ouseley, 
Prashar and Silverstone argued, perpetuated conscious and unconscious 
racism. Only those local authorities that took positive action – usually 
through establishing a race unit, as Lambeth had done – could 
‘demonstrate to black people that their different and special needs would 
be identified, adequately considered and provided for’.66 The book 
contributed to a new field of professional anti-racist practice and what 
Gilroy would describe as the new neoliberal ‘managerialist ideology’ of 
anti-racism.67 But the title is also significant: ‘the system’, in Ouseley et al’s 
reading, was ‘organizational arrangements within large companies and 
institutions’, ‘bureaucratic procedures’ as well as the ‘attitudes, actions 
and practices’ of managers.68 ‘The system’ in radical Black circles was 
regularly used to denote the wider political economy and hegemonic 
racist ideology. Here it was reduced to the size of a (manageable) 
organisation.69 The radical language of Black Power was marshalled to 
moderate ends.70
Ouseley et al. did not see ‘positive action’, however, as ‘unradical’. 
Prashar, for example, in Scarman and After (1984), criticised the Scarman 
report into the Brixton disturbances in 1981 for ‘underestimat[ing]’ the 
impact of ‘institutional racism’ and ‘ignor[ing] the Government’s racist 
immigration laws’; she called for ‘positive action’ to tackle racism and 
discrimination and emphasised that such action needed to be supported 
by government leadership and funding.71 Prashar argued for the 
monitoring of the ethnicity of civil service staff to measure and combat 
discrimination in hiring (a policy which had been rejected by the Thatcher 
government in 1981). In the study Sickle Cell Anaemia, Prashar and her 
co-authors developed further the case for widespread problems with ‘the 
system’, and the need for positive action to remedy this.72 They highlighted 
the flagrant discrimination which meant much less money was spent on 
sickle cell than was spent on much rarer diseases (such as phenylketonuria) 
that did not predominantly affect Black people. Surveying provision for 
sickle cell sufferers in 101 health districts in England, they found that 
provision was inadequate, and that the seven existing sickle cell centres 
had only been set up because of pressure from Black communities, all 
with only short-term funding. The authors concluded that Black people 
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‘rightly feel discriminated against and allege that there is racism in the 
NHS’; they set out proposals for the organisations and services needed, as 
well as long-term funding.73 Positive action, in Prashar’s analysis, was 
vital, and this went beyond a liberal understanding of the need to remove 
formal barriers: Prashar argued for programmes to actively create equal 
opportunities and necessary services.74
Another contribution to Scarman and After, from Devon Thomas, 
demonstrates how the economic concerns of Black activism could be in 
tune with elements of the Thatcherite ‘enterprise culture’ and yet be 
motivated by much more radical, transformative intentions. Thomas, 
whose parents had been very active in the Garveyite movement in 1930s 
Jamaica, first began community work when he helped to establish an 
early Black youth club, the Allardyce, in Brixton with Linton Kwesi 
Johnson.75 Thomas worked alongside Ouseley at Lambeth Council in the 
early 1980s as Lambeth’s first ‘economic development officer’, creating 
temporary jobs for the unemployed, ‘three quarters of whom are black’ 
(the chair of Lambeth’s new subcommittee on unemployment was a 
young councillor by the name of Peter Mandelson).76 Thomas was also a 
member of the radical Brixton Defence Committee, which campaigned 
for amnesty for all those arrested in the riots; its leader, Rudy Narayan, 
argued the Black community did not need an inquiry to know that 
policing was racist, and called for the Black community to boycott the 
official Scarman inquiry, on the grounds that it was an attempt to dissipate 
Black protest.77
In 1981, soon after the uprising, Thomas held a conference, ‘Why so 
few Black businesses?’, which was filmed as an hour-long special for The 
Money Programme on BBC Two. Conference participants spoke of having 
been refused capital by banks despite their good financial track records 
and sound business proposals: racist barriers to the mainstream economy 
were why young people were, as Thomas put it, ‘in the street burning 
down the place’.78 A few years later, in Scarman and After, Thomas offered 
a vision of Black empowerment through the private sector, lamenting that 
while ‘10 per cent of whites and a similar percentage of Asians’ were 
involved in their own ‘self-employment, small business or co-operative 
enterprise’, only 3 per cent of West Indian people were similarly engaged. 
The limits of Black ‘self-generated economic activity’, he argued, 
‘constrains our ability to mobilise influence and power and independent 
political and social activity’. Rejecting commonplace views of Brixton as 
a place of ‘dereliction, despair and apathy’, Thomas emphasised that the 
‘community . . . is and always has been very active and dynamic’, seeing 
the seeds of transformation in Brixton’s already existing community 
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organisations, such as the Melting Pot Foundation or the Brixton 
Neighbourhood Community Association. West Indian community and 
self-help groups were already, Thomas argued, looking to become 
‘independently self-sustaining’ by ‘trying to apply their previous 
experience in other fields to that of the world of business’.79 While, 
Thomas thought, ‘the black community has evolved a whole range of 
strategies to redirect local and central government finance’, the more 
difficult task remained: influencing ‘those in this society who control the 
private sector’.80 By 1984, Thomas had already founded the South Bank 
Inner City Centre, a think tank and economic development organisation 
focused on ‘black economic empowerment’, in partnership with South 
Bank Polytechnic and the GLC. With funding from Prudential Life 
Insurance, it built a science park for new technology companies – the first 
inner-city science park in Britain – on the ‘bombsite’ at Elephant & Castle 
roundabout; it later built 11 more business parks around London and 
across the country. The turn to ‘enterprise’ under Thatcher did not simply 
represent a capitulation: it can also be seen to represent a continuation of 
a Black self-help tradition, an argument for economic empowerment and 
the ‘black pound’. In the early 1990s, Thomas went on to be substantially 
involved in the ‘Brixton City Challenge’, writing the regeneration strategy 
for the area. Since then, he has continued to work to support Black-owned 
businesses in Brixton, serving as Director of the independent agency 
Lambeth Enterprise, Director of Lambeth Business Advisory and Chair of 
the Brixton Business Forum.81
From the mid-1980s, the attack on local government – its powers 
and funding – intensified; the GLC was abolished in 1986. Thatcher, 
however, needed to appear to be achieving progress on inner-city 
problems, so she launched the repackaged ‘Action for Cities’ in her third 
term; spending was focused even more on business and enterprise, and 
local authorities were edged out.82 For Thatcherites, urban poverty was 
the result of ‘market failure’ in the city. The City Action Teams (CATs) 
originated within the Department of the Environment in 1985 in response 
to the urban unrest in that year: the government rolled out ‘Task Forces’ 
in eight inner-city areas to stimulate Black business activity. The aim was 
not to spend large amounts of government funding, but to ‘create’ an 
enterprise culture among Black people, as well as an infrastructure 
specifically for Black business. The focus was supposed to be on unleashing 
entrepreneurial energy and developing urban space, not resisting racism. 
In Liverpool, the Task Force created a business park, hotel and conference 
centre; in Leeds, a design centre comprising small studios, workshops and 
galleries. The activists involved did not see this as necessarily lacking in 
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radical and transformative potential, however. In its first year, the Director 
of North Kensington’s Task Force, Colin Francis, insisted in a local paper 
that he did not just represent another ‘ministerial public relations exercise’ 
or ‘white man in a black skin’: the project was ‘about helping people to 
help themselves’, and he was ‘an ambassador for black people’. Like 
Thomas, Prashar and Ouseley, Francis viewed his role as a form of social 
justice work: ‘I don’t have to be here. I could be working for some bank, 
paying off a big mortgage. But I chose to come back to the community, to 
give something back.’ Like Thomas, he believed the private sector was the 
key to achieving Black liberation: ‘Unless people get an economic base in 
society, things will never change . . . We want to establish seeds of 
independence.’83
The ‘community enterprises’ still receiving financial support from 
the state by the early 1990s tended to be those training unemployed 
youth, especially Black youth: as local authority funding dried up, many 
turned to the Department for Education/Training, and so ‘changed their 
role’.84 The Conservative government did not want to abolish the CRE, but 
rather hoped it would suffer a ‘slow death’ as a result of cutting its budget 
each year and restricting its influence.85 Under Ouseley, the CRE worked 
to adapt to this unfavourable environment by shifting its emphasis from 
‘appeals to social justice and tougher legislation to forming a government–
business consensus around the idea of being “fair” to the disadvantaged’, 
arguing that this would benefit ‘human resources optimization and 
organizational efficiency generally’.86 The 1995 campaign ‘Racial Equality 
Means Business’ argued that an ‘organisation’s competitive edge’ depends 
on being able to reach out ‘to all sectors of the community, as employees, 
customers, clients and suppliers’;87 alongside the ‘legal and moral reasons 
for racial equality’, Ouseley argued, there was ‘a strong business case’.88 
Looking back on the end of his chairmanship of the CRE, Ouseley noted 
in 2000 that, with the decline in anti-racist programmes in the public 
sector, ‘many people had to fend for themselves and get involved in 
enterprise culture’.89 Importantly, race relations legislation gave many a 
way into enterprise. While funding to local government was cut under 
Thatcher, the key provisions of the legislation of 1965, 1968 and 1976 
were not abolished: they remained in place, creating a framework for race 
relations professionals who could help the public sector and, increasingly, 
the private sector navigate the law and ‘maximise efficiency’. As discussed 
above, Linda Bellos founded Diversity Solutions Ltd, and many others 
followed a similar path; for example, Chris Mullard, secretary of the 
Campaign Against Racial Discrimination and community relations officer 
in Durham, founded Focus Consultancy in 1986; David Dine, a Black 
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social worker in Brent Council in the 1980s and later Chair of Ujima 
Housing Association, founded DD Consultancy in 1994; and Herman 
Ouseley was Managing Director and then President of Different Realities 
Partnership Ltd, which focused on equality, diversity and human 
resources, between 2000 and 2010.
In March 1983, Sivanandan was a keynote speaker at the GLC 
Ethnic Minorities Unit Consultation on Challenging Racism, a huge 
conference bringing together professional activists and intellectuals, 
partly organised by Ouseley. Sivanandan began his talk by describing 
himself as ‘a heretic’ of the GLC Unit, ‘a disbeliever’ in the efficacy of 
ethnic policies to alter ‘the monumental and endemic racism’ of British 
society.90 He repeated his seminal critique of government programmes for 
ethnic minorities: they were ‘a tool to blunt the edge of black struggle’ 
and divide Black people into different cultural groupings. Government 
efforts to support a ‘nascent black bourgeoisie’ were a strategy of political 
containment.91 Yet to position radicals such as Sivanandan in perpetual 
opposition to an anti-racist ‘black bourgeoisie’ made up of people such as 
Ouseley – and to view Sivanandan’s radical critique as the final word on 
the progressive potential of anti-racism in local government – is to ignore 
the robust ideological debate and diverse strategies of Black resistance in 
a time of crisis. Later in his talk, Sivanandan advocated pragmatism, a 
revolution from inside the house:
Don’t let’s be purists and stand outside, for we can’t fight the system 
bare-handed. We don’t have the tools, brothers and sisters; we’ve 
got to get the tools from the system itself and hope that in the 
process five out of ten of us don’t become corrupt.92
If the GLC was prepared to give Black activists the tools, it was time to 
take them. Seeing Black activism in the 1980s as divided into the 
incorporated ‘professionals’ and the authentic radicalism of those who 
remained outside the state is to ignore the fact that these activists often 
worked in the same spaces and towards the same ends. Government 
funding did change the ecology of Black and anti-racist activism and 
ideology, but there were continuities and important legacies which 
should be remembered alongside the defeats. ‘Enterprise’ was emphasised 
under Thatcher in ways that it had not been in the Black activism of the 
preceding decade, and here we can certainly identify the influence of the 
neoliberal context. But, as we demonstrate in the final section of this 
chapter, there were also precursors to the emphasis on enterprise in the 
Black activism of the 1970s.
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Black politics and Black enterprise culture in the 1970s
Among the advocates of Black enterprise in the 2000s was Tony Wade, a 
businessman from Montserrat who had migrated to Britain in 1954 and 
made his money in the Black cosmetics and haircare industry. In a history 
of Black British enterprise published in 2003, Wade prefaced his narrative 
by explaining that his ultimate aim was to show how Black Britons could 
incorporate ‘our human capital investment to the UK economy’ and 
contribute ‘to the nation’s wealth creation’.93 His celebration of Black 
Britain, and of the post-colonial migrations of which he was a part, was 
couched in the language of added value: ‘Each wave of immigrants has 
enriched the cultural and social fabric of British society, and represents 
building blocks of prosperity.’94 In this respect, Wade is identifiably a 
Black neoliberal, but he was not made one in the 2000s. Digging into his 
history, we find a politics of Black British neoliberalism avant la lettre, 
reaching back half a century – a politics that bears a closer relationship to 
post-war forms of Black collectivism than we might imagine.
Wade was a passionate supporter of Tony Blair and, before that, of 
Margaret Thatcher; in 1984, he was a guest at Downing Street.95 Wade 
was, in many ways, a natural Thatcherite. Even in the early 1960s, when 
the post-war settlement still held strong, he would argue against state 
ownership with his Labour-supporting wife and promote the virtues of 
private property.96 Like Thatcher, Wade believed that a stake in society 
was secured by a stake in the economy. In 1980, he argued, in an 
idiosyncratic rendition of Marcus Garvey’s politics, that the lesson to take 
from what he called ‘the Garveyist spirit of self-help, enterprise and risk-
taking’ was that the road to racial equality must come by ‘owning a stake 
in the British economy’.97 In the same speech, delivering what Wendy 
Brown might recognise as a classically neoliberal rationality, Wade 
articulated the challenge facing Britain’s Black communities as a 
challenge of resource maximisation:
. . . we must . . . prepare to gird our loins, and use every opportunity 
to utilise our skills and distinctive competencies to create and build 
our own business, our own markets and ultimately create our own 
wealth.98
He also presented this as something to which West Indians were 
particularly suited. Entrepreneurialism, he argued, was characteristically 
West Indian: this ‘spirit of self-initiative, enterprise and risk-taking . . . 
brought most of us to Britain’.99 Mobilising this entrepreneurialism, 
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Wade argued in 1982, was the solution to the problem of Black 
disadvantage. It would mean that ‘the leaders in industry and commerce’ 
should be the key movers in building ‘a healthier and a more harmonious 
society’.100
Wade’s vision of the reparative power of work and enterprise was 
shared by other members of the small but influential Black business 
community in 1960s and 1970s Britain. Wade’s big break in business 
came through his involvement in Dyke and Dryden Ltd, which he joined 
as a partner in 1968. Formed three years earlier in Tottenham by Len 
Dyke and Dudley Dryden, Dyke and Dryden specialised in records, 
haircare and cosmetics. It was among the most successful Black British 
businesses operating at the time,101 and Dyke, Dryden and Wade each 
received an extensive public platform in the Black press, particularly in 
the business- and professional-supporting weekly newspaper West Indian 
World, and in the magazine Westindian Digest. This public platform was 
not only a recognition of Dyke and Dryden’s success (or of the publications’ 
need for advertising revenue from the business); it was due to the work 
of Dyke, Dryden and Wade in race relations, Black community 
development, uplift politics and anti-racist campaigning. The link 
between business and community work is important. All three men were 
champions, simultaneously, of Black business and Black social work. Both 
Dyke and Dryden, arriving from Jamaica in the 1950s, were founding 
members of the West Indian Standing Conference (WISC), formed 
following the 1958 white riots to promote West Indian integration and 
welfare. In 1963, Dyke co-founded the North London West Indian 
Association (NLWIA), which echoed the WISC’s ambitions; it became 
most significant for its campaigns against the streaming of Black children 
into schools for the ‘educationally sub-normal’.102 Dryden also founded 
the Hackney Council of Citizens, the forerunner to the Hackney 
Community Relations Council, in 1966.103 Both Dyke and Dryden 
campaigned tirelessly on behalf of young Black people targeted by 
the police, spending their Sundays patrolling the streets of Hackney 
and Haringey, monitoring police activities.104 Wade pursued similar 
community initiatives. In the 1950s, he was a part of the international 
friendship movement, founding the Finsbury Park Methodist Church 
International Fellowship. A decade later, he became active in both the 
NLWIA and the WISC, for which he served as Housing Officer.105
Alongside these political preoccupations, the three men also 
sponsored annual Dyke and Dryden Beauty Competitions, ‘to give black 
girls an opportunity to win prizes and develop their femininity and project 
our Black and Beautiful image’.106 The contest became a key event in the 
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social calendar of West Indian business and community leaders in 
London, and an opportunity for the Dyke and Dryden men to deliver 
speeches on their ideas about community development.107 The promotion 
of community work and the promotion of an individual work ethic, 
however, were of a piece here: ‘Involvement in community social affairs’, 
Wade explained in his memoir, ‘provided a platform to spread the merits 
of disciplined hard work’.108 Hard work was repeatedly underlined in the 
pronouncements of the West Indian business leaders. ‘Hard work made 
us successful’, Dyke and Dryden told West Indian World, in an interview in 
which they underlined their credentials as community leaders.109 ‘All it 
needs is hard work. Sometimes I work 24 hours a day’, Stuart Weathers, 
the Jamaican owner of a successful Clapham plumbing business, told the 
journalist Mike Phillips, in a similar move.110 There is a clear congruity 
with Thatcherism here; but we should not overlook the fact that the 
ideology of meritocracy was also deeply woven into the fabric of social 
democracy in Britain, in the Race Relations Acts of the 1960s and the 
framework they created for individuals to challenge discrimination in 
order to win equality of opportunity.111 The social democratic vision of 
meritocracy emphasised overcoming structures of inherited privilege by 
reforming those structures to give those with talents the ability to use 
them; the Thatcherite version placed far more emphasis on overcoming 
adversity though hard work.112 Dyke and Dryden emphasised the virtue of 
hard work, but they also worked to dismantle structures of discrimination. 
Their message was that in a racist society, Black people could only rely on 
themselves: they needed to work hard as well as working collectively.
For men such as Dyke and Dryden, hard work was not only the key 
to individual success; it was also vital to the collective ‘uplift’ of Black 
Britain, through the pride that successful Black businesses offered, the 
clout they commanded in social and political affairs, and the possibility 
they offered for further prosperity in Black communities. For Vince 
Howard, owner of the successful West End club Gilly’s, ‘the powerful new 
movement to improve the position of blacks in business’ was evidence of 
an ‘enlightened age’. He urged papers such as West Indian World to 
‘encourage Black people to support Black businesses, and for Black 
businessmen to play a positive part in alleviating the Black Community 
from its present situation’.113 In 1978, Mike Phillips reported the growing 
‘assumption that it’s possible to create an immigrant middle class which 
would owe its prosperity to hard work and ingenuity’, and which would 
in turn be the base for better political leadership (this assumption, as we 
have seen, intensified in Thatcherite circles after 1981).114 The often-cited 
model to follow was the Jewish migrants of the late nineteenth century, 
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to whom Len Dyke, as early as 1966, pointed as justification for the need 
for more West Indians to work hard, ‘get into business’ and thus have an 
‘impact’ in British society.115 Thatcher, of course, would also frequently 
celebrate the Jewish community on these grounds.116
The UK Caribbean Chamber of Commerce (CCC), formed in early 
1977, became a primary vehicle for this Caribbean business–political 
class to promote their version of enterprise-driven self-help. Like Wade, 
the CCC presented entrepreneurialism as characteristically West Indian:
Let us remember that the slaves who went to the Americas came 
from West Africa with a long history and tradition of business in 
gold, silk, precious stones, salt, copper, palm oil, hides and skins, 
ivory, dye-woods and hardwoods.117
The lesson was that Black people should be proud of their history and 
heritage; this was a history, however, which emphasised precolonial 
Africa not as a proto-socialist society (the meaning usually given to it by 
Black radicals of the era), but rather as a deep-rooted ‘enterprise culture’. 
The CCC’s central purpose was to pressure the government ‘to enable 
ethnic minority small businesses to overcome the main obstacles to their 
economic development’: state monopolies, the unfair lending policies of 
the ‘big five’ banks and the inadequacies of inner-city policies.118 The CCC 
thus sought to fight the institutional racism that held Black businesses 
back. This could be seen as a neoliberal anti-racism; it saw racism’s 
degradations, as Wade put it in a speech to the CCC in 1982, in ‘the harm 
it does both in demoralising and rending to waste skills and human 
resources that should be gainfully employed’.119 The ambition to remove 
the barriers of institutional racism was coupled with the demand for 
capital investment and building capital management skills in order to 
allow ‘the ethnic community to develop’.120 This was a manifesto for anti-
racism that the CCC pushed wherever they could gain a platform – which 
they often did: their activities were covered regularly in West Indian 
World, and Syd Burke’s popular Rice ‘n’ Peas show on BBC Radio London 
broadcast their convention speeches.121
Beyond businesses and commercial networks, a wider culture of 
Black enterprise flourished around the newspaper West Indian World 
itself, and later around the magazine Root. West Indian World was founded 
in 1971 by Aubrey Baynes, a Vincentian journalist who had previously 
edited Daylight International, one of Black Britain’s early lifestyle 
magazines. From 1973, its editor was the Guyanese Indian Arif Ali, 
who since 1971 had published the magazine Westindian Digest, another 
Anti-rACiSm in thE AgE oF EntErPriSE 217
home for the West Indian middle class in Britain, which hosted regular 
features on business leaders and entrepreneurs. Ali was famous as the 
man behind Hansib, a publishing company that produced the first ‘Who’s 
Who’-style anthologies for leaders of business, arts and entertainment 
in West Indian Britain.122 West Indian World, however, was the most 
significant output in this business-supporting culture. Its daily distribution 
reached 25,000 per week, covering England and Scotland, within six 
months of its inauguration, and even by 1980, when it was past its peak, 
it was selling 10,000 weekly copies.123 It is in the pages of West Indian 
World that we can most easily see the thriving world of Black business in 
the 1970s. The newspaper regularly profiled Black hairdressers and 
barbers, stores and distributors, estate agents and market traders – many 
of them the paper’s own advertisers. It celebrated each new business 
venture and was a firm believer in the importance of establishing a Black 
professional and business class for the furtherance of good ‘race relations’. 
It also conducted regular ‘buy black’ campaigns, admonishing those who 
spent their money with businesses known for racial discrimination or for 
investments in South Africa or Rhodesia. Root, founded in 1979 by former 
West Indian World journalist Hal Austin, had less to say on the ethics of 
consumption but shared with West Indian World a prioritisation of what 
it called ‘the black achiever’, celebrating money-making and advertising 
luxury commodities to its readers, including ‘good food, quality wine 
bars, pioneering fashion, nice music, stylised home décor, relaxing travel, 
the lot’.124
These celebrations of Black entrepreneurialism and consumption 
drew the ire of many Black radicals. Root, for example, was criticised by 
the Black feminist group the Organisation of Women of African and Asian 
Descent (OWAAD) for suggesting to its readers that ‘by aspiring to [this] 
kind of lifestyle . . . their lives will somehow miraculously improve’.125 
While Root talked in the language of ‘collective suffering’ that was 
prominent in the Black politics of these years, OWAAD objected that 
Root’s was a cynical appropriation of such language. Black advocates of 
‘enterprise and self-help’ in the 1970s were swimming against the tide of 
Black activism in the period and were frequently and hotly criticised for 
it.126 Despite these skirmishes around the language of Blackness and 
Black community, there was a substantial overlap between the concerns 
with enterprise, work ethic, entrepreneurialism and profit that defined 
the Black business networks and cultures discussed in this section, and 
the priorities of sections of the Black Power movement who would, 
nonetheless, seek to distance themselves from this business culture. The 
first, most obvious overlap is the organisations from which both emerged. 
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The WISC included not only Dyke, Dryden and Wade, but Neville 
Maxwell, whose The Power of Negro Action (1965) signalled an early turn 
to the new Black liberation politics cohering around Malcolm X in the US, 
and Joseph Hunte, whose N[***]r Hunting in England? (1966) marked 
the start of a protracted effort at monitoring racist policing that defined 
the Black Power era.127 The NLWIA was a home not only for Dyke and 
Wade, but also for the Trinidadian labour activist and poet John La Rose; 
the radical lawyer Rudy Narayan, head of the Brixton Defence Committee 
in 1981; and many other key figures of London Black radicalism. 
West Indian World, moreover, included among its regular contributors 
Narayan, the prominent Black Power activist Roy Sawh and the Black 
Panther movement photographer Neil Kenlock, who also went on to 
co-found Root.
To see these crossovers is to see that the history of Black anti-racist 
work is not one only of the social democratic or liberationist left; indeed, 
even Black liberation projects could appear in guises that shared many 
common assumptions with emergent Black neoliberalisms. Ideas about 
the role of work, entrepreneurialism and the logic of the market in 
securing racial equality found surprising accommodation within the 
movement for civil rights in Britain and even had affinities with parts of 
the movement for Black liberation. This was most obviously so in the self-
help initiatives, particularly hostels and youth centres, that sprang up 
across Britain’s multicultural cities in the wake of Black Power in the 
1970s, often led by figures who had become active through Black Power 
organisations.128 There was nothing intrinsically neoliberal about the 
philosophy of self-help practised here, but these institutions did emphasise 
the virtues of self-improvement, responsibility and industriousness. The 
hostels were places to learn skills. This apprenticeship system, as Devon 
Thomas remembers, was a strategic response to the racism of British 
schooling.129 At Dashiki in Notting Hill, young people were taught motor 
mechanics, electrical engineering, welding, radio and television 
engineering, photography, plumbing, painting and decorating, brick 
laying, carpentry, dress making, typing and secretarial skills, beautician 
skills, driving, tailoring and African and Caribbean arts.130 At Melting Pot 
in Brixton, they trained in heavy goods driving and operated their own 
garments factory, specialising in Caribbean styles; the ambition was 
‘training up Westindians for better jobs’.131
This was not simply about making economically useful citizens, 
even if this was the premise upon which these projects won government 
and charitable funding. Notting Hill’s Unity House, for example, maintained 
that the young people it worked with only came there because ‘they 
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would rather break bricks for an organisation or business run by black 
people, than be caught up in one of the “shit jobs” they might be offered 
at the labour exchange’. They certainly saw more purpose in supporting 
‘the youngsters on the street’ in opposition to ‘baton-wielding police’ than 
in skills training for jobs that either did not exist or would be denied to 
Black people anyway.132 The self-help hostels, moreover, were often 
pitched as efforts in collectivism, where, as Dashiki put it, ‘personal greed’ 
was to be dispensed with and ‘everyone is prepared to respond in any way 
necessary, beneficial to black people’s collective interest’.133 Black self-
help, as Paul Gilroy has insisted, has historically been articulated in 
individual and collective registers simultaneously.134 The relationship 
between individual and collective prosperity was different across different 
parts of the Black self-help movement. In Dashiki’s iteration, the job of 
self-help was to offer a different route to self-fulfilment for the Black 
middle class, who ‘may have to take a fall in positions and earnings; but 
an increase in their self-respect and a sense of contributing to the cause 
of a world-wide struggle for total and complete human respect of our 
people’.135 In Dyke and Dryden’s, by contrast, a Black middle class making 
money was a virtue in itself and a benefit for the wider community. Dyke 
formed the business because he and Dryden ‘saw the need for a black 
business coming up as an economic status for the black people’.136 The 
crossovers, nonetheless, are important.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have traced the different forms that neoliberal 
rationalities took in different spheres, but we have also suggested that 
neoliberalism is not a sufficient category to explain New Labour’s policies 
on race and racism, the transformation of anti-racist activism in the 1980s 
or Black enterprise culture in the 1970s. We must view neoliberalism not 
as a conspiratorial agent – or an all-encompassing political and economic 
force that destroys the progressive potential of everything it touches – but 
instead as one ideological formation intersecting with (and itself 
transformed by) many others. Neoliberal rationalities shaped the public 
sector under New Labour, to be sure: diversity was cast as positive because 
it maximises quality; race was reduced to one among many axes of 
diversity, and activists became diversity professionals. But we should also 
recognise longer continuities: the meritocratic assumptions deeply rooted 
in the post-war social democratic state, and given form in the Race 
Relations legislation of the 1960s and 1970s, persisted into the 2000s 
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alongside ideas and practices drawn from the New Urban Left and the 
multiculturalism and anti-racist activism of the 1970s and 1980s. Anti-
racist activism and Black enterprise traditions were rearticulated under 
Thatcher, but neoliberal ideology was far from the only force shaping the 
transition. Finally, neoliberalism did not come from nowhere: it found 
roots in already existing elements of Black culture. We should not see 
‘enterprise culture’ as simply foisted on Black Britons by Thatcher; rather, 
we need to understand how Black vernacular cultures, social and political 
practices and institutions became articulated to an emergent neoliberal 
hegemony.
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Neoliberalism and the Labour Party
mark wickham-Jones
Writing in The Times in June 2002, Peter Mandelson announced: ‘We are 
all “Thatcherite” now.’1 Mandelson was a senior Labour politician and 
close adviser to Prime Minister Tony Blair (although in January 2001 he 
had resigned from the Cabinet for the second time). Emphasising the 
need for deregulation and greater flexibility, by ‘Thatcherite’ he appeared 
to mean something close to neoliberal: ‘[G]lobalisation punishes hard any 
country that tries to run its economy by ignoring the realities of the 
market or prudent public finances.’ On the same day that Mandelson 
offered his provocative pronouncement, Blair gave a set-piece speech on 
welfare reform. He insisted that his administration offered a radically 
new position on the subject, one that broke with the party’s past. It was 
an approach based on responsibilities, creating ‘a dynamic labour market’: 
‘We have changed the culture of the welfare state.’2
The notion that Labour had turned towards neoliberalism was 
hardly surprising. In February 1988, Tony Benn, a long-standing Labour 
MP, recorded in his diary an account of a joint meeting of the party’s 
Shadow Cabinet and National Executive Committee (NEC), called to 
discuss the draft of a new statement of aims and values. Describing the 
text as ‘insubstantial’, Benn recorded his concern as Roy Hattersley, 
Labour’s deputy leader and one of the authors of the document, said that 
‘he thought we [Labour] were in error to criticise market forces, and we 
must avoid the libel that we wanted a command economy’.3 Benn was not 
alone: others (including members of the party’s right wing) queued up to 
criticise the draft as being far too supportive of the market and putting too 
much emphasis on individual freedom.4 Changes were made, but the final 
document offered a clear endorsement of the market mechanism as the 
basis for the economic organisation of most goods and services.5 A few 
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months later, when Labour published its new policy documents, Benn 
was glum about the party’s trajectory: ‘This is the Thatcherisation of the 
Labour Party. We have moved into the penumbra of her policy area and 
our main argument is that we will administer it better than she will.’6
In May 1989, following two days of discussions, marking the 
culmination of the party’s two-year-long Policy Review, Benn was equally 
gloomy, writing: ‘[T]he NEC has abandoned socialist aspirations and any 
idea of transforming society: it has accepted the main principles not only 
of capitalism but of Thatcherism.’7 The Labour leadership had just agreed, 
against Benn’s vehement but marginalised protests, a new programme, 
outlined in Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, and heralded by many as 
marking a decisive change in the party’s outlook. The opening pages of 
the text stated: ‘Of course, private business can be the most efficient way 
of producing and distributing many goods and services.’8 For the veteran 
left-winger, the Policy Review marked a fundamental transformation of 
Labour: in effect, it had become a party defined by its neoliberalism, that 
is, put rather starkly, by the extent of its commitment to free-market 
capitalism. (Benn did not use the term neoliberal.)
With the advent of Tony Blair’s leadership of Labour in 1994, 
scholars and others claimed that the party was neoliberal in its orientation. 
As a letter writer to the Glasgow Herald put it in March 1995, ‘[t]here is 
nothing modernising about the new Labour Party. It is simply joining the 
neoliberal bandwagon.’9 To signal the far-reaching extent of its underlying 
reorientation, Blair rebranded the party as ‘New Labour’. To demonstrate 
the break with its past, he insisted on the reform of Clause IV of the party’s 
constitution (its historic and sweeping commitment to public ownership) 
and he appeared to relish emphasising his pro-market credentials at every 
available opportunity. Within a year of becoming leader, giving the 
Mais Lecture in the City of London on 22 May 1995, Blair mapped out a 
minimalist economic strategy that resonated firmly with neoliberalism. 
He prioritised the fight against inflation, criticised Labour’s Keynesian-
oriented past and, insisting that ‘capital flows . . . can swiftly move against 
policies which fail to win investors’ confidence’, concluded governments 
had minimal policy autonomy.10 In developing the party’s policies in this 
period, fulsome support came from Labour’s Shadow Chancellor, Gordon 
Brown. He told one audience in 1994 that ‘the old-style corporatism 
offered no solution’.11 He continued: ‘Labour will not take risks with 
inflation and we reject old quick-fix solutions of tax, spend and borrow.’12
For many, Blair’s adoption of a neoliberal paradigm became even 
more forthright following his landslide general election victory in May 
1997. When the Japanese firm Fujitsu closed a factory in his Sedgefield 
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constituency in the north-east, the new Prime Minister was blunt (and 
unapologetic): ‘It’s totally dishonest’, he said defiantly, ‘to pretend 
governments can prevent such decisions . . . let us not kid ourselves. In 
certain sectors there will be an impact . . . We can’t as the government do 
much about the twists and turns of world markets in an increasingly 
globalised economy.’13 Giving his own Mais Lecture in 1999, Brown 
emphasised market credibility and endorsed Milton Friedman’s 1968 
monetarist analysis (claiming ‘conclusive evidence for this proposition’).14
In this chapter, I examine the nature of Labour as a neoliberal 
political party. I start with an outline of three influential social scientists, 
among the many, who have examined the link between social democracy 
and neoliberalism: Adam Przeworski, Colin Hay and Stephanie Mudge. In 
one way or another, each has suggested that, in recent decades, in 
conceptual terms reformist politics in the UK have collapsed into a 
residual neoliberalism. In subsequent sections, I detail the development 
of Labour’s outlook over the course of the twentieth century, I discuss the 
attitude of the party’s left and I consider the reform of Clause IV, before 
going on to assess whether Blair and Brown can be judged as neoliberals. 
Given the constraints of space and the ambitious extent of my coverage, 
readers may criticise my account for a lack of depth. But these are 
important issues covering much of the party’s history. Let me emphasise 
that I do not intend to resolve the question of Labour’s neoliberal turn. I 
hope this chapter will be taken as it is intended: as a plausible explanation 
of the party’s politics that might contribute to further debate. Put starkly, 
my central aim is to ask: how far has Labour embraced neoliberalism?
In this discussion it is important, of course, to be clear about what 
I mean by the term neoliberalism. As the editors of this volume note, 
analyses of neoliberalism often fall back on an overly reductionist 
conception of the term based somewhat clumsily around free markets. 
Mudge offers a more layered definition of the term as an intellectual 
project that comprises a set of distinct policies (including, among other 
measures, deregulation, monetarism and privatisation) and some sort of 
political and normative commitment to markets. Manifestly, markets are 
central to the neoliberal endeavour: Mudge argues that neoliberalism 
embodies ‘an unadulterated emphasis on the (disembedded) market as 
the source and arbiter of human freedoms’.15 Several scholars have 
documented the complicated and nuanced history of neoliberal thought, 
from its emergence within the Mont Pèlerin Society to its dissemination 
among policymakers during the 1970s and 1980s.16 In his account of 
neoliberal debates during the 1940s, Ben Jackson elaborates an intricate 
definition that highlights the complexity of the term and its contextual 
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development: the neoliberal project has evolved in fundamental ways 
during the second half of the twentieth century.17 (For more on this, see 
Jackson’s chapter in this volume.) Both Mudge and Jackson share an 
emphasis on the historical nature of the term ‘neoliberalism’, its intricacies 
and its normative character.
Perspectives on Labour and neoliberalism
Writing in New Left Review, in 1980, Adam Przeworski offered a bold, 
sweeping and ultimately influential account of the development of social 
democratic politics.18 Although he did not deploy the word ‘neoliberal’, 
the thrust of his argument and the importance he placed on such an 
outlook were straightforward. Moreover, while he subsequently 
formalised the analysis with the development of a sophisticated model 
and offered some emendations of his argument, the core elements 
remained pretty much the same throughout his later writings.19 Przeworski’s 
suggestion was that, under capitalism, reformist governments would 
encounter profound structural constraints, the effect of which was to force 
them to abandon their social democratic aspirations. He argued that any 
government, radical or not, needed to ensure a prosperous economy in 
order both to generate resources for its policies and to maintain electoral 
support. But growth under capitalism relied upon investment, which in 
turn required a profit incentive. Ensuring a sufficient rate of profit for 
growth therefore meant, put starkly, that governments needed to offer 
neoliberal-orientated (that is market-friendly) policies: ‘The very capacity 
of social democrats to regulate the economy depends upon the profits of 
capital. This is the structural barrier which cannot be broken: the limit of 
any policy is that investment and thus profits must be protected in the 
long run.’20 Such, Przeworski concluded, were the structural constraints 
of capitalism.21 His writings abound with similar, simple statements.
Following publication of the more formal account, working with 
Michael Wallerstein, Przeworski revised his model, now framing it 
explicitly in terms of neoliberalism: ‘At this moment’, Przeworski and 
Wallerstein wrote, presumably with a degree of provocation in mind, ‘the 
reader may remark that this is the neoliberal theory as well. It is.’22 
(Przeworski and Wallerstein noted a difference between neoliberals and 
their own variant of rational choice Marxism concerning the power that 
groups might enjoy.) Przeworski and Wallerstein argued that some – 
limited – redistribution was possible. But they remained doubtful 
about the social democratic prospect, putting particular emphasis upon 
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mobility (could capital flows be taxed effectively?) and upon anticipations 
of radical measures. More importantly perhaps, their analysis remained 
couched in a pessimistic language, noting the constrained framework that 
must confront social democrats. In a sense, whatever the fine detail of 
their model (that some reformism might be possible), most readers 
associated Przeworski with the stark nihilism of his original argument, an 
association of which he did little to disabuse them. In a retrospective, the 
American political scientist opined gloomily: ‘Does social democracy 
make a difference? It is only natural to expect that most of the time it 
would not.’23
By the time of the retrospective, Przeworski offered an explicitly 
historical account: he suggested that, for social democrats, revolutionary 
aspirations (by which I assume he meant aspirations for wholesale and 
abrupt measures) would give way to reformist ones, and that this 
approach, in turn, would pave the way for remedialism. Reformism 
(based around the notion of gradual, cumulative measures) gave way to 
policies aimed at correcting and limiting but not challenging market 
difficulties. In effect, reformism dissolved into neoliberalism. For 
Przeworski, such a position was accompanied by ‘resignation’, an 
acceptance on the part of social democrats that there were fundamental 
issues that they could not resolve. Social democratic parties such as 
Labour might begin with radical intentions, usually revolving around a 
programme of public ownership. But, Przeworski argued, nationalisation 
was neither sufficiently electorally popular nor developed as a strategy to 
provide a viable approach. Instead, left-wing parties would drift steadily 
into market-oriented policies: public ownership ‘has turned out to be 
electorally unfeasible; radical redistributive policies result in economic 
crises which are not in the interests of wage-earners; and general 
affluence can be increased if capitalists are made to cooperate and wage-
earners are continually disciplined to wait’.24 The market became an 
essential aspect of economic strategy: its ‘informational role is crucial’ 
(though Przeworski noted that other forms of ownership than either that 
of shareholders or the state might have been developed).25 His definition 
of neoliberalism focused on ‘the claim that markets spontaneously 
maximise the welfare of society, or at least “efficiency”, with only minimal 
regulation’.26
To be sure, as a political scientist Przeworski did not engage with 
the case of British Labour in any depth (though he did quote from its 
history). But the application of his analysis to the UK was clear-cut. 
Social democracy as a reformist concept was an exhausted historical 
phenomenon. Labour was, effectively, neoliberal. By 2001, Przeworski’s 
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conclusion was that, whatever Tony Blair’s claim about negotiating a 
distinct ‘Third Way’, Labour had become such a party, following the 
policies of its Conservative predecessors.27 Moreover, he presented this 
drift to neoliberalism as self-evident: describing the policy transformation, 
he concluded, ‘[t]he reader knows the rest, so I stop’.28 He qualified the 
analysis to the extent that governments would try to offset the impact of 
globalisation (through, among other measures, protection against import 
penetration). There might be debate about the ideas underpinning social 
democracy, but Przeworski insisted that policies had, in practical terms, 
converged. Indeed, in the extent of their resignation, social democrats 
had abandoned some of their remedialism.
In a sequence of publications from the mid-1990s into the 2000s, 
focusing much more directly on the case of Labour, Colin Hay reached a 
broadly similar conclusion: that the party had become neoliberal.29 There 
were two central aspects to Hay’s account. Firstly, Labour had abandoned 
reformism (in the form of Keynesian social democracy) in favour of a 
Thatcherite free-market-based approach to policy. Dismissing the notion 
that such a process represented the modernisation of reformism, Hay 
emphasised a range of factors shaping such an outcome, including the 
direct impact of Thatcherism and Labour’s Downsian-like quest for the 
centre ground of British politics and the median voter. As with Tony 
Benn’s position, quoted in my introduction, Hay took Labour’s 1987–9 
Policy Review to be a critical episode in this transformation.30 He argued:
By the completion of the Policy Review – and, perhaps, some time 
before that – Labour had ceased effectively to be a social democratic 
party, committed as it had by then become to a pervasive neoliberal 
economic orthodoxy and to a basic acceptance of the legacy of the 
Thatcher years.31
Secondly, while Hay detailed the outcome of policy development within 
Labour from the 1980s onwards, he challenged the inevitability of the 
party’s trajectory. Instead, in a series of papers, some written with Matthew 
Watson, he argued that a central aspect of Labour’s accommodation with 
neoliberalism was the manner in which Labour elites had deliberately 
constructed a pessimistic discourse justifying their course.32 No resignation 
here: the party had willingly agreed to, embraced even, its new position. 
As such, Labour’s neoliberalism reflected the claims of senior figures that 
the nature of the global economy was an all-embracing and inevitable 
constraint upon any government, social democratic or not. Hay 
emphasised the extent to which politicians (most obviously Blair and 
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Brown) had built a narrative for neoliberalism in the rhetoric that they 
had articulated, using such a discourse to justify subsequent policy 
moderations: Labour politicians assembled ‘an overarching logic of 
political “necessity” where the economic “realities” themselves did not 
warrant one’.33 In another account with Watson, Hay argued that Labour 
politicians had ‘internalised’ the neoliberal imperative.34 In marked 
contrast to Przeworski’s inevitable structuralism, for Hay, the invocation 
of constraints (many stemming from globalisation) was a deliberate 
discursive strategy on the part of Labour politicians to justify an 
unnecessary and deeply problematic neoliberalism.35
Of course, Hay was by no means alone in drawing the conclusion 
that Labour’s apparent acquiescence to Thatcherism represented the 
deliberate adoption of a neoliberal outlook. In a similar vein, for example, 
Richard Heffernan argued that Labour had been ‘colonised’ by the ideas 
of the right and so ‘neoliberalised’.36 Like Hay, Heffernan suggested that 
there was some agency in Labour’s trajectory: the party was ‘increasingly 
unwilling’ to challenge Conservative initiatives regarding privatisation 
and deregulation.37
More recently, in Leftism Reinvented, Stephanie Mudge has developed 
an argument about social democracy’s surrender to neoliberalism that 
echoes aspects of Przeworski’s account. Like him, she advances an 
historically based analysis identifying different stages that the social 
democratic project has moved through. Socialism, she argues, gave way 
to Keynesianism (Przeworski’s reformist phase), only for that to result 
in a neoliberal turn. But her causal explanation for such phases is 
different. While Przeworski emphasised the constraints that social 
democrats must confront and cannot overcome, Mudge places much 
more weight on the role of economists within social democratic parties. 
In its 1918 programme, without much expert input, a radical Labour 
Party criticised private ownership, ‘reckless “profiteering” and wage 
slavery’.38 From the 1930s onwards, partly under the guidance of Hugh 
Dalton, the party looked towards a more Keynesian-inclined outlook, a 
position that became institutionalised with the emergence of, among 
others, Hugh Gaitskell, Evan Durbin, Douglas Jay and, subsequently, 
Tony Crosland.39 In the 1960s, under pressure from theoretical 
developments such as monetarism, rational expectations and public 
choice, Keynesian economics started to unravel, at the same time that 
Labour’s management of the British economy ran into profound 
difficulties. In such circumstances, guided by a new group of expert 
economists and by external think tanks, by the 1990s, Blair and Brown 
had turned Labour towards neoliberalism. One adviser, Ed Balls – later a 
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Labour MP and Cabinet minister – was especially important in shaping 
the party’s outlook.40 Left-inclined economists played a critical role in 
driving the neoliberal project: ‘[T]he tactic . . . was to refit Labour’s 
economic strategy to the imperatives of markets.’41
Labour and the market
Has Labour moved towards the market over the course of its history? 
I noted above that neoliberalism should not be defined simply by a 
reductionist view of market mechanisms. At the same time, patently, 
market processes, profits and price incentives are important aspects of 
such an approach (along with other factors). Each of the three perspectives 
above indicates a shift towards the market on the part of British reformists 
during the last decades of the twentieth century. Has Labour adopted a 
neoliberal perspective in recent decades through its embrace of the price 
mechanism and private ownership?
As part of its constitutional reorganisation in 1918, Labour adopted 
commitments that were, on the face of it, radical and far-reaching. Most 
obviously, in its well-known Clause IV (section 4), the 1918 constitution 
pledged Labour to sweeping and comprehensive nationalisation through 
‘the common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and 
exchange and the best obtainable system of popular administration and 
control of each industry or service’.42 For Przeworski and Mudge, the 
abandonment of such a commitment is part of the transformation towards 
neoliberalism.43 But note that Clause IV said nothing about what might or 
might not be the role of the market mechanism in allocating goods and 
services. Moreover, quite what such a statement meant in practice was by 
no means obvious. While sweeping in its apparent ultimate objective, few 
commentators thought that it meant that Labour would literally abolish 
private ownership. Rather, they tended to take it as a signal of the party’s 
radical intent and as some sort of general aspiration.
Many scholars concluded that the 1918 constitution defined the 
party’s moderation. For Tom Nairn, it enshrined the party’s labourist 
outlook: in effect, it institutionalised trade union control of Labour in a 
defensive and atheoretical manner.44 Nairn pointed out that, having 
adopted such a commitment, the party immediately debated a resolution 
concerning social reconstruction that made no reference to ownership 
whatsoever. When a delegate complained, Sidney Webb (author of the 
new clause) told the conference that Labour should not go back over old 
shibboleths, effectively equating the clause with such a status. Nairn 
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concluded: ‘Socialism, in short, belonged in its proper place, the 
constitution, where it could be admired occasionally and referred to in 
moments of emotion.’45 Ralph Miliband’s equally critical judgement in 
Parliamentary Socialism was that Labour’s new programme was a ‘Fabian 
blueprint for a more advanced, more regulated form of capitalism’, 
one that would humanise private enterprise.46 Attributing the Clause IV 
wording to Webb, Ross McKibbin argued that the new clause was 
important ‘precisely because of its vagueness and lack of rigour’. It had ‘an 
umbrella function: it was an acceptable formula in a party where there 
was otherwise little doctrinal agreement’.47 Rather than being a precise 
policy statement, its architects saw the phrase ‘common ownership’ as 
electorally popular in appealing to middle-class Fabians.
In March 1923, Philip Snowden, soon to become Labour’s first 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced a motion into the House of 
Commons about the capitalist system. He criticised private ownership 
and control and called for their gradual supersession with a system based 
on public ownership and democratic control.48 But, while Snowden’s goal 
was radical, interestingly, he also talked about ‘social amelioration’ (and 
the improvement of industrial conditions), exactly the kind of objective 
that Przeworski so disparaged as watered-down reformism. While 
Snowden was especially critical of economic monopolies and trusts, his 
critique was essentially empirical and his means moderate: ‘There are 
three or four ways in which we have been dealing with the capitalist 
system, and all we suggest is that we should continue along these lines, 
but move much more rapidly.’49
Over the next 50 or so years, while the party formally retained 
Clause IV, Labour’s approach to economics remained based around a 
combination of modest state intervention and market arrangements. 
There were, of course, different policy packages, and the proposed 
extent of public regulation across economic affairs varied. In office 
between 1945 and 1951, Labour did take parts of the economy into public 
ownership. But there was little suggestion that such public ownership was 
a specifically socialist endeavour designed to replace the market. Far from 
it: with few exceptions, nationalisation covered basic utilities, natural 
monopolies and essential services. In practice, public ownership neither 
challenged the market nor directly furthered socialism. Even at the time 
of this programme – the party’s most interventionist phase – Hugh Dalton, 
Labour’s second Chancellor of the Exchequer (following Snowden), told 
the House of Commons: ‘[W]e all desire that private enterprise should 
show itself capable over the great field that will be left to it, even after we 
have carried out the programme on which this government and the 
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Labour Party won the election.’50 A couple of years later, Dalton told the 
Labour Party conference:
Since we are operating a mixed economy in which the socialised 
sector is still not very large, relatively speaking, the profit motive 
cannot be completely removed within the private sector . . . The 
private sector, which is conducted for profit, would not be conducted 
at all, if there were no profits.51
Stafford Cripps and Hugh Gaitskell, successive chancellors between 1947 
and 1951, professed a similar outlook. Cripps described the profit motive 
as an essential factor in the economy, albeit one that should be regulated.52 
Gaitskell emphasised the importance of understanding ‘the nature of the 
pricing system’ and not being ‘hopelessly prejudiced against a market 
economy’.53 He continued: ‘To-day the party attitude in the main is that 
free choice must be continued and unfairness corrected rather through 
redistribution of income and wealth than through direct controls.’54 
Subsequently, Labour chancellors adopted a comparable position. James 
Callaghan reordered corporation tax to increase incentives: ‘[O]ne can, 
as I am proposing here, have a relatively low rate of tax on the profitability 
of the company, so encouraging it to plough back its retentions into new 
machinery and plant, whereas there will be a higher rate of tax on the 
shareholder.’55 Roy Jenkins told the Labour conference in 1969 that the 
party should not ‘tax people without limit . . . [while] we ought not to be 
ashamed of believing in taxation for worthwhile social purposes. But we 
certainly ought not to be a party of taxation for taxation’s sake or a party 
which is instinctively hostile to private consumption.’56 Between 1974 and 
1979, Denis Healey made clear his commitment to a ‘vigorous and 
profitable private sector’.57
This brief discussion suggests that there was no abrupt turn on the 
part of Labour towards the market (and so potentially towards 
neoliberalism). Regardless of what was in Clause IV, for decades Labour 
politicians took profit incentives and the price mechanism to be acceptable 
features of the prevailing economic arrangements, albeit ones that 
required some regulation. They certainly condemned ‘profiteering’, as 
Mudge noted, which I take to mean the uncontrolled accumulation of a 
surplus (usually through some sort of market distortion, such as 
monopoly). But they were much less hostile to what might be taken as a 
reasonable profit (that could be taxed and regulated). For Stafford Cripps, 
in 1945, profiteers were on a par with racketeers. At the same time, his 
acceptance of the market mechanism was plain: ‘[A] great many controls 
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have already been removed where they are not necessary for the 
decent and orderly development of industry in the present economic 
circumstances.’58 As Eric Shaw notes, ‘Labour never sought to challenge 
the market as the organising principle of economic life’.59
Labour’s left and the market
It might be expected that Labour’s attitude towards the market and profits 
would have undergone a change during the period in which the party was 
dominated by its left wing, between the early 1970s and the early 1980s. 
At this time, Labour adopted a series of radical interventionist measures 
– known collectively as the Alternative Economic Strategy – revolving 
around the public ownership of individual firms and the introduction of 
planning agreements between private companies and the state.60 But, 
for Stuart Holland, the economist who was the central architect of the 
party’s new programme, competition, market processes and the pricing 
mechanism remained central (for some reason Holland does not figure in 
Mudge’s account of Labour’s trajectory).61 What mattered was the public 
ownership of individual firms in order to inject competition into a 
particular sector and so challenge private monopolies – ‘competitive 
public enterprise’, as Holland termed it: ‘The [new public] companies 
would be employed within a market economy framework in which the 
price mechanism remained the key resource allocation guideline.’62 The 
result would be ‘healthy competition’.63 By 1976, Labour’s commitment to 
a state holding company working within the market was mapped out: 
‘The NEB [National Enterprise Board] must be given the same operating 
freedom as other companies. It must be able to make competitive bids on 
the market for companies.’64 In developing such a position, Holland 
was categoric: ‘[P]rofits are as important in modern capitalism as 
ever before.’65
Outlining Labour’s approach to economic planning after the 1979 
general election, Geoff Bish, Labour’s left-wing research secretary, 
addressed the issue of the market, distinguishing between four different 
(though not mutually exclusive) positions. They included improving 
the market, anticipating it, fixing it and, finally, replacing it (what Bish 
termed Soviet planning). His conclusion was straightforward: through ‘a 
judicious combination of anticipation and fixing together with some 
improvement’, the party should come up with a plan that ‘should, in my 
view, have a market orientation’.66 That is, there should be no replacement 
of the market (Bish’s fourth position). Planning in Eastern Europe had, 
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Bish argued, moved towards market criteria. (He was also interested in 
Japanese planning.) In a later paper, Bish pointed out that international 
trade meant the British economy needed to be competitive, which, ‘unless 
we envisage moving toward a system of autarchy’, implied a role for the 
market and for prices. Industrial activities should, by and large, be 
profitable. Accordingly, the market ‘should have a very important role in 
industrial planning’.67 Bish went so far as to offer a more normative defence 
of market processes: they could ‘be a useful means of decentralising 
decision-making in the economy’. (In other words, he offered them the 
sort of informational role that Przeworski saw as crucial: my point is that 
Labour politicians, including left-wingers, have pretty much always held 
this view.) Central planners should not pass decisions downwards. Within 
such a framework, Bish indicated that there needed to be far greater 
public ownership and government intervention, while price signals might 
on occasion be misleading.
In the early 1980s, Labour passed on discussion of its planning 
policy to the Trades Union Congress–Labour Party Liaison Committee, a 
joint union–party structure. In September 1981, its subcommittee on 
Industrial Democracy and Planning discussed the relationship between 
planning and the operation of markets and was critical of the latter: the 
group’s minutes recorded, ‘it was argued that the market mechanism was 
incapable of allocating resources to meet social requirements’. But the 
minute went on to accept a role for market processes: ‘At the same time, 
it was pointed out that economic planning was not meant to negate the 
allocative functioning of the market but rather to perform those functions 
more successfully.’68 The committee noted even East European countries 
used information about rates of return, prices and preferences across both 
international and domestically focused sectors.
Tony Benn was dismissive of the discussion. In his diary, he noted 
that Norman Atkinson, another veteran left-wing MP, had complained 
that the document did not criticise markets. Bish responded: ‘Well the 
party hasn’t opposed the market mechanism for a decade or more. It 
hasn’t been rejected by the party for years.’69 But Benn made a more subtle 
point than had Atkinson: ‘We should’, he told his colleagues, ‘therefore 
redefine our concept of the market mechanism and make it absolutely 
clear that we are talking about the difference between the big companies 
and the 98 per cent of companies that are medium and small businesses.’70 
Benn appeared to accept that market processes, albeit regulated and 
modified, could work for medium and small firms. He had made a similar 
point some years earlier, praising such firms and saying, ‘I am a firm 
believer in free enterprise on this scale’.71 In 1982, the final document 
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tried to capture the party’s position: ‘[I]f the political dogma of the free 
market offers no solution to our economic problems, neither does a 
planning system which tries to direct economic activity from the centre.’72 
The draft had included a further qualification, referring to ‘the totally free 
market’.73
The repeal of Clause IV
At the end of his first speech as Labour leader to the party conference, 
Tony Blair told his audience that they must adopt a new statement of 
objectives. Clause IV needed to be completely rewritten. It was not, of 
course, a new issue. Following the party’s 1959 general election, Hugh 
Gaitskell had tried and failed to amend it: ‘[S]tanding as it does on its 
own, this [Clause IV] cannot be regarded as adequate. It lays us open to 
continual misrepresentation.’74 As leader, Neil Kinnock had had more 
success with the adoption of Democratic Socialist Aims & Values, the 
document that had so alarmed Benn back in 1988. In his original draft of 
the economic section, the Labour leader had opened by stating that 
change could not be left to random market forces. Hattersley felt this was 
‘a far too total rejection of the market: the sort of wild swing that got us 
into previous trouble’.75 His position was that, while requiring regulation, 
markets promoted liberty and efficiency. He insisted that such a stance 
was at odds with a neoliberal one and that it was firmly within the 
traditions of Labour. Markets had no ‘moral significance’ other than as 
means to ends.76
Some of the criticism of the market in the new document was 
modified. In the final version, Labour offered an explicit, though qualified, 
commitment to market forces. While in some areas of activity (for 
example, health care and education) it was inappropriate, the document 
concluded, ‘in the case of the allocation of most other goods and services, 
the operation of the market, where properly regulated, is a generally 
satisfactory means of determining provision and consumption’.77 
At the same time, Kinnock attempted to clarify the party’s attitude to 
nationalisation by detailing the need for an extension of ‘social’ ownership. 
But Labour was manifestly committed to the mixed economy and to a 
private ownership structure. These commitments sat somewhat uneasily 
alongside the original Clause IV section 4 which was retained in party 
literature. At the party’s conference in 1988, Kinnock defended the Policy 
Review and recognised ‘the fact that the kind of economy we will be faced 
with when we win the election will be a market economy. That is what we 
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have to deal with and we will have to make it work better than the Tories 
do.’78 The detail of Kinnock’s policy programme owed much to continental 
arrangements. In the same speech, the Labour leader sought to attack 
Margaret Thatcher’s individualism and her ‘no such thing as society’ 
aphorism: ‘No person other than me. No time other than now. No such 
thing as society, just “me” and “now”.’79 The new statement of aims had, 
however, little impact on the party as a whole.
Tony Blair, by contrast, was not prepared to maintain the old Clause 
IV in any form. Unsurprisingly, he was subsequently scathing about its 
wording, calling it, over a few pages, ‘intellectually redundant’, ‘politically 
calamitous’, ‘hopelessly unreal’, ‘a refusal to confront reality’, a ‘graven 
image’ and an ‘unfettered indulgence’.80 (Don’t hold back, Tony.) He did 
admit that it was ‘largely symbolic’, but to Blair such rhetoric mattered; as 
he told one audience, ‘[r]e-writing Clause IV is an essential part of the 
transformation of the Labour Party’.81 In April 1995, Labour committed 
itself to a new statement of aims, this time replacing the old version 
altogether. Gone was the promise of sweeping nationalisation. The new 
Clause IV offered common endeavour, community, solidarity, tolerance 
and respect. But it explicitly endorsed the ‘enterprise of the market and 
the rigour of competition’ as well as a ‘thriving private sector and high-
quality public services’.
New Labour and neoliberalism
It is easy to see why scholars presumed Labour to be a neoliberal party 
during the 1990s. As Colin Hay argued, there is much in the rhetoric 
deployed by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown that reverberates with aspects 
of such an approach. Each seemed determined to construct a very clear 
and distinct discourse. Moreover, as Adam Przeworski indicated, each 
placed considerable emphasis on the constraints that must confront any 
government.
From his election as Labour leader, Blair quickly made plain his 
determination to reorient the party, to tone down its policy commitments 
and to moderate its rhetoric.82 Outlining its values and policies, Labour 
made a series of apparent concessions to the neoliberal cause, seeming to 
abandon many of its past radical commitments. In the wake of Labour’s 
defeat in the 1992 general election, Gordon Brown, as Shadow Chancellor, 
had already mapped out changes to the party’s economic strategy: ‘[W]e 
had to leave behind the old sterile conflicts between public and private 
sectors, between state and markets, between managers and employees . . . 
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we had to shed old dogmas.’83 Blair’s 1995 Mais Lecture became 
something of a defining statement on the economy, emphasising the 
market forces that a Labour administration must encounter. A year later, 
he told an audience in New York that ‘errors in macroeconomic policy will 
be punished rapidly and without mercy’.84 In the Mais Lecture, distancing 
himself from European-style economic arrangements, Blair appeared to 
accept the nature of the UK as a liberal market economy (though the 
speech obviously pre-dated the subsequent Varieties of Capitalism 
scholarly debate). He defended the ‘Anglo-Saxon structure’, something 
that had ‘not stopped the US economy being dynamic and strong’.85 Such 
a liberal structure, it could be presumed, lent itself to a neoliberal outlook 
(though see the discussion on growth models by Peter Sloman in this 
collection).
Repeatedly, Blair and Brown emphasised that Labour had ditched 
its past: ‘The days of reflex tax and spend politics are over . . . we will 
reward work, effort and opportunity.’86 In January 1997, the Shadow 
Chancellor pledged that there would be no increase in personal taxation, 
including the higher rate, under a future Labour government (‘no return 
to the penal tax rates of the 1970s’).87 Writing in The Observer, the 
journalist Patrick Wintour said the decision represented ‘not simply the 
end of socialism but of social democracy, and the whole Croslandite 
commitment to use public spending and tax to reduce inequality’.88 
(Wintour’s argument anticipated Przeworski’s claim that remedialism 
had replaced reformism.) Brown followed this undertaking with a 
promise to accept the Conservative government’s existing spending limits 
for its first two years of office. In other words, social democracy did not 
mean higher public expenditure.
In criticising past Labour governments’ management of the 
economy, Tony Blair came close to endorsing Thatcherism. The Labour 
leader admitted that ‘serious change was required to improve 
competitiveness at the end of the 70s. The emphasis on enterprise, on 
initiative and incentive and on tackling lack of responsiveness in the 
public sector was necessary.’89 On another occasion, he pronounced: 
‘Business runs business. There’ll be no “corporatism” or “picking 
winners”.’90 At times, the rhetoric echoed the views of those who saw 
Labour as a manifestly anti-market party in its previous policy positions. 
Hence, Gordon Brown proclaimed that ‘past Labour governments tried to 
counter the injustice and failings of free market forces by substituting 
government for market’.91 He argued that ‘the old economic policies 
which ended at the boundaries of the nation state . . . no longer made 
any sense’.92
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In mapping out such a position, Blair and Brown were particularly 
concerned to assure business of their moderation (so ‘building a genuine 
new partnership’).93 Developing the party’s so-called prawn cocktail 
offensive of the early 1990s, they went to considerable effort to persuade 
firms about their limited intent.94 Drawing on rational expectations and 
public choice, New Labour politicians offered a pro-market rules-based 
approach to economic strategy: there would be no policy surprises 
once the party took office. Accordingly, business could trust a Blair- 
led administration. The Labour leader approved the profit-making 
activities of the private sector: ‘[F]irms invest to make money and over the 
decades, poor returns have probably been the biggest single explanation 
for the UK’s poor investment record.’95 Profit needed to be sustained. 
During the 1997 general election campaign, Blair gave a straightforward 
endorsement of the market mechanism, saying: ‘There is no overriding 
reason for preferring the public provision of goods and services, 
particularly where those services operate in a competitive market 
economy.’ He continued: ‘The presumption should be that economic 
activity is best left to the private sector, with market forces being fully 
encouraged to operate.’96
New Labour followed up this moderate agenda in office.97 In her 
account of neoliberalism, Stephanie Mudge mapped out distinct policy 
areas including liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, depoliticisation 
and monetarism.98 In each, the Blair government can be argued to have 
followed a neoliberal trajectory. In terms of monetarism and depoliticisation, 
as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown immediately made the 
Bank of England independent. Meeting Eddie George, its Governor, to 
discuss interest rates after the May 1997 general election, Brown raised 
interest rates, only to announce that henceforth a new Monetary Policy 
Committee made up of bank officials and civil servants would be 
responsible for operational decisions. It was a standard claim of 
neoclassical economic theory that politicians should not be trusted with 
setting interest rates because of the temptation to manipulate the 
economy for political purposes. Brown’s delegation of the decision 
represented a straightforward acknowledgement of the neoliberal case: 
in the future, the decision would be depoliticised, to the extent that it 
would be taken by Bank officials and economists and not by elected 
politicians. (There was some qualification of this position to the extent 
that the Chancellor still set the inflation target that the Bank should 
attain. For critics of Labour, it was little consolation.) In his Mais Lecture 
of 1999, Brown accepted much of the monetarist case, emphasised the 
importance of credibility, transparency and trust, and outlined a modest 
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agenda for government aimed at the promotion of stability. He was clearly 
influenced in such thinking, as Mudge notes, by Ed Balls.99
New Labour’s approach to fiscal policy was equally cautious (‘an 
iron commitment to financial stability and fiscal prudence’).100 In 
opposition, Brown had mapped out several market-based rules.101 The 
first, termed the ‘golden rule’, indicated that the government should 
borrow only to meet the demands of investment. The second was that the 
ratio of public debt to GDP should remain constant over the economic 
cycle. The rules were backed up during Brown’s first years as Chancellor 
with an austere approach to taxation, though he introduced a windfall tax 
on the privatised utilities and increased the taxation of company dividends 
alongside several other revenue-raising measures. When the auction of 
licences for mobile phone services brought in a windfall, Brown simply 
used it to reduce the national debt. Corporation tax was cut. Blair claimed 
that any government needed to take care when raising personal taxation 
and went so far as to state that, ‘even making allowance for that [some 
redistributive measures], inequalities have merit’.102 He had earlier 
suggested that ‘[t]he public simply won’t pay more taxes and spend more 
to fund an unreconstructed welfare system’.103
In terms of public spending, at times, the government appeared to 
take an aggressive position. Blair complained about social democrats in 
the past: ‘We seemed to want to throw money at every problem, with little 
if any concern for the efficiency with which public resources were 
spent.’104 New Labour placed considerable weight on the need for welfare 
reform. Early on, Brown signalled his intention by forcing through a 
Conservative-planned cut in benefit for lone parents. The administration’s 
position was, moreover, accompanied by an aggressive rhetoric that was 
hostile to perceived dependency. Blair argued that ‘the welfare system can 
discourage hard work and honesty . . . it locks people into dependency on 
benefits’.105 When the government launched its welfare reform bill, 
Blair insisted that it marked ‘a fundamental break with the past’, stating 
that ‘the days of an automatic right to benefit will go’.106 In a similar vein, 
Alistair Darling, the relevant minister, stated that ‘no-one has an 
unqualified right to benefit’. He promised that ‘the new regime will be 
far-tougher than people thought . . . we will end the something-for-
nothing approach that has characterised the past’.107 People would be 
helped into work but there would be conditions and responsibilities that 
they would be expected to meet. In his chapter in this volume, Bernhard 
Rieger emphasises Blair’s commitment to duty as underpinning the 
party’s approach to welfare. In a statement co-authored with Gerhard 
Schröder, the German social democrat, the Labour leader maintained 
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that ‘[p]ublic expenditure as a proportion of national income has more or 
less reached the limited of acceptability’.108 By 2001, Roy Hattersley, the 
former deputy leader of the party who had promoted the market back in 
the 1980s, had had enough: ‘Now my party not only pursues policies with 
which I disagree; its whole programme is based on a principle that I 
reject.’109 During the general election campaign that year, Jeremy Paxman 
asked Blair on 11 occasions whether rising inequality was acceptable.110 
He refused to answer.
In terms of privatisation, New Labour did not maintain the bold 
programme associated with previous Conservative governments. Some, 
relatively limited, privatisations continued, however, including air traffic 
services, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency and the British 
Nuclear Group. By and large, other than in extreme circumstances, 
Labour governments between 1997 and 2010 did not reverse any 
privatisations. They did take over Railtrack (the rail network – not the 
train companies) in 2002, and they did receive a stake in several banks in 
exchange for public funds during the financial crisis of 2008–9. The 
government made widespread use of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 
under which private capital was used to fund many hospital, education 
and other construction projects. The PFI traded immediate investment 
funds (which did not appear as public liabilities) for repayment over 
several decades. Blair insisted that it did not amount to privatisation and 
that his approach was simply pragmatic: ‘Where it works and delivers a 
better public service, use it; where it doesn’t, don’t.’111
Regarding liberalisation and deregulation, Labour launched several 
initiatives. During his second term in office, Blair established foundation 
hospitals, which enjoyed greater financial autonomy in their decision-
making, with market-based incentives. Top-up fees were introduced into 
higher education. It was in such a context that Mandelson made his 
claim about a Thatcherite Labour Party, referring to ‘the urgent need to 
remove rigidities and incorporate flexibility in capital, product and labour 
markets’.112 Repeatedly and unashamedly, Brown made the case for 
markets: acknowledging their extension under Labour, he claimed that 
‘where there was insufficient competition our aim should be to enable 
markets to work better’.113 Making them work better meant more 
competition, increased enterprise, better information, less regulation 
where possible and more flexibility. In opposition, Blair had been critical 
of ‘Eurosclerosis’, perceived institutional inflexibilities on the Continent: 
‘We do not want to import the rigidities apparent in some European 
economies.’114 In office, he developed the notion of flexible labour markets 
as a central aspect of economic strategy (see Peter Sloman’s chapter in 
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this volume). To critics, such arrangements simply institutionalised low 
pay. Blair told the Confederation of British Industry in 2001 that ‘the UK 
has among the least regulated product and labour markets of any 
industrialised countries . . . It will stay that way.’115
At certain points, Tony Blair tried to map out a Third Way as a 
distinct position between the left and the right, one that would offer a 
theoretical underpinning to his policy trajectory. The Third Way 
(a concept that Gordon Brown did not subscribe to) reached its height in 
1998 in a Fabian pamphlet, several speeches and the statement jointly 
authored with Schröder. But many commentators concluded that the 
terrain detailed by Blair was largely a reworked neoliberalism. While he 
committed himself to the public interest, Blair emphasised dynamic, 
competitive markets, acknowledging ‘that the private sector, not 
government, is at the forefront of wealth creation and employment 
generation’.116 With Schröder, he criticised high public spending, 
indicated that too much effort had gone to correcting market failures and 
condemned the belief in government intervention: ‘[T]he weaknesses of 
markets have been overstated.’117 It was as part of an attempted reboot 
of the Third Way that Mandelson offered his 2002 judgement about 
Thatcherism.
Assessing New Labour’s neoliberalism
Care needs to be exercised, for several reasons, however, in assuming 
New Labour’s trajectory to be conclusively neoliberal.118 Firstly, having 
mapped out a cautious approach to public spending for its first years in 
office, such a stance was not sustained. From July 2000 onwards, the Blair 
administration implemented some significant increases in public 
expenditure. While the administration maintained a rhetoric of having 
broken with ‘tax and spend’, spending in some areas, including health 
care and education, went up substantially. Doubling in cash terms, health 
care expenditure rose from around 6.5 per cent of GDP to just under 
10 per cent by 2010 (partly as a result of the recession). Overall, between 
2000/1 and 2007/8, public spending as a percentage of GDP increased 
from 36.9 to 41.1. Funding of public services increased year by year by 
4.4 per cent in real terms, more than the 0.7 per cent rise per annum 
under the Conservatives between 1979 and 1997.119 Moreover, the fiscal 
rules announced by Brown proved far less constraining than might have 
been the case. With regard to the first, the government did not define 
investment; concerning the second, Treasury ministers avoided offering 
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a commitment to the exact terms of the economic cycle. In any case, when 
circumstances demanded, during the economic crisis of 2008–9, the 
government accepted that the rule could not be maintained. It is worth 
noting, too, how the financial crisis reshaped the image of Labour in 
office. Having frequently been considered as an austere proto-Thatcherite 
government, it came to be seen as profligate in public spending, 
unremittingly increasing expenditure with little regard for efficiency or 
sustainability.
Secondly, a similar pattern characterised the government’s 
approach to taxation. Having offered a cautious rhetoric (and in 1999 
having cut income tax), Labour proved prepared to raise tax (as noted 
above) in myriad ways – sometimes called stealth taxes because they did 
not have an immediate impact on pay packets. In 2002, Brown increased 
national insurance contributions specifically to fund the National Health 
Service, something that was well received by the public: according to one 
pollster it was ‘the most popular tax rise ever’.120 Spending increases were 
also funded by borrowing as well as by growth. Further tax increases, 
including of the higher rate of income tax, took place during the 2008–9 
financial crisis. Of course, until that economic crisis, Labour’s fiscal 
position also reflected buoyant tax receipts in a growing economy, 
especially those from the financial sector. Critics questioned the 
sustainability of such a model as well as the government’s reliance on 
increased debt (especially household liabilities).121
Thirdly, between 1997 and 2010, Labour made a series of significant 
interventions in the operation of the market economy. Brown introduced 
a ‘New Deal’ to assist the long-term unemployed back into the labour 
market through a Gateway process to prepare them for work and several 
options to guide them into employment (see Bernhard Rieger’s 
contribution to this volume). Employers were given subsidies to take on 
workers. Subsequently, the programme was embedded and extended to 
other groups. In terms of its impact, there was considerable debate as to 
how effective the various New Deal programmes were. Nevertheless, the 
theory underlying them was a straightforward rejection of the notion that 
labour markets were efficient and could spontaneously adjust to reduce 
unemployment. I noted in my introduction Tony Blair’s reaction to the 
closure by Fujitsu of a factory in his constituency. The bleak position 
he articulated was certainly at odds with the argument underpinning 
the myriad New Deal programmes. These programmes concluded that 
market corrections would not tackle unemployment for all sorts of reasons 
(such as rigidities, information asymmetries, differential time horizons 
and skills deficiencies) without sustained government intervention.
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Following on from the New Deal, Brown attempted to integrate the 
tax and benefits system more fully, thereby ensuring that people had 
incentives to take employment. In 1998, he introduced the Working 
Families Tax Credit (WFTC), which offered supplementary payments to 
those taking low-paid jobs. Again, the approach was based on the notion 
that markets, as presently structured, did not operate efficiently: they 
created a poverty trap where people might be better off on benefit because 
of the tax liabilities associated with work. Tax credits offered an automatic 
top-up to market wages. The WFTC was developed into a Working Tax 
Credit and a Child Tax Credit as well as improved maternity care and the 
Sure Start programme (which assisted with childcare arrangements). By 
2007, six million families benefited from tax credits of one kind or 
another. Labour also introduced a statutory minimum wage (see Jim 
Phillips’s analysis in this volume). While there was debate about its 
effectiveness, again the theory underlining the measure was at odds with 
neoliberalism. (It is, of course, important to note that some aspects of 
such measures were problematic – notably the punitive element of the 
New Deal in the form of withholding benefit from those who did not 
cooperate.) In his chapter in this volume, Jim Tomlinson offers an account 
of governmental interventions in the labour market (concerning benefits 
and wages) as well as in housing.
Fourthly, there was a pronounced redistributive aspect to some of 
New Labour’s measures (see Sloman’s chapter in this volume for a 
sustained discussion of this point). The New Deal, tax credits and 
minimum wage were all intended to help the less well-off. Regarding 
child poverty, Labour chose a relative target (thereby endorsing a 
redistributive goal): between 1998/9 and 2009/10, the level of child 
poverty fell from around 26 per cent to 20 per cent.122 In 2000, one 
commentator stated of the budget measures: ‘These are very, very 
substantial changes. It really is a dramatic change . . . I can’t think of any 
economic measure giving such a large group of the population gains on 
this scale in 20 years of tax and benefits policy.’123 Another termed it 
‘redistribution by stealth’.124 Such a pattern continued into Labour’s 
second and third terms in office, beginning in 2001 and 2005 respectively. 
Curiously, at much the same time that he embraced Thatcherism, Peter 
Mandelson told readers of a new version of his book, The Blair Revolution, 
that ‘there is much of Croslandism that is still relevant to Labour 
thinking . . . promotion of equality through the increased public spending 
that growth permits’.125 To be sure, the inequalities in British society did 
not improve markedly. Labour did not reverse the increased inequality of 
the 1980s, as evidenced by a rising Gini coefficient, but they did stabilise 
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it (as illustrated by figure 4.1 in Peter Sloman’s chapter in this volume).126 
At the level of decile groups, real income went up for the second, third 
and fourth bands by more than it did for the seventh, eighth and ninth 
groups, demonstrating greater equality between these groups. But this 
pattern was countered by the performance of the first band, the very 
weakest (whose real income fell) and by the growth of the top band, the 
richest.127 Such an outcome reflected, in part, how market pressures in a 
globalised world were accelerating such disparities and the fact that 
Labour’s approach focused on some disadvantaged groups at the expense 
of others. Reducing unemployment was the main route by which those in 
poverty would become better off (that is through the provision of work).
A last point to make is that, even in its neoliberally oriented rhetoric, 
New Labour’s endorsement of the market was frequently qualified. Both 
Blair and Brown noted the extent to which the market needed regulating, 
argued that its operation frequently produced significant failures and 
asserted that it should not be judged in isolation from its relationship to 
the state and to society. For example, in 1994, Brown claimed that ‘the 
British free market, without effective intervention, has proved to be a 
static, brittle and second rate model of economic development’.128 
Explicitly critiquing the notion that markets worked automatically and 
that any interference in them was problematic, he attacked the right and 
their commitment to unregulated laissez-faire.129 Even in declaring the 
universalism of the Thatcherite position in 2002, Peter Mandelson 
attacked ‘old laissez-faire notions of indiscriminate tax cuts and rolling 
back the state’.130 He put considerable emphasis on social justice as a 
guiding value. When The Guardian asked Blair whether narrowing 
inequalities was one of his government’s objectives, he was unambiguous, 
replying ‘[y]es, of course it is’.131 In this volume, Jim Tomlinson suggests 
that Labour inherited a set of structures that hindered the implementation 
of neoliberal measures. Alongside such a constraint, I am less certain of 
the neoliberal intent of New Labour’s agenda.
Conclusion
After 2015, with Jeremy Corbyn as leader and John McDonnell as Shadow 
Chancellor, Labour moved away from aspects of the economic model that 
the party had articulated during the 1990s and 2000s. Given their 
background on the left of Labour, as well as the economic difficulties that 
the Brown administration had run into, and the party’s electoral defeats 
in 2010 and 2015, such a shift in trajectory was unsurprising. In speeches, 
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McDonnell made the case for greater government intervention, increased 
public ownership and higher taxation at the same time as promising an 
end to the PFI.132 Furthermore, he was clear in linking New Labour with 
neoliberalism, effectively blaming the Brown administration’s market-
based approach for the economic crisis of 2008–9. Whether McDonnell’s 
approach amounted to a break either with the market mechanism or with 
the kind of measures the party had adopted in the past is another 
matter. His call for increased public ownership effectively amounted to 
limited renationalisation and did not involve anything like the scale of 
intervention associated with the Alternative Economic Strategy. His 
proposal for ‘Inclusive Ownership Funds’, based on the distribution of 
profits across a firm’s workforce, bore some similarities to a scheme 
developed by Labour in the early 1970s.133 Incidentally, the suggestion in 
the 1970s that Labour might develop capital-sharing was vehemently 
opposed by many left-wingers in the party because it would encourage 
profit-making while undermining traditional public ownership and 
socialist consciousness, thereby legitimating capitalism. However, no one 
appeared to have accused McDonnell of neoliberalism on the basis of his 
proposal for collective funds in the late 2010s.
In this chapter, I have examined Labour’s relationship with 
neoliberalism. Has Labour turned into a neoliberal party? It depends, in 
part, on what is meant by the term neoliberalism. If it represents a 
residual belief in the market mechanism, then I think that Labour has 
always, despite the lofty ambitions of Clause IV, been a neoliberal party. 
If the term means something more complex, the conclusion is less clear. 
Przeworski equates neoliberalism with a belief that markets spontaneously 
maximise welfare, while Mudge sees it as a belief in markets as the source 
and arbiter of human freedoms. I am unpersuaded that New Labour 
would meet such a threshold: for all its endorsements, the party neither 
advocated markets as extemporaneously and naturally meeting human 
needs, nor did it believe that markets would sponsor freedom, without a 
considerable role alongside them for the state. For all their support of 
markets, neither Blair nor Brown offered the kind of principled normative 
support of markets that might be expected of neoliberalism. While their 
position was manifestly supportive, it was also empirical, pragmatic and 
qualified. Stephanie Mudge rightly emphasises the importance of policy 
advisers (and party officials), a much-neglected aspect of Labour’s policy 
development. But it is not clear to me that their contribution during the 
New Labour years was to determine a neoliberal trajectory. Frequently, 
the importance of economists was to legitimate and signal the detail of 
policy on the basis of decisions already taken.
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In reaching such a conclusion, I do not deny that New Labour moved 
towards a more market-friendly position – as the party has done at 
other points in its past. Such a development has also reflected the context 
in which the party has governed, one reflecting the considerable 
deindustrialisation within the British economy. Some of the inequality 
commonly associated with neoliberalism has resulted from the 
polarisation of a deindustrialised workforce and its impact on incomes 
(see the chapters by Jim Phillips and Jim Tomlinson in this volume).134
The above discussion indicates that both Blair and Brown did, as 
Colin Hay has argued, offer a discourse that resonated with aspects of 
neoliberalism. But, in contrast to Hay, I conclude that in Labour’s policies 
there remained significant commitments to tax and spend and to 
intervention in the economy, as well as to a redistributive impulse. Indeed, 
at times, despite its appearance, Labour’s rhetoric was not deployed to 
justify a neoliberal programme. Rather, the party’s discourse hid a more 
radical approach to practical policy measures. As such, in the study of 
New Labour, it is important to separate policy pronouncements from 
practical interventions (in much the same way as the 1918 Clause IV can 
be separated from the party’s then attitude to the market mechanism). In 
particular, as Chancellor between 1997 and 2007 and as Prime Minister 
from then until 2010, Brown was able to offer a range of distinct policy 
positions, some of which were manifestly at odds with the party’s rhetoric. 
A Times leader on the same day as Mandelson’s claim about Labour’s 
Thatcherism complained about the Blair government that ‘it offers 
slogans when it cannot decide how to act. It says it will embrace the 
private sector to deliver healthcare yet shows little progress . . . Enough 
of talking. It is time now to do.’135
Overall, there is considerable continuity, over the course of the 
party’s history, in Labour’s attitude to the market and to capitalism. While 
Tony Benn complained about the apparent rightward turns taken by 
Labour in the late 1980s, he also noted the enduring similarity of the 
party’s outlook. A day before the comment in May 1989 which I quoted in 
my introduction, he wrote despairingly: ‘Looking back on it, I must 
recognise that the Labour Party has never been a socialist party, it has 
never wanted social transformation.’136
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Neoliberalism and Conservatism  
in Britain
James Freeman
What was the relationship between neoliberalism and Conservatism in 
twentieth-century Britain? Political and intellectual historians have often 
told the story of one by reference to the other. Until recently, for example, 
the main impetus for tracing ‘neoliberalism’ back to an international 
network of thinkers in the 1930s and 1940s was to explain the ideas and 
networks that supposedly held sway over Conservative elites in later 
decades.1 In Britain, the high-water mark of neoliberal influence was 
normally located in the Conservative administrations governing between 
1979 and 1997.2 Accordingly, when critics or advocates of neoliberalism 
looked for agents of neoliberal change in Britain these were often found 
working in the party’s orbit.
Writing about twentieth-century Conservatism has likewise been 
shaped by neoliberalism. The label has been used to describe shifts in 
party philosophy or factional power struggles.3 It also plays a role in the 
literature’s preoccupation with explaining ‘Thatcherism’.4 Neoliberal 
ideas both help distinguish Thatcherism from other Conservatisms 
and help tie together the aims, policies and arguments of Thatcher’s 
governments as a local implementation of a transnational ideology. Thus, 
as one of many spillover effects of searching for Thatcherism’s origins, 
neoliberalism has indirectly shaped our understanding of the party’s 
history well before the 1970s.
But as much as these are two histories told in tandem, adequately 
describing the interaction between neoliberalism and Conservative 
politics has proven challenging. Contemporaries noted tensions between 
neoliberal solutions and the party’s political needs, as well as an 
uncomfortable intellectual fit between the two on certain issues, 
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particularly on questions of personal morality.5 Representatives of each 
tradition have offered public support for the other and yet made it clear 
that they did not regard themselves as members.6 Other representatives 
have been openly hostile, arguing that links between the two are 
unwelcome or tantamount to an invasion.7 Political scientists and 
historians have further contributed to the catalogue of contradictions, 
mostly by exposing the inconsistent practice of Conservatives said to be 
governing as neoliberals.8
To make sense of the 1970s and 1980s in particular, commentators 
and academics institutionalised these tensions in terms such as ‘the New 
Right’ and ‘Thatcherism’, or in formulations such as ‘the free economy 
and the strong state’.9 As Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders point out, 
these terms are themselves historical artefacts; they were responses to the 
observation that the political energy of the right in this period seemingly 
stemmed from contacts between Conservatism and neoliberalism, aided 
at least in part by think tanks.10 Rather than tie much down, these terms 
produced more debate. At its best, this provoked insightful, cross-
disciplinary exchanges about what their alliance represented.11 At its 
worst, it became self-limiting, trapping explanations of what happened 
within a web of contemporary terms that came to signify both the ideas 
said to be motivating political action and the resulting policies themselves.
As we learn more about the inner workings of Thatcher’s 
governments, it has also become evident that these formulations imply 
too much coherency and too little contingency and evolution.12 While 
think tanks did play a role in policy change, it is easily overstated and a 
much wider array of motivations, influences, interests and actors were 
involved.13 New ideas were in play, but they stood in relation to longer 
historical processes.14 And while the tension between Conservative and 
‘neoliberal’ instincts did directly inform policy debates, these tensions are 
best thought of as ongoing, malleable, sometimes explosive, sometimes 
inert, and generally more unstable than the terms above implied.15 
‘Thatcherism’, then, is not so much a term that denotes a stable configuration 
of Conservative and neoliberal ideas then implemented, as one set of 
possible paths Conservatives took through complex electoral and policy 
problems, only partly guided by an ongoing renegotiation of Conservative 
and neoliberal principles and arguments.
Taken together, this recent work suggests we need to think afresh 
about the interface between Conservatism and neoliberalism, freeing our 
description from the questions, timelines and models suited to explaining 
the Thatcher ‘revolution’. Paradoxically, this does not mean ceasing to 
focus on the 1970s and 1980s as the period in which the two became most 
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obviously entwined (although understanding other points of contact is 
important).16 Rather, it means reading their relationship in these decades 
in ways that look beyond the question of ‘influence’. The factors driving 
their relationship might be different from those that led Thatcher to 
power. The mechanisms shaping their interaction might lie outside the 
policy process. And the events and developments that put this relationship 
in historical perspective might involve people who do not feature in the 
usual backstory of Thatcherism.
This chapter begins to re-describe the relationship between 
Conservatism and neoliberalism in two ways. Firstly, it resets our 
historical perspective on their relationship prior to Thatcherism by 
drawing out the cumulative historiographical impact of applying models 
used to understand their interaction in the 1980s to earlier periods. 
Secondly, the chapter offers a deeper account of the interface between 
Conservatism and neoliberalism in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
‘Interface’ is a deliberate choice of term. My interest here is not the 
organisational structures of think tanks or academic/journalistic 
networks. Nor is it in establishing a chain of neoliberal influence from 
thinker through to policy implementation. And nor is it the wider socio-
economic contexts that promoted a general affinity between the two. 
Instead, I want to isolate specific moments of contact and assess what 
their particular features – both medium and message – tell us about the 
wider interaction between Conservatives and neoliberal arguments. One 
way to take forward Ben Jackson’s suggestion that we pay closer attention 
to how politicians translated abstract ideas into more ‘demotic’ terms, 
then, is to better characterise the kinds of interaction that took place 
between these groups as part of a speechwriting process.17
Neoliberalism and Conservatism before 1975
‘Influence’ has been the chief way of relating neoliberalism to 
Conservatism. While this is most obvious in accounts of think tanks’ 
influence on Margaret Thatcher’s party, three types of ‘influence claim’ 
have been made about earlier periods. Firstly, historians have detected 
influence in specific moments in the party’s post-war history, especially in 
Churchill’s ‘Gestapo’ broadcast of 1945.18 Secondly, earlier Conservatives 
have been identified as converts to neoliberal thought.19 Thirdly, there are 
broader claims to influence, such as those which read the 1945–51 
Opposition’s emancipatory rhetoric as evidence of Conservatives adding 
‘a dash of Hayek to their previously Keynesian tonic’.20 The weight placed 
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on intellectual influences varies, but this reading of rhetoric opens up a 
connection between Thatcherism and 1940s Conservatism.
Yet the influence model can distort neoliberals’ relationship to 
Conservatism in earlier periods. As I have discussed elsewhere, the claim 
that F. A. Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944) influenced Churchill’s 1945 
election broadcasts is unsound.21 The speech’s general line of argument 
was set prior to the publication of Hayek’s book and it built on a tradition 
of argument that could produce similar conclusions to Hayek but 
from distinctly Conservative premises. Accordingly, reading 1945 as an 
inaugural moment for the party’s relationship with neoliberalism omits 
the roles of Stanley Baldwin and other figures such as Viscount 
Cranbourne; they were not influenced by neoliberals, but they did 
develop their party’s tradition of argument in directions that shaped the 
relationship between Conservatism and neoliberalism as the latter 
emerged.22
‘Influence’ also detracts from other developments in anti-statist 
arguments. Debate about the nationalisation of banks in the mid-1930s, 
for example, saw Conservatives argue that competition enshrined public 
control over the economy: industries worked to meet public demand and 
banks financed those successfully doing so. Without banks’ freedom to 
make investment decisions, the public would lose its ‘freedom of choice’, 
and socialists looking to impose teetotalism ‘in the public interest’ might 
simply cut off breweries’ credit.23 ‘Influence’ does not take us very far 
here. A specific rhetorical need (refuting the accusation that banking 
elites controlled the economy) encouraged the mixing of newer 
arguments with older attacks on progressives. Instead, it suggests one 
factor promoting longer-term compatibilities – but not equivalence – 
between Conservative and neoliberal arguments was that interwar debate 
about the ‘public interest’ shaped both.
A second means of relating Conservatism and neoliberalism has 
been to use ‘neoliberal’ as a label to denote free-market positions.24 This 
is an understandable – if problematic – shorthand in the 1970s. But 
without caveats, it risks anachronism or confusion with simple ‘libertarian’ 
positions when applied to earlier periods, because it homogenises 
neoliberal viewpoints and underplays the evolution of their positions 
between the 1930s and 1980s.25 Even with caveats, the label can 
misrepresent episodes in the party’s history. For example, the party’s 
1949 policy statement ‘The right road for Britain’ can accurately be read 
as a departure from the Industrial Charter (1947). It is not, however, 
evidence of a party turning towards ‘neo-liberalism’.26 In fact, the party’s 
right criticised the document for ‘rather too much adherence to the notion 
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of a planned economy’.27 The impression of a shift arises in part because 
its launch was designed to deflect that criticism.28 Control-cutting 
individualism came through in the press coverage and Churchill’s 
associated speech. His speechwriters were clear, though, that they wanted 
to free the economy to protect full employment and social services, not 
reject them.29 The risk with using the term, then, is that it shrinks the 
distance between the mid-century party and neoliberals of both periods.
This labelling has been attractive because it integrates the 
relationship between neoliberalism and Conservatism within a wider 
model that understands Conservative history as a tussle between 
‘paternalist’ and ‘libertarian’ instincts, arranging policies, factions and 
periods along that axis.30 Little of the original chronology remains 
unchallenged. However, its basic plot – the libertarian strand’s rise, fall 
and revival – set the template for claims that the influence of neoliberals 
under Thatcher represented either a Conservative restoration or a liberal 
invasion.31 Moreover, neoliberalism has been drawn into explanations 
which retain the duality’s concepts but complicate its narrative. For some 
historians, Conservatives pragmatically drew on both instincts. Jim 
Tomlinson described 1950s economic policy as neither ‘neo-liberal’ nor 
interventionist but ‘lurch[ing] from expedient to expedient’ in pursuit of 
‘liberty with order’.32 Alternatively, Harriet Jones identified a 
‘reinvigorated neo-liberal Conservatism’ in 1950–1, but one restrained by 
the electorate’s support for social services.33 To others, the ‘two souls’ of 
Conservatism were reconciled by a higher principle, such as the 
preservation of social order, or by seeing conflicting rhetoric as a proxy for 
a deeper debate about the effectiveness of civil society’s institutions.34
In later periods, related theories have helped explain why 
Conservatives were attracted to neoliberalism. Neoliberal theory, it can be 
argued, was one part of a political project to construct a cross-class electoral 
alliance, and the link between new ideas and economic circumstances is 
captured in the idea that Conservatives were attracted to neoliberalism as 
a way to navigate the crisis of Keynesian social democracy or legitimise a 
counter-inflationary strategy.35 Likewise, contradictions between 
Conservatism and neoliberalism can be lessened by seeing the latter as a 
tool for pursuing a higher statecraft.36
But in earlier periods, the duality model and the theories attached 
to it have obscured the relationship between Conservatism and 
neoliberalism. The duality oversimplifies the ideological breadth of mid-
century Conservatism.37 In particular, the temptation to focus on 
‘libertarian’ periods or factions misses important developments that 
rendered mainstream Conservatism much more compatible with 
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neoliberalism. For instance, it was R. A. Butler who began to make 
important connections between welfare, choice and moral virtue. As 
Home Secretary, he argued that, although he did not think crime was 
‘entirely due to the . . . Welfare State’, it was important to recognise that 
crime had risen despite prosperity and that material satisfaction had 
not ensured ‘moral progress’.38 Several years later, through debates that 
(re)established the family as key to preventing delinquency, he made the 
case for the ‘proper balance between State-help and self-help’ on the 
grounds that the family’s role was to transmit ‘manners and morals’, and 
that the family could not be expected to ‘remain vigorous and vital if it 
comes to rely on the State’.39
The language of pragmatism also fosters unhelpful arguments 
about sincerity. In the early post-war period, Churchill’s party is said to 
have not been committed to its libertarian rhetoric.40 Later, in a highly 
politicised version, Edward Heath is either guilty of having betrayed the 
neoliberal policies his rhetoric in opposition suggested, or of having 
‘allow[ed] himself to be pushed into a more doctrinaire right-wing 
rhetoric’.41 In both instances, the reading of Conservative rhetoric as 
‘neoliberal’ sets up a false standard in which it is only sincere if it reflects 
‘neoliberal’ policies. These arguments have several weaknesses. Firstly, 
they misconstrue the motivations of the rhetoric said to reflect 
neoliberalism. Because the emancipatory rhetoric of 1940s Conservatism 
reflected a diagnosis of Britain’s economic situation, not abstract views of 
the state, leading Conservatives could call for both deep cuts to public 
spending and a corporatist Industrial Parliament.42 Secondly, by 
underestimating Conservative commitment to principles, they ignore 
important developments. During the economic crisis of 1961, for 
example, the principle of a ‘free society’ acted as an important brake on 
intervention. Conservatives stressed that their pay pause needed to be 
voluntary to preserve the free society, in contrast to their opponents who 
allegedly desired a ‘Fascist society where we would impose our will’.43 
Well into 1962, the Cabinet’s private and public framing of the crisis 
centred on the challenge of how to control inflation without sacrificing 
freedom, and Harold Macmillan put his New Approach (an Incomes 
Commission) to the Cabinet as an answer to whether it was possible to 
meet their economic objectives ‘in a free society’.44 Even though the policy 
itself was the antithesis of neoliberalism, the arguments made at the time 
about the balance of freedom and responsibility became a major site of 
connection between later Conservatives and neoliberals. Thirdly, because 
they ignore this heritage, accusations of insincerity forget that freedom 
rhetoric was not the exclusive property of the New Right in 1960s Britain; 
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Conservatives with different beliefs were making different arguments 
about freedom and its conditions. Heath’s speeches on the Great Divide 
owed as much to Macmillan’s earlier rhetoric as they did to Enoch 
Powell’s. A key step in breaking the hold of Thatcherism over the 
relationship between Conservatism and neoliberals, then, is reading the 
rhetoric of earlier periods on its own terms.
The image of a party with competing instincts has informed a final 
model for relating neoliberalism and Conservatism, one less concerned 
with direct ‘influences’ than with identifying ‘resonances’ between the 
two to help explain Thatcherism. Individual policies associated with 
Thatcher’s governments have been shown to have a much longer lineage, 
suggesting the novelty of Thatcher’s governments lay in their ability to 
implement neoliberal-inflected versions of long-standing aims given 
more fortuitous circumstances.45 More broadly, E. H. H. Green saw 
Thatcherism as a product of ‘trends in the Conservative Party’s subculture 
since 1945’, and others have built on his insight to claim that Thatcher 
used her party’s traditions – especially that of the One Nation Group – to 
‘domesticate’ the American New Right.46 In Jackson’s more nuanced 
model, neoliberalism’s success is partly down to how effectively it was 
‘translated into diverse neo-liberalisms’ suited to party traditions.47
This ‘resonance’ model is the best platform on which to build an 
understanding of neoliberalism’s relationship with Conservatism that 
connects developments from different periods without falling into 
teleology. It does need modification, though. There is a natural bias 
towards exploring more obvious precursors or claimed connections. As 
such, the danger is that the approach mirrors other approaches to 
Thatcherism, emphasising headline policies, economics and the state 
over other connections. Too little attention has been paid, for example, to 
the increasing advocacy of an emotional politics of conflict in 1960s 
Conservatism, or the tendency to ground virtue in the characteristics of 
an agricultural community, not just the imagined virtues of the urban 
middle class. Furthermore, to escape the one-directional ‘influence’ 
model, we need to assess how far changes in neoliberal thought itself 
created new connections with Conservatism. Melinda Cooper’s work on 
‘family values’ and Jackson’s analysis of neoliberals’ reliance on the 
breadwinner model indicate ways forward,48 but the literature on 
neoliberals’ views of tradition and religion remains disconnected from 
political histories. Finally, the way to construct a history of the relationship 
between neoliberalism and Conservatism outside Thatcherism’s origin 
story is to see these developments as a process in which two traditions of 
argument gradually developed more potential commonalities. These were 
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not inevitable connections: understanding the historically specific 
pressures that shaped how arguments developed at each stage is a 
pressing task. Nor did these commonalities need to end in Thatcherism. 
That outcome relied very much upon the agency of later actors responding 
to these potential links, and it is to that process which we now turn.
The interface
Interrogating policymaking has changed how historians think about the 
role of neoliberal and Conservative ideas in shaping initiatives under 
Thatcher. But the case for reading the 1970s and 1980s as a fusion of 
Conservatism and neoliberalism has never rested on policies alone; for 
Stuart Hall and others, ‘Thatcherism’ was expressed in the narratives, 
values and logics Thatcher and her allies used to win support for their 
programme.49 To fully understand the interface between neoliberalism 
and Conservatism in the late 1970s and 1980s, then, we need to 
complement analysis of policy with a finer-grained understanding of the 
processes that generated these wider arguments. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I demonstrate this approach by asking what the contributions of 
speechwriters, advisers and Thatcher’s own reading can tell us about the 
interface between neoliberalism and Conservatism.
Speechwriting played an important role in Thatcher’s leadership. 
Reconfiguring the electorate’s understanding of the world was seen as a 
precondition of victory, and considerable effort was expended on crafting 
the leader’s message. Practically, Thatcher also used the process of 
speechwriting to collect and integrate viewpoints.50 For her advisers and 
speechwriters, access to this process was an important way to exert 
influence, especially when they had less access to the party or Whitehall. 
To accurately describe the interface between Conservatism and 
neoliberalism in shaping the party’s discourse, then, we need to describe 
these writers’ roles in relating the two.
Alfred Sherman is perhaps the best-known example of a speechwriter 
and adviser who served as a ‘conduit’ for neoliberal ideas.51 He was well 
connected with the network of free-market think tanks, was fluent in the 
ideas of neoliberal economists and had direct access to the Conservative 
leadership. Along with Thatcher and Keith Joseph, he founded the Centre 
for Policy Studies (CPS), which coordinated neoliberal-informed 
perspectives on policy problems and which is thought of as a ‘focal point 
of their efforts to convert the Conservative party to the ideology 
of neo-liberalism’.52
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But although Sherman is sometimes presented as ‘attracted to 
ideological absolutism’, he and other speechwriters thought of themselves 
as Conservatives, not neoliberal ‘ideologues’.53 Sherman described 
himself, and the CPS, as ‘Tories first, (economic) liberals only second’. 
In his view, economic liberalism was not a universal ‘verity’; it was 
dependent on circumstance and assumed certain values, ethics and social 
obligations.54 Indeed, Sherman sometimes made the case for market 
solutions in the traditional Conservative tones of pragmatism. In 1981, 
for example, he privately urged the Prime Minister to refute the idea 
that Benjamin Disraeli would have been a ‘wet’ and explain that her 
government was neither ‘monetarist’ nor ‘laissez-faire’.55 Conservatives 
did believe that humankind could ‘gain increasing control over its social 
environment’. They were just wary of the ‘unexpected side-effects’. That 
‘indiscriminate welfare can demoralise . . . [did] not mean that we should 
cease to seek constructive ways of helping the unfortunate, and indeed 
the unworthy, because we are a Christian society’. Rather, it meant that 
governments must assess the impacts of such policies on recipients, 
taxpayers and those ‘struggling to shift for themselves’. Similarly, 
Conservatives ‘had never argued that the Government must necessarily 
always stand aloof from industrial and commercial matters’. They merely 
felt that most intervention had ‘done more harm than good’.
Some might doubt Sherman’s sincerity – ideologues can, after all, 
adapt their arguments for an audience. Yet this standpoint explains 
how advisers such as Sherman promoted both moral conservatism and 
economic liberalism to their political masters. In 1976, for example, 
Sherman proposed that Thatcher take a stand against pornography. 
Responding to the publication of Inside Linda Lovelace (1976), Sherman 
feared that the ‘whole system of dykes provided by the law against the 
flow of pornography, anti-social fantasies, and sexual corruption [was] 
on the point of collapse’.56 Much of Sherman’s case echoed arguments 
made by Conservatives throughout the 1960s. Pornography was an evil 
because it normalised the treatment of people (especially women) as 
means rather than ends; it threatened the family – ‘the basis of civilisation’; 
and it created a ‘moral climate’ in which weakened restraints on 
‘gratification of anti-social instincts’ could spiral into other areas. 
Importantly, Sherman emphasised a ‘populist’ element to these arguments 
by claiming that the climate of opinion had been shifted by a small 
number of opinion formers, some of whom saw ‘the breaking down of 
sexual restraints as a weapon for weakening capitalist society’. In fact, ‘the 
majority of people fear[ed] pornography . . . But they lack[ed] the means 
of expressing their fear.’ In place of ‘so-called experts’, ‘ordinary people’s 
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experience and wit must be taken into account’ and if the ‘resentment’ of 
mothers, housewives, parents and churches were ‘organised’ then 
pressure for action would arise. This suggests that a complex mix of 
advisers’ beliefs and the active pitching of rhetorical opportunities may 
connect Thatcher’s rhetoric to a wider anti-permissive reaction.57
As noted below, the wider use of ‘populist’ framings may have 
played a role in smoothing tensions between Conservative and neoliberal 
arguments. Nevertheless, there was a contradiction between Sherman’s 
call for moralism and the freedom he advocated elsewhere. Critically, he 
addressed this:
Now it may be asked: how does this square with our abjuration of 
paternalism, our espousal of liberty, our contention that men must 
work out their own salvation, must grapple with temptation? Yes we 
must allow people to make their own choices and live with them, 
but we must also protect the weak, the victim, the exploitee. Where 
these two duties conflict, it is the weak, the women and children, 
the potential victims who have the first claim on us.58
This should give us pause for thought about one of the main vectors 
through which ‘neoliberal’ ideas reached the Conservative leadership. 
The story is not necessarily one in which outsiders provided ideas which 
were then brought into tension with other currents by the leaders 
themselves. Instead, the individuals who connected the party with 
neoliberal networks did so a) from the perspective of Conservatism and 
b) with the potential tensions between elements of the two consciously in 
mind. In short, it suggests that the activity of combining these forces must 
be sought downstream from leaders and that an alliance model in which 
different individuals contributed to the creation of a mixed message is 
inadequate.
This understanding of Sherman sheds light on two more specific 
contributions that help characterise the interface between neoliberalism 
and Conservatism. Firstly, Sherman’s ability to straddle both the 
Conservative and neoliberal worlds was precisely why Thatcher found 
him useful as a speechwriter. One of his typical tasks was to synthesise 
contributions from others, combining the words of traditional Conservative 
speeches with his own Conservative reading of liberal economics.59 He 
was, for example, responsible for editing Lord Elton’s draft of Thatcher’s 
Iain Macleod Lecture and inserted a section that defended self-interest as 
moral.60 Secondly, Sherman’s social conservatism meant that he served 
as a conduit for a wider range of international thought. In 1979, for 
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example, he wrote to Joseph and Thatcher about the threat posed by the 
‘disintegration’ of the arts.61 Those art forms directly ‘contributing to 
violence or irresponsible behaviour [were] only a small part of the evil’ 
– rock, punk and pop art, and the celebration of anti-heroes, were unlikely 
to produce a society ‘at peace with itself’. He attached an issue of a 
broadsheet produced by the Rockford College Institute, the American 
conservative think tank, which précised parts of Michael Novak’s The 
American Vision (1978) to claim that a ‘new class’ of activists, officials and 
entertainment elites were intent on bringing about a cultural shift. As 
well as promoting violence, their efforts to convince audiences that liberal 
morality was what ‘most people think’ threatened capitalism. Television’s 
support for the ‘do-it-your-way liberation ethos’ was subverting 
‘hierarchical working relationships’, and its relentless advocacy of ‘having 
a good time and gratifying the senses’ undermined the work ethic. 
Banning pornography was not enough; corporations had to use their 
influence to ensure cultural outputs reaffirmed the principles of ‘thrift, 
honour, and virtue’ that supported capitalism. What Sherman’s role 
reveals, then, is that the individuals normally seen as carrying neoliberal 
ideas into British Conservatism were also carrying a neoconservative 
tradition, one increasingly framing its arguments in populist terms and 
using the language of virtues to connect public morality and the survival 
of capitalism.
The Letwins
More occasional advisers also played a role in bridging Conservatism and 
neoliberalism. In 1976, for example, Thatcher and Joseph regularly dined 
with the academics William and Shirley Letwin. Although the label 
‘neoliberal’ would not apply to either in a straightforward way, the 
Letwins’ careers had connected them with the first Chicago strand of 
neoliberalism,62 and they provided Thatcher with notes that became 
sources for several speeches they helped write. One such paper, on the 
role of the state, illuminates several features of the interface between 
neoliberal ideas and Conservative politics that are worth unpacking.
Firstly, arguments and policies clearly influenced by the neoliberal 
thought collective were pitched into Conservative politics in a re- 
systematised form. In the Letwins’ system, the organising concept became 
a state which ‘ruled’ rather than ‘managed’ and sought only to secure 
‘freedom for self-determination’.63 Instead of maximising wealth, health 
or education, the state limited itself to actions which enabled people to 
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‘preserve and develop their individual identity’. Support for that concept 
could be found in the writings of most neoliberal authors. But in the 
Letwins’ version this premise acted as the justification for other positions 
that had multiple rationales in the wider neoliberal corpus. Governing 
through stable laws rather than arbitrary decrees was important, for 
example, because it was a condition of people being able to exercise self-
determination in a predictable context. What Conservative leaders were 
presented with were somewhat truncated pathways through neoliberal 
arguments.
Secondly, these pathways were selected in response to rhetorical 
problems. Much of the Letwins’ paper was designed to combat the 
accusation that Conservatives envisioned a weak state. This in part 
explains the focus on ‘self-determination’; it was explicitly intended to 
reconceptualise the differences between political parties as not about 
the extent of the state but about its aims. Consequently, the paper 
foregrounded the need for a strong state: ‘government concerned to rule 
must be strong government’ to secure both individual self-determination 
and competition against monopoly power. This was a central spine of 
neoliberal argument, particularly associated with the German ordo-
liberals. But the conscious emphasis the Letwins gave to it as a proleptic 
defence against their critics suggests that we may have underplayed the 
role of perceived rhetorical needs in selecting which arguments – indeed 
which strands of neoliberalism – were emphasised.
Similarly, the Letwins set out to combat accusations that Conservatives 
desired a ‘free-for-all’. Accordingly, they repainted the corporatist state as a 
licentious anarchy in which the monopoly interests battled for control at 
the expense of the individual. The strong state was necessary to protect 
self-determination against these bullies. Likewise, to anticipate the charge 
that such a state would be uncaring, the Letwins agreed it should provide a 
minimum standard in welfare and education. This standard could even be 
high, provided it was a political decision. This allowed them to recast the 
issue as whether or not the state sought out ways in which it could avoid 
becoming a monopolising power or increasing dependency (the inverse of 
self-determination). Neoliberal policies such as a negative income tax, 
school and university vouchers, and health and mortgage insurance 
schemes were recommended as complementary ways to achieve these 
ends, ones which the state could support alongside its own provision to 
preserve opportunities for self-determination.
This was a conscious principle of rhetorical selection: the paper ends 
by listing the ways its earlier suggestions meet these tasks. It also accounts 
for a third feature: the presentation of neoliberal policies in a populist 
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framework that layered an English nationalism onto minority–majority 
structures. In the Letwins’ view, for example, the existence of a minority 
which ‘could not live as adults’ and take on the responsibilities of self-
determination was not a sufficient reason to ‘reduce the people of England 
to the status of children’. Self-determination also meant the championing 
of the ‘hard common sense for which [England] was always distinguished’ 
over the arrogance of government and experts. Accordingly, one section of 
the paper transitioned quickly from arguments about economic interven- 
tion to make the case against compulsory vaccination schemes. Self-
determination in this context was not so much an efficiency principle or 
route to moral behaviour as an emotive appeal ‘to restore to the people of 
England mastery over their own lives’. Of course, opposition to overbearing 
elites had long been part of the party’s discourse. This was not a rhetorical 
layer added later, though; it was part of how more complex points derived 
from neoliberal points of view arrived into Conservative argument. Indeed, 
read alongside Roberto Romani’s recent case that neoliberal thought took 
on a populist turn from the 1970s, the Letwins’ paper suggests that one 
reason why neoliberalism might have been useful was the ease with which 
it could be assimilated into national populist frameworks.64
Finally, the Letwins explicitly positioned interest in neoliberal policy 
alternatives with reference to a Conservative ethos. The paper contained 
an entire section on ‘implications for Conservatives’ which re-emphasised 
that the latter were ‘practical politicians’, not ‘ideologues’ replacing one 
ideology with another. This pragmatism was said to lead Conservatives 
to look to alternative policies dismissed by their opponents outright, such 
as voucher and insurance-based schemes. Indeed, Conservatives were 
said to be uniquely able to examine these alternatives because they 
represented the nation, not interest groups. Centring the principle of self-
determination played an important supporting role here because 
it offered proof that the party had no ‘fanciful, ideological preoccupations’ 
– seemingly its only interest was to allow the people to make decisions. 
This suggests that neoliberal positions and Conservative themes were not 
simply placed together. Their relationship is better characterised as one 
in which some long-standing themes of Conservative rhetoric could 
provide a justification for the inclusion of neoliberal alternatives.
Thatcher’s reading
To explain Thatcher’s mix of moral conservatism and neoliberal 
economics, it is tempting to emphasise her personal faith.65 In fact, her 
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oft-cited speeches on the links between religion, morality and free 
enterprise were largely written by others and rehearsed well-worn 
Conservative arguments. This is not to say she lacked agency; Thatcher 
engaged with a wide range of materials to set her speechwriters’ briefs. 
But apocryphal stories about her dramatically directing colleagues to 
Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty have detracted from a more complex 
picture of what she read and what this tells us about the relationship 
between Conservative and neoliberal thought.66 To understand the 
interface between the two we need to consider the arguments made in 
some lesser-known texts that Thatcher read and pay closer attention 
to how these were interpreted.
The materials that Thatcher ‘saved’ in her speechwriting files 
suggest that books written by neoliberals informed speechwriting. It is 
not coincidental, though, that the clearest examples involve authors who 
emphasised the commonalities between Conservative and neoliberal 
ideas. Henry Hazlitt is a good example. An American journalist and 
member of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) who popularised the work of 
the early neoliberal economist Ludwig von Mises and Hayek, parts of 
Hazlitt’s Foundations of Morality (1964) can be found in Thatcher’s ‘ideas’ 
folder for speeches on Conservative philosophy.67 The specific chapter 
retained is important because it synthesised different neoliberal writers 
to reconcile liberal economics with morality. Hazlitt’s argument began by 
asserting that free enterprise ‘presupposed morality’ – both because its 
underlying principles, such as private property, rested on morality and 
because enterprise needed to be conducted in a climate of morality to 
serve the general interest. Yet Hazlitt’s central claim was that free markets 
strengthened morality. To this end, he framed two elements of the market 
economy as ‘social cooperation’. Using Burke’s analogy of wrestlers 
improving each other’s skill, Hazlitt saw competition as triangular 
cooperation – companies spurred each other to innovate and in doing so 
cooperated with the consumer to lower prices.68 He then quoted Ludwig 
von Mises to show that the division of labour was not an endorsement of 
self-interest but an acceptance that individuals could best meet the needs 
of others by acting in their own self-interest.69 Crucially, this system of 
‘mutualism’ rendered debates about altruism and egotism redundant – 
individuals could never know how their actions impacted others, but the 
system itself ensured they cooperated.
Hazlitt then marshalled together several more ‘neoliberal’ writers to 
draw out the moral benefits of this cooperation. Von Mises’s student and 
fellow MPS member Murray Rothbard was quoted to claim friendship 
resulted from the free economy’s social cooperation – the cooperation 
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intrinsic to the division of labour gave scope for friendliness and other 
forms of cooperation to arise, whereas an economic system lacking it 
would reduce individuals to a violent, zero-sum scramble for resources. It 
also provided a strong incentive to restrain immoral behaviours, as 
breaches would result in less willingness to cooperate.70 Importantly, 
though, it was the free economy’s version of social cooperation that led to 
moral improvement. As a system of freedom, this cooperation was actively 
chosen by participants. Quoting Hayek, Hazlitt claimed this free choice 
was the precondition of moral virtue and left individuals free to 
voluntarily use the surplus generated by the efficient system in selfless 
ways.71 The combination of these points allowed Hazlitt to argue that the 
free economy was a system that made people more interdependent and 
led to a general raising of morality through its incentives.
To be clear, ‘influence’ is not what is at stake here. Hazlitt’s 
arguments had much in common with traditional Conservative 
explanations of how socialism demoralised individuals and how free 
choice improved people. However, the fact that some of the specific 
neoliberal texts we can be more confident Thatcher actually read were 
those which emphasised the compatibility of the liberal market with 
morality tells us two things about the interface between neoliberalism 
and Conservatism. Firstly, the interface involved more than raw theory 
– the particular glosses and arrangements given to neoliberal thought in 
summary texts such as Hazlitt’s can help explain how and why these 
traditions were seen as compatible. Secondly, the tensions identified 
between questions of morality and liberal economics were not necessarily 
products of neoliberal texts colliding with Conservatism; instead, the 
Conservative leadership could be exposed to these ideas through 
explorations of that tension (and attempts to resolve it).
We must also remember that politicians did not experience the 
interface between Conservative and neoliberal ideas in isolation; texts 
belonging to neither tradition could reinforce arguments from either and 
bridge their arguments. One such example can be seen in criticism of 
social science. Attacks on the left as led by an arrogant intelligentsia 
planning to remake society had a long pedigree in Conservative circles, 
along with the idea that government schemes dehumanised people in 
favour of statistics. By the late 1960s, some Conservatives targeted this 
critique at social scientists, claiming their work on the causes of crime and 
other social ills undermined the intellectual foundations of responsibility.72 
For their part, neoliberals made a similar case that the application of 
determinist approaches from the physical sciences to human society had 
played a part in diminishing individual responsibility.73
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But at least one of the ways in which Thatcher was aware of these 
arguments was via a piece by Paul Wilding in New Society.74 Wilding, a 
lecturer in Social Administration, was no Thatcherite and would go on to 
write a defence of the welfare state. Nevertheless, Thatcher read his 
critique of contemporary social science and kept her annotated copy 
among her speech ideas papers. Wilding claimed that whereas the 
nineteenth-century ‘idiom’ attributed responsibility to individuals for 
their success or failure, ‘environmental and social’ explanations had 
become dominant in the twentieth century. This ‘dominant idiom’ meant 
that solutions were not aimed at changing attitudes but instead focused 
on better systems and planning and encouraged the general application 
of statistical rules to groups. This ‘stress on systems and forces implies and 
encourages a denigration of man’ [Thatcher’s underlining] and when 
applied to issues like delinquency contributed to ‘weakening the sense of 
individual responsibility’.
These would have been familiar arguments, and no doubt some of 
Thatcher’s interest lay in the potential to quote a member of the field. But 
Wilding’s piece is interesting because it connects these critiques to other 
arguments about the limits of government action becoming popular 
among those associated with a neoliberal critique of social democracy. 
Social science, Wilding felt, had wrongly taken conflicts between groups 
outside of debate, implying they could be resolved ‘a-politically’ as social 
problems through further research and funding. It implied that the 
solutions were technocratic and most damagingly ‘contribute[d] to 
excessive optimism about what can be achieved through government 
action’. Explicitly connecting his claims with Anthony King’s ‘overload’ 
thesis, Wilding wrote that the result was that ‘governments have taken on 
an ever-widening range of responsibilities; but sadly, to use King’s phrase, 
the reach of British government has exceeded its grasp’. Key to 
understanding the relationship between Conservatism and neoliberalism 
in 1970s Britain, then, is that it was not just members of either tradition 
who connected the arguments together.
Some of the annotations on Wilding’s article indicate a wider 
practice of political reading that characterises Thatcher’s engagement 
with these texts. There are few instances where we can be certain an 
annotation indicates assent or dissent, but the general patterning 
indicates that Thatcher read new information through the lens of her own 
party’s traditions. Her annotation of an article by a leading American 
neoconservative, Irving Kristol, illustrates this point, as well as showing 
that she read neoliberal texts in the context of neoconservative authors 
attempting to couple neoliberal policies with social conservatism.
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Ostensibly an ‘obituary’ for socialism, Kristol’s real purpose was to 
outline the challenge facing liberal capitalism in a post-socialist world.75 
Socialism had been ‘a necessary idea’ because it offered ‘elements that 
were wanting in capitalist society’. Its original ‘utopian’ advocates offered 
a secular version of a valid criticism also made by the Church:
The essential point of this indictment was that liberty was not 
enough. A society founded solely on ‘individual rights’ was a society 
that ultimately deprived men of those virtues which could only exist 
in a political community which is something other than a ‘society’. 
Among these virtues are a sense of distributive justice, a fund 
of shared moral values, and a common vision of the good life. 
[Thatcher’s underlining]
Capitalist thinkers had not denigrated these values, but they had taken for 
granted the ‘moral and spiritual heritage of Judaism and Christianity 
[bold indicates Thatcher’s paragraph/line marking]’ and assumed that the 
‘new individualism of bourgeois society’ would not disturb this. Using a 
line of argument familiar to British Conservatives through the writings of 
T. S. Eliot, Kristol argued that capitalism had been ‘able to live off the 
accumulated moral and spiritual capital of the past’. However, this 
heritage had been spread thinner and was now bankrupt, leaving ‘a spirit 
of nihilism’ that not only dismissed traditions but also replaced the very 
idea of the ‘good life’ with the commodified ‘lifestyle’.
Kristol’s essay then launched into a narrative of scientific socialism’s 
embrace of materialism, detailing how its inadequacies led to a spiral in 
which social democratic parties’ left wings demanded ever greater 
control, eventually culminating in a political crisis that would either 
produce an authoritarian regime or liberal capitalist reaction. Thatcher 
no doubt welcomed his prediction that Britain was about to go down the 
latter path, but this still left the question: ‘what can liberal capitalist 
society do to inoculate itself against a resurgence of anti-capitalist 
dissent?’ Kristol saw two areas for action. Firstly, such an inoculation 
could be brought about by reforming welfare to stress individual choice. 
The welfare state was not popular in and of itself; it reflected a ‘demand 
for a greater minimum of political community, for more “social justice” 
(i.e. distributive justice), than capitalism, in its pristine, individualistic 
form, can provide’. In Kristol’s view, a mix of voluntary and compulsory 
insurance schemes – those developed by neoliberal thinkers – would 
satisfy support for the welfare state and make such provision compatible 
with a liberal capitalist society. In a second area, though, ‘the decline of 
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religious beliefs and traditional values’, there were fewer answers because 
the decline stemmed from liberal capitalism’s willingness to confine such 
questions to private affairs. Without resolving this question, though, 
Kristol warned that any revival of liberal capitalism would remain fragile, 
leaving socialism ‘putrefying’ rather than seeing it ‘dead and buried’.
A text such as this is important for understanding the interface 
between neoliberals and Conservatives for several reasons. It again 
suggests that we need to look beyond the ‘neoliberal’ international 
thought collective towards wider neoconservative networks. Indeed, it 
suggests that British Conservatives were exposed to neoconservatives’ 
efforts to connect their own arguments to neoliberal policies.76 This 
particular example also shows that Conservatives had access to different 
ways of thinking about the relationship between morality and neoliberal 
policies. Kristol does not position the two as in conflict; instead, the 
re-moralisation of public life and neoliberal reforms are presented as 
solutions to capitalism’s weaknesses. Finally, it exposes the difficulty of 
reading the relationship between Conservatism and neoliberalism as a 
contrast between national and international influences. Kristol’s piece 
was international in scope and published in an Australian magazine. 
However, most of its arguments had a history within British Conservatism, 
and it is interesting that most of Thatcher’s annotations pick up lines she 
would have been familiar with through her national party discourse.
Conclusion
Just as historians are now exploring the development of international 
neoliberalism in a wider range of contexts,77 the time has come to explore 
the relationship between British Conservatism and neoliberalism 
outside the context of explaining the origins and policies of Thatcher’s 
governments. This does not mean abandoning the 1970s and 1980s. We 
should recognise, though, that the concepts used to understand those 
decades’ politics can cloud rather than clarify the relationship between 
neoliberals and Conservatives in earlier periods. Instead, historians might 
explore (and explain) not the influence of one tradition on the other, but 
the developments in both traditions of argument that increased potential 
points of compatibility, regardless of whether these arguments led 
members of each tradition to the same policies.
An important guard against the potential for teleology in that 
approach is to better define the agency involved in using those potential 
points of connection. Acquiring a better view of the interface between 
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neoliberalism and Conservatism in the late 1970s marks a first step in that 
direction. This chapter suggests that interface should be characterised as 
one which was Conservative in outlook and keen to select arguments that 
helped resolve rhetorical problems confronting the party. It carried plenty 
of other traffic alongside ‘neoliberal’ ideas, partly because those involved 
had their own socially conservative views and partly because the networks 
these individuals were connected to included neoconservatives trying to 
build links between moral conservatism and liberal economics. But as 
well as bringing some of the tensions between Conservatism and 
neoliberalism into the former ‘at source’, Conservative leaders were 
exposed to readings of neoliberalism or wider texts that resolved such 
tensions. Other parts of the interface indicate the importance of 
‘reinforcement’ texts and selective reading through the lens of established 
national traditions. This is not a complete picture of the interface between 
neoliberalism and Conservatism, but it does indicate that some of the 
factors shaping their relationship become clearer when we step back from 
the question of policy influence to ask how the routes through which 
politicians experienced contact between these traditions may have 
affected their view of how the two could be brought together.
Finally, this chapter shows the utility of Jackson’s wider suggestion 
in this volume that we treat the analysis of political speech and intellectual 
history as complementary. I would argue that the best way of achieving 
that integration without making one the master of the other is to forgo a 
search for individual ‘neoliberal’ lines in speeches. Instead, we should 
re-examine the interfaces where neoliberalism and Conservatism met, 
stressing how the particularities of each point of contact worked with 
longer-term developments to shape exchanges between the casts of 
political and intellectual histories.
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Organised business and the rise  
of neoliberalism: the Confederation 
of British Industry 1965–1990s
neil rollings
Let there be no going back.
– No going back to the days of industrial relations chaos.
– To the bogus sham that was the Corporate State; to useless so- 
called ‘agreements’ that no one can deliver where it matters, on 
the ground at local level.
– To nationalisation . . .
– To the poisonous politics of envy.
Let there be no going back, in short, to the dreary dreadful days of 
failure.1
John Banham, the Director-General of the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI), wound up the 1990 CBI annual conference with these words. Shortly 
afterwards, the CBI published Business Agenda for the 1990s, which 
repeated this message, contrasting itself with a similar CBI report, The Will 
to Win, published 10 years earlier. As an adviser in Number 10 Downing 
Street put it, ‘[t]he report admits that the CBI thought in corporatist terms 
when it published the “Will to Win” in 1981, admits the error of its ways 
and says we must never go back to that’.2 The Will to Win was the brainchild 
of Sir Terence Beckett, whom Banham had succeeded in 1987, and is best 
known for calling for a ‘bare knuckle fight’ to save manufacturing industry 
at the 1980 CBI conference, which was widely perceived as a direct assault 
on the government.3 A leading article in The Times marking the change 
from Beckett to Banham summed up the conventional picture of the 
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relationship between the CBI and Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
governments during the 1980s. Thatcher rejected engagement with the 
CBI and unions in the form of a corporate state, whereupon the CBI’s 
influence ‘plummeted’. Only gradually was a relationship re-established 
and only through the CBI acknowledging the changed circumstances, such 
that ‘the voice of the whingeing tendency’ was quietened.4
Many features of the conventional portrayal of Thatcherism are 
visible here: Margaret Thatcher’s dislike of the CBI because of its 
association with 1970s corporatism; the resulting weakness of the CBI as 
it was ‘cold-shouldered’ by the government, and ‘elbowed out’ by the 
more supportive Institute of Directors (IoD); and that the CBI only had 
the ear of government once it had moved into line with the government’s 
neoliberal view of the world.5 This also fits the more general account of 
the rise of neoliberalism in the UK in which businesses feature as funders 
of neoliberal activities such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), but 
the CBI, as the voice of industry, was a bystander.
This chapter questions this dominant interpretation by showing that 
the position of organised business in these developments was more 
complex and nuanced. There were strands of business support for 
neoliberal ideas at the heart of the CBI from its creation, and there was less 
distance between the government and the CBI than is commonly believed 
during the 1980s. It is suggested that this has been missed in the existing 
historiography for three main reasons. Firstly, the relationship was private 
rather than public. Secondly, the contemporary media misrepresented the 
relationship. Thirdly, the relationship was interdependent, such that the 
government had to take notice of the CBI. This was because of the CBI’s 
role in pay restraint in the absence of incomes policy (which has also been 
overlooked in the historiography of Thatcherism), its production of the 
CBI Industrial Trends Survey and, linked to this, the impact of its public 
pronouncements on market confidence. The chapter starts by a brief 
presentation of the key features of the conventional account, followed by 
discussion of the Industrial Policy Group (IPG). It then moves to relations 
between the CBI and the Thatcher governments before a section that 
explains why relations were closer than is commonly understood.
Conventional account
The dominant account of the role of organised business in the rise of 
neoliberalism in the UK is both straightforward and widely agreed. The 
spotlight has been on the role of ideas and on a small group of converts to 
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neoliberal ideas working through think tanks, most notably the IEA.6 
Although Damian Cahill has criticised this ideational focus as overly 
simplistic and has highlighted the centrality of business in the process, 
even he presents the contribution of business as primarily limited to its 
provision of funds.7 In the British case, Ben Jackson has examined 
business funding of the IEA.8 While many large companies were consistent 
sponsors of the IEA, the CBI and its predecessors played no direct part in 
these developments.
More generally, despite there being natural affinities between the 
Conservative Party and the CBI, the relationship was not so 
straightforward.9 With Margaret Thatcher’s appointment as leader of 
the Conservative Party in 1975, it was the CBI’s engagement in tripartite 
discussions and corporate-style incomes policy that was the problem. 
According to E. H. H. Green, Thatcher referred to corporatism or the 
corporate state 25 times in speeches over her career, and all were deeply 
critical: she even told Geoffrey Howe, her first Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, not to use the word corporate as it was too close to 
corporatism.10 Two particular episodes are highlighted for both 
illustrating and exacerbating this tension. The first relates to a dispute 
between Campbell Adamson and the CBI’s Economic Director, Barry 
Bracewell-Milnes, which in 1973 resulted in Bracewell-Milnes being 
forced to leave the organisation.11 On leaving, Bracewell-Milnes became 
Economic Director of the IoD, a founder of the Selsdon Group within the 
Conservative Party, and active in the Adam Smith Institute and other 
neoliberal bodies. Apparently, ‘[o]ne of his proudest boasts was that he 
was “sacked in 1973 by Mr Campbell Adamson . . . for supporting 
capitalism, free enterprise and the market economy”’.12
However, it was the second key episode which is more commonly 
cited as illustrating the chasm between the CBI and Thatcherites. This 
was Terence Beckett’s speech as the new CBI Director-General to the 
November 1980 CBI conference. With the government’s focus on 
controlling inflation via monetary policy, interest rates rose, the Bank of 
England base rate reaching a peak that year of 17 per cent. This 
exacerbated the rise in the value of the pound – from $2.06 when the 
Conservatives came to power to a peak of $2.42 just at the time of the CBI 
conference – raising the price of UK exports by 17 per cent in just 18 
months. British industry suffered the consequences: in August 1980, 
unemployment rose to over two million for the first time since 1935, 
with redundancies running at 20,000 jobs per week, virtually all in 
manufacturing industry. Industrial production and economic growth 
collapsed. Beckett revised his speech at the last minute to reflect the anger 
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felt by business: ‘We have got to take the gloves off and have a bare 
knuckle fight because we have got to have an effective and prosperous 
industry.’13 The media presented his speech as ‘a fierce attack on the 
Conservative Party and the Government’s economic policies’.14 With 
Beckett supposedly summoned by the Prime Minister, the speech became 
viewed as a ‘political and PR disaster’: Thatcher was ‘infuriated’, and 
Beckett and the CBI President, Ray Pennock, ‘were castigated for [their] 
temerity’ by Thatcher and afterwards stood outside Number 10 ‘looking 
positively craven’.15 Resignations from the CBI followed.16 Beckett and the 
CBI were seen to be clearly damaged by the episode. John King, one of 
those to resign from the CBI, mocked them: ‘They went in like Brighton 
rock and came out like Turkish delight.’17 Likewise, The Times suggested 
that the speech was ‘ill-judged and that the degree of subsequent 
retraction undignified’, going on to explore the awkward and uncertain 
role of the CBI in the government’s move away from corporatism.18
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the CBI’s status and influence are 
perceived as having ‘withered dramatically’ after 1979.19 Not only was the 
CBI leadership regarded by Thatcher as ‘unreconstructed bastions of 
corporatism’, but they were also seen as being in cahoots with the wets in 
Cabinet, notably Jim Prior, the Secretary of State for Employment.20 Her 
advisers were equally scathing. One noted that ‘[t]he CBI were loathed 
more than the Bank of England’, while Alfred Sherman, one of Thatcher’s 
closest advisers, claimed that ‘[a]s a patronat-style appendage of the 
corporate state, [the CBI] served no purpose and should be closed down 
as soon as possible’.21 Instead, it is argued, she consulted ideologically 
sympathetic businessmen directly or used the overtly free-market IoD as 
her route to business opinion.22 Walter Goldsmith, the Director-General 
of the Institute, used every opportunity to play up his support for the 
government to contrast with the complaints emanating from the CBI.23 
Indeed, his replacement in 1984, John Hoskyns, had come directly from 
heading the Policy Unit at Number 10.
The period to 1983 was one where conflict between the CBI and the 
government was ‘a marked and continuous feature’ and where ‘the level 
of conflict had been deep and mistrust had been more evident than 
cooperation’, according to one account from a Thatcherite sympathiser.24 
It was only when the CBI’s position shifted to one more clearly in line with 
that of the Conservative government that it was able to regain some of its 
status. Even then, although Stephen Wilks refers to the emergence of a 
new ‘corporate state’, collective business representation tends to be seen 
as relatively weak, with the emergence of direct lobbying by individual 
firms.25 A further complication was that the CBI was firmly in favour of 
deeper European integration, in contrast to the IoD and many on the right 
THE NEOLIBERAL AGE? BRITAIN S INCE THE 1970s282
of the Conservative Party. Thus, the 1980s marks a clear turning point in 
the existing historiography, as a moment when the status of the CBI was 
permanently damaged, and what improvement there was flowed from the 
CBI rejecting its past, illustrated by Banham’s speech quoted at the start 
and the CBI’s Business Agenda for the 1990s.
An alternative interpretation
It is argued here that there are fundamental flaws with this existing 
account. While there were repeated tensions between Conservative 
ministers, including Thatcher, and the CBI, the differences were not as 
great as presented in the historiography. We begin with the creation of 
the CBI in 1965. This involved the merger of the Federation of Business 
Industries with the British Employers’ Confederation and the National 
Association of British Manufacturers, which represented small business. 
There was a concern that the cost of becoming the voice of industry was 
that the voice of big business would be watered down, as would the 
ability of the CBI to speak frankly. Tensions were building between the 
CBI and the 1964–70 Labour governments, with business increasingly 
frustrated at the growing intervention in the economy and becoming 
more vocal in its criticism of government policy.26 As a result, leading 
businessmen and the Economic Director of the CBI, Arthur Shenfield, 
came together to create the Industrial Policy Group in 1967. The group 
was the brainchild of Shenfield, who became its Director, and Sir Paul 
Chambers, the Chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) (1960–
8), who became IPG Chairman. Shenfield was active in the Mont Pelèrin 
Society (MPS), having been its Secretary and later becoming its 
President. Chambers had good links with the IEA.27 All of the members 
headed large, well-known British companies and most were active in the 
CBI and other business organisations. The IPG’s membership changed 
over time but remained at around 20 in number. Table 13.1 sets out the 
early membership. In 1969, Shenfield was succeeded as Director by 
John Jewkes, ex-Professor of Economics at Oxford University and 
another MPS President. Jewkes ‘sympathised with the aims of the 
Group’ and believed his views on the importance of ‘a vigorous system 
of private enterprise’ were ‘similar to those held by the members of the 
Group’.28 Indeed, Boswell and Peters considered the IPG to be ‘the most 
formidable liberationist [neoliberal] challenge to the revisionist 
ascendency in this period’.29
In all, the group published 10 reports before being wound up in 
1974. Its objective, as set out by Shenfield, was ‘to study the cause of the 
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Table 13.1 Members of the Industrial Policy Group in January 1968
Sir Paul Chambers Chairman ICI
Henry Lazell Chairman Beecham
Lord Cole Chairman Unilever
David Barran Chief Executive Shell
Lord Boyd Chairman Guinness
Sir Joseph Lockwood Chairman EMI
A. F. McDonald Chairman Distillers
John Partidge Chairman Imperial Tobacco
Lord Netherhope Chairman Fisons
Sir William McEwan Younger Chairman Scottish and Newcastle 
Breweries
Sir Charles Wheeler Chairman AEI
Sir Peter Runge Senior Director Tate and Lyle
Sir George Bolton Chairman Bank of London and South 
America
Sir Cyril Harrison Chairman English Sewing Cotton
Sir Nicholas Cayzer Chairman British and Commonwealth 
Shipping
Sir Reay Geddes Chairman Dunlop
Sir Maurice Laing Deputy Chairman John Laings
Lord Pilkington Chairman Pilkingtons
Sir John Nicholson Chairman Ocean Steam Ship Co.
Lord Sieff Chairman Marks and Spencer
Gordon Richardson Chairman J. Henry Schroder
R. G. Soothill Chairman Turner and Newall
John Davies CBI Director-General (ex officio)
Sir Stephen Brown CBI President (ex officio)
Source: MRC MSS200/C/3/DG1/44, IPG meeting, 4 January 1968.
country’s malaise and to make their views public’. ‘The “malaise” or 
weakness in the British economy’, he continued, ‘is deep-seated and its 
origins go a long way back – perhaps half a century or more’, going on to 
explain the relatively poor productivity performance of British industry 
in terms of restrictive practices, particularly those of trade unions, the 
policy of full employment, a lack of private investment due to excessive 
government expenditure and the tax system.30
THE NEOLIBERAL AGE? BRITAIN S INCE THE 1970s284
However, the IPG’s relationship with the CBI proved ambiguous, as 
the leadership of the CBI were reluctant to break with political neutrality 
in public. Having the CBI President and the Director-General in the group 
ex officio meant that any IPG publications might be regarded as having 
official CBI approval. Indeed, the final IPG report was published with a 
note of dissent from the CBI President and Director-General. Nevertheless, 
at the outset The Times believed that the IPG ‘may well develop into an 
unofficial inner cabinet of the CBI’.31 Moreover, its office was in the CBI’s 
building and its papers were commented upon by CBI staff prior to 
publication. Shenfield even continued to use CBI headed paper until his 
retirement in 1969. Originally it was talked about as ‘Shenfield’s Research 
Unit’ within the CBI and received CBI funding.32
Clearly, then, the IPG was not a mouthpiece of the CBI, but it was 
present at the heart of the CBI from its creation, while having members 
who were clearly sympathetic to neoliberal thinking. Its members’ 
influence continued even as it was being wound up. IPG members took a 
leading role in manoeuvres which restricted Adamson’s freedom, one of 
which was the creation of the President’s Committee, a body of senior 
industrialists to advise the CBI President.33 Significantly, the initial 
committee contained six ex-IPG members as well as other critics of the 
way the CBI had been operating.34
The Thatcher governments
During the 1970s the CBI remained committed to tripartite discussions. 
However, in private the CBI moved much closer to the Conservative Party, 
meeting the shadow ministers increasingly often and sharing draft policy 
statements for comment prior to publication.35 A senior CBI committee 
was set up to explore the changes needed in ‘the balance of power’ with 
trade unions.36 And, even in public, the CBI was uncompromising in its 
critique of the Bullock Report on industrial democracy.37 At the CBI 
Council meeting following the 1979 election, it was clear where political 
sentiment lay: a spontaneous round of applause followed Lord 
Watkinson’s remark that:
. . . the new Prime Minister had put her trust in the principles which 
the CBI stood for, and could be expected to act to back this up. The 
CBI and its members must justify this trust by making their ideas 
work. Every company board should therefore consider what it 
would do to this end.38
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Yet, at the first meeting with the Prime Minister, the CBI leadership made 
clear their concerns about the impact of the high rate of interest.39 As the 
economic situation deteriorated, so criticism became more vehement 
and the calls for a reduction in the rate of interest more desperate. 
Nevertheless, many Thatcherites also believed interest rates were too 
high. John Hoskyns, now working in Number 10, believed that ‘[o]nly 
ministers and civil servants devoid of business experience could think 
that the private sector could adjust to such ham-handed policy without 
suffering great damage’.40 It is in this context, with manufacturing output 
and employment falling sharply, that Beckett’s ‘bare knuckle fight’ speech 
needs to be placed. The government was not surprised, therefore, to be 
facing attacks at the conference: ministers had been warned that the 
CBI leadership, caught between the membership and the government, 
might feel obliged to say some unpleasant things.41 Six months before 
Beckett’s speech, the Prime Minister’s office was informed that Sir John 
Greenborough, the then CBI President, had given ‘a distinctly tougher’ 
speech at the CBI dinner owing to ‘increasing pressure from CBI firms’.42 
Even before then, Greenborough had made clear that the CBI’s concerns 
were rising and there was growing pressure from members for action to 
alleviate industry’s problems, including a reduction in interest rates.43
As the summer progressed, that pressure mounted. In September, 
Ray Pennock, Greenborough’s successor, met with Thatcher. He explained 
industry’s problems and the need for help from the government.44 A 
month later, Geoffrey Howe was warned by his special adviser that 
‘government policies are quite likely to get a very rough ride at the [CBI] 
Conference’.45 Only days afterwards, Howe heard directly from the CBI 
about the very real fears of industry and the pleas for action. At the end 
of the meeting he ‘thanked the CBI for their forceful and persuasive 
presentation. The diagnosis was clear enough; the right answers, as he 
had attempted to show, were less easy to find.’46 Not long after (and just 
days before the CBI conference) Beckett and Pennock took the opportunity 
to warn the government again that they might be forced to say some 
harsh things at the conference and to suggest that a further meeting with 
the Chancellor might be in order.47 In reply, they were told that Howe 
would be happy to see them, that he was ‘certainly well aware of the 
likelihood of disquiet’ at the conference and that he ‘would not feel 
affronted by suggestions that the government ought to do more to control 
monetary growth by limiting its own borrowing and curbing expenditure 
and public service pay increases’.48
The next day, Howe’s special adviser, Adam Ridley, reported that, in 
Pennock’s conference speech:
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He will express unstinting admiration for the PM personally (he 
stressed the word personally), and his own and the CBI’s complete 
support for the fundamental objectives of the government’s policy . . . 
He will then go on to say, however, that there are certain things he 
must point out to the government.49
Ridley stressed to Pennock that he would be ‘at his [Pennock’s] disposal 
throughout the conference should he wish me to see anybody, attend any 
meetings or be helpful in any other way that might occur to him’. That the 
Chancellor’s special adviser was willing to go to such lengths illustrates 
the extent to which the government was working together with the CBI 
leadership at this time.
Similarly, while Beckett’s speech did cause ructions in the 
government, including with the Prime Minister, what followed was not 
evidence of any breakdown in relations, nor of Pennock and Beckett 
being called into Number 10 and ‘given the full handbag treatment’.50 
Firstly, the meeting was called for by the CBI, not by Thatcher.51 
Secondly, the minute of the meeting paints a very different picture: the 
overall tone was one of a constructive discussion. Thatcher listened to 
the industrialists’ position for the first 25 minutes of the hour-and-a-half 
meeting ‘in a rare mood of restraint’.52 Pennock opened by pointing out 
that while the CBI conference supported the government’s basic aims, 
‘they questioned whether the government fully understood the gravity 
of the industrial situation’.53 Beckett then outlined what he had learned 
on his tour of the regions prior to the conference and his plans for a 
medium-term strategy for industry to complement the government’s 
monetary strategy. It was only then that the Prime Minister spoke, 
explaining that, while industry’s problems were largely outside the 
remit of government influence, ‘the government were determined to get 
interest rates down as soon as possible – to give hope to industry if 
nothing else’. Thatcher did not offer much prospect of respite and there 
were clear differences of opinion, but there was no ‘handbagging’ of the 
CBI representatives. Moreover, Thatcher’s reaction to the meeting was 
positive: ‘You have probably heard by now that I had a useful meeting 
with him [Beckett] and with Ray Pennock.’54 And in another letter she 
wrote: ‘I agree with you that the Government and CBI must work 
together for the longer term success of industry. I had a fairly lengthy 
and rather good talk a few days ago with Terry Beckett and Ray Pennock; 
we are not really far apart in my view.’55 Indeed, she added, ‘Ray 
Pennock’s [conference] speech was very practical and very good. He is 
a marvellous President.’56
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This working relationship continued. Geoffrey Howe’s 1981 budget 
is infamous for its controversial nature, and for prompting the critical 
letter to The Times signed by 364 economists. The CBI were critical but, 
given the state of the economy, nothing like as much as many others and 
always with qualification. At a private meeting with the Prime Minister 
and the Chancellor, Pennock opened by making clear that the CBI were 
not ‘moving into confrontation with the government’, but, thereafter, he 
made clear the CBI’s dismay in robust terms.57 Likewise, Beckett, having 
also stressed that there was no desire for confrontation, told the Prime 
Minister that ‘the Budget was of no net help to industry, and it was not in 
any way an industrial budget’. The meeting closed with Sir Terence 
noting:
Although the government’s and the CBI’s analysis of the underlying 
situation seemed to be identical, their view remained that the 
budget had been misjudged. He hoped that the government fully 
understood their concern; but at least the assurance that the 
government wanted to reduce interest rates was helpful.58
What is more significant in many respects was that the CBI leadership 
could get to see both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor just one day 
after making the request. Again, there is no evidence that there had been 
a breakdown in relations, nor that the CBI had been sidelined. On other 
occasions the CBI leadership was able to get access to senior ministers, 
including the Prime Minister, even when there was no time immediately 
available in the diary.59 In all, between Thatcher’s election in May 1979 
and the end of 1982, the CBI leadership met with her 21 times, of which 
14 were small private meetings.60 Added to regular meetings with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, which Donald MacDougall estimated as 
occurring on average every six weeks, and with other ministers, there 
seems to have been a close working relationship just at the time when the 
historiography talks about the extent of division.61 Indeed, one effect of 
Beckett’s speech was to strengthen this dialogue. ‘A frank and realistic 
discussion’ over ‘a relatively intimate’ private lunch for the CBI leadership 
and Geoffrey Howe at the start of December 1980 was followed by a 
meeting later that month.62 There it was agreed that fairly regular private 
informal meetings between senior economic ministers and the CBI 
were needed ‘to permit a real exchange of views’ to ensure mutual 
understanding.63
Just as Beckett’s ‘bare knuckle fight’ speech did not lead to a 
breakdown in the working relationship between ministers and the CBI, so 
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the 1991 depiction of the 1981 CBI publication The Will to Win, with 
which this chapter opened, does not stand up to scrutiny either. The 
initiative for the document came from Beckett himself, and the aim was 
to develop a medium-term strategy to provide a clearer sense of direction 
for the next five years for CBI members.64 A summary of its likely shape 
was sent to the Prime Minister, and she met with Pennock and Beckett to 
discuss it at the start of February. An advance copy was sent to her a 
month later.65 Once the budget was out of the way, Pennock and Beckett 
again met with the Prime Minister to discuss the document.66 The CBI 
paper set out 50 action points for the government, trade unions and 
industry. Government officials believed that the document should be 
welcomed for the emphasis it placed on industry’s role in restoring the 
UK’s economic prosperity: ‘While the government is not prepared to 
contemplate any dramatic changes in its policy towards industry, it is 
anxious to maintain a “constructive dialogue” with the CBI.’67 More 
specifically, the CBI’s analysis on pay and on competitiveness were flagged 
for praise: ‘We think the CBI leaders deserve congratulations for being 
willing to tell their members in fairly forthright terms what they should 
be doing.’68 While there were elements of The Will to Win which were not 
in line with the government’s outlook, notably on reflation, it would be 
hard to describe it as corporatist and significantly out of line with 
government thinking, especially on pay bargaining.
And that picture of broad agreement but with differences on 
particular aspects of policy remained evident for the rest of the decade. 
One government official, reporting on the 1984 CBI conference, summed 
up the situation:
There was throughout the discussions an obvious sympathy for the 
government. While government policies were criticised, sometimes 
in a hard and uncompromising manner, these criticisms were almost 
invariably prefaced by general remarks to the effect that the speaker 
still supported the broad thrust of government policies.69
Many examples of just this situation can be found.70 As a 1987 Treasury 
brief put it:
CBI have various complaints – about rating reform, electricity 
prices, interest rates, exchange rates, corporation tax, public sector 
investment and the employment bill – but they freely admit that 
these are all heavily outweighed by the healthy state of the 
economy.71
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There is considerable continuity in the working relationship that existed 
between the Conservative governments and the CBI throughout the 1980s.
Explaining the working relationship
So far, evidence has been presented showing that the CBI was able to get 
access to the heart of the Conservative government and that, despite 
differences, there were common understandings which underpinned that 
working relationship. This begs two questions: if the relationship was not 
so bad as commonly believed, why was this the case? And why has the 
historiography emphasised division? Various factors are relevant here. 
One factor has been the dominance of ideologically focused accounts in 
establishing the narrative of the rise of neoliberalism in the UK.72 
Secondly, there was the media coverage, which tended to play up the 
differences between the CBI and ministers. As already mentioned, Beckett 
pointed to this over his ‘bare knuckle fight’ speech, and Pennock believed 
‘[i]t was clear that the media were looking for opportunities to show the 
government and the CBI in disagreement with each other, and that they 
would not shrink from selective reporting.’73 It became a fairly common 
refrain to point to press misrepresentation of CBI views.74
Thirdly, and more importantly, there was an interdependent 
relationship between the government and the CBI. The government relied 
on the CBI in certain respects and these coloured its dealings with the 
organisation. This was most important during the first Thatcher 
government. The Prime Minister was determined not to have an incomes 
policy – wage inflation was a symptom rather than a cause of inflation – 
and this was a key test of Thatcherism. ‘Under Thatcher’, Green has 
argued, ‘wage negotiations were left to management and the private 
sector was not even addressed indirectly’.75 The validity of the second half 
of the sentence is questionable. By the late 1970s, 74 per cent of all 
manufacturing firms were members of the CBI, rising to 88 per cent of 
firms employing more than 1,000 employees.76 The CBI had a key role in 
encouraging its members to show pay restraint, and the government was 
aware of this: it needed the CBI to be effective in helping to achieve this. 
Hence, sustaining a constructive dialogue with the CBI was crucial.77 This 
was particularly the case in 1981, with the prospect of emerging from the 
recession. As Howe was briefed:
This will be an important meeting in terms of concerting views 
and action with the CBI on the next pay round. Given that the 
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government will not want to be promulgating pay norms, the CBI 
have an important role to play in communicating the right message 
to the private sector. It is important that the government and the 
CBI are as far as possible at one both on what this message should be 
and on what is necessary to ensure that the case does not go by 
default. One objective of the meeting will be to ensure that there is a 
clear understanding with the CBI about this. Another, which is hardly 
less important, will be to get the CBI’s views on what economic 
ministers and the government generally need to do and say to 
facilitate a satisfactory outcome on pay over the coming year.78
Two years later, Margaret Thatcher and her advisers were again 
emphasising the importance of the CBI’s role in getting across to its 
members the importance of pay restraint and, in return, ‘[s]he would 
welcome further such exchanges between the government and the CBI’.79 
Indeed, the discussion of the CBI’s approach to each annual pay round 
remained one of the main reasons for senior ministers, including Margaret 
Thatcher, to meet with the CBI leadership.80
Nor was pay the only issue which illustrated the dependence of the 
government on the CBI. The CBI also published its Industrial Trends 
Survey. This survey was begun in 1958 and was originally published three 
times per year.81 By 1984, the survey appeared quarterly, used a panel of 
1,700–1,800 firms covering 56 per cent of manufacturing employment, 
and could rely on most of the larger firms replying regularly.82 The scale, 
nature (including data rather than just business opinion) and longevity 
of the survey gave it, and the CBI, authority not accorded to other business 
surveys, such as that by the IoD begun in 1983.83 Its significance was such 
that in the 1980s the Chancellor would usually receive a briefing on it 
prior to publication.84 The survey would also sometimes be the prompt for 
the CBI to meet with senior ministers.85
It was not just the content of the survey that mattered. The tone of 
the language which the CBI were likely to use in their press conferences 
and press releases was also crucial. Ministers and government officials 
were concerned that the CBI downplayed any positive news to ‘eke out as 
much gloom as possible’.86 The role of ministers was to counter this. As 
Thatcher noted to Sir James Clemminson in 1985:
I am sure we are agreed on the importance of presenting your 
surveys with great care and in a balanced way . . . The prospects . . . 
of continued prosperity for business are not assisted by propagating 
the idea that the expansion is about to end, which can only damage 
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business confidence. It would also be helpful if, as you say, you can 
keep your pressure on interest rates ‘very low key’. High key pressure 
makes it harder not easier to lower interest rates, for markets may 
think that the government has been pushed into taking risks with 
inflation, which could be very damaging.87
Seven years later, her successor, John Major, was making the same point 
about the importance of presentation for maintaining market confidence 
to one of Clemminson’s successors, encouraging the CBI to highlight any 
signs of recovery.88 Back in 1982, an official highlighted the CBI’s 
responsibilities here:
Perhaps the most important point to make is that they can by their 
statements help or hinder the recovery. They, of course, have a duty 
to represent their members’ interests as they best see fit. But it does 
not do them or anyone else a service to encourage gloom simply in 
order to try to bring pressure to bear on the government. That only 
weakens confidence still further. The cycle can then become self-
reinforcing and the recovery itself is damaged . . .
The CBI, like the government itself, has a duty to weigh its 
words with care. It has public responsibilities.89
Throughout the period of the Thatcher governments, and later, the 
government remained dependent on the CBI. If the government wanted 
the CBI to take its public responsibilities seriously, ministers could not 
ignore the organisation. It had to rely on the CBI presenting a suitable 
message of pay restraint to its members, particularly during the first 
Thatcher government, but it also depended on the CBI’s public discourse 
because of its potential impact on market confidence, especially when the 
economy was fragile. This provided to the CBI leadership a means of 
access to ministers at the heart of the government and allowed it to 
maintain its traditional insider lobbying, which was meant to have 
disappeared during the Thatcher governments. Instead, the CBI still had 
opportunities to make its case in small private meetings with the Prime 
Minister and senior economic ministers.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the depiction of the CBI as having been 
ignored by Margaret Thatcher and her like-minded ministers after 1979 
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because of its corporatist mindset is overly simplistic and sweeping. This 
interpretation has been accepted unquestioningly to date – even by the 
CBI itself – yet appears on the basis of the research presented here to be 
fundamentally flawed. It is flawed in the way it presents organised 
business in the form of the CBI; it is flawed in its depiction of the way 
Thatcher and other senior ministers viewed the CBI; and it is flawed in its 
presentation of the nature of the relationship between the two groups of 
actors. From its outset, the CBI faced internal tensions over the desired 
direction of economic policy. As the case of the IPG illustrates, some 
senior industrialists were happy to support neoliberal arguments, 
especially ones about the value of free enterprise, and to employ, and 
engage with, leading neoliberal activists. The way in which they were 
able to constrain the freedom of Campbell Adamson in 1974 through 
the creation of the President’s Committee shows that their influence 
remained real.
With this in mind, it is less surprising that the working relationship 
between the CBI and the Thatcher governments endured despite the 
economic pressures pulling them apart in the early 1980s. The relationship 
was not without its tensions and misunderstandings, but there was a 
genuine desire from both parties to maintain a constructive dialogue and 
to get past any difficulties. It is easy to understand why the CBI would 
want access to Thatcher and her economic ministers, but given the 
existence of the IoD as an alternative source of business advice, what 
could the CBI offer to the government? The existing dominant account 
suggests very little, dismissing the CBI as largely irrelevant in the 1980s. 
This was not the case: the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and their 
officials recognised that the CBI had a key position in British society and 
the government had to work with it if the government was to achieve 
its goals. This dependency was sufficiently recognised to ensure that 
dialogue continued and remained constructive and suitably regular.
This should not be surprising. There were natural affinities between 
the Conservative government and the CBI which did not disappear. Cahill 
is right to remind us that all forms of neoliberalism are embedded. This 
also means that influences other than ideology are important in 
understanding the spread and implementation of neoliberal ideas. Just as 
business’s involvement in this process was more than simply funding 
think tanks, so one must also not forget that Thatcher was a politician and 
that she could not ride roughshod over everyone if she was to achieve 
the changes she desired for the UK. Pragmatic politics and material 
interests remained important throughout the 1980s. On that basis, the 
CBI remained a key actor with which to maintain an understanding, even 
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if Thatcher personally preferred the company of the IoD. It also means she 
was able to see the significance of encouraging the CBI to disseminate a 
message of pay restraint to its members, although this does not seem 
congruent with neoliberal thinking on the causes of, and cures for, 
inflation: a politician of conviction perhaps, but one who appreciated the 
value of consensus-building with sympathetic vested interests.
This last point suggests that the conventional account overstates the 
extent to which 1979 was a turning point in the relationship between the 
government and the rest of society: there were continuities. Broader 
implications for our understanding of the development of neoliberalism 
in the UK, and beyond, flow from this. Firstly, it highlights the interaction 
between ideas and material interests in which business did more than 
simply supply funds to neoliberal think tanks. There is a need to recognise 
the complex and diverse ways in which ideas and material interests 
interacted, rather than to see them as alternative interpretations of 
neoliberalism. Secondly, building on this first point, the account given 
here questions a rigid focus on intellectuals and ideas when defining who 
should be included in the ambit of neoliberalism. Some businessmen 
directly promoted neoliberal ideas themselves, as illustrated here through 
the example of the IPG. At the same time, and thirdly, this account 
reasserts the diversity inherent in the thinking found in neoliberal circles, 
where there could be agreement on the broad goals but sharp dis- 
agreement on particular policies. Here the CBI, and business more 
generally, found it difficult to accept monetarism, but so did others in 
neoliberal circles. On the other side of the coin (and not elaborated here 
for reasons of space), the CBI was highly critical of the Conservative 
governments’ efforts to control public expenditure and to roll back the 
state. Lastly, the interdependent relationship between the government 
and the CBI cautions against overly simplistic depictions of the Thatcher 
governments as a limited but strong and independent government 
operating separately from a free economy. In contrast, in this case, the 
Thatcher governments’ necessary reliance on the CBI to achieve their 
policy goals evokes an awareness of the constraints on their power and 
independence.
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The roots of Britain’s financialised 
political economy
Aled Davies*
The collapse of the global financial system in 2008 may be regarded as the 
beginning of the end of the neoliberal age. This catastrophic event, caused 
by the transmission of US mortgage defaults throughout the complex 
network of transnational financial markets, profoundly undermined a 
core neoliberal assumption that markets were always rational and 
efficient and revived ‘the state’ as the only economic actor capable of 
saving capitalism from destruction.1 While the crisis did not lead to a 
coherent, radical break with the neoliberal norms that governed national 
economies and the global economic order, these norms have been 
continually destabilised in the subsequent decade by the political forces 
unleashed by the legacy of the crash.2
In its ‘death’, as in life, neoliberalism was closely bound up with the 
fortunes of finance. The political revolutions of Margaret Thatcher 
and Ronald Reagan, which heralded the birth of the neoliberal age at the 
start of the 1980s, coincided with the liberalisation and globalisation of 
financial markets. Given this synchronicity, we cannot analyse one 
without the other. Indeed, many scholars have already interrogated the 
relationship between triumphant global finance and the political economy 
of neoliberalism in the late twentieth century. For some, such as the 
Marxist economists Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, neoliberalism 
was simply ‘the ideological expression of the return to hegemony of the 
financial fraction of the ruling class’.3 In this account, the crisis of Fordist 
accumulation in the late 1960s served to financialise capitalism, which in 
turn forced changes to the way in which it was managed and regulated by 
introducing neoliberal economic policies.4 This materialist account has, 
however, been challenged by those who see the liberation of finance as a 
product of a neoliberal ideology that claimed that impediments to 
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financial markets were inefficient and contrary to individual liberty.5 The 
key question, therefore, is whether neoliberalism was a cause or an effect 
of ‘financialisation’.
A financialised growth model
Britain’s economy in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries 
can be described as having been ‘financialised’, by which is meant that the 
financial sector, and financial-type activities, had become increasingly 
dominant within British capitalism. This took two particularly salient 
forms: a globally oriented financial sector with a hegemonic position 
within the structure and government of the nation’s economy, and a 
reliance on private mortgage borrowing to sustain economic growth.6 At 
the turn of the millennium, the UK was distinctive among the world’s 
leading economies for having an especially large financial sector with a 
predominantly global character, based in (but not confined to) the City of 
London.7 On the eve of the 2008 financial crisis, banks in London were 
responsible for 20 per cent of global cross-border lending and held 
one-fifth of all international bank assets. In 2007, London could claim a 
46 per cent share of global foreign equity trading, a 70 per cent share of 
international bond trading and a 47 per cent share of the entire world’s 
cross-border derivatives turnover. The nation’s capital was at the heart of 
the global financial system. In 2007, financial and professional services 
accounted for 11 per cent of UK GDP, and the trade surplus in financial 
services equalled £35.6 billion.8 Employment in financial services peaked 
and remained at roughly 1.2 million after 1990, and the financial sector’s 
share of total profits in Britain reached 20 per cent in the 2000s (compared 
with roughly 5 per cent in the 1950s and 1960s).9
Since the financial crisis, critics such as John Cristensen, Nicholas 
Shaxson and Duncan Wigan have argued that this large financial sector is 
a national curse that has:
. . . crowded out manufacturing and non-financial services, leeched 
government of skilled staff, entrenched regional disparities, 
fostered large-scale financial rent-seeking, heightened economic 
dependence, increased inequality, helped disenfranchise the 
majority and exposed the economy to violent crises.10
Furthermore, the liberalised, market-based financial system is alleged to 
have imposed its short-term priorities on the real economy, which has 
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weakened the long-term prospects of British industry.11 However, such 
criticism had little purchase in the decades preceding the financial crash, 
as the City was embedded in a political consensus committed to 
championing its global role. To maintain and promote the City, financial 
services were insulated from ‘excessive’ taxation and regulation. The 
creation of the Financial Services Authority in 2001 was an attempt to 
replace the supposedly ‘burdensome’ system that had preceded it.12 
Furthermore, threats from abroad were vigorously resisted. Take, for 
example, the response of the Labour government to the idea of a European 
Union withholding tax on savings in 1998, which was designed to reduce 
tax avoidance. The City’s political representatives argued that such a 
move would be damaging to its international bond business, and so the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, unilaterally abolished the 
UK’s tax on international bond interest, which in turn forced the EU to 
agree to a watered-down agreement based on the greater international 
exchange of information.13 Not only was the City seen as a key asset, but 
it was celebrated by Brown for embodying Britain’s ‘enduring qualities’ of 
‘creativity’, ‘enterprise’, ‘openness to the world’ and a ‘belief in duty and 
fair play’.14 In the age of apparently inevitable, unstoppable globalisation, 
the City demonstrated to the rest of the country the need to ‘think globally’ 
and to embrace ‘the vigour, ingenuity and aspiration . . . that [was] the 
hallmark of [the City’s] success’.15
Beyond London’s position as a key node in the network of globalised 
finance, by the end of the twentieth century the provision of credit to the 
domestic economy through a liberalised financial system had become 
essential to the national model of economic growth. Easy access to credit, 
primarily used to buy property, was central to what Colin Hay has 
characterised as the ‘Anglo-liberal growth model’.16 Households borrowed 
to acquire property that could be expected to appreciate in value, and 
which would in turn enable them to ‘move up the housing ladder’, 
withdraw equity to fund present consumption, or save for retirement.17 
The latter factor became especially important as generous employer-
based pension schemes were dismantled and state retirement benefits 
dwindled.18 High costs and constraints on borrowing had been reduced 
by the integration of the UK mortgage market within a transatlantic 
financial system, which introduced the American practice of mortgage 
securitisation.19 This economic model has been described, by Avner Offer 
and James Wood respectively, as a ‘property windfall economy’20 and a 
‘mortgage-led accumulation regime’.21 Colin Crouch has characterised it 
as a system of ‘privatized Keynesianism’, in which demand in the economy 
was no longer maintained by governments taking on the burden of debt 
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to fund growth-provoking expenditure, but instead indebtedness was 
devolved to individuals (whose wages, on average, had stagnated since 
the 1980s, but who benefited from rising house prices).22 House price 
inflation was tolerated because it provided the necessary spur to 
encourage borrowing, as well as delivering nominal capital gains to a 
home-owning electorate. As Offer points out, this growth model seemed 
to produce more winners than losers, and so generated broad popular 
support.23
How, and why, did this financialised economic model emerge? One 
popularly held view is that it was the deliberate creation of the Thatcher 
governments and their implementation of an ideological commitment to 
unfettered market competition, combined with a radical attempt to create 
a home-owning society. Indeed, two achievements that are often 
identified as embodying Thatcherism are the enforced sale of council 
houses at a discount (the ‘Right to Buy’) and the de-cartelisation of the 
London Stock Exchange in the so-called Big Bang of 1986. It is certainly 
the case that the actions of the Thatcher governments served to create the 
financialised economic model, and it is also undeniably true that the 
Thatcher governments contained many neoliberal partisans who 
championed this. However, these governments did not operate in a 
vacuum, and to develop a more accurate understanding of their 
achievements it is essential to situate them in a longer-term historical 
context. This chapter will argue that the financialised growth model is 
best understood as an emergent political-economic strategy in which the 
Thatcher governments acquiesced to processes of ‘financialisation’ that 
had been underway throughout the post-war decades. In particular, the 
chapter will focus on the re-globalisation of finance through the City of 
London in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the substantial demand for 
mortgage finance generated by the post-war political consensus in favour 
of expanding home ownership. The confluence and fusion of these two 
processes during the crisis of the industrial economy in the early 1980s 
established the financialised growth model that underpinned the 
political-economic settlement of Britain’s neoliberal age.
Re-globalising finance
Despite the supposed novelty and hyper-modernity of late twentieth-
century globalisation, it was in fact a part-revival of an economic order 
that had prevailed at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.24 
The City of London had been at the heart of the late nineteenth-century 
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global economy: it provided the capital for economic development, 
markets for trade, a mechanism for international payments, means of 
global shipping and insurance and a trusted currency backed by the gold 
standard.25 The First World War, and the ensuing political chaos of the 
interwar decades, destroyed this liberal order and destabilised London’s 
position as a financial centre. Most significantly, after the financial crisis 
of 1931, government-mandated controls on capital prevented the free 
movement of money across political borders.26 The City’s merchant banks 
were subsequently trapped within the limitations of the sterling area 
(a group of mostly British colonies and post-colonial states that pegged 
their currencies to the pound).27 The City’s partially de-globalised status 
was subsequently cemented by the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944, 
which arranged to fix international exchange rates and, importantly, 
permitted the continued control of capital flows to support the legitimate 
pursuit of domestic-focused, employment-maximising macroeconomic 
policies by national governments.28
By the 1950s, the prospects for the City’s role as an international 
financial centre looked bleak. The costs to Britain of maintaining sterling 
as an international currency became increasingly intolerable as efforts to 
maintain confidence in the pound forced governments to adopt restrictive 
economic policies at the expense of their intended aims of national 
economic modernisation and social reform.29 Meanwhile, as Britain’s 
imperial financial inheritance crumbled in the face of domestic political 
pressure, the US dollar had become the dominant currency for trade and 
investment – reflecting the USA’s hegemonic position in the post-war 
global order.30 At this juncture, the City’s banking elite was forced to find 
a way to reconcile the decline of sterling with the new dollar dominance. 
Financial historians have long understood that it was the City’s response 
to this structural change to the international economy that laid the 
foundations for its revitalisation as a global financial centre. The revival 
of the City did not begin with the Thatcher government’s deregulatory 
agenda in the 1980s, but with the creation of the so-called Eurodollar 
market during the years of post-war political consensus.31
The Eurodollar market was one in which dollars could be deposited 
and lent outside the exchange controls imposed on both sterling and the 
dollar. This was achieved by treating the dollars as technically ‘offshore’ 
on the balance sheets of banks based in London, and so not subject to 
national regulation. These dollars that had accumulated overseas arose 
from the combined effects of a cap on domestic interest rates, a balance 
of payments deficit and the multi-nationalisation of American firms. Gary 
Burn has demonstrated that the creation of the Eurodollar market – a 
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global financial market outside the control of national states – was the 
product of a deliberate attempt by the Bank of England and London’s 
banking fraternity to re-establish the freedoms that the global City had 
lost since 1931. The market was only able to develop because the Bank of 
England permitted it to do so and encouraged its growth.32 The success of 
the Eurodollar market divorced the City from its reliance on sterling, 
which enabled London to operate freely as a post-imperial financial 
centre. As P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins put it:
As the good ship sterling sank, the City was able to scramble aboard 
a much more seaworthy young vessel, the Eurodollar.33
The triumph of the Eurodollar was, at once, a victory and a defeat for the 
gentlemanly financial order that had originated in the nineteenth century. 
Its commitment to a globally oriented City, liberated from the demands 
of national economic management, had been sustained and championed 
by the nominally nationalised Bank of England throughout the mid-
century of financial de-globalisation. Once the Eurodollar market had 
been established, however, British banks were quickly displaced by 
American and other foreign banks that flooded into London to participate 
in the financial free-for-all.34 Ironically, the rebirth of the global City 
through the Eurodollar market went hand in hand with the ‘death of 
gentlemanly capitalism’.35
Beyond revitalising the City, the liberation of finance from national 
boundaries via the Eurodollar market had a profoundly destabilising 
effect on the global economic order that had been constructed following 
the Second World War. The accumulation of vast pools of short-term funds 
outside national control exposed fixed exchange rates to increasingly 
intense and rapid speculative attacks. The effect was to erode the capacity 
of nation states to pursue domestic-focused economic policies. This has 
been demonstrated by Scott Newton, who has shown how the sterling 
crises of the 1960s were made more severe and more unmanageable by the 
unforgiving flows of ‘hot money’ enabled by the Eurodollar market.36 
Speculation against the US dollar and sterling undermined the Bretton 
Woods order of fixed exchange rates and led ultimately to the system’s 
collapse in 1971. The subsequent worldwide explosion in prices dictated 
that governments were compelled to demonstrate their commitment to 
controlling inflation to the judge and jury of global financial flows. The 
result was an enforced abandonment of Keynesian policies intended to 
minimise unemployment, and the adoption of a harsh discipline of 
monetarist policies designed to reduce inflation. In Britain, where the 
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Thatcher government inherited a system of monetary targets that had 
been unwillingly adopted by its Labour predecessor in 1976, this proved 
disastrous for large sections of British industry.37 Rocketing interest rates 
and the resulting exchange rate appreciation of the pound, exacerbated 
by the UK’s new role as a major oil exporter during the second oil shock, 
resulted in an unemployment rate of over three million and pushed many 
export-manufacturing industries to the wall.38
While Eurodollars wreaked havoc and eventually destroyed the 
post-war Bretton Woods order, the re-globalisation of London was 
presented as an opportunity for the British state. While nurturing the 
Eurodollar market, the Bank of England also sought to promote the 
importance of the global City to the national economy. In 1967, a 
committee was formed called the Committee on Invisible Exports. Funded 
and managed at arm’s length by the Bank of England, the committee was 
made up of senior City figures and was led by the financial journalist 
William Clarke. The committee sought to counter the notion that the City 
was a hindrance to the national economy, and to do this it argued that 
London’s globally oriented financial services sector was invaluable to 
Britain because it generated foreign income that contributed to the 
nation’s balance of payments. The committee ran a highly successful and 
influential campaign that persuaded Britain’s governing elite in the 1960s 
and 1970s that allowing London the freedom to operate globally (not just 
in banking, but in a whole range of financial and commercial services) 
would be beneficial to the nation (rather than harmful – as had allegedly 
been the case when London’s international role was bound up with 
sterling).39 The power of this argument was that it even came to be 
deployed by the British state to accelerate the destruction of the remnants 
of the City’s gentlemanly order: the Big Bang deregulation of the London 
Stock Exchange was a deliberate attempt to internationalise the market 
so that it would begin to compete for business with other financial centres, 
especially New York, and therefore generate foreign income.40 One reason 
for the effectiveness of this argument was that it successfully conflated 
the interests of the globally oriented elements of the financial sector with 
the service sector of the entire economy (which had been growing 
throughout the twentieth century).41 The Committee on Invisible Exports, 
and in particular its spin-off the Liberalisation of Trade in Services 
committee, positioned itself (somewhat disingenuously, but politically 
effectively) as the champion of the entire service sector.42
This is not to say that by 1979 a financial service exporting strategy, 
with the City at its centre, had been adopted by the British state at the 
expense of manufacturing industry. The Conservatives under Thatcher 
thE rootS oF BritAin’S F inAnCiALiSED PoLit iCAL EConomy 305
had in fact entered government committed to industrial revival.43 It was 
not until the disastrous effects of the monetarist macroeconomic 
experiment that the government was forced to rely on the overseas 
provision of global financial services for national economic prosperity. 
The evidence of this can be found in the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Nigel Lawson’s combative contribution to the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Overseas Trade in 1985. Presented with the evidence of 
Britain’s crumbling industrial base, he argued that it mattered less than 
critics claimed because Britain in fact had a comparative advantage in 
providing services to the rest of the world. Lawson told the committee:
There is no adamantine law that says we have to produce as much 
in the way of manufactures as we consume. If it does turn out that 
we are relatively more efficient in world terms at providing services 
than at producing goods, then our national interest lies in a surplus 
on services and a deficit on goods.44
This argument had been developed by the invisibles committee over the 
preceding two decades and was readily available as a tool for giving a 
positive, progressive spin to the government’s economic policies. 
Lawson’s pursuit of this argument must be situated in the context of the 
continuing failure of the government’s economic policies (unemployment 
remained above 10 per cent and the UK’s trade balance in manufactures 
had been in deficit since 1983).45 It was a politically necessary attempt to 
justify the speed of the deindustrialisation that had taken place over the 
previous six years. It is notable, however, that in their evidence to the 
House of Lords committee the British Invisible Exports Council expressed 
scepticism that service exports would ever be an ample substitute for the 
loss of manufactured exports.46 Meanwhile, Baron (Arnold) Weinstock, 
the managing director of General Electric Company (GEC), was 
indignant in response to Lawson’s apparent indifference to the fate of 
British industry and condemned the vision of future economic prosperity 
outlined by the Chancellor. He told the committee, with evident 
distaste, that:
We will be servicing, presumably, the production of wealth by 
others. We will supply the changing of the guard, we will supply the 
Beefeaters around the Tower of London. We will become a curiosity. 
I do not think that is what Britain is about; I think that is rubbish. 
What service industries are there going to be in Wigan, or in Bolton, 
or at Smethwick?47
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As Barry Supple has noted, Weinstock’s condemnation drew on a long-
standing critique of the service sector that can be traced back to Joseph 
Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform campaign at the beginning of the 
century.48 Yet it also presaged the geographical and cultural tensions that 
were subsequently to develop over the following decades, factors that 
would lead ultimately to the political storms that would engulf the 
neoliberal order in the 2010s.49
The international economic order that had been planned at the 
Bretton Woods conference in 1944, and that had been imperfectly 
implemented in the post-war decades, suppressed global finance to assist 
national governments in the pursuit of the social democratic aims of 
sustained economic growth, full employment and redistribution. The 
banking institutions of the City of London, wedded to an ideal of financial 
liberalism inherited from the age of British imperialism, successfully 
reconstructed global finance under the auspices of US dollar hegemony. 
The result was to destroy the international framework that had 
underpinned the social democratic age. The harsh conditions unleashed 
by re-globalised finance inadvertently washed away the remnants (if not 
the ideals) of the City’s gentlemanly order and, even more significantly, 
accelerated the deindustrialisation of Britain. For the British state, 
commandeered by Conservative governments under the influence of 
neoliberal ideas, the only feasible course of action appeared to be to 
embrace global finance as the centrepiece of a new, post-industrial 
national economic strategy.
Liberating the mortgage market
The domestic component of Britain’s financialised growth model in the 
late twentieth century – liberalised access to mortgage borrowing to 
purchase appreciating property assets – is commonly attributed to the 
deregulatory agenda of the Thatcher governments. However, despite 
the undoubted liberal market orientation of the Thatcherite agenda, the 
deregulation of the mortgage market was in fact unplanned. Instead, we 
should see it as a product of two factors that were fused together by the 
adoption of monetarist economic policies in the late 1970s: a public 
demand for mortgages generated by the post-war expansion of home 
ownership and the re-globalisation of finance.
Owner-occupation became the dominant form of tenure in Britain 
during the post-war decades. This profound economic and social change 
was largely attributable to the combined effects of economic affluence 
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and a political consensus in favour of home ownership, which provided 
tax exemptions and subsidies for owner-occupiers (see also Guy Ortolano’s 
chapter in this volume).50 Home ownership also came to be associated 
with independence, autonomy and social status.51 Given the substantial 
cost of house purchase, potential buyers required credit that could be paid 
back over a long term: a mortgage. This meant that as the desire for home 
ownership grew, the demand for mortgages increased. In the post-war 
period mortgages were provided by specialised financial institutions: 
building societies. These were mutually owned institutions that pooled 
the savings of their members and then provided mortgages to those 
members once they had saved for a deposit.52 These societies sat within a 
wider domestic financial system which, although not under direct state 
control, was subject to a semi-formal regulatory regime designed to aid 
the implementation of demand management and industrial development 
policies. In particular, governments sought to direct credit to export-
oriented industries in order to help overcome the nation’s recurrent 
balance of payments deficit and to maintain the sterling exchange rate. In 
essence, the financial system was strictly compartmentalised and 
organised by a range of semi-private cartels.53 Most significantly, the 
banking system was subjected to instructions from government on how 
much it could lend, and to what sectors of the economy. This influence 
over lending was operated through an oligopoly of clearing banks that 
agreed not to compete with each other on price.54 Banks were prevented 
from engaging in mortgage lending, and instead the system of housing 
finance was confined to the building societies.55 Like the clearing banks, 
the building societies did not compete with each other on price – they 
agreed instead to a system of recommended interest rates through the 
Building Societies Association (BSA).56 This uncompetitive practice, and 
the exclusion of banks from the mortgage market, was tolerated because 
it made it easier for governments to manage the allocation of credit in 
accordance with the perceived needs of the overall economy.57 It also 
prevented credit-fuelled house price inflation.
Despite the submission of the mortgage market to the imperatives 
of economic management, the building societies cartel was successful in 
enabling the growth of home ownership. By the late 1960s, however, 
growing demand for mortgage finance, combined with fluctuating 
interest rates, generated recurrent political crises. Given the need to meet 
the demand for home ownership in the age of affluence, Labour and 
Conservative governments were burdened with the responsibility of 
maintaining the supply of mortgages and limiting their cost.58 While the 
cartelised building society sector allowed governments to exercise 
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influence over mortgage lending, it also exposed the government to 
public criticism. Because the building societies were dependent on a 
narrow funding model (they could only access savings deposits from the 
British public), if they wanted to increase their lending they had to attract 
more savings into their specialised compartment of the financial system. 
Members of the public wanting to obtain a mortgage could only do so if 
building societies had accumulated sufficient deposits. If not, potential 
borrowers were forced to wait until funds were available, which resulted 
in the formation of so-called mortgage queues.59 The existence of such 
queues was determined by the wider environment of monetary policy: if 
the interest rate offered on building society deposits was lower than other 
locations for savings (for example banks), savers would move their money 
to get a higher rate of return. The result was that the societies would then 
not have sufficient funds to offer mortgages, and so queues would 
form every time the government increased interest rates according to 
wider macroeconomic requirements. This would, in turn, lead the BSA to 
announce their intention to increase the building societies’ recommended 
rate of interest in order to clear their mortgage queues. But if building 
societies increased their interest rates, the cost of mortgage borrowing 
would also have to increase. In a note to the Prime Minister in April 1974 
the Cabinet Secretary, John Hunt, summarised the problem facing the 
government:
The mortgage question must surely command very high priority. 
The basic problem is to find acceptable means of insulating house 
purchasers from the money market while at the same time ensuring 
an adequate supply of mortgage finance. If market rates of interest 
are high the most obvious method of protecting house purchasers is 
by some form of Exchequer subsidy . . . If the mortgage rate is kept 
at a lower level than the market justifies, without any subsidy, then 
adequate finance for house purchases will not be forthcoming, with 
the result that there will be a mortgage famine and a decline in the 
house building programme.60
To overcome the trade-off between increasing lending rates and limiting 
the supply of mortgages, governments provided loans to the building 
societies until interest rates fell back to a level that enabled the societies 
to attract deposits once again. In April 1973, when the BSA proposed 
increasing their rates, the Daily Mirror described the move as ‘political 
dynamite’.61 The only way to prevent the societies from increasing the 
costs of mortgages was to provide a £15 million government subsidy.62 
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A year later, in 1974, the societies accepted (after some cajoling) a 
£500 million loan from the new Labour government to prevent a proposed 
increase in the mortgage rate to 11 per cent.63 This solution to the problem 
was only feasible, however, if governments had the budgetary freedom to 
provide loans to the societies. The post-1976 monetarist constraints on 
government expenditure removed this option, and governments were 
forced to relinquish control over mortgage rates. In June 1979 the 
Thatcher government, as enthusiastic as its predecessors had been to 
continue to expand home ownership (combined with an ideological 
commitment to eliminating the public rental sector), was faced with the 
threat of an increase in the recommended mortgage rate (the bank rate 
had risen to 15 per cent in an effort to control the ‘money supply’).64 The 
Chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, informed the Prime Minister that the only 
two options available to prevent such an increase, which she feared would 
deter potential home buyers, were to pay an interest rate subsidy to 
borrowers (at the cost to the exchequer of an estimated £25 million per 
percentage point per month) or to loan between £100 million and 
£150 million a month to the societies. Yet the constraints on public 
expenditure, which were central to the government’s monetarist 
economic policy, meant that neither option was feasible.65 Kenneth 
Berrill, head of the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), argued that for 
the government to intervene would tarnish its ‘genuinely new approach 
to our post-war malaise’. ‘Everybody’, he said, was ‘waiting to see if the 
Government has the strength of its convictions: not least the Unions’.66 
The influential City analyst Gordon Pepper informed Thatcher’s private 
secretary that any government subsidy to the building societies would 
signal to the financial markets that the government was ‘moving away 
from its firm intentions on monetary discipline’.67 John Hoskyns, a key 
adviser to Thatcher, warned the Prime Minister that ‘to preach economic 
realism and urge people to abandon the dream world etc., and then try to 
subsidise mortgage rates would invite ridicule’.68 The constraints imposed 
on the government by its commitment to controlling inflation through 
reducing government expenditure and tight monetary policy disabled the 
government’s ability to manage mortgage costs.
Abolition of the building society interest rate cartel would not solve 
the problem of the rising cost of borrowing in 1979. Nevertheless, there 
was some pressure on the government to take such action. The BSA’s 
uncompetitive practices, and particularly its recommended rate, had 
drawn cross-party criticism since the late 1960s. In 1980 the Tory Bow 
Group proposed a rationalisation of the financial system so that the 
advantages afforded to building societies (favourable tax treatment, in 
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addition to the cartel) would be removed and the societies incorporated 
within the banking system.69 The report of the Committee to Review the 
Functioning of Financial Institutions, set up under the chairmanship of 
Harold Wilson to consider possible reform of the national financial 
system, also endorsed abolishing the cartel to create a more competitive 
financial system.70 Yet despite the ideological commitments of the first 
Thatcher government, such a move was resisted. Shortly after Margaret 
Thatcher arrived in Downing Street, the CPRS proposed breaking up the 
building society cartel in order ‘to help avoid the periodic mortgage 
famines which have been a common feature since the war’.71 Thatcher’s 
response was that while she did not like the cartel, she was ‘fearful of 
encouraging competition with the present structure in management of 
the societies [Thatcher’s underlining]’, which she believed to be poor.72 
Harold Wilson had been equally scathing of the building societies during 
his tenure at Number 10, describing them as ‘hidebound’, ‘fuddy-duddy’ 
and ‘ossified’.73 The quality of building society management was not, 
however, the primary concern. A key worry, expressed by Nigel Lawson, 
then Financial Secretary to the Treasury, in a speech to the BSA conference 
in May 1980, was that by creating a unified mortgage market the building 
societies would increase their interest rates and this would remove the 
mechanism by which mortgage costs had been made affordable since the 
war.74 It was also recognised that to create a unified mortgage market 
would likely result in increased house prices, as had occurred during the 
brief experiment in the liberalisation of bank lending under the Heath 
government.75 It was a major concern, too, that to lose control over 
mortgage lending would weaken the government’s ability to control the 
money supply, which at that time was the central aim of macroeconomic 
policy.76
Once again, however, the imperatives of monetarism had unintended 
consequences. Anti-inflationary policies had attracted foreign capital into 
Britain in 1979, which, combined with North Sea oil, had the damaging 
effect (for British exporters) of appreciating the sterling exchange rate. 
The government was unable to abandon its monetarist policies and so 
instead decided that the most effective way to reduce the exchange rate 
would be to allow foreign outflows of capital. Exchange controls, which 
had been in place in various forms since the 1930s, were abolished in 
October 1979.77 The corollary of this final capitulation to re-globalised 
finance was that any government limits on the domestic banking system 
were deemed to be no longer operable. Banks could simply evade 
government controls by freely moving their money abroad, and so they 
were abandoned as useless. Geoffrey Howe’s Treasury advisers were 
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divided over whether removing controls on bank lending would see the 
clearing banks enter into the mortgage market in any significant way.78 
Lawson expressed concern that the banks would begin to offer mortgages, 
which would have the adverse side effect of increasing the money 
supply.79 Without any formal controls, the Chancellor was forced to rely 
on making requests to the banks that they restrain their lending in the 
mortgage market.80 However, these requests went unheeded and the 
banks, with their ability to source wholesale funds in the now-global 
money markets, began to undermine the building societies’ dominance. 
In 1982 over a third of all new mortgage lending was provided by banks.81 
The competitive pressure brought to bear on the building societies served 
to break down the cartel arrangements.82 It also prompted the building 
societies, which were traditionally wedded to their mutual ownership 
structure and their reliance on retail deposits, to lobby the government 
for the freedom to operate as banks. This was so that they could defend 
their market share in the newly competitive environment of Britain’s 
globalised domestic financial system.83 Significantly, by 1988 
new legislation enabled the building societies to obtain up to 40 per cent 
of their funding from wholesale sources.84 They were also given the 
freedom to demutualise and become banks, an opportunity that many 
embraced.85
The liberalisation of mortgage lending in Britain may have accorded 
with the free-market principles of Thatcherism, but it was, in fact, imposed 
on the post-1979 Conservative government by the exigencies of its 
monetarist macroeconomic policy, which itself was a response to globalised 
finance. The aims of the first Thatcher government were no different from 
those of its Labour predecessors: to satisfy the public demand for affordable 
homes to buy, and credit to buy them with. It was only as time went on that 
the government realised that a combination of higher mortgage rates and 
rising house prices could be politically acceptable and, indeed, provide the 
basis for continued electoral dominance. The government’s failure to 
achieve broad-based economic growth in the wake of the monetarist 
experiment had left it without a coherent economic strategy for future 
prosperity. Tim Congdon wrote in The Times in 1986:
The Conservatives are asking themselves how they can secure 
re-election. Unless the economy recovers more vigorously, un- 
employment will remain at over three million . . . How does it 
escape? Is there any mechanism still available for strengthening 
demand and improving business conditions in time to swing enough 
votes in its direction?86
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As interest rates came down in the mid-1980s, a mortgage lending 
bonanza ensued that allowed more and more people to borrow to 
purchase houses that were increasing in value.87 The Thatcher 
government’s escape route was found in appreciating house prices, which 
not only made substantial numbers of voters feel more prosperous, but 
also encouraged greater consumption that in turn generated economic 
growth.
The demand for home ownership, and the desire for easy access to 
mortgage credit, was entrenched during the years of the post-war 
consensus. Government attempts to maintain both the supply and the 
cost of mortgages were rendered impossible by severe limits on 
government spending and tight monetary policies dictated by monetarism 
after 1976. The ‘mortgage-accumulation regime’ that emerged in the 
mid-1980s was an unintended product of the globalisation of finance, 
which intersected with this deep demand for home ownership.88 In the 
post-monetarist, post-industrial economy of the mid-1980s, easy access 
to credit to purchase properties appreciating in value emerged as an 
effective way to achieve a politically stable form of ‘inclusive’ economic 
growth.
Conclusion
Britain’s late twentieth-century financialised economic model was forged 
in the 1980s. It was not, however, simply the product of an ideological 
commitment to free markets by the Thatcher governments. Instead, we 
must situate these governments in a historical context that recognises the 
importance of processes of ‘financialisation’ that had been underway 
throughout the post-war decades. This chapter has highlighted two of 
these: the incorporation of large sections of the British public within the 
financial system as mortgagors (or potential mortgagors), and the 
re-globalisation of finance through the Eurodollar market. The latter was 
the most fundamentally important development: uncontrolled cross-
border financial flows managed by banks in London destabilised the 
international economic framework that provided the basis for post-war 
social democracy and thus created the most important material condition 
for the transition towards neoliberalism.
The argument presented in this chapter challenges the temporal 
framing of a transition from post-war social democracy to neoliberalism 
having taken place around the time of the election of the first Thatcher 
government. Although profound changes to Britain’s political economy 
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did take place in the 1980s, it is evident that these had deep roots that 
pre-dated ‘Thatcherism’: the globalisation of the City of London was a 
1960s revival of Britain’s pre-1931 liberal-imperial position in the world 
economic order (albeit within the wider frame of US financial hegemony); 
and the demand for mortgages took off in the 1930s and became deeply 
embedded in the post-war political consensus. This does not mean that 
there was nothing novel about the Thatcher years, but what was new was 
not created ex nihilo.
Furthermore, this chapter should remind us not to lose sight of the 
material conditions in which neoliberal ideology, as well as neoliberal 
social and cultural practices, developed. This does not mean that we 
must revert to a simplistic materialist analysis in which the economic 
fundamentals are deemed to be direct determinants of politics, society 
and culture. Clearly, the material conditions prevailing in the 1970s and 
1980s were themselves produced by ‘non-economic’ factors, such as the 
institutional and cultural hangover of British imperialism in the City, or 
the multiple meanings and values attached to home ownership in British 
culture. It is also true that new ideas, especially neoliberal economic 
theories (for example monetarism), could be drawn upon to make the 
new conditions comprehensible and manageable. Yet histories of 
neoliberalism that focus solely on neoliberal ideas about capitalism, but 
fail to pay attention to the contemporaneous dynamics of capitalism, will 
only provide a limited analysis of the late twentieth century.
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Begrudging neoliberalism:  
housing and the fate of the  
property-owning social democracy
guy ortolano*
By ‘begrudging’ neoliberalism, I mean two things. Firstly, the term 
refers to the historian’s unease in adopting such a notoriously woolly 
concept. The intellectual historian Daniel Rodgers, for example, faults 
‘neoliberalism’ on both conceptual and pragmatic grounds, as a word 
‘accelerating through too many meanings, employed in too many debates, 
gluing too many phenomena together, and cannibalising too many other 
words around it’, its very invocation rendering ‘it harder to see both the 
forces at loose in our times and where viable resistance can be found’.1 
David Edgerton, echoing Voltaire on the Holy Roman Empire (‘in no way 
holy, nor Roman, nor an empire’), charges that to ‘call the new order neo-
liberalism is to flatter it, for there was little original or new, or liberal, 
about it’.2 Partly for these reasons, and following the example of Avner 
Offer, when presented with the option I prefer to cite, as more precise and 
less polemical, ‘market liberalism’ instead.3 And yet, if the task at hand is 
not primarily terminological, but rather to engage broader conversations 
about political life in the late twentieth century, ‘neoliberalism’ has come 
to serve as the banner under which, begrudgingly, we now gather.4
The second meaning of ‘begrudging’ neoliberalism refers to the 
position of public sector actors who, as the 1970s became the 1980s, 
found themselves accommodating priorities contrary to their own. 
Broadly speaking – though mindful of G. M. Young’s admonition against 
forcing ‘historic movements into exaggerated symmetry’ – the second half 
of the twentieth century saw a shift in the relative authority of social 
democracy and neoliberalism.5 If social democracy aimed to reduce 
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collective inequality by removing aspects of social and economic life from 
the market, neoliberalism aimed to increase individual freedom by 
removing aspects of social and economic life from the state. In explaining 
the transition from the former to the latter, neoliberalism’s historians 
tend to focus upon the right. The heroes (or anti-heroes) of these accounts 
are the liberal economists, financial journalists, conservative politicians 
and think-tank intellectuals who nurtured ideas and policies that achieved 
ascendance during the century’s closing act.6 Yet in the effort to secure 
not merely an altered set of policies, but an altered way of thinking, an 
equally significant development came when even that movement’s critics 
found themselves enacting neoliberal policies.
Consider the case of housing. Housing figured centrally both to the 
welfare state from 1945, and to Margaret Thatcher’s Britain from 1979. 
As the post-war Labour government’s minister of housing as well as 
health, Aneurin Bevan sought to turn housing into a universal service; as 
Thatcher’s first Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine 
believed that owner-occupation would ‘strike at the heart of Labour’s 
concept of how society should be ordered’.7 In the aftermath of Thatcher’s 
polarising decade, the sociologist Peter Saunders adopted this dichotomous 
reading of housing policy, depicting owner-occupation as a ‘counter-
revolution’ against ‘the left’s commitment to social engineering’.8 This 
perspective associates the left with council housing and the right with 
private ownership, making the trajectory from the former to the latter 
appear to be the triumph of Conservative initiatives. Yet, as Aled Davies 
discusses in this volume from a different perspective, social democrats 
had long supported owner-occupation as part of a mixed housing system 
that included private owners alongside public renters – a programme 
referred to here as a property-owning social democracy. From the mid-
1970s, in the wake of recession and retrenchment, some public sector 
actors discerned an opportunity to advance their existing goal of 
extending owner-occupation. In time, however, this shift in emphasis 
developed into an end unto itself, so that these social democratic actors 
soon found themselves enacting neoliberal policy goals. In this light, the 
ascendance of neoliberalism resulted not only from the exertions of its 
champions, but also from the begrudging acquiescence of its critics.
The argument that follows develops in four parts. The first part 
elaborates upon the ‘property-owning social democracy’, identifying this 
long-standing position as still viable through the 1970s. The second part 
examines efforts to realise the property-owning social democracy in a 
significant sector of municipal housing, the 32 New Towns designated by 
the British state between 1946 and 1970. Focusing on the most ambitious 
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of these projects, Milton Keynes, this section reveals the ways in which, 
during the late 1970s, public sector actors adapted social democratic 
priorities in response to economic and political pressures. The third part 
follows these adaptations as they developed into ends unto themselves, 
as housing sales took priority over measures that could forestall 
socio-spatial polarisation. The fourth part recaps the argument, before 
indicating the general account of neoliberalism that this analysis makes 
available: one that features a more dynamic social democracy and a more 
contingent neoliberalism, and that accordingly accounts for the tactical 
accommodations that helped secure the ascendance of the latter.
The property-owning social democracy
With the decline of private landlords after the First World War, Britain’s 
housing system became increasingly organised around a combination of 
municipal renters and owner-occupiers. From 1919 to 1980, the country’s 
housing patterns converged towards this ‘dual tenurial system’.9 Despite 
their differences in emphasis, both Labour and the Conservatives accepted 
a role for each sector. Thus, while Bevan prioritised public provision, he 
called owner-occupation ‘an excellent thing’ and assumed it would persist.10 
His Tory successor, Harold Macmillan, favoured owner-occupation but also 
depended upon local authorities’ construction to meet his annual building 
targets.11 Labour’s 1959 manifesto pledged to assist prospective buyers, a 
commitment that subsequent Labour manifestos only strengthened.12 As 
Aled Davies shows, it often fell to local Labour councils to finance housing 
purchases: in Sheffield, for example, the Labour council provided more 
than ten thousand housing loans during the early 1960s.13 Labour’s 1965 
white paper, The Housing Programme, 1965–1970, acknowledged owner-
occupation as Britain’s ‘normal’ housing tenure, and Harold Wilson’s 
governments committed to extending it. Upon regaining office in 1974, 
Labour spent nearly as much on homeowners’ tax relief as on local 
authorities’ housing.14 These investments from the left did not amount to 
tactical concessions, much less ideological surrenders. They represented, 
rather, a British iteration of transnational efforts to extend property 
throughout the popular classes, from African Americans in the US to late 
colonial Africans to the favelas of Brazil.15
In other words, advocating a role for the state in housing did not 
negate a simultaneous commitment to owner-occupation. Rather, the 
commitment to both enjoined the state to foster home ownership along 
social democratic lines, forging a property-owning social democracy.16 
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In the light of this position, the mere fact of council house sales on either 
side of 1979 did not represent a continuity in policy, since these 
superficially similar policies served contrary ideological agendas. The 
Conservative vision of a property-owning democracy sought to attach 
citizens to capitalism through home ownership – despite turning public 
housing into a second-class tenure, and despite the polarisation of 
property and wealth that resulted. The property-owning social democracy, 
by contrast, aimed to achieve a more equitable distribution of property 
and wealth, by placing renters alongside owners in a balanced social 
whole.
This ideal of ‘balance’ was integral to the property-owning social 
democracy. Balance had figured in political thought since Aristotle’s 
Politics, which depicted extremes of wealth as damaging to the polity; it 
functioned similarly in Thomas More’s Utopia, which imagined the 
elimination of the extremes plaguing More’s own Europe.17 Entering the 
twentieth century, balance defined town and country planning, beginning 
with the field’s foundational text. Ebenezer Howard’s A Peaceful Path 
towards Real Reform (1898) celebrated balance in its famous illustration 
of ‘The Three Magnets’, which resolved the evils of town (‘foul air’) 
and country (‘lack of drainage’) in the perfect symmetry of town– 
country (‘pure air’ and ‘good drainage’).18 In the context of a social 
democratic vision for housing, ‘balance’ referred both to a more equitable 
distribution of wealth-in-property between the top and bottom of society, 
and to the integration of renters alongside owners in a healthy polity. The 
former commitment was distributive, the latter communitarian, and 
together they testified to housing’s indispensable role in achieving social 
democratic goals.19
In practice, however, balance proved elusive. Bevan worried that 
the sale of council housing would divide renters and owners along 
class lines. He deplored this connection between public provision and 
financial need, in housing no less than health.20 Housing scholars know 
the dynamic that worried Bevan as ‘residualisation’.21 Residualisation 
threatened whenever public provision became divorced from general 
needs and consequently acquired stigma. From the late 1960s, when 
Labour’s housing minister, Anthony Greenwood, resumed Bevan’s 
former practice of denying Tory councils’ applications to sell municipal 
properties, he did so in part to retain the state’s capacity to provide 
housing, but also to forestall the public sector’s residualisation.22 These 
denials made it possible for the Conservatives to depict Labour as hostile 
to owner-occupation. ‘The Labour Party’, they charged in 1983, ‘is still 
fighting a rear-guard action against wider home ownership’.23 But that 
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interpretation wrongly conflates positions on the sale of council housing 
under the terms of 1980 Housing Act with positions on home ownership 
generally.
The alternative to the property-owning democracy was not, as the 
Conservatives would have it, universal public accommodation, but the 
property-owning social democracy: a managed housing system including 
both the public and private sectors. That system required oversight, in the 
form of an authority that could forestall residualisation while still 
facilitating ownership. With this programme in mind, the 1970s appear 
to be a fertile moment featuring a range of possibilities – including, but 
not limited to, the right to buy. This field of possibilities reflected the 
cross-party consensus in support of home ownership: ‘a deep and natural 
desire’, according to a Tory white paper; ‘a basic and natural desire’, 
echoed Labour.24 At the same time, the state’s housing commitments were 
expanding. A few enterprising local authorities bolstered their housing 
stocks by purchasing entire streets of flats, while – as Peter Shapely has 
shown – municipal tenants increasingly demanded the quality housing 
and routine maintenance that a social democracy promised.25 Some 
policy reforms brought unintended consequences, as when the 1977 
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act enshrined a right to housing in the 
council sector for the homeless, only to exacerbate the residualisation of 
the housing sector to which they had won access.26 Meanwhile, new 
initiatives were emerging without obvious ties to right or left, private or 
public, owning or renting. New legislation enhanced the ability of ancient 
institutions, ‘housing associations’, to invest in what would later become 
known as the ‘social housing’ sector – an obscure innovation dealing with 
a fraction of the market, but one that would figure centrally in housing 
policy from the 1980s.27
During the 1970s, though, the effective achievement of universal 
housing, combined with economic pressures impacting both the 
public and private sectors, stimulated a context in which inherited 
commitments and disruptive innovations coexisted. This too-brief 
overview of that history has aimed to unsettle the presumption of a left/
right divide over home ownership, while recovering possibilities other 
than those that followed from the 1980s Housing Act. In this fluid policy 
context, departures from Bevan’s 1940s did not necessarily point 
to Thatcher’s 1980s. How, then, did that particular end come about? 
Answering that question requires a shift in focus, from housing policy in 
general to housing policy on the ground – for instance, in Treasury-
financed developments spread across all four nations of the UK, the 
New Towns.
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A dynamic social democracy
By 1966, Britain’s New Towns housed three-quarters of a million 
people.28 But this achievement overwhelmingly came through rental 
accommodations, posing a problem for those who sought a balance among 
classes and between tenures. Among the most significant of the authorities 
responding to this challenge was the Milton Keynes Development 
Corporation (MKDC), established in 1967 and in existence until 1992. 
Charged with developing a ‘new city’ of 250,000 residents between 
Birmingham and London, MKDC had the misfortune of embarking upon 
that task amid a series of escalating funding crises. The development 
corporation’s leadership struggled to navigate those crises while still 
achieving housing balance.
The challenge was previewed in the New Town of Stevenage. 
Designated in 1946, 90 per cent of Stevenage’s housing had been built for 
rent.29 In 1966, however, a survey found that nine residents in ten favoured 
sales to sitting tenants. Two years later, consistent with the vision of a 
property-owning social democracy, the Labour government authorised 
those sales, only for Stevenage’s development corporation to meet 
difficulty finding buyers. It turned out that there was a difference between 
expressing an interest in buying, as an abstract proposition, and producing 
a deposit. Having failed to realise the promised market, the development 
corporation took steps to create one. They launched a campaign 
advertising the ease and benefits of home ownership, while offering their 
residents discounts of up to 20 per cent off their home’s market value. 
Sales promptly took off, eventually extending to nearly one home in every 
three. By 1974, rates of home ownership in Stevenage had trebled.30
Then, in 1974, the Labour government suspended sales, creating an 
opportunity to assess the impact of liberalising sales in a discrete time and 
place. During this six-year period, the town’s most affluent renters bought 
their homes. These proud new owners reaped economic and psychological 
rewards, gaining an investment along with the satisfactions of home 
ownership. These benefits, however, came at a cost, in those publicly 
subsidised discounts: 20 per cent below what the corporation would have 
yielded had they sold at market rates. Then, after five years, these new 
owners could sell their homes and keep that subsidy – effectively a hidden 
cash transfer, shifting public investments into individuals’ pockets. 
Meanwhile, as Stevenage shed its public housing stock, housing wait lists 
doubled, stimulating the rental market. That market fostered the 
development of a phenomenon that had barely existed previously, private 
landlords: profit-making purveyors of rental housing that, just a few years 
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earlier, the local authority had managed. But if this experiment revealed 
some of the problems attendant upon the sale of municipal housing, it 
also attested to the policies that could forestall those problems: a public 
authority managing the distribution of sales, while simultaneously 
maintaining a viable rental sector.
Thirty miles away, at precisely the same time, the builders of Milton 
Keynes were determined to get housing right. Far from an innovation of 
later housing acts, home ownership was inscribed in the New Town’s 
DNA. ‘The Minister of Housing and Local Government . . . has asked that 
at least 50% of households in the new city should own their own homes’, 
read the master plan of 1970. ‘The Corporation endorses this aim and 
has accepted it as a fundamental guide to policy.’31 The pursuit of 
‘balance’ figured centrally. Social integration, the planners believed, 
fostered social cohesion. ‘We must, at literally all costs, build a balanced 
city’, the chairman insisted, long before the first trench was ever dug.32 
The master plan pledged to forestall economic polarisation, by distributing 
the city’s services evenly across the city.33 The planners wanted residents 
to mix with one another. Following the war, Bevan and the Labour Party 
had primarily imagined this mixing in terms of class, but the social axes 
requiring mixing had since proliferated.34 Milton Keynes’s planners now 
sought balance within, as well as between, classes, aiming to cultivate a 
diversity of races and generations no less than income groups.35
But after 10 years, Milton Keynes had achieved an ownership rate 
of just 30 per cent – a disappointment, but not a crisis. However, policies 
from London soon sent MKDC into a panic. In 1976, Labour’s secretary of 
state for the environment, Peter Shore, announced a policy shift that 
posed an existential threat for Britain’s New Towns programme. After 
30 years of dispersal, in which New Towns had enjoyed a privileged role, 
Shore announced a focus on inner cities instead. He wanted smaller New 
Towns, serving older cities, partly by absorbing their most disadvantaged 
populations.36 Eleven days later, the Prime Minister issued a sobering 
lecture of his own. ‘The cosy world we were told would go on for ever’, Jim 
Callaghan informed his party’s conference on 28 September 1976, ‘where 
full employment would be guaranteed by a stroke of the Chancellor’s pen, 
cutting taxes, deficit spending – that cosy world is gone’.37 The autumn 
became consumed by negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, 
leading to Denis Healey’s painful mini-budget of 15 December 1976. That 
budget halved the next year’s New Town housing starts. Shore twisted the 
knife, slashing Milton Keynes’s planned growth by 100,000 residents over 
the next 10 years, part of an overall reduction among all third-generation 
New Towns by nearly 400,000.38
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Squeezed between Shore’s priorities and Healey’s economies, 
1976/7 marked the end of an era for Milton Keynes. The New Town’s very 
survival required a new commitment, to ‘profitability and growth’: 
profitability to offset the cuts from Healey’s budgets, and growth to 
alleviate the crisis of confidence following Shore’s priorities.39 Both 
profitability and growth could be served, the development corporation 
concluded, by building and selling houses. In a development that had 
grown by 35,000 people in 10 years, nearly doubling the area’s initial 
population, the corporation now sought to add another 75,000 over the 
next decade.40 In the light of these trends, the most promising opportunity 
for growing owner-occupation lay less in transferring rentals – which 
would change tenures, but not increase numbers – than in building new 
sale housing. The corporation pledged to turn Milton Keynes into ‘a 
rallying point for investment in industry, commerce, housing, and the 
environment’, indeed a new ‘centre for the building industry’ nationwide.41 
In order to achieve these goals, they established a new department, the 
Private Housing Unit.42 The Private Housing Unit accelerated dealings 
with developers, aiming to treble 1976’s construction of homes for sale.43
In addition to building houses, they needed to sell them. The Private 
Housing Unit doubled as a marketing unit, turning renters into owners. 
The general manager, Fred Roche, wrote to every renter in the city, 
alerting them to new opportunities for buying their homes.44 MKDC 
became a fixture at area home shows, and the Private Housing Unit 
erected an installation in central Milton Keynes advertising the benefits 
of home ownership.45 These measures worked. In 1976, the city had sold 
just 200 homes, but by 1978 that figure had more than trebled – and they 
were on pace to reach 1,200 completions by 1981.46 By that time, the city 
was finally approaching the rates of ownership to which its master plan 
aspired, helping the development corporation to achieve the profitability 
and growth that might secure its standing.
Early in 1979, the development corporation contemplated the 
possibility of a new Conservative government. Mindful of the Tories’ 
historic suspicion towards the New Towns, a local newspaper expressed 
the obvious concern: ‘City in danger if Tories win’.47 But New Towns had 
survived many changes of government previously, and the most damaging 
policies had recently come not from the Conservatives, but from Labour. 
Navigating these crises had led the corporation to develop revenue 
streams independent of the Treasury, promising some measure of 
autonomy and, they hoped, the chance to continue building. Thus, while 
they harboured no illusions about the Conservatives, the city’s leadership 
envisioned harnessing Tory zeal to further their own goals. As the election 
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neared, they plotted a dual course. Their project would contribute to the 
‘restructuring, expansion, and growth of the British economy’, while 
maintaining their commitments to ‘a balanced social and economic 
structure’, ‘a diversity of social, educational, and cultural opportunities’, 
and an ethic informed by ‘social consciousness’.48 Having navigated 
economic and policy crises, and anticipating further challenges, MKDC 
hoped to manage – even harness – an ascendant market liberalism.
A shock city of private housing
The MKDC engineered its own survival, but on terms that knocked 
things badly out of balance. In May 1979, with the right-to-buy provisions 
of the 1980 Housing Act still more than a year away, the Conservative 
government liberalised New Town housing sales. Already by the summer, 
more than 20 per cent of tenants in Milton Keynes’s 10,000 rentals had 
inquired about purchase; by September, 10 per cent of these inquiries 
were proceeding with sales – a figure exceeding all prior such sales in the 
New Town to date.49 By 1983, owner-occupation locally had risen from 41 
to 51 per cent and was fast bearing down on the national rate of 57 per 
cent.50 By 1987, 83 per cent of new dwellings in Milton Keynes were sold, 
not rented – shattering the national rate of 64 per cent. At a time when 
public rentals still amounted to 25 per cent of new construction in 
England and Wales, in Milton Keynes they comprised a mere 7 per cent.51 
These trends climaxed in 1991, on the eve of MKDC’s dissolution. In 
1977, public rentals had comprised 70 per cent of the city’s housing; by 
1991, that figure had plunged to just 26 per cent. Even more striking, in 
1990/1 the city oversaw the completion of 1,241 homes – including 
no public rentals.52 These developments did not follow automatically 
from government policies, but rather represented the achievement 
of the development corporation’s commitment to seeing those policies 
through.
As a shock city of private housing, Milton Keynes began to preview 
coming national problems. Soon after embarking upon these reforms, the 
development corporation discerned a previously rare problem, 
repossessions – which, by the 1990s, reached crisis levels nationally.53 Not 
one year into the Conservatives’ new policies, MKDC grew concerned 
about the loss of entry-level housing in the city, particularly among 
younger residents. As property values rose, public rentals newly converted 
into private homes became too expensive for first-time buyers when they 
next reached the market.54 More troublingly, estates that had recently 
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mixed renters alongside owners were increasingly becoming associated 
with one or the other. This segregation of tenures became exacerbated by 
a polarisation of incomes. On the lower end, Heseltine’s elimination of 
‘Parker Morris’ standards ensured that rental estates included lower-
standard homes, while on the upper end, private developers prioritised 
upper-income construction at the expense of building more affordable 
developments.55
Ben Jones discusses this sorting of housing by tenure, income and 
class as ‘socio-spatial polarization’, and it had several causes.56 Firstly, 
their eyes fixed on the bottom line, private developers preferred to boost 
property values (and thus their profits) by concentrating on middle-class 
developments.57 Secondly, renters on the most prosperous estates seized 
upon the government’s generous subsidies to convert their homes’ 
tenures, causing those estates to shed their rental sectors. Thirdly, the 
development corporation’s campaigns were not so much creating new 
pools of buyers, as subsidising tenants most interested in buying anyway. 
Renters on lesser-valued estates, by contrast, were denied the lavish 
subsidies that facilitated purchase, not because they would not or could 
not buy, but because the discounts that made buying possible only became 
available when a home’s value exceeded the cost of its construction.
The depressed valuations of these homes were being set not by a 
neutral and unerring ‘market’, but by real estate appraisers. These 
appraisers remained unconvinced of the market viability of non-
traditional, rental housing – even when the development corporation 
noted that these very renters comprised the most promising pool of 
untapped buyers. The obstacle to their purchasing consisted not of their 
homes’ designs, but their costs – costs that stemmed, in a cruel catch-22, 
from the lack of discounts and mortgages enjoyed by residents on higher-
valued estates. Rented homes on lesser-valued estates – precisely the 
population the development corporation wanted to reach – thus became 
frozen out of a market that, paradoxically, deemed the very homes they 
wanted to buy as unmarketable. At the same time, prosperous renters on 
other estates were converting public investments into private assets – 
pocketing public subsidies and privatising public buildings, while 
rendering their communities more exclusive.58 These developments did 
not follow naturally from the workings of a market, unleashed at last, but 
rather from this particular system of discounts and appraisals. Socio-
spatial polarisation followed.
Though the obstacles to balance were substantial, MKDC initially 
proved up to the challenge. If raw sales were their sole priority, they could 
easily have goosed them, by moving prospective buyers on lesser-valued 
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estates (which did not qualify for discounts) into more highly valued 
areas. Such manoeuvres, however, would polarise wealth, segregate 
tenures and undermine the communities left behind, and the development 
corporation rejected them accordingly. In the planning director’s 
judgement, such a gambit would represent ‘a radical change of Corporation 
policy’, ‘directly contraven[ing] the Master Plan’.59 At the same time, the 
development corporation pushed back against developers’ demands that 
they relax bidding procedures and building requirements. Developers 
were simply seeking to minimise costs, but the corporation’s general 
manager could respond by invoking values other than their bottom 
lines.60 At other times, when building societies denied residents the 
mortgages necessary to make purchasing possible, the development 
corporation stepped in to offer mortgages of its own.61 And when 
developers sought to cultivate higher-value sales by separating their 
customers from public renters, the development corporation mounted a 
campaign depicting the city as a whole – rather than its most exclusive 
estates – as a symbol of socio-economic arrival.62 Building societies and 
private developers were not villains, but they were risk averse, and they 
were operating according to the logic of financial, rather than social, 
incentives. The development corporation, however, could function as an 
alternative centre of power, one with the ability to keep alternative 
priorities in mind.
In time, however, the capacity to defend those priorities eroded. In 
summer 1979, even while welcoming the government’s sales procedures, 
New Towns nationally faced budget cuts of 5 per cent. In Milton Keynes, 
these cuts impacted on roads and rental housing, but no sooner had the 
board adjusted than the minister announced a new round of staff cuts as 
well.63 The development corporation began losing its most valued staff, 
including its general manager and planning director, who could readily 
see opportunities moving to the private sector.64 Whitehall next instructed 
all New Town development corporations to sell £120 million-worth of 
holdings within a year; when they managed only half that figure, 
the shortfall was added to the next year’s even more ambitious 
£270 million target. As MKDC sold off its assets, even more profound 
changes arrived.65 The era of public housing was finished, the housing 
minister announced in 1980, a sentiment echoed by the Prime Minister. 
‘[A]s regards the traditional post-war role of government in housing’, 
Thatcher declared, ‘the state should be withdrawn . . . just as far and as 
fast as possible.’66
The accommodations that this policy demanded evacuated the 
city’s founding goals of all their content. By the mid-1980s, to the extent 
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that they still paid lip service to the goal of ‘balance’, that concept’s 
meaning had altered beyond all recognition. ‘Balance’ no longer referred 
to the integration of tenures, classes, generations and races, as in 1970, 
but rather to bringing a diversity of incomes into the private market. 
The housing market, not the city or its residents, now figured as the 
entity in need of balance. In adjusting to this altered calculus, the policy 
became an end unto itself. In 1987, 2,600 residents applied for rental 
accommodation. During the city’s founding decade, the development 
corporation would have met these needs through its rental sector. Now, 
they handled these applications differently. Just 400 of 2,600, they 
determined, consisted of proper (mostly elderly) renters, whereas 2,200 
remained ‘economically active’ – all but 500 of whom, upon further 
examination, should be directed onto the private market. Partly through 
such techniques, Milton Keynes was by this time smashing national sales 
trends, en route to reversing 1977’s ratio of renters to owners. Such 
achievements were made possible by turning a pool of 2,600 renters into 
a new market of 1,700 buyers.67
‘The new town development corporations have always been ready to 
be pioneers’, the Conservative housing minister declared in 1979.68 Indeed, 
New Towns pioneered the new regime of housing. In that new regime, 
liberalised mortgages increased repossessions, the housing market sent 
prices soaring, private landlords made a comeback and the right to buy 
exacerbated socio-spatial polarisation. MKDC had valorised owner-
occupation since its founding, but it had also remained committed to – and 
capable of – managing the social consequences that followed from that 
goal. During the 1980s, however, the government’s campaign against the 
welfare state included an assault upon its spatial balancing. Cuts in funding, 
staff and public rentals transformed the development corporation’s role, 
from providing oversight and management to leveraging sales and 
investment, evacuating its capacity to advance goals other than the private 
sector’s profits. In Milton Keynes, as in Britain, home ownership and private 
investment figured prominently in the housing system before 1980. But so, 
too, did a commitment to balance – and the mechanisms for achieving it – 
that differentiated housing’s ultimate trajectory from the alternative 
represented by the property-owning social democracy.
Begrudging neoliberalism
During most of the twentieth century, though private landlords never 
vanished, Britain’s housing pattern became increasingly characterised by 
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a duopoly between public sector renters and private sector owners. 
Rather than reading these tenures through political lenses, associating 
public rentals with the left and private ownership with the right, I have 
called attention to a programme that I call the ‘property-owning social 
democracy’. This concept conveys the way in which private ownership 
always figured in the left’s vision for housing, if not on the same terms as 
in the right’s more famous ‘property-owning democracy’. The property-
owning social democracy embraced a mixed tenurial system, in which 
the government retained a role in managing both public rentals and 
private sales. The goal was neither universal ownership nor universal 
municipalisation, but rather balance – of tenures, incomes and races; 
within communities, and across the country – in the face of the polarising 
forces that the private market encouraged.
Possessed of these goals, mindful of these dynamics and embarking 
upon a substantial housing programme, MKDC aimed to get housing 
right. But the goal of balance proved difficult to realise, even before 
mounting economic and political pressures from 1976 threatened the 
development corporation’s existence. In response to those challenges, 
MKDC became committed to achieving profitability and growth, to which 
end they prioritised the development and sale of housing. This initiative 
succeeded so thoroughly that, by 1979, they could cautiously welcome 
new Conservative policies favouring home ownership. That powerful 
current, however, soon pulled them off course, as the priorities 
of developers and the government undermined this public sector 
body’s ability to pursue the social goals at the heart of the property-
owning social democracy. Social democratic actors thus anticipated, 
accommodated and – eventually – enacted neoliberal ends.
But rather than inevitably producing neoliberalism’s triumph, these 
crises of the 1970s stimulated innovations on the left as well as the right. 
As Daisy Payling, Stephen Brooke, Andrew Seaton and many others are 
now showing, social democratic housing innovations found echoes in 
other sectors, too.69 Together they attest to a social democracy neither 
exhausted nor moribund, but instead capable of responding to novel 
challenges. In the case of housing, though, as public sector actors sought 
to manage this swirling economic and political environment, they made 
calculations and entered alliances that compromised their first intentions. 
Strategies aimed at securing the survival of a public sector housing 
programme unwittingly exacerbated socio-spatial polarisation. This 
process resulted not from the emergence of ‘neoliberal subjectivities’, but 
from the accommodation of neoliberal polices – after all, as we have seen, 
home ownership had fit within a social democratic politics no less than its 
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alternative.70 Ultimately, then, the history of housing offers a less 
deterministic account of a seminal ideological change: one that includes 
contingency as well as structure, irony as well as agency, and the public 
sector as well as the private, as social democratic actors begrudgingly 
accommodated neoliberalism.
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Afterword: British neoliberalism  
and its subjects
tehila Sasson
Is neoliberalism a useful historical and analytical term? Despite the title 
of this volume, the majority of its chapters reject the term – or at the least 
are sceptical of it. David Edgerton, in the first chapter, is perhaps the most 
hostile, suggesting the label ‘neoliberal’ is ‘best dispensed with’. I too was 
sceptical of its usefulness beyond the history of political and economic 
thought. After reading this volume, however, I am convinced that 
neoliberalism – or rather what we may call ‘neoliberal rationality’, the 
economic reason that extended economic values, ideas and practices to 
various spheres of life – offers a powerful and fruitful framework for all 
kinds of historians.1 In their efforts to do away with or propose caveats to 
the term, the chapters in this volume inadvertently demonstrate that 
neoliberalism does, in fact, afford historians a useful – even if provocative 
– framework to investigate the changing relationship between the state, 
economy and society in the second half of the twentieth century. As Stuart 
Hall has put it, ‘there are enough common features to warrant giving 
[neoliberalism] a provisional conceptual identity’.2 Just like liberalism, 
neoliberalism was never one single, coherent system of thought or 
policies. Its richness lies in the multiple iterations it developed and how it 
intersected with other economic and political transformations in the late 
twentieth century.
Broadly speaking, the chapters in this volume represent two types 
of scholarship: the first examines political and economic policies and 
ideas, and the second uses the lens of social and cultural history. In this 
afterword, I will consider some of the common threads that emerge from 
both types of work, and I will read with them and beyond them in order 
to assess what was distinctive about British neoliberalism; what we can 
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learn from them about the active role of the British state and British 
governments in facilitating neoliberalisation; what this shows us about 
what happened to the welfare system and the development of the welfare 
state under neoliberalism; and what it illuminates about the exact place 
of entrepreneurship, the flexible labour market and self-employment 
in Britain.
I argue that we cannot understand the neoliberal rationality in 
Britain without considering how it developed alongside and was shaped 
by global and post-imperial transformations in the economy, in particular 
deindustrialisation and financialisation. These two transformations were 
never only nationally bounded but were a product of the economics of 
decolonisation and its enduring effect on British financial and credit 
institutions, trade agreements, and migratory and labour regimes.3 The 
conjuncture of neoliberal rationality with the political economy of both 
deindustrialisation and financialisation had a profound effect on 
economic and party policies, as much of the excellent work of British 
historians, represented in this volume, has demonstrated.4 Equally 
important, however, was how this conjuncture transformed British 
society and especially its gendered and racial formations. I will show that 
considering the post-imperial legacies of deindustrialisation and 
financialisation reveals the connections between the long and lasting 
effects of the end of empire on labour and financialised regimes and the 
racialised and gendered forms of neoliberal capitalism in Britain. 
These connections are some of the most distinctive features of British 
neoliberalism.
Examining neoliberalism from the perspective of ideas, politics, 
economics, society and culture highlights the multiple lives of neoliberal 
rationality in Britain; it demonstrates that there is no single ‘origin story’ 
for neoliberal rationality but many points of convergence – and it is this 
convergence which makes neoliberalism a useful analytical category. It 
also, crucially, helps us understand why proclamations of neoliberalism’s 
deaths, notably in 2008, 2016 and 2019, are somewhat premature and 
how neoliberal rationality has continued to shape contemporary Britain.5
*
The first body of scholarship about the history of neoliberalism in Britain 
comes from economic, political and intellectual historians. This 
scholarship forms part of a burgeoning literature that moves away from 
narrow (and popular) understandings of the neoliberal project as anti-
statist and instead shows that neoliberalism was a project that aimed to 
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transform the state. A new generation of historians such as Ben Jackson 
and Quinn Slobodian have demonstrated that neoliberalism – both in 
Britain as well as in Europe and the US – was never a libertarian project.6 
Quite the opposite: in Britain, as elsewhere, neoliberalism depended 
upon a strong state to transform market and social relationships through 
laws and policies. Many neoliberal economists and policymakers saw the 
state as a crucial agent to facilitate their reforms. Just as the state was 
central to the great transformation of laissez-faire capitalism in the late 
eighteenth century,7 so was it crucial to the shift to neoliberal economics 
in the late twentieth century.8 Neoliberal thinkers such as Walter Eucken 
and Wilhelm Röpke, for example, often assigned ‘an important role for 
the state in maintaining market freedom’ through anti-monopoly 
policies.9 Neoliberalism was different from liberalism precisely because it 
acknowledged that some form of economic management was necessary 
to create competitive markets and to secure political support for them.
Take, for example, the story of unemployment benefits under 
Margaret Thatcher. As Jim Tomlinson’s chapter argues, the rapid 
deindustrialisation of Britain from the late 1970s to the 1980s was a 
critical motor in shaping state interventions in labour and housing 
markets regardless of Thatcherite privatisation rhetoric. The Thatcher 
governments in fact increased spending on wage and housing subsidies, 
‘a major problem for the ambition to reduce public spending in the post-
crash “austerity” era, given their scale’. For Tomlinson this proves that 
‘neoliberal plans for state retreat’ clashed with ‘the effects of the shifts in 
the labour market as a consequence of deindustrialisation’. He separates 
deindustrialisation from neoliberal rationality, arguing that neoliberals 
had to concede their ambitions to supposedly ‘roll back’ the state. But 
there is perhaps another way to tell this story, where neoliberals – in 
response to deindustrialisation – created a new infrastructure for the 
deregulation of the labour market. As we learn from Bernhard Rieger’s 
chapter, the British state had a crucial role in shaping neoliberal labour. 
Thatcher’s unemployment policies ‘mobilised state institutions to promote 
market mechanisms in new social contexts’. In a period of rapid 
deindustrialisation, the Thatcher government used state action to inject 
the labour market with a new neoliberal mentality and redefined the 
causes of unemployment. Instead of treating unemployment as the 
product of deindustrialisation, which lowered the demand for waged 
workers, the Thatcher government argued that the price of labour was too 
high. In this logic unions’ bargaining power was too strong and they 
demanded wages that were higher than market value. The Thatcher 
government therefore created a new benefit system that imposed income 
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tax on unemployment benefits and kept them at a minimum, regardless 
of inflation. The idea was ‘to remove distortions in the play of supply and 
demand on the labour market’. This set of policies on unemployment 
benefits should not be seen as a moment where the state was rolled back, 
nor as a moment where Thatcherites failed to roll back the state as much 
as they wanted; rather, this was a moment when the state actively pushed 
more people to seek employment at a lower wage.
Instead of limiting the state’s reach, as we learn from Jim Phillips’s 
chapter, the neoliberal project in Britain was focused on ‘the narrowing 
of industrial democracy’. The Thatcher government used the power of the 
state to weaken the bargaining power of unions and strengthen the power 
of the employer. Following Friedrich Hayek, the Thatcher government 
believed the monopoly of unions was detrimental to the functioning of 
markets and that the state should actively design policies to dismantle 
them.10 Phillips looks at laws and policies such as the Employment Act of 
1980, which restricted picketing and eroded workplace rights. Furthermore, 
in subsequent laws of 1982 and 1988 the Thatcher governments targeted 
the closed shop, which – following Hayek – Thatcherites saw as ‘a coercive 
attempt by unions to impose costs on workers, employers and the public 
more broadly’. The state bolstered the sovereignty of the employer. It used 
its power during the miners’ strike of 1984–5 to police strikers, to prevent 
them from blockading power stations and collieries, and to provide 
financial incentives to strike-breakers. These were actions that were not 
against neoliberal rationality but rather closely adhered to it. As Jackson 
suggests, actually existing neoliberalism never mapped perfectly onto 
ideology, but from the late 1970s neoliberal ideas profoundly shaped the 
‘conceptual space in which [political] decision-making takes place’. 
Reconstructing how some ideas were transformed into policies at the 
particular moment of deindustrialisation provides a fruitful ground for 
understanding the political histories of neoliberalism in Britain.
And it was not only the narrowing of industrial democracy. 
Neoliberal rationality also remade the British welfare state. As Peter 
Sloman’s chapter shows, British policymakers used neoliberal ideas to 
financialise and limit the reach of welfare services through transfer 
payments. Sloman traces how Milton Friedman’s idea of Negative Income 
Tax (NIT) came to shape British welfare policies in the last third of the 
twentieth century. For Friedman, NIT was a monetary alternative to the 
service-based welfare system. NIT provided a cash transfer that allowed 
citizens to choose how to spend their benefits and, at the same time, 
incentivised people to not be dependent on them. Based on Friedman’s 
idea of NIT among others, from 1979 the British government developed 
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a system of means-tested benefits and tax credits for low- and middle-
income households that would alleviate ‘the inequality generated by a 
financialised and service-based liberal market economy’. As British 
industrial output declined and unemployment numbers rose,11 cash 
transfers helped legitimise free-market reforms. For example, cash 
transfers for housing provided a form of welfare while at the same time 
they legitimised the introduction of new policies such as the Poll Tax, 
which exacerbated inequalities. These tax-based transfer payments also 
became the basis for New Labour’s welfare policies and, as Sloman 
suggests, serve as the origins of the contemporary Universal Credit 
system. Tackling the problem of poverty through cash transfers ‘played an 
important role in reconciling Labour politicians (and voters) to market 
liberalism’. Rather than a complete assault on welfare, as Sloman’s 
chapter for example shows, neoliberalism in Britain devised its own 
alternative to welfare through what the economist John Kay called 
‘redistributive market liberalism’.12
In fact, while neoliberalism is often thought to be antithetical to 
welfare, one of the major contributions of historians in this volume has 
been to show that neoliberal thinkers and reformers often sought to revise 
rather than abolish welfare altogether. Many of the chapters in this 
volume move away from using ‘Thatcherism’ as an exclusive frame to 
study the origins of British neoliberalism; instead, they trace the 
neoliberal project back to as early as the 1940s and still see it developing 
in the 1990s and 2000s. In this view, neoliberalism was a project that had 
its roots in earlier decades of social democracy and stretched well beyond 
Thatcher’s government to include Third Way politics. As Guy Ortolano 
suggests, ‘the ascendance of neoliberalism resulted not only from the 
exertions of its champions, but also from the begrudging acquiescence of 
its critics’. Neoliberalism was a much more contingent phenomenon than 
we might think. Policies often associated with neoliberalism, such as the 
privatisation of housing, were not exclusively a Thatcherite story. They 
had roots both in liberal programmes in the early twentieth century as 
well as in the social democratic project of the post-war period. It is how 
these policies were interpreted and elaborated during the 1980s and 
1990s that offers us a better understanding of British neoliberalism, or, to 
borrow from the American historian Amy Offner, how the mixed economy 
of welfare was sorted between the private and public.13 In Ortolano’s 
chapter, neoliberal policies had a very localised position in the New 
Towns such as Milton Keynes, where the notion of a property-owning 
democracy moved from a social democratic programme of the mixed 
economy to a neoliberal project that would create rafts of self-reliant 
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citizens as homeowners with different stakes in the economy, shifting 
towards more Thatcherite views on welfare, work and the state.14
Aled Davies’s chapter also focuses on Britain’s social democracy, 
tracing how neoliberalism’s origins intersected with an earlier turn 
towards financialisation.15 Focusing on the story of the mortgage market, 
Davies shows that the political economy of home ownership began not 
with the Thatcherite ‘Right to Buy’ but with the financialisation of the 
British economy, a process which he dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. 
It was the re-globalisation of finance through the City of London in these 
decades, and the substantial demand for mortgage finance that followed, 
he argues, which created the infrastructure for the neoliberalisation of 
Britain. The push for home ownership was not only a major example of 
privatisation, but a development that reorganised the British economy 
around credit and finance. The case provides an interesting comparison 
with the history of the mortgage market in the US and pre-dates it. The 
so-called mortgage-led accumulation regime that was partially 
responsible for the 2008 crash had its origins not only in the ideological 
Thatcherite programme to liberalise the British economy but also in the 
crisis of the industrial economy.16 Ortolano and Davies focus on the earlier, 
social democratic origins of home ownership, but the history they tell us 
provides us with some crucial insights into the deeper roots of what some 
scholars have recently termed ‘the asset economy’ of the 1990s; that is, the 
story of how property accumulation came to replace waged employment as 
a generator of capital, wealth and generational inequality in Britain.17
If Ortolano’s and Davies’s chapters show how some of the origins of 
neoliberalism can be located in Britain’s social democracy, then other 
chapters follow it all the way to the ‘post-Thatcherite landscape’, as the 
editors call the period post-1990 in the introduction to the volume. Many 
of the chapters analyse the transformations of British neoliberalism beyond 
the Thatcher and the Major governments. They interrogate how neoliberal 
rationality morphed with the Blair government and came to inform New 
Labour politics. In her chapter on childcare policies, for example, Helen 
McCarthy shows that despite Blair’s commitment to break from Major’s 
government, in the case of childcare policy the Blair governments 
nevertheless relied on ‘traditional forms of family-based care’. The state 
only supplemented what Blair saw as primarily family (and therefore 
women’s) responsibility. Similarly, according to Sloman, New Labour did 
not substantially transform Conservative legislation on benefits and still 
used the tax system to tackle the problem of poverty through the Working 
Families Tax Credit. Rieger also demonstrates that Blair’s government 
kept much of the Conservatives’ employment policy and its disciplinary 
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strategy, the Jobseeker’s Allowance, albeit emphasising ‘the programme’s 
supportive rather than punitive intentions’. As Mark Wickham-Jones 
emphasises in his chapter, there is a long continuity in Labour’s acceptance 
of markets and capitalism, going right back to the early years of the 
twentieth century; nevertheless, there are substantive ways in which 
Third Way politics was shaped by Thatcherite reforms and influenced by 
neoliberal rationalities. This points to the importance, then, of recognising 
the multiple lives that neoliberalism had in Britain after the 1970s.
*
While the majority of the contributions in this volume focus on how 
neoliberal rationality has shaped economic and welfare policies, the 
remaining chapters consider how it has come to transform the social. 
These chapters tend to reject the term neoliberalism or qualify its utility 
as a category with which to understand late twentieth- and early twenty-
first-century Britain, but they nonetheless offer rich insights into what a 
social history of neoliberalism in Britain might look like, focusing on two 
crucial yet understudied categories of the British economy and especially 
of neoliberalism: gender and race.
Gender has only recently been taken on by historians of neoliberalism 
as a category of analysis. Historians have argued that Anglo-American 
neoliberalism often fused social conservatism and traditional morality 
with market liberalism.18 Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, for example, has 
revealed that neoliberal welfare policies placed family responsibility at 
the heart of their reforms of the national insurance system. In her chapter 
on feminism, family and work, however, McCarthy disagrees with this 
analysis and argues that family responsibility was not particularly unique 
to the last decades of the twentieth century. She suggests that an emphasis 
on family responsibility has characterised British social policy throughout 
the twentieth century. Both liberal feminism in the interwar period as 
well as the post-war welfare state, she shows, saw childcare as a maternal 
responsibility, framing women’s real work as childrearing. When in the 
1940s and 1950s welfare experts and policymakers began to perceive 
(white, middle-class) women as wage-earners, they nonetheless kept this 
maternalist framework in social provisions. The 1970s and 1980s, 
McCarthy argues, did not depart from the previous period. ‘[S]tate-
endowed mothers and the eternal dependants of men left a complex and 
contested legacy for policymaking and for women’s own subjectivities in 
the 1980s and beyond.’ The term neoliberalism, McCarthy concludes, 
does not capture the continuities of this history.
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McCarthy’s analysis illuminates the important continuity between 
liberal and neoliberal rhetoric in Britain, which she terms the discourse 
of ‘responsibilisation’. She leaves out, however, some central global 
transformations in the political economy of the 1970s which shaped this 
history. These transformations played an important role in the critique of 
neoliberal feminism and the place of the family in neoliberal policymaking 
in Britain in the 1980s. While the working mother was in no way new to 
the 1970s,19 by the end of the decade rates of maternal employment rose 
sharply, increasing demand for day care. This so-called feminisation of the 
workforce was a product of both changes in the divorce rate and an increase 
in single-parent households, and the growth of the service economy in 
Britain, due to structural transformations such as deindustrialisation. The 
transition was supported by British governments up through the 1990s, 
which helped to produce a supply of part-time female workers who had 
to take lower-skilled, lower-paid and less secure jobs, as they had few easy 
childcare options available to them. It was this shift that generated a new 
debate within feminist circles about the place of work – productive, 
reproductive and later even emotional labour – in women’s lives.20 The 
feminist so-called discovery of work, in other words, was at least partially 
the result of the global crisis of labour and the move to the service 
economy in Britain and beyond.
The feminist discovery of work created new gender norms and new 
demand for childcare provisions from both the Conservative and later 
New Labour governments. How these governments responded to and 
interpreted these demands was what made their policies neoliberal. In 
the case of childcare, as Jackson has shown elsewhere, neoliberals argued 
against a universal system that would support working mothers because 
they perceived state-sponsored childcare as an ‘intrusion into family 
life’.21 They saw public expenditure on childcare as encouraging mothers 
to work. The state should take a neutral stance, they argued, between 
mothers who choose to go out to work and those who wish to spend more 
time with their children. By the 1990s, Major’s government adopted a 
voucher system that offered financial support to parents who wished to 
use the private childcare sector. The voucher system represented the 
neoliberal ideal of ‘preserving a market for childcare services through 
subsidising demand rather than instituting a new universal public 
service’.22 These policies designated the family as responsible for 
childcare, with the option of using the private market to support the 
white, middle-class working mother. In doing so, British governments not 
only helped generate a private childcare market but also inadvertently 
encouraged the growth of a precarious, part-time, female labour force 
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– often comprising women from ethnic minorities and Commonwealth 
immigrants – who could not afford private and expensive childcare.
The attention to women’s history in the story of British neoliberalism 
is also at the heart of Sarah Mass’s chapter on the culture of entrepreneurship. 
According to Mass, women, and particularly housewives, were central to 
the ascendency of ‘enterprise culture’ in economic life in Britain. Looking 
at entrepreneurs such as market organiser-turned-civic activist Wendy 
Hobday, Mass shows that the critique of state intervention in economic 
life had its origins in the post-war debates about the proliferation of 
mobile trading in New Towns such as Harlow and Sunday open-air market 
trading rather than the rise of individualism, which she associates with 
neoliberal culture.23 Mass’s chapter offers an interesting read alongside 
recent works by historians of neoliberalism such as Angus Burgin that 
date the reinvention of entrepreneurship in American social thought to 
the post-war decades. While the figure of the entrepreneur in economic 
thought was not new to this period, Burgin shows, from the 1950s 
Americans began to conceive entrepreneurship as broadly accessible, 
meaning that ‘anyone, whether working within a large organization or as 
a sole proprietor, could display and should try to cultivate entrepreneurial 
role behavior’.24 Both Mass and Burgin explore the popularity of enterprise 
culture beyond big industry in the post-war period, but they attribute 
it to different factors. For Burgin, entrepreneurship in the US was a 
product of a larger political economy rooted within automation and 
deindustrialisation; Mass looks at the urban history of consumerism in 
Britain, arguing that in Britain, enterprise culture developed in response 
to a rise in demand for consumer goods and flexible retailing.
Mass’s chapter provides historians of neoliberalism with a fruitful 
case study to consider the emergence of what economists in the 1970s 
began to call ‘the informal economy’, although she herself does not use 
the term. The term emerged within an international and post-imperial 
context, when development economists sought new ways to explain the 
crisis of unemployment and the global supply of labour, especially in post-
colonial economies such as that of Kenya.25 Its emergence marked the 
expansion of not only what counted but also who counted as a legitimate 
economic actor. The shift towards the informal economy suddenly 
accounted for economic activities beyond the space of the factory and the 
male industrial worker. It allowed economists to factor in what had 
previously been cast as ‘disguised unemployment’ and include in their 
analyses the perennial forms of work done by women in agriculture and 
handicraft work within the home.26 In the global South that transition 
marked the emergence of a new approach to Women in Development 
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(and later also the Gender and Development agenda), but it also came to 
influence economic and policy debates about entrepreneurship in Britain. 
Much of the neoliberal discourse about entrepreneurship in Britain was 
rooted within the story of the rise of a flexible job market, and it was 
dependent on economic formulations which originated in post-imperial 
economies rather than exclusively within a domestic story about demand. 
Here, as in the story about the feminisation of the workforce, the post-
imperial formation of the supply side was integral to the culture of 
entrepreneurship, structures of self-employment and the pseudo-informal 
economy in Britain and cannot be understood separately from it.
Thatcher’s Enterprise Allowance Scheme, mentioned in both 
Rieger’s and Sloman’s chapters, is one good example of the flexible job 
market and how it reshaped the history of work in Britain. The Scheme 
was first tested in post-industrial northern communities in order to solve 
the problem of unemployment in the region without offering protected 
jobs or government resources. Entrepreneurship was seen not as some 
abstract ethos or new subjectivity but rather as a concrete way to generate 
self-employment. The neoliberal deployment of the entrepreneurial 
discourse and its emphasis on economic ‘independence’ was used to shift 
the burden of employment to citizens instead of investing in the industrial 
sector. Thus, the first generation of neoliberal policymakers in the 1980s 
encouraged the development and proliferation of more informal and 
flexible economies in Britain through entrepreneurship. Analysis of 
deindustrialisation has focused on changes in the demand for industrial 
labour. Yet we cannot think of demand in isolation from the story of 
supply and how the Thatcherite governments responded to changes in 
demand for labour and attempted to shape its supply.27 The emergence of 
the informal economy as a focus of economic management was central to 
enterprise culture of the 1980s and the Thatcher governments’ embrace 
of enterprise.
Enterprise culture is also the subject of Camilla Schofield, Florence 
Sutcliffe-Braithwaite and Rob Waters’s analysis. Their chapter grapples 
with the relationship between race relations and neoliberalism. It seeks 
to show how enterprise culture was embraced by the Black community in 
Britain rather than imposed on it by the Thatcher and New Labour 
governments. Schofield, Sutcliffe-Braithwaite and Waters explore how in 
the 1970s an enterprise culture grew alongside a more radical, anti-
capitalist tradition, out of ‘the meritocratic assumptions deeply rooted in 
the post-war social democratic state, and given form in the Race Relations 
legislation of the 1960s and 1970s’. According to them, Black enterprise 
culture owed much to social democracy in Britain rather than simply to 
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neoliberal policies. Schofield, Sutcliffe-Braithwaite and Waters follow the 
stories of entrepreneurs such as Len Dyke and Dudley Dryden and suggest 
that they built their multi-million-pound business enterprise alongside, 
and as part of, an investment in an anti-racist politics of integration rooted 
in the aftermath of the Notting Hill white riots in 1958. In this narrative, 
entrepreneurship was an investment in the community and for the 
community. For some members of the Black British community, 
entrepreneurship was a path to racial equality, a way to own ‘a stake in the 
British economy’.28 It is for this reason that Schofield, Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 
and Waters conclude that ‘neoliberalism is not a sufficient category to 
explain New Labour’s policies on race and racism, the transformation of 
anti-racist activism in the 1980s or Black enterprise culture in the 1970s’. 
The turn to entrepreneurship by individuals in the Black British 
community was in part the product of the politics of assimilation and 
integration developed from within the Black British community.
This is a rich account and the sole chapter in this volume to consider 
the important place of race in the history of British neoliberalism. It 
urges historians of neoliberalism to take the voices of the Black British 
community seriously and consider what enterprise culture offered its 
members, rather than to see enterprise culture as something that was 
imposed on it. Yet we still do not know why and how race relations 
became connected to New Labour’s economic agenda or what the 
relationship was between race, multiculturalism and neoliberal rationality 
in the 1990s. Was there an inherent connection between neoliberal 
rationality and race relations in New Labour’s Britain? And more broadly, 
was there a distinctive form of racial capitalism that developed in Britain 
which was characteristic of neoliberal rationality?
One way to answer these questions is by looking at the history of 
labour rather than entrepreneurship. In a recent article, for example, 
James Vernon has examined the relationship between race and 
neoliberalism by looking at their entangled history at Heathrow Airport 
after 1965 with the setting up of the state-financed British Airports 
Authority (BAA) to operate it. As Vernon argues, Heathrow was a 
microcosm for the post-imperial and racialised social formation of 
neoliberal rationality in Britain through immigration and deregulated 
labour regimes. Heathrow became ‘Britain’s de facto border’, where an 
increasingly restrictive and racialised immigration regime developed 
alongside the privatisation of border control, privatisation which was 
often supported by government concessions and funds to expand the 
airport. Government contracted the management and regulation of 
Britain’s border to the privately owned Securicor. ‘Aside from detainees’, 
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Vernon reveals, ‘it was Securicor’s non-unionized employees who paid the 
price for detention on the cheap: they received little training and were 
paid so poorly that they often had to work up to sixty hours a week to 
make a living’. In fact, many Heathrow workers – from outsourced 
cleaning and catering companies – were themselves often Commonwealth 
citizens and primarily women of colour ‘who were on the front lines of 
economic liberalization and outsourced jobs that were poorly paid and 
precarious’. The racialised forms of neoliberal capitalism at Heathrow, 
Vernon shows, were created at a particular, post-imperial conjuncture 
and were shaped by the political economy of decolonisation and its 
aftermath; they cannot be understood outside this context.29 As I have 
argued in the cases of the informal economy and the feminisation of the 
economy, the production of labour supply in the case of Heathrow 
similarly cannot be seen as an exclusively domestic story as it was shaped 
by post-imperial transformations in the global economy. What I am 
trying to suggest here is that we should consider decolonisation as an 
economic and not only political process (rather than a singular event) that 
pushed for deindustrialisation and shaped labour and migratory regimes 
in Britain as a post-colonial metropole, a story that is absent in this 
volume.
But there are other ways in which we might consider the entangled 
relationship between post-imperial legacies of race relations, the supply-
side history of the British economy and neoliberal rationality, such as 
through the history of financialisation. My own research traces the 
intersection between financialisation and race relations as part of a 
broader story of microfinance in Britain. Microfinance was imported to 
Britain in the 1990s from the global South by New Labour, via the US, 
through non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam. It was a 
technique used and supported by British humanitarians in South Asia and 
later Latin America and Africa in the 1980s, as a response to the problem 
of unemployment and deindustrialisation, in order to generate self-
employment in the global South. Its origins lay in post-colonial community 
development and the cooperative schemes most associated with (though 
not exclusive to) the Bangladeshi activist Muhammad Yunus and his 
Grameen Bank. Yunus suggested organising borrowers in small solidarity 
groups that would receive financial education from an aid worker and 
would work as a form of emotional guarantor. The idea was to teach the 
habitus of being a financial and indebted subject who is able to become 
creditworthy while still taking financial risks.
Grameen laid the groundwork for a financialised model of aid that 
fit closely with neoliberal theories about entrepreneurship, finance and 
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human capital that dominated in the 1990s. Its financialised model of aid 
was embraced by Third Way neoliberals, who saw in it an emancipatory 
project to shift the burden of poverty to the poor themselves, and 
especially to ethnic minorities. Just as microfinance became a panacea 
for solving unemployment among the global poor, so, its enthusiasts 
argued, it could be used as a remedy for those ethnic minorities 
excluded from the labour market in the global North. Instead of increasing 
welfare dependency, its advocates argued that microfinance held the 
potential for generating self-employment. With microfinance the poor 
took responsibility for their own material conditions by becoming 
entrepreneurs. Microfinance was designed to connect ethnic minorities 
with commercial banking providers, which had traditionally excluded 
them, and to help build credit history. It also legitimised economic 
activities in the informal economy, which has often been occupied by 
ethnic minorities. ‘In the United Kingdom’, according to the activist and 
microfinance enthusiast Ruth Pearson,
[t]he small ‘corner shop’ culture tends to be confined to the margins 
of the economy, particularly in localities where such activities have 
been the preserve of ethnic minorities. Self-employment and 
microenterprise has [sic] often been seen as ‘cheating’ . . . This is 
compounded by the hostility towards new immigration from the 
Commonwealth.30
Incorporating microfinance into welfare programmes was seen as a path 
out of financial exclusion as well as an opportunity to combat racial 
prejudice.
Microfinance, in fact, became part of a broader focus on financial 
and social inclusion, and it was seen as a path to solving the problem of 
race relations in Britain. Social scientists had already begun to explore the 
place of ethnic minorities in the British economy in the early 1980s; in the 
1990s they began to focus on the difficulties encountered by ethnic 
minorities in operating their own businesses. ‘[T]he use of credit by 
people from minority ethnic groups was more limited than was justified 
by their financial circumstances’, claimed one report by the think tank the 
Policy Studies Institute. ‘Cultural differences and the credit industry’s lack 
of understanding of the needs of ethnic minority communities were also 
felt to limit access. There were also allegations of racism in the high street 
credit industry.’31 The problem of limited credit and the financial exclusion 
of ethnic minorities became the heart of the new political discourse of the 
New Labour government in 1997 through the new Social Exclusion Unit. 
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In New Labour’s view, the problem of race and poverty in Britain was one 
of access to financial resources and services. Once inclusion was achieved, 
ethnic minorities would not only be lifted out of poverty but would also 
be able to integrate into the social body.
And yet New Labour’s emphasis on ending financial exclusion 
through schemes such as microfinance overrode local forms of lending 
and borrowing organised by the Caribbean and Asian communities. The 
British Caribbean community, for example, had its own lending structures 
aimed at offering support to new immigrants and young families who 
had struggled to get credit from high street banks since the 1950s 
and 1960s. These ‘pardner schemes’, as they were called, resembled 
cooperatives. They were essentially rotating saving and credit associations 
that collected regular deposits of a fixed amount from members with a 
main organiser, called a ‘banker’, depositing these into a central fund. The 
banker distributed the total sum to members in a prearranged order. 
Other forms of community-based banking included credit unions, such 
as the Camberwell Credit Union, founded by a small Afro-Caribbean 
church group in the late 1960s and registered in 1972 under the Friendly 
Society Act.32 The credit union offered a variety of financial services to the 
Afro-Caribbean community in the area – who had been essentially 
redlined from commercial banking – from life insurance to credit. These 
organisations helped many community members purchase consumer 
goods or pay for housing but were not necessarily designed to support or 
encourage entrepreneurial activities.
When New Labour began to invest in financial inclusion, it often did 
not build on these schemes but rather aimed to replace them with a mixed 
economy of public and voluntary aid focused on access to commercial 
banking. Aid schemes such as microfinance were intended to educate 
members of the Afro-Caribbean community to take financial risks and, in 
particular, to invest in starting their own businesses. Its language of 
financial empowerment was often paternalistic in nature, perhaps 
because it was imported from an aid discourse that belonged to 
international developments. It was part of a post-imperial legacy of 
development aid that was then imported back as a somewhat racialised 
type of welfare service offered in particular to ethnic minorities. Instead 
of the locally organised schemes that developed more organically to meet 
specific financial needs, microfinance was designed with a more market-
driven purpose. Its model aimed to encourage individuals to take financial 
risks and open their own businesses. For its advocates, microfinance 
schemes offered the broad financial education and literacy that were 
‘essential for full social participation and survival’ and increased the 
Brit iSh nEoLiBErALiSm AnD itS SuBJECtS 349
‘employability and employment readiness’ of participants.33 Microfinance 
was a path to the labour market because it offered skills that ‘have 
transferability into the mainstream labour market and other aspects of 
modern life’.34
Microfinance fitted into a broader transformation in neoliberal 
rationality in the 1990s. Third Way politicians broke with Keynesianism 
and instead made it their mission to encourage and to train citizens to 
increase their ‘creditworthiness’ and ‘employability’ without offering 
them protected jobs or government resources. Microfinance, in fact, was 
a way to invest in human capital through financial mechanisms. It 
encouraged citizens to embrace the condition not of entrepreneurs 
necessarily but of investees, responsible for increasing their own 
employability and solvency.35 The ‘creditworthiness’ of citizens became a 
way to estimate the value of human capital, based on crude speculations 
on their potential ability to generate income or take financial risks 
through credit. Microfinance offers historians of British neoliberalism one 
way to consider the social formations and entangled relationship between 
race relations, post-imperial finance and neoliberal rationality – or what 
I call the ‘financialization of race relations’ – one that is attuned to the 
intersection between labour, entrepreneurship and finance and the forms 
of community organising they came to substitute. It demonstrates both 
the continuities as well as the ruptures caused by decolonisation as an 
economic process that shaped racialised notions of economic subjects 
for British policymakers not only in the 1980s but also in the 1990s 
and 2000s.
*
Who are the subjects of the British economy and, in particular, of its 
neoliberal rationality? The burgeoning literature on British neoliberalism 
and especially its economic, political and intellectual histories – much of 
it represented in this volume – has demonstrated that neoliberal 
rationality has come to shape the British state, industrial relations, its 
urban landscape and welfare services. In this afterword I have also 
suggested that neoliberal rationality has had a profound effect on British 
society and particularly its gendered and racial formations between the 
1960s and the 1990s. The burgeoning literature on neoliberalism has 
emphasised the role of politicians, intellectuals and economists in shaping 
its history, but there were also other grassroots, social forms of neoliberal 
expression that were similarly important. The categories of gender and 
race were central to the distinctive formations and features of neoliberal 
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rationality in Britain and, to my mind, offer some of the most fruitful and 
rewarding grounds for future work on the particular configurations of 
neoliberalism in Britain. They reveal the relationships between flexible 
labour, entrepreneurship and financialisation, as well as post-imperial 
legacies, in shaping the British economy in the late twentieth century. 
Neoliberal rationality was never one consistent or totalising body of ideas. 
Rather, it developed and morphed in response to myriad changes in 
Britain’s post-imperial make-up as well as shifts in global political 
economy – particularly deindustrialisation and financialisation – and 
generated new social relationships and a new understanding of British 
feminism, the informal economy, immigration control and race relations. 
We would do well to expand our understanding of who are the subjects of 
British neoliberalism.
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The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are commonly characterised as an age of 
‘neoliberalism’ in which individualism, competition, free markets and privatisation came to 
dominate Britain’s politics, economy and society. This historical framing has proven highly 
controversial, within both academia and contemporary political and public debate.
Standard accounts of neoliberalism generally focus on the influence of political ideas in 
reshaping British politics; according to this narrative, neoliberalism was a right-wing ideology, 
peddled by political economists, think-tanks and politicians from the 1930s onwards, which 
finally triumphed in the 1970s and 1980s. The Neoliberal Age? suggests this narrative is too 
simplistic.
Where the standard story sees neoliberalism as right-wing, this book points to some left-wing 
origins, too; where the standard story emphasises the agency of think-tanks and politicians, 
this book shows that other actors from the business world were also highly significant. Where 
the standard story can suggest that neoliberalism transformed subjectivities and social lives, 
this book illuminates other forces which helped make Britain more individualistic in the late 
twentieth century.
The analysis thus takes neoliberalism seriously but also shows that it cannot be the only 
explanatory framework for understanding contemporary Britain. The book showcases cutting-
edge research, making it useful to researchers and students, as well as to those interested in 
understanding the forces that have shaped our recent past.
Aled Davies is Career Development Fellow in Modern History at Jesus College, Oxford 
University.
Ben Jackson is Associate Professor of Modern History at Oxford University.
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